14 Nov 12: Israel Launches Operations in Gaza

[Old Sweat]

In the meantime Hamas continues to score propaganda and public opinion points every time the Israelis fire into Gaza. Forget about all the outgoing rockets; the media largely has. There may be intense diplomatic pressure on both sides to agree to a cease fire, but it only will be a matter of time before it is broken again.

 

[Edward Campbell]

In the meantime Hamas continues to score propaganda and public opinion points every time the Israelis fire into Gaza. Forget about all the outgoing rockets; the media largely has. There may be intense diplomatic pressure on both sides to agree to a cease fire, but it only will be a matter of time before it is broken again.

Right: the Twitterverse is very active with reports like this, from a BBC correspondent: "#Israel has bombed the homes of at least 7 Hamas officials today. Several civilians have also been killed, many of them children." It's all true but it is also slanted. Was it wrong, I wonder, that we killed children in Italy in 1943/44 and NWE in 1944/45? Or is it only "wrong" when Israelis (Jews) kill Palestinians (gentiles)?

 

[Haletown]

Israel can keep up the air campaign for a long time, Hamas will run out of missiles, or at least long range ones and the people in Gaza will see their civic infrastructure crumble.

I doubt Israel will do any sustained ground campaign. Maybe some small armour heavy incursions into specific areas where there is a military target, but they will likely stay far away from civil areas.  Bombs are much better for the targets Hamas embeds among their people.

Keep bombing the tunnels and border areas, keep targeting the Hamas leadership, keep bombing launching sites and magazines.  Egypt won't likely do anything other than talk - that nation is almost broke and is running out of food and the money to import more if it.  The rest of the Arab world couldn't care less about Palestinians because they are so supported and tied to the Iranians. Arabs hate Persians more than they hate Jews and a bunch of suffering Palestinians takes the focus off the real Arab-on-Arab genocide in Syria, civil unrest in Bahrain and Mass protests against the King in Jordan.

Such a lovely place the the Middle East.  No wonder there has never been extended peace in the region.  In the long game, Israel is very happy to have the unrest in the Arab world festering and occasionally boiling over.  As long as they are hating and killing each other, Israel has a more peaceful time. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

Stratfor's George Friedman weighs in in this article on potential negotiations which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Stratfor website:

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/pause-negotiations-israeli-hamas-conflict

A Pause for Negotiations in the Israeli-Hamas Conflict

By George Friedman

November 18, 2012

The Israeli-Hamas conflict has entered into a negotiation phase. Both sides want talks. Hamas wants them because any outcome that prevents an Israeli ground assault gives it the opportunity to retain some of its arsenal of Fajr-5 rockets; the Israelis want them because the cost of an invasion could be high, and they recall the political fallout of Operation Cast Lead in 2008, which alienated many European and other governments.

No matter how much either side might want to avoid ground warfare, negotiations are unlikely to forestall an Israeli assault because Hamas' and Israel's goals leave little middle ground.

One of Hamas' main goals in this current round of fighting is to retain enough Fajr-5 rockets to allow it to threaten the Israeli heartland, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor. If they succeed, Hamas will have gained a significant lever in its relations with the Israelis. The Israeli goal is to deny Hamas these rockets. The problem for the Israelis is that this requires a ground assault in order to have any chance of success. The Israelis may think they know where the rockets are, but they cannot be certain. Airstrikes can target known facilities, at least those where rockets are not stored in hardened underground bunkers. But only by going in on the ground with substantial force will the Israelis have the opportunity to search for and destroy the rockets.

Finding middle ground will be difficult. The retention of the Fajr-5 both dramatically improves Hamas' strategic position and gives Hamas the chance to further weaken the Palestinian National Authority. Hamas cannot agree to any deal that takes the rockets away -- or that does not at least leave open the possibility that it could have them. Meanwhile, Israel simply cannot live with the Fajr-5 in the hands of Hamas.

Lack of International Involvement

It is interesting to note the remarkable indifference of most countries that normally rush to mediate such disputes, the United States chief among them. Washington has essentially endorsed the Israeli position so strongly that it has no option to mediate. The Turks, who had been involved with the Gaza issue during the flotilla incident of May 2010, have taken no steps beyond rhetoric in spite of relations with both Hamas and Israel. The Saudis have also avoided getting involved.

The Egyptians have been the most active in trying to secure a cease fire: Beyond sending their prime minister into Gaza on Nov. 16, as well as their intelligence chief and a group of security officials, Cairo then hosted a delegation of senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad members to further this goal. But while the Egyptians have a great interest in preventing an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza and are crucial to the Israeli imperative to prevent weapons smuggling via Gaza, there is little more they can do at present to mediate between the two sides.

If no one seems to want to serve as mediator, it is because there is such little room for negotiation. It is not ideology but strategy that locks each side into place. Hamas has come this far and does not want to give up what it has maneuvered for. Israel cannot allow Hamas a weapon that threatens the Israeli heartland. This situation is too serious for the parties to reach an agreement that ends the hostilities for now but in reality simply pushes back the issues to be addressed later. No one is eager to mediate a failure. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has said he will go to Gaza in the coming week, but he will not be in a position to find middle ground.

Israel will not budge on this. Hamas could be compelled to relent under threat from its core financial supporters in the Arabian Peninsula, but these states, such as Qatar, are all far more concerned with the threat posed by Iran. The fact that these rockets likely originated with Iran ought to give them incentive to lean on Hamas.

Dubious Prospects for Negotiations

It is important to bear in mind that the war is already under way. Israeli airstrikes are intense and continuous. Hamas is firing rockets at Israel. What has not yet happened is a direct ground attack on Gaza by the Israelis, although they have been mobilizing forces and should now be in a position to attack if they so choose. But the Israelis would much rather not attack. They fear the consequences -- measured both in human casualties and in political fallout -- that would certainly follow.

Thus, both sides want a negotiated end on terms that would leave the other side in an impossible position. While Hamas might be able to live with the status quo, Israel cannot. A negotiated end is therefore unlikely. Still, both sides are signaling their willingness to talk, and however forlorn the possibilities, there is a chance that something could be arranged.

We remain of the opinion that this current pause will be followed by a ground assault. Only by expanding the discussion beyond the Fajr-5 to a broader settlement of Hamas-Israeli issues could these negotiations succeed, but that would require Hamas recognizing Israel's right to exist and Israel accepting the equivalent of a Palestinian state run by Hamas in Gaza -- one that might spread its power to the West Bank. The more expansive the terms of these negotiations get, the more dubious their prospects for success -- and these negotiations start off fairly dubious as it is.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here are two article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Affairs; the first deals with the nature of the operation from Israel's point of view and it concludes with a recommendation that the US press Egypt's President Morsi to borker a deal; the second with a possible outline of that brokered peace:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138432/daniel-byman/israels-gamble-in-gaza?page=show

Israel's Gamble in Gaza
The Perils of Operation Pillar of Defense

Daniel Byman

November 15, 2012

Israel's latest campaign in Gaza, which began on Wednesday with the killing of Hamas' military commander, Ahmed Jabari, and air strikes on the group's long-range rocket launchers, is a gamble -- and one that Israel might lose. Its goal is to compel Hamas to stop shooting rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip and to crack down on other groups who are also doing so. Hamas, however, will find it hard to bend to Israeli pressure. In turn, it will be up to outside states, particularly Egypt, to foster a deal to end the fighting.

After Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2008-2009 that resulted in over 1,000 Palestinian deaths and tremendous destruction, relations between Hamas and Israel wavered uneasily between hostility and tacit cooperation. True, Hamas' rhetoric toward Israel remained hostile, but the number of rockets that went over the border plunged and most of them were launched not by Hamas, but by more radical groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas feared that launching large numbers of rockets would prompt Israel to again retaliate harshly and devastate Gaza, thus jeopardizing Hamas' political position there. At times, the group even tried to restrain its uncomfortable bedfellows. Indeed, although Hamas and Israel would both deny it, their interests were often aligned. As Aluf Benn, one of Israel's leading analysts, put it after Jabari's death, "Ahmed Jabari was a subcontractor, in charge of maintaining Israel's security in Gaza."

But Jabari's first allegiance, of course, was to Hamas. And, over time, Hamas became increasingly accepting of attacks on Israel. As the memory of Cast Lead faded, the number of attacks coming from Gaza began to rise once more. Israel claims that over 200 rockets struck the country in 2010. The number climbed to over 600 in 2011. And 2012 has seen even more -- over 800 before the current operation began. Most of these attacks came from other Palestinian groups, but more recently Hamas seemed to take a more active role in the violence, openly tolerating other groups' gambits and carrying out some strikes itself.

By this week, those attacks had "made normal life impossible for over one million Israelis," as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained on Thursday. And so he and his government are again pounding Hamas in an attempt to restore the post-Cast Lead status quo, in which Hamas polices both itself and the rest of the strip. So far, Operation Pillar of Defense, as Israel calls it, has resulted in the deaths of 18 Palestinians (of whom roughly half were civilians). Hamas' response has killed three Israelis.

No single attack forced Israel to respond. In theory, it could have chosen not to. But the steady increase in rocket fire over the last few years had become politically intolerable for the Netanyahu government. With national elections approaching in January, his administration seemed unable to carry out perhaps government's most basic function: protecting citizens from violence. In addition, although Israel's political and security leaders might recognize the difference, ordinary Israelis simply did not care whether Hamas launched attacks itself or simply did not stop others from doing so. In other words, it was time to take out Hamas or else risk being taken out of office.

By launching this operation, Israel has resorted to its time-honored strategy of holding the government (or in Hamas' case, de facto government) that hosts militants responsible for the actions of the militants themselves. The approach has had some successes: in Jordan in 1970, Israel pressured Amman to instigate a bloody civil war against the country's Palestinian militants, eventually crushing them. But in Lebanon later in the same decade, Israel tried the same thing, with much worse results. The Lebanese government was too weak to crack down on terrorist activity in its borders and the country descended into chaos. In 2006, the same logic drove Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although the war was initially seen widely as a Hezbollah victory, Israelis now see it as a win. The Israeli military performed poorly, but Hezbollah has grudgingly kept the peace since then, fearing that rocket attacks from Lebanon would again lead to a devastating Israeli response. Indeed, the last six years have been the quietest along the Lebanon-Israel border in decades.

Israel's usual strategy might not bring about such decisive results this time. Hamas will find it hard to pull itself back from the brink and start stopping others' rocket fire. Jabari's death has infuriated Hamas' military wing, and whoever replaces him will be just as militant, if not more. Such a leader will press for revenge and warn Hamas' governing arm that his troops might well join rival groups if Hamas throws in the towel. After all, Hamas is trying to be both a resistance movement and a government. In many ways, it has succeeded as a government, establishing law and order and delivering basic services in Gaza. But Hamas must take care not to lose credibility among Palestinians for its willingness to fight -- and die -- in the struggle against Israel. So Hamas has tried to walk a fine line by allowing some attacks -- and, at times, even participating in them -- to maintain its militant street cred while shying away from an all-out assault that would push Israel to repeat Cast Lead.

Complicating the Israel-Hamas dynamic is the Arab Spring, particularly the fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the rise of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood-led government. During the Mubarak era, Egypt helped Israel contain Hamas, maintaining a blockade on goods from Gaza and a travel ban on Gazans as well as supporting Hamas' rival, Fatah. During crises, Cairo often worked with Israel to press Hamas to back off. Today, however, Hamas has an ideological affinity with, and personal ties to, to the government of Egypt's new president, Mohammad Morsi. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood wants to court the Egyptian public, which is viscerally anti-Israel and highly supportive of Hamas. Openly siding with Israel in this conflict would be political suicide for Morsi. So, not surprisingly, Egypt has recalled its ambassador from Israel and publicly criticized Israel.

Israel, too, cannot afford to alienate Egypt. Putting aside the vital 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (which still seems likely to hold), Jerusalem needs Cairo to keep whatever little pressure it can on Hamas. Although the rhetoric between the Morsi government and Hamas is far warmer than it was under Mubarak, the new government in Cairo has still not rushed to open up the Rafah border crossing with Gaza. In addition, Israel needs the Egyptian government to continue, and ideally expand, its recent crackdown on radicals in the Sinai, who have repeatedly attacked Israel. Finally, Israel needs the Egyptian government to refrain from whipping up pro-Hamas sentiment among its own people, which could quickly spread across the region and further destabilize already vulnerable countries like Jordan.

Israel also lacks any easy option to escalate if Hamas does not restrain itself soon. Although Israel has called up reservists and threatened to expand the scope of its military campaign if Hamas doesn't end the rocket attacks, Israelis do not want to reoccupy Gaza. What is more, the Obama administration would be unlikely to get behind a massive operation, since it would further complicate already tense U.S. relations with Egypt and other Arab countries. Perhaps most important, Israel's view of itself would be in danger. The western way of war stresses proportionality, which, in Gaza, means that Israel must limit its strikes--particularly on infrastructure and other targets that directly affect civilians. The logic of deterrence, by contrast, stresses disproportionate punishment: the enemy must suffer.

In the short run, the United States should press the Morsi government to broker a deal: a development that would not only end the current crisis but also indicate that Morsi can be a responsible leader who can work with Washington. In the long run, the United States, and the world, needs to make the choice between resistance and governance sharper for Hamas. There must be more and real rewards if Hamas moves toward becoming a regular government that eschews violence. Allowing more normal economic activity and more people to go to and from Gaza would show Hamas that the world will let it govern Gaza. At the same time, there must be serious and sustained punishment for any continued rocket attacks or other violence with the international community maintaining economic pressure on Hamas and accepting that Israel will hit Hamas hard to keep its deterrence credible. But Cast Lead showed that any military campaign, no matter how devastating, can only deter Israel's enemies for so long. Israel and the international community need to take some bold political risks in trying to bring Hamas into the fold -- or else start preparing for the next war.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138434/ehud-yaari/how-to-end-the-war-in-gaza?page=show

How to End the War in Gaza
What an Egypt-Brokered Cease-Fire Should Look Like

Ehud Yaari

November 17, 2012

Israel and Hamas are once again locked in a shooting war. Each day, hundreds of missiles fly toward Israeli cities and villages. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force has been systematically pounding the Gaza Strip, carrying out no less than 1000 strikes on Hamas military targets in the last several days. As indirect negotiations over a cease-fire progress at this moment, with active U.S. involvement, it is time to chart a course to end this round of hostilities.

Israel has set fairly modest goals for its campaign, dubbed Operation Pillar of Defense. It does not seek to topple the Hamas regime in Gaza, as it has sought in the past, nor does it want to bring about the total collapse of Hamas' military wing. As statements from senior Israeli officials indicate, the objective is a long-term cease-fire along the Israel-Gaza border. Hamas, for its part, has one objective: to stay on its feet. It is trying to inflict maximum damage and casualties in order to prove that Israel's military superiority alone will not force it to back down. With the right kind of a no-victors formula, sponsored by the United States and other international players, a deal can be reached to ensure a long-term calm.

Previous conflicts between Israel and Hamas, including the 2009 war, have been resolved, with Egyptian faciliation, through a simple formula: each side commits to refrain from opening fire as long as its adversary does the same. But these calm periods -- or tahdia, as they are called in Arabic -- have historically not lasted very long. Hamas has increasingly allowed other heavily armed terrorist groups in Gaza, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to launch attacks on Israel. And in the past few months, despite Egyptian warnings, Hamas has targeted Israeli soldiers and military outposts along the border, too.

This time, ending the conflict and restoring stability will require a different type of arrangement. The cease-fire agreement should involve other parties and contain additional checks on violence. It will have the best chance of lasting if it is primarily based on an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, supported by the United States and, possibly, by the European Union. It will be up to Hamas to adhere to the terms.

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood-led government has showered Hamas with statements of solidarity, and its prime minister made an unprecedented visit to Gaza on the second day of the Israeli operation. But what Cairo ultimately wants is a speedy cease-fire. Despite its support for Hamas, the new Egyptian regime is reluctant to grant the group a defense guarantee or to open the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi underscored this on Friday, saying, "We don't want a war now."

Egypt knows well that ongoing support for Hamas' shelling of Israeli civilians would jeopardize the billions of dollars in international aid that its bankrupt treasury depends on -- $450 million annually from the United States, $4.3 billion annually from the IMF, and $6.3 billion annually from the EU's development bank. This explains why, despite Cairo's venomous anti-Israeli rhetoric over the past several days, Egypt did not take any serious actions beyond recalling its newly accredited ambassador from Tel Aviv. Furthermore, the Egyptian military and intelligence services are hesitant to provoke a confrontation with Israel.

Given Egypt's adversity to conflict, Egypt and Israel should strive to reach an understanding about Gaza. In doing so, they would reaffirm the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty for the post-Arab Spring era. Such an Egyptian-Israeli understanding could include several components.
First, Egypt should broker the Israel-Hamas cease-fire at the highest political levels, rather than through behind-the-scenes talks organized by its General Intelligence Directorate. That in itself would constitute a departure from the Morsi administration's policy of putting a pause on normalization with Israel and preventing any contact with the country other than for military or intelligence cooperation. Egypt faces a choice: launching a high-level political dialogue with the Israel to obtain the cease-fire that it desires, or seeing the continuation of violence in Gaza. An Egyptian refusal to lead the political process should raise red flags in Washington.

Second, since most of the weapons in Gaza were trafficked through Egyptian territory, Cairo should agree to help prevent the reconstruction of Hamas' arsenal. For years now, Egypt has been turning a blind eye to smuggling in the Sinai Peninsula and tolerating the operation of 1200 tunnels that run underneath the Egypt-Gaza frontier. Cairo could try to shut down the tunnels and intercept arms shipments that come through the Suez Canal. Egypt, which is already domestically unstable, has every reason to prevent renewed violence by counteracting the remilitarization of Hamas and its allies.

Any agreement should also address the growing lawlessness in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, where attacks against Israel and even sometimes against Egyptian security personnel have become regular occurrences. Egypt's Operation Eagle, aimed at cracking down on insurgents there, has so far failed to dismantle the widespread terrorist infrastructure in the area. (Hamas even twice took the liberty of testing its long-range Fajr-5 missiles by firing them into the Sinai desert.) Since a number of Salafi jihadist organizations have branches in both Gaza and Sinai, for all practical purposes the peninsula is an extension of the Gaza front.

Egypt and Israel need to ensure that when the cease-fire takes hold in Gaza, terror operations do not simply pick up and move south to Sinai. Despite restrictions on Egyptian military deployments in the area, which stem from the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel and Egypt can work through the decade-old Agreed Activities Mechanism to allow Egyptian units to take up positions in the eastern Sinai. Israel has already consented to let Egypt introduce a mechanized brigade and commando battalions in the area. Israel could also approve the deployment of whatever Egyptian troops are necessary -- save tanks and antitank weapons -- to uproot the terrorist safe havens. Egypt won't just be doing Israel's dirty work; Cairo knows that these organizations might eventually target the Suez Canal as well.

A cease-fire agreement could also address the sensitive and important issue of border crossings. Egypt might get Israeli consent to open the Rafah terminal on its border with Gaza, not only for passenger traffic but also for trade. This could mean that Gaza would get its fuel and other commodities from Egypt, while Israel would continue to supply electricity. Egyptian ports could begin to handle the flow of goods in and out of Gaza, and Israel would gradually phase out the commercial activities that pass through the six terminals it now operates into Gaza. The move would signal the completion of Israel's 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, slowly handing over responsibility for the area's economic needs to the Egyptian government. Egypt, which already perceives itself as a patron of Hamas, would see this situation favorably because it would grant Cairo more influence over the group. And Hamas is already pleading for this type of arrangement, seeking to end its economic dependence on Israeli goodwill.

Given its leverage over Egypt, Washington has a role to play in bringing about such a comprehensive cease-fire -- and in keeping it in place. The Obama administration should inform Morsi that, in return for the huge financial support Egypt gets from the United States, it must start ensuring stability in the region, create a dialogue with Israel that is not restricted to security personnel, prevent Egyptian territory from becoming a safe haven for weapons smugglers, and convince Hamas militants to stop lobbing missiles into Israeli towns and villages.

Reaching such a deal in the depths of a conflict will not be easy. But if the aim is anything more than a temporary break from fighting, it's a deal worth striving for.

 

[tomahawk6]

Hamas has launched over 500 rockets into Israel.They arent going to get alot of sympathy when Israel enters Gaza. The IDF killed the commander of Hamas rocket operations.

Palestinians search for victims under the rubble of the destroyed house of a Hamas official after an Israeli air strike in Jabalya in the northern Gaza Strip November 17, 2012. (Reuters)


Israel claims killing top Hamas operative
From: AAP November 19, 2012 3:55AM

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/israel-claims-killing-top-hamas-operative/story-fn3dxix6-1226519236552

  THE Israeli army says it has killed a senior Hamas operative in Gaza who was responsible for the movement's rocket operations.

An army spokesman identified the Palestinian as Yehia Bia, who was killed in one of the northern neighbourhoods of Gaza City that experienced the brunt of Israeli attacks on Sunday.

"We can confirm a direct hit," the army spokesman said by telephone.

Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon said Bia was "the commander of the (Hamas) rocket units" whom the Israeli forces had "intercepted and killed".

The Israeli army said that 544 rockets had struck various parts of Israel since hostilities between the two sides intensified on Wednesday with the killing of the Hamas movement's military leader in Gaza.

Officials said an additional 302 rockets had been intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome missile defence system and that more fell into the Mediterranean Sea as well as on Gaza itself.

 

[Journeyman]

Hamas has launched over 500 rockets into Israel. They arent going to get alot of Israeli sympathy when Israel enters Gaza.

But as noted, the bleeding bleating hearts and anti-Israel propagandists are out in full force.

 

[Edward Campbell]

But as noted, the bleeding bleating hearts and anti-Israel propagandists are out in full force.

I don't know anything about the source but I find the argument in this piece, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Commentator, compelling:

http://www.thecommentator.com/article/2079/gaza_exposes_our_deepest_prejudices

Gaza exposes our deepest prejudices
As dozens are killed in Gaza, what does it tell us about the news media that so little is heard of the other struggles around the region?

by Media Hawk

As the fighting rages on in the Middle East, spare a moment for the civilians who are being murdered en masse.

No, I'm not talking about in Gaza.

Although any civilian deaths are to be mourned, the onus of blame for Gazan lives being lost is on Hamas, a fact lost on media commentators and producers, but illustrated by the graphic (below) quite well, along with this video.

From the article

What I mean is that we should spare a moment of thought for Syrians and Iranians.

Gaza dominates the news as the death toll this week climbs to 42 - a staggeringly low statistic considering how many hundreds of raids Israel has made. But we continue for some reason, to ignore the tens of thousands being slaughtered in Syria, and the dozens killed in Iran by their respective regimes.

So far, over 37,000 people have been slaughtered by Assad's regime. And while the international community has had some stern words for the regime, we continue to sit back and effectively ignore the tragedy. Even the media is no longer interested.

In Iran this week, there have been around 81 public executions. Barbaric punishments, including the cutting off of fingers, hangings and floggings continue to blight Iran and yet not a word can be heard from the international community.

Yet we continue to lambast Israel for its tireless efforts in defending its Jewish population in the face of terrorist onslaught.

What does that say about us in the West? I would love to believe that it is simply that many people are instinctively pro-Arab, but the silence on Iran doesn't explain that. I would love to believe it was post-colonial guilt, but I fear it goes much deeper.

Regardless of the reasons behind which we hold Israel to an impossible standard, this does not account for the blackout regarding other areas in the world.

I hope we can all agree that no ones lives should be considered more important, simply because they are the cause of international celebrity or  NGO campaigns. I look forwarding to hearing accurate and balanced reporting in future. For obvious reasons I won't hold my breath.

 

[tomahawk6]

I have zero sympathy for people who hide behind the forces of prejudice and intolerance. Hamas fired rockets into Israel and now they reap what they have sown.Its an object lesson for Hizbollah and Iran

 

[a_majoor]

From SDA; a video that shows us what it is like to live in Israel under threat of rocket attack:

http://www.smalldeadanimals.com/archives/021956.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gsm-mEy38pQ&feature=youtu.be

As for Hamas, being in biblical territory only makes it more fitting to quote Hosea 8:7:

"Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind"

 

[tomahawk6]

The only way for Israel to stop the rockets is to enter Gaza.The launchers are in civilian areas like schools and playgrounds. You dont need to take ground just mini-thunder runs. Go in and take out a target and pull out.

 

[brihard]

The only way for Israel to stop the rockets is to enter Gaza.The launchers are in civilian areas like schools and playgrounds. You dont need to take ground just mini-thunder runs. Go in and take out a target and pull out.

Why would we beleive 'entering Gaza' will 'stop the rockets'? They entered gaza in strength back in 06, and it doesn't look to me like it's stopped the rockets.

Why the hell does ANYONE still think that any scale of military intervention whatsoever can make this problem go away? That's completely out of touch with reality?

I'm not purporting to offer a viable solution- but killing people sure hasn't either.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Sometime soldier/author/farmer Gilad Sharon, son of Gen Ariel Sharon, thinks that there are only two useful courses open: totally shatter the Gazan military infrstructure or reoccupy the Gaza Strip. He makes his point in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisons of the Copyright Act from the Jerusalem Post:

http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=292466&R=R1&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

A decisive conclusion is necessary
There is no middle path here – either the Gazans and their infrastructure are made to pay the price, or we reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip.

By GILAD SHARON

11/18/2012

Anyone who thinks Hamas is going to beg for a cease-fire, that Operation Pillar of Defense will draw to a close and quiet will reign in the South because we hit targets in the Gaza Strip, needs to think again.

With the elimination of a murderous terrorist and the destruction of Hamas’s long-range missile stockpile, the operation was off to an auspicious start, but what now? This must not be allowed to end as did Operation Cast Lead: We bomb them, they fire missiles at us, and then a cease-fire, followed by “showers” – namely sporadic missile fire and isolated incidents along the fence. Life under such a rain of death is no life at all, and we cannot allow ourselves to become resigned to it.

A strong opening isn’t enough, you also have to know how to finish – and finish decisively. If it isn’t clear whether the ball crossed the goal-line or not, the goal isn’t decisive. The ball needs to hit the net, visible to all. What does a decisive victory sound like? A Tarzan-like cry that lets the entire jungle know in no uncertain terms just who won, and just who was defeated.

To accomplish this, you need to achieve what the other side can’t bear, can’t live with, and our initial bombing campaign isn’t it.

THE DESIRE to prevent harm to innocent civilians in Gaza will ultimately lead to harming the truly innocent: the residents of southern Israel. The residents of Gaza are not innocent, they elected Hamas. The Gazans aren’t hostages; they chose this freely, and must live with the consequences.

The Gaza Strip functions as a state – it has a government and conducts foreign relations, there are schools, medical facilities, there are armed forces and all the other trappings of statehood. We have no territorial conflict with “Gaza State,” and it is not under Israeli siege – it shares a border with Egypt. Despite this, it fires on our citizens without restraint.

Why do our citizens have to live with rocket fire from Gaza while we fight with our hands tied? Why are the citizens of Gaza immune? If the Syrians were to open fire on our towns, would we not attack Damascus? If the Cubans were to fire at Miami, wouldn’t Havana suffer the consequences? That’s what’s called “deterrence” – if you shoot at me, I’ll shoot at you. There is no justification for the State of Gaza being able to shoot at our towns with impunity. We need to flatten entire neighborhoods in Gaza. Flatten all of Gaza. The Americans didn’t stop with Hiroshima – the Japanese weren’t surrendering fast enough, so they hit Nagasaki, too.

There should be no electricity in Gaza, no gasoline or moving vehicles, nothing. Then they’d really call for a ceasefire.

Were this to happen, the images from Gaza might be unpleasant – but victory would be swift, and the lives of our soldiers and civilians spared.

IF THE government isn’t prepared to go all the way on this, it will mean reoccupying the entire Gaza Strip. Not a few neighborhoods in the suburbs, as with Cast Lead, but the entire Strip, like in Defensive Shield, so that rockets can no longer be fired.

There is no middle path here – either the Gazans and their infrastructure are made to pay the price, or we reoccupy the entire Gaza Strip. Otherwise there will be no decisive victory. And we’re running out of time – we must achieve victory quickly. The Netanyahu government is on a short international leash. Soon the pressure will start – and a million civilians can’t live under fire for long. This needs to end quickly – with a bang, not a whimper.

I suspect that his view is popular in Israel.

 

[Infanteer]

Sharon's approach is very Sherman-esque and makes for a valid option.

 

[tomahawk6]

The bleeding hearts wring their hands and talk about how bad Israel is. The Palestinians are great at playing the victim even after firing hundreds of rockets into Israel. Which to my mind is an act of war.  Acts of war have to be responded to in kind. I also agree with Sharon that to make the rockets stop is to takeover the Gaza strip. It would require occupying 141 square miles and controlling around 1.7m people. It should be telling that not even Egypt wanted Gaza.Maybe under the Egyptian islamist government they might take responsibility but I doubt it.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Sharon's approach is very Sherman-esque and makes for a valid option.

And I think it fits with tomahawk6's approach ~ essentially blitzkreig done properly: speed, violence and shock effect, but followed by an immediate withdrawal when the tactical objective has been accomplished.

 

[brihard]

I also agree with Sharon that to make the rockets stop is to takeover the Gaza strip. It would require occupying 141 square miles and controlling around 1.7m people. It should be telling that not even Egypt wanted Gaza.Maybe under the Egyptian islamist government they might take responsibility but I doubt it.

Do you contend that it would be possible to achieve this indefinitely without making the situation incalculably worse?

I imagine the worst of what Iraq or Afghanistan had to offer, played out on the streets of Gaza more or less full time. I believe it would make current civilian death tolls - even the Palestinian one, never mind the negligible Israeli one - pale in comparison.

A 'go in, kill/smash and withdraw' may well achieve the same success as was achieved in 2006. A tactical victory may be won. I conside rit borderline deluded to think a strategic victiry would be won, however. It would just set the clock back a few years and start the cycle again.

 

[Infanteer]

A 'go in, kill/smash and withdraw' may well achieve the same success as was achieved in 2006. A tactical victory may be won. I conside rit borderline deluded to think a strategic victiry would be won, however. It would just set the clock back a few years and start the cycle again.

Do you mean 2008?

Stating that an invasion would only "set the clock back a few years" assumes that no amount of coercion will denude the support of Gazans for Hamas.

 

[Journeyman]

It would just set the clock back a few years and start the cycle again.

As noted in one of the previously-posted articles, this is likely the best Israel can hope for -- a few more years' breathing space.

Israel certainly doesn't want to occupy Gaza, with the attendant need to govern the place. I suspect that their intent is to strike very hard, break Palestinian toys, and withdraw...with a note pinned to the door: "fire more rockets and we do it all again; you know we're capable, and aren't concerned about international angst, so smarten up."

But Hamas won't smarten up, and so after a few years' grace, we can all just change the dates on these posts.

 

[brihard]

Do you mean 2008?

Stating that an invasion would only "set the clock back a few years" assumes that no amount of coercion will denude the support of Gazans for Hamas.

Yes, sorry, '08. Op Cast Lead.

And I accept the supposition that Israel is not immune to the historically demonstrable truth that short of the utmost extremes, naked force cannot offer remedy to a population that feels itself under a heel and willing to resort to violence. Israel cannot kill its way to Palestinians seeing Hamas as the bad guys. That's not a realistic strategy if the end state is 'peaceful coexistence'.

If Israel simply consciously accepts an inevitable, perpetual 'Israelis and Palestinians will kill each other in small numbers', and accepts that their strategic choices will provide one half of an epoxy that will cement the status quo, then that will be that. But it won't be an improvement.