Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

I like Champion. His book was well researched and well presented. If there is one weakness its that he carries the Reserves 2000 message on the expansion of the reserves. He puts out the number 60 - 100,000. I can't find that number on Reserves 2000 web page now but numbers close to that have been put forward before. It's basically created by taking the existing reserve units (roughly 150 and filling them to fuller establishments of 500-600 each) That's coupled with a separate but equal partner structure with the RegF

I see two large problems with that.

First the numbers. 60-100,000 is the equivalent of roughly 4 to 7 divisions (at 15,000 per division average) or 20 to 35 brigades at 3-5,000 each. Canada struggles to equip and train 4 RegF brigades. The ten current ResF brigades are unequipped and poorly trained. Are we merely recruiting people and giving them rifle drill and parades? Do we even have a need for 4 to 7 divisions?

In Post WW2 the Militia was authorized at 180,000 in 6 divisions and four independent armoured brigades equipped with much war surplus equipment. By 1954 the Militia had dwindled to 46,506 all ranks. Yes, it was a smaller population then, but still we'd be challenged to keep even 60,000 reservists. And we certainly can't (or won't) equip them.

Secondly is the question of the complexity of leadership. The skill levels needed to lead, both at the officer and Snr NCM level is no longer learnable on weekends and two week summer courses. Cementing that book learning with practical training is even more difficult. The reserves would essentially have to send large numbers of people on senior leadership training at exactly the point in their civilian careers where senior leaders have little time to devote. Alternatively there would need to be full-time leadership and instructors either from the RegF or created "in-house."

I'm entirely with Champion on all the problems he describes. I just can't buy the solution. In the numerous napkin force I've floated here there is one underlying constant. We have to start with the force we have, the number of RegF, the number of ResF, and the equipment we have and which is in the pipeline. We build a better force with that and once its established and working we determine if and how it can be expanded. Unfortunately this means amalgamation and an overall reduction in reserve units which Reserves 2000 fights hard against. Partially with reason. Previous amalgamations have not been rousing successes for a host of reasons. the challenge is to avoid those reasons the next time.


I agree. Given time and the requisite support.

Based on a 6 to 1 ratio on Class A to PY ratio, that should gain the RegF 4,000 folks tops. That's barely enough to replace all the Class Bs littering cubicles in Ottawa. I jest in part. Let @dapaterson give us the real figures but I'm pretty sure the field force wouldn't grow. Of course they might get enough $ selling all that prime downtown real estate that the armouries are on to build that Star Top replacement headquarters in Ottawa.

To expand like that, you'd also need to spend billions on infrastructure.

600 troops are not going to parade in a 1915 (or earlier) vintage armoury, for one

 

[Kirkhill]

Canada
39,727,685​	Population
297,958​	Volunteers	Attested, Unpaid, Willing
92,367​	Active	Attested, Unpaid, Active
23,530​	Reserve	Attested, Paid, Contracted
21,560​	Regular	Ready

Volunteers of the Danish Homeguard Type Inactive
Volunteers of the Danish Homeguard Type Active
Reservists of the Canadian Class A/B/C Type Contracted
Regulars of the Canadian Army

Homeguard able to provide 6000 PYs for security, military and civil emergencies voluntarily with no need for compulsion or coercion or disruption of the economy.

Homeguard also a source of willing individuals available for further training and defined contributions.

Support for the Defense includes:	Support for civil preparedness includes:
Guarding of military installations Education of the Armed Forces soldiers Marine environmental tasks Guarding of air stations Monitoring of the airspace Sovereignty enforcement at sea .	Helping the police with tasks at sea Securing civilian airports Supporting the Tax Administration with maritime controls Blocking Traffic regulation Search

EXAMPLES OF THE ARMY HOME GUARD'S TASKS​

• Support for the Police
• National and international exercises and operations
• Support for training of selected army units r
• Storm flood preparedness 
• Environmental preparedness
• Anti-terror preparedness
• Snow preparedness

EXAMPLES OF THE MARINE HOME GUARD'S TASKS​

• Water and marine environmental monitoring
• Search and rescue
• Guarding and security around naval vessels and civilian ships
• Fighting oil pollution
• Patrol cruises with the Police and customs officials from SKAT
  

EXAMPLES OF AIR HOME GUARD TASKS​

• Guarding of aircraft, helicopters and other military equipment
• Access control at airports
• Security tasks at air stations
• Instructors for the training of Air Force soldiers
• Support as moment strength for the Air Force's exercises
• Guarding of civilian airports
• Aerial overview of, for example, wildfires or oil pollution

 

[Kirkhill]

To expand like that, you'd also need to spend billions on infrastructure.

600 troops are not going to parade in a 1915 (or earlier) vintage armoury, for one

Fair Point

Even if you were just accommodating the Active Volunteers then you would be looking at a unit strength of 5 to 600 right enough
92,000 / 185 units (per Champion)

Counter Point

The facilities need upgrading
The money is spent in the community for the community
It enhances local emergency preparedness
It enhances local security

All that as well as taking a load off the Regs AND providing them with a pool of recruits and retained talent.

 

[Kirkhill]

High end of the Homeguard.

Hjemmeværnets Særlig Støtte og Rekognosceringskompagni (SSR)

www.hjv.dk

Armed Active Homeguard (Canadian Equivalent would be about 32,000 reservist with their rifles in their homes).

Danish Home Guard to disarm after terror attack

Some 4,300 volunteer members of the Danish Home Guard are being told to disassemble their rifles in light of the fact that one of the weapons used in February's shootings in Copenhagen was a stolen military rifle.

www.thelocal.dk

Danish Home Guard to rearm after terror attack

Six months after some 4,300 volunteer members of the Danish Home Guard were told to disassemble their rifles in the aftermath of the Copenhagen terror attacks, members will once again be allowed to keep functioning weapons at home.

www.thelocal.dk

 

[dapaterson]

The Army Reserve had millions set aside to build new capabilities and modernize.

The Army Reserve selected a pack of senior officers to work full time to plan and work within the Army to design and implement.

That pack came up with broad ideas, expected undefined others to do the work, and, in closing out their efforts, wrote a bunch more "here are more ideas without any sort of implementation plan" papers.

Most of the funding set aside lapsed or ended up reprofiled, as they made no effort to create a sustainable long term program, or to modernize. Rather than a deliberate plan to grow, with training capacity built in advance, they advocated "recruit until your eyes bleed" resulting in thousands joining, not getting trained, then releasing; that in turn created long term damage to recruiting as those negative experiences were socialized

That was Land Force Reserve Restructure.

For the few things they took credit for (most of which was done by others), they failed to secure any funding for sustainment.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Army Reserve had millions set aside to build new capabilities and modernize.

The Army Reserve selected a pack of senior officers to work full time to plan and work within the Army to design and implement.

That pack came up with broad ideas, expected undefined others to do the work, and, in closing out their efforts, wrote a bunch more "here are more ideas without any sort of implementation plan" papers.

Most of the funding set aside lapsed or ended up reprofiled, as they made no effort to create a sustainable long term program, or to modernize. Rather than a deliberate plan to grow, with training capacity built in advance, they advocated "recruit until your eyes bleed" resulting in thousands joining, not getting trained, then releasing; that in turn created long term damage to recruiting as those negative experiences were socialized

That was Land Force Reserve Restructure.

For the few things they took credit for (most of which was done by others), they failed to secure any funding for sustainment.

And an excellent example of a self-inflicted wound that occurs when you don't cull the herd early on, and just keep promoting the dross, IMHO...

 

[GR66]

High end of the Homeguard.

Hjemmeværnets Særlig Støtte og Rekognosceringskompagni (SSR)

www.hjv.dk

Armed Active Homeguard (Canadian Equivalent would be about 32,000 reservist with their rifles in their homes).

Danish Home Guard to disarm after terror attack

Some 4,300 volunteer members of the Danish Home Guard are being told to disassemble their rifles in light of the fact that one of the weapons used in February's shootings in Copenhagen was a stolen military rifle.

www.thelocal.dk

Danish Home Guard to rearm after terror attack

Six months after some 4,300 volunteer members of the Danish Home Guard were told to disassemble their rifles in the aftermath of the Copenhagen terror attacks, members will once again be allowed to keep functioning weapons at home.

www.thelocal.dk

I don't think you can simply look at another country's model which is based on a completely different history, culture, threat perception, geography, etc. and assume that it can be duplicated elsewhere. Recreating the Danish Home Guard in Canada is just as unrealistic as recreating the US National Guard. No matter how many spreadsheets you present showing how another nation's Reserves are organized and how that translates to our relative population it doesn't somehow make that system workable here.

We require a uniquely Canadian solution that matches our particular political, cultural, demographic, organizational, geographical and financial realities. Where I think we all agree is that the model for the Army Reserves we have now is simply not fit for purpose. And I will agree with you 100% that we need to look outside the traditional boxes of Augmentation and Cold War-style expansion to find a solution that effectively makes use of our Reservists.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd accept an outside the box look.

I look at other models not for replication but to expand the envelope of the possible.

 

[Kirkhill]

And another attempt to expand the envelope....

Can you find volunteers in Canada?

Altogether, 24 million Canadians volunteered 2.5 million hours of their time to improve the health, well-being, education and safety of our communities in 2018.

On average, Canadians aged 15 and older dedicated 206 hours of their time in 2018.

National Volunteer Week - Statistics Canada

The pandemic has posed tremendous challenges to volunteer organizations, given the repeated lockdowns and re-openings during the various waves of infection. Particularly challenging is that seniors—Canada’s most dedicated volunteers in terms of hours committed⁠—were also among the most...

www.statcan.gc.ca

Are we sure that of the 24 million Canadians volunteering 200 hours per year we couldn't find 300,000 willing to volunteer to work with DND/CAF?

 

[GK .Dundas]

And another attempt to expand the envelope....

Can you find volunteers in Canada?

National Volunteer Week - Statistics Canada

The pandemic has posed tremendous challenges to volunteer organizations, given the repeated lockdowns and re-openings during the various waves of infection. Particularly challenging is that seniors—Canada’s most dedicated volunteers in terms of hours committed⁠—were also among the most...

www.statcan.gc.ca

Are we sure that of the 24 million Canadians volunteering 200 hours per year we couldn't find 300,000 willing to volunteer to work with DND/CAF?

We'll give you a really nifty t- shirt and box lunches.
I have just made the Treasury people relatively happy.

 

[Blackadder1916]

To supply a pool of volunteers - unpaid and willing - from which you can draw contracted personnel for longer contracts for specific tasks.

In your many posts extolling the virtues of the Danish Home Guard, you seem to place much stead on their volunteer and "unpaid" status in comparison to Canadian Reserves. I'll repeat what I've mentioned a few times before; we are not Europeans; our histories of war, disaster and volunteerism are not the same; we don't think like Europeans; we don't live like them; our school systems (primary, secondary, post secondary, graduate and post-graduate) are not organized, conducted and financed the same; our social support systems are not the same. These factors should be considered when suggesting the Danes (or many other nationalities) as a model for organizing our military forces.

If we take the typical (ideal?) reserve recruitment target of the Canadian Forces, it would be a late teen (or early twenties) who has just completed high school (or still in secondary school), is either currently attending (or planning to attend) post secondary school (university or technical college), has two or more full summers available for training and is probably looking for work so that they can pay for their education. That last item, financing school, was a common theme I encountered when I was with a reserve unit years ago. Compare that to a Danish school leaver - their university or college tuition will be taken care of by the government and he will also receive a small living expenses allowance while attending post secondary education. How does that translate to the typical Danish Home Guard member? Are those young people taking advantage of educational financial freedom to volunteer for unpaid military service?

Survey says . . .

https://pure.vive.dk/ws/files/796885/1710_Volunteers_in_the_Danish_Home_Guard_2016.pdf

THE TYPICAL HOME GUARD SOLDIER
Many of the members of the Home Guard have been members for along time. On average, volunteers in 2016 have been members for 28 years compared with 23 years in 2007. There is a significant difference between the three Home Guard branches in terms of volunteers’ length of service. Air Force Home Guard volunteers have been members on average for 32 years, while Naval Home Guard volunteers have been members for 23 years on average.

Home Guard volunteers make up a broad cross-section of the Danish population, but there is a clear majority of men aged 40 and above. Women make up 14% of volunteers. Relatively speaking, the Air Force Home Guard has the greatest number of female members (22%).

The average age is 50, which is slightly higher than in 2007, when it was 47. The proportion of members below 30 is at the same level in 2016 as in 2007. The increase in average age is primarily due to the fact that members of the reserve were four years older on average in 2016 than they were in 2007. Considering only the active force, the average age has only increased slightly, from 45 years in 2007 to 46 years in 2016.

Furthermore, a relatively large number of Home Guard volunteers have a vocational education qualification. However, the proportion of volunteers with technical qualifications has actually gone down, while the proportion of members with short-cycle or medium-cycle higher education has increased since 2007.

Furthermore, Home Guard volunteers are relatively often employed in the private sector. Since 2007, the proportion of members of Home Guard in retirement or on early retirement has increased, and this is reflected in the higher percentage of members within the older age groups. Around half of volunteers live in small urban areas or rural districts.

Or for the TLDR crowd

The typical Home Guard volunteer is therefore male, aged above 40, has a vocational education qualification, is employed in the private sector and lives in a rural district or in a small town. Since 2007, the proportion of members in the older age groups has increased, thus increasing the average age of volunteers. However, members below 30 make up the same share in 2016 as in 2007.

What percentage of those volunteers are "in education" (you know, our preferred target market) - 2.5%



Or as noted in that survey, instead of young, fit (potential) soldiering material they find "Looking at the labour market attachment of volunteers, . . . . that 29% of volunteers are early-retirement pensioners or old-age pensioners"

And how much time do they spend on Home Guard activities?

Active members spend an average of 21 hours a month in the Home Guard, while members of the reserve spend an average of less than half an hour a month. For the active force, this average increased by more than three hours a month from 2007 to 2016. Most active members feel they spend an appropriate amount of time on the Home Guard. One-in-four, however, feel they spend too little time and would therefore like to spend more time in the Home Guard. The majority of volunteers used to be more active. Almost everyone in the reserve says that they used to be more active, and 70% of active members also say that they used to be more active in the Home Guard. Therefore, it seems that the most active members, with high hours of service, compensate for the falling activity among the remaining active members. Volunteers who were previously more active state as the main reason for their lower activity today that they would rather spend time on other things than the Home Guard.

And as for "unpaid" FAQ

Q: DOES IT COST ANYTHING TO BE A MEMBER?
A: No, Hjemmevärnet is a voluntary organization where you join because you want to and think it's a good idea. That's why it's free to be a member, and you don't get any (definitely) salary either, but you can get compensation for lost earnings, transport in your own vehicle, etc. - and then there's the value of personal development, education and lots of experiences.

But the administration of that compensation may be a dissatisfier.

from the survey

The last topic related to competences is whether volunteers find they lack something in connection with the performance of their function. A considerably larger share of active members than of reserve members report that they feel they lack something, see table 5.5. The two factors respondents stated most frequently they lacked are 'training/education' and ‘better possibilities to have Home Guard service expenses reimbursed'. These factors are indicated by one-in-three active members.

 

[Kirkhill]

And yet, Canadians do volunteer.

Volunteer rate and average annual volunteer hours, by age group, inactive

Volunteer rate and distribution of volunteer hours, population aged 15 and over, age group, 2013.

www150.statcan.gc.ca

Looking at this another way.

• 2019-2020: 10,118 individuals joined the Canadian Armed Forces, with 5,172 joining the Regular Force. Of those who joined, 1,775 were women.

The average age of the Homeguard is 50 and that includes a very large number of ancients. But it also includes a very large number of middle aged men and women who are living normal lives.

Every year, in Canada, some 5000 civilians volunteer to work with the CAF Reserves. And 3 to 5 years later the CAF loses track of them.
If the CAF could keep track of those 5000 volunteers for the 23 to 32 (call it 25) years that the Danes typically associate with the Homeguard, then that would represent a body of 125,000 people between the ages of 25 and 50. Attested, cleared, willing, with some military training and willing to spend 20 hours a month "parading". That is not a million miles away from two Wednesday nights and a Weekend. But they are maintaining that pace for 25 years. Not 5 years.

And that doesn't reference at all the equivalent number of "Professionals" that are trained and released annually that the CAF loses track of.

These people may not be up to serving the guns or driving a tank but they are a source of organized labour for the types of jobs described by the Homeguard - Vital Point security and Civil Emergencies - work that others would have to do if they weren't doing it.

....


But, I take the point. This is Canada.

 

[GR66]

Perhaps there is a role for a new Class of Army Reservist in combination with a change to mandatory training attendance for the current Class A Reservists.

Class A Reservists would shift to something like the 1 weekend/month and 2 week concentration per year mandatory training as many have suggested is required to produce operationally effective Reservists. This would be accompanied by strengthened job security legislation and slightly increased pay. These would be the Reservists that would fill the established Platoon/Company positions within the reorganized/Reg Force integrated Reserve units. They would follow the same trade training requirements (modified where necessary to be workable for part-time soldiers) and would follow normal rank progression up to a certain limit (governed by what rank level can realistically be achieved through part-time service).

A new Class of Reservist (Class AA perhaps?) could be created to cover those Militia/Home Guard/Volunteer type recruits that @Kirkhill is seeking to target. Those Reservists would not receive specific trade training beyond BMQ. They would not fill established Platoon/Company positions within their units and would not progress in rank. They would have attendance requirements similar to current Class A Reservists (maybe something like 1 night per week and one weekend EX per quarter?).

Training would be for skills useful in domestic deployment operations like flood/fire response, LUSAR, First Aid, Wheeled Vehicle Driver, Cold Weather Ops, Aid to Civil Powers, etc. They could be called up in response to domestic emergencies only. They could volunteer to take part in Class A exercises in supporting roles such as roleplayers, advance set-up, CSS support (field kitchens, etc.). They would be something like paid Civil Defence Reservists organized under the umbrella of the Reserve units something along the lines of Auxiliary Police or Volunteer Firefighters and would hopefully generate a pool of potential Class A Reservists as well as being a role that former Reg Force or Class A Reservists could fulfill once they are no longer at a point in their life that they can meet the mandatory training requirements.

 

[Blackadder1916]

But, I take the point. This is Canada.

And this is Alberta (blue) - 15 times larger than Denmark (green)

. . . willing to spend 20 hours a month "parading" . . .

Well I remember weekend exercises in Wainwright. Following typical protocol, Friday sign-in was not authorized until after 1800 hrs (less than 6 hours, so only a half day pay). Travel from Calgary to Wainwright would normally take 5 hours (same for the return on Sunday). Similarly, travel to Edmonton or Suffield or any other location within Alberta would eat up time. The same would probably be the norm across Canada. If up to half of a Danes monthly time was taken up by traveling (and that doesn't include the time to actually get to work) they might have much less enthusiasm to get on the bus.

My impression, from my service yo those many years ago in Germany, is that many of the European 'emergency volunteers' (fire fighters, disaster response, Red Cross, etc) were very much locally focused. That worked well for them in terms of responding to local situations (especially in non-urban areas) without having multiple levels of bureaucracy to approve a response. Not only did it seem that they could roll out quicker after a request, they typically did not have as far to travel to reach the scene. That's one of the problems I see with nationally organized and controlled emergency response organizations. They may have the concentrated resources (centrally located manpower and equipment) that may be better for the big events, but responding to "small emergencies" can get tangled in the details of what goes and how long it takes to get there.

 

[dapaterson]

Organizational complexity breeds administrative complexity. The optimal solution is rarely to add complexity to manage, but rather to declutter and decomplexify.

 

[McG]

A new Class of Reservist (Class AA perhaps?) could be created to cover those Militia/Home Guard/Volunteer type recruits that @Kirkhill is seeking to target …

So, we already have something that covers most of this.

DAOD 2020-4, Supplementary Reserve - Canada.ca

Defence Administrative Orders and Directives - DAOD 2020-4 - Supplementary Reserve

www.canada.ca

 

[daftandbarmy]

Every year, in Canada, some 5000 civilians volunteer to work with the CAF Reserves. And 3 to 5 years later the CAF loses track of them.

You mean, like people who hit CRA and they're still waiting - 3 years later - for their DWD?

 

[Blackadder1916]

As has been mentioned numerous times in this thread and elsewhere, changes to the force structure or most any significant improvement in Canada's defence posture would require political commitment. In looking at the Danish experience to formulate a response to @Kirkhill's posts, I did come across what would probably be the one Danish practice that Canada should emulate; an all party agreement on defence policy.

https://www.fmn.dk/en/topics/agreements-and-economi/agreement-for-danish-defence-2018---2023/

DEFENCE AGREEMENT 2018 - 2023
The Danish Government (Venstre (the Liberal Party), the Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives) and the Social Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and the Social-Liberal Party (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”) have entered into the following agreement regarding the Danish Defence for the period 2018-2023.

Introduction
The purpose of the Danish Defence is to enforce the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and ensure the continued existence, integrity and security of the nation. Threats can occur anywhere in the world, both far from Denmark and in our region. A robust Danish defence and preparedness is the prerequisite for a safe society.

With this Agreement the Parties agree to give the Armed Forces a substantial increase that will be phased in gradually and lead to a strengthening of the Armed Forces' annual budget by DKK 4.8 billion by 2023. By the end of the agreement period the Danish Armed Forces will have more operational units and troops than today and a less top heavy organisational structure.

The Parties wish to strengthen:

• Denmark's contributions to NATO's collective deterrence and defence.
• The Armed Forces’ ability and capacity for international operations and international stabilisation efforts.
• Defence's contribution to national security, e.g. in the event of terror attacks in Denmark.
• The protection of Denmark against cyber attacks.
• The National emergency preparedness.

The Parties agree on a 6-year framework agreement that will also include the Emergency Management Agency, and which sets out the overall direction for The Ministry of Defence areas of responsibility as well as the defence spending. This framework will allow the Minister of Defence together with the Chief of Defence to direct the activities and further organisation of the Armed Forces.

The Minister of Defence will on an annual basis inform the Parties on progress in implementing the Defence Agreement.
. . .

more at link

 

[GR66]

So, we already have something that covers most of this.

DAOD 2020-4, Supplementary Reserve - Canada.ca

Defence Administrative Orders and Directives - DAOD 2020-4 - Supplementary Reserve

www.canada.ca

Are members of the Supplemental Reserve active on an ongoing basis with their local Reserve Unit? How often are they called out (or volunteer) for service in response to Op Lentus taskings, etc.?

 

[McG]

Are members of the Supplemental Reserve active on an ongoing basis with their local Reserve Unit? How often are they called out (or volunteer) for service in response to Op Lentus taskings, etc.?

They are not part of any primary reserve unit. Neither primary nor supplementary reserve get called out.