Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

So keep in mind the US Army has TOW at the Squad Level for the Bradley units. The Anti Armor plan doesn’t need as much detailed work as a Canadian one, as you have a great deal of Anti Armor weapons at the Coy level for a Bradley Company.

Heck even the 25mm with the APDSFS-DU rounds can take on a Russian tank if the need arises.

It's true, but the Abrams/Bradley/Apache team is one with an overmatch of AA weapons designed in the 90s primarily for offensive operations (including countermove operations). Few countries can afford to develop and deploy such systems on the scale the US has.

The US army has gone through several evolutions of how it organizes AA capabilities in IBCTs and SBCTs but essentially has not done much in the way of rethinking the issue post Iraq because it was busy with counterterrorism.

In the meantime AA weapon systems - cannon launched, rocket launched, drone delivered, and hand held - have matured by leaps and bounds. There is a major reset needed on how to deploy and use these varied systems to their bast advantage in a full-spectrum, high-intensity conflict.

I agree with @Kirkhill in one respect - we need to look at the cost aspect of these munitions. Ukraine teaches that modern war isn't what we expected. It's a long term slug fest which requires plenty of munitions, and an ability to replenish stocks rapidly and economically.

We aren't getting the full picture from Ukraine - or at least we're not paying full attention to it. While we rightly focus on precision weapons we mustn't loose sight of the fact that every time that we see a video of some little drone striking yet another BTR, it's doing so in fields churned up by hundreds of craters of dumb munitions and covered with acres upon acres of dumb minefields.

The fear here is that we're losing sight of the overall picture and the fact that we'll need to coordinate the use of numerous weapon systems to their best effect. That isn't done reliably by a handful of folks at platoon level using some jury-rigged app on a phone. The only reason it is being done at all is because something better isn't available to them. We do have some time to perfect the system.

As an aside - a drone just destroyed a military helicopter that's been unused for 20 years in Transnistria with an allegation the drone came from Odessa. Anyone else smell a Russian provocateur operation?

 

[dapaterson]

I agree with @Kirkhill in one respect - we need to look at the cost aspect of these munitions. Ukraine teaches that modern war isn't what we expected. It's a long term slug fest which requires plenty of munitions, and an ability to replenish stocks rapidly and economically.

We are discovering that modern war is unchanged, is what you're saying...

 

[GR66]

We are discovering that modern war is unchanged, is what you're saying...

Doesn't matter if it's sling stones, spears, arrows, musket balls, howitzer shells, loitering munitions, PrSM, hypersonic glide bombs or photon torpedoes. If you run out before your opponent you lose.

 

[FJAG]

We are discovering that modern war is unchanged, is what you're saying...

I'm not sure "unchanged" is what I'm thinking - albeit that's apt too.

I'm personally surprised at the duration of this one and how many of their own people the Russians are prepared to see die. 2014 had limited objectives and a limited duration and expenditure of resources before it went quiet. I don't see this one stopping and in that respect it shows obvious parallels to WW 1 vis-a-vis resource commitments. There's also a change to the character of warfare that makes the rapid breakthroughs, that the Russians were expecting, difficult.

All that to say that "modern war" isn't what I expected it to be.

That leads me to several conclusions:

1) We need to think much more about our common "border" with the Russians to the north and be prepared to deter aggression there and to defend our claims;

2) We need to be a better NATO ally. I do not think that MND-N is a credible entity that has a true deterrence capability and as the framework nation in Latvia we are falling far short of what we should be bringing to the table;

3) We can't afford to sit back with a 60 day supply of ammunition, equipment and personnel (and I seriously doubt that we have one) unless there is also a practical plan that allows production to ramp up to meet the day 61 and thereafter requirements; and

4) None of the above will happen while the Liberals reign.

 

[FJAG]

Deleted as duplicate

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

1) We need to think much more about our common "border" with the Russians to the north and be prepared to deter aggression there and to defend our claims;

How many times do we, sailors (you know, the people wearing black and spending their time on the oceans) have to remind every body that (1) we don't have a "common border" with the Russians, and (2) the Russian hordes are NOT coming at us across the Arctic. Heck! They would have a hard time defending their own Arctic coast.

There are more than 1,800 (yes, that is eighteen hundred) kilometers between the two closest land points of Russia and Canada, over the world's most (OK second most, but just, to Antarctica) hostile environment. At such distances, even if the Arctic ocean was ice free it would be beyond Russia - or just about any country in the world - to mount an operation against Canadian Arctic lands.

 

[GR66]

How many times do we, sailors (you know, the people wearing black and spending their time on the oceans) have to remind every body that (1) we don't have a "common border" with the Russians, and (2) the Russian hordes are NOT coming at us across the Arctic. Heck! They would have a hard time defending their own Arctic coast.

There are more than 1,800 (yes, that is eighteen hundred) kilometers between the two closest land points of Russia and Canada, over the world's most (OK second most, but just, to Antarctica) hostile environment. At such distances, even if the Arctic ocean was ice free it would be beyond Russia - or just about any country in the world - to mount an operation against Canadian Arctic lands.

By comparison the Allied invasion fleet "only" had to cross approximately 100 miles from the Channel ports to Normandy for D-Day.

 

[FJAG]

How many times do we, sailors (you know, the people wearing black and spending their time on the oceans) have to remind every body that (1) we don't have a "common border" with the Russians,

That's why I put "border" in parentheses. Let's call it the national boundaries with no intervening nation.

and (2) the Russian hordes are NOT coming at us across the Arctic. Heck! They would have a hard time defending their own Arctic coast.

I don't expect to see hordes at all. I expect to see exploration ships, weather stations, and the like setting out to establish claims to resource rich areas, and eventually backed by military assets once challenged.

There are more than 1,800 (yes, that is eighteen hundred) kilometers between the two closest land points of Russia and Canada, over the world's most (OK second most, but just, to Antarctica) hostile environment. At such distances, even if the Arctic ocean was ice free it would be beyond Russia - or just about any country in the world - to mount an operation against Canadian Arctic lands.

That does not answer the question of regions of disputed claims with economic interests. There are also "rights to innocent passage" through Canadian waters that are an issue with others such as China.

For a recent RAND study of that see here. It's a US oriented one but discusses other issues beyond that. Arctic resources and access to Arctic territories will become an issue in time when they become more exploitable and accessible.

It's not so much the question of an "operation" mounted against Canadian Arctic territories but Canada's ability to mount its own operations in the Arctic if and when required.

 

[markppcli]

So keep in mind the US Army has TOW at the Squad Level for the Bradley units. The Anti Armor plan doesn’t need as much detailed work as a Canadian one, as you have a great deal of Anti Armor weapons at the Coy level for a Bradley Company.

Heck even the 25mm with the APDSFS-DU rounds can take on a Russian tank if the need arises.

Yes but if those Bradley’s were all firing NLOS missiles linked to other sensors that cognitive work load would probably require a shift in thinking. Further they are able to achieve that becaus of the system they’re employing, it’s not an additional role added to the squad, and it’s a point and shoot weapon. I’d agree that specifically in Bradley units what you’re saying is true, but they also have paired tank companies so the requirement for detailed anti tank planning is lessened some what. In light infantry the tow systems are I d educated platoons performing a dedicated task.

 

[KevinB]

Today agree on that aspect @markppcli

Part of the theory of the ‘Netwarrior’ digital battlefield is that distributed systems can be used at various levels.

The Javelin is a 6km system, as such it’s not looked at CURRENTLY as a distributed asset. There are Hellfire, JAGM etc longer range NLOS systems that already have a role and sensor / shooter link. The LWCLU can be attached to that sort of network — and the EVENTUAL role is that everyone/everything can be used optimally as needed.

The LWCLU doesn’t need to accept targets from a NLOS link, and the gunner is free to choose a target — the theory as I understand it is that they can engage a pressing target as opposed to a linked target. The concern has been with Squad Missiles is that a higher element may want to task something else - but the Squad’s “right” to self defense trumps that. The Light and Styker units still have Hellfire and TOW for the integrated Armor Defense plan, but the LWCLU can also lock targets for other LWCLU’s so depth elements can offer support to forward elements without direct exposure, or the forward element needing to use their missiles right away.

There are still a lot of theories as to the best organization for the control of the close fight / and I suspect we will see a lot of development and refinement in the next few years.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I doubt the rifle section can function well if it's overloaded with capabilities. It might be workable in peacetime with the advantages of long training, but everything has to also work under wartime conditions, which I predict would result in foreshortened training times.

If it's still the case that anti-air and anti-armour weapons are most effective when used in salvos, grouping/control at a higher level is indicated.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's why I put "border" in parentheses. Let's call it the national boundaries with no intervening nation.

I don't expect to see hordes at all. I expect to see exploration ships, weather stations, and the like setting out to establish claims to resource rich areas, and eventually backed by military assets once challenged.

That does not answer the question of regions of disputed claims with economic interests. There are also "rights to innocent passage" through Canadian waters that are an issue with others such as China.

For a recent RAND study of that see here. It's a US oriented one but discusses other issues beyond that. Arctic resources and access to Arctic territories will become an issue in time when they become more exploitable and accessible.

It's not so much the question of an "operation" mounted against Canadian Arctic territories but Canada's ability to mount its own operations in the Arctic if and when required.

Not to mention the "Little Green Men" flying in with their credit cards. If a criminal or domestic terrorist can get ahold of kit alarming to the state think how much more injurious a concerted effort, by foreigners that purchased locally available resources, might be.

 

[Kirkhill]

I find it worthwhile to consider your responses before I reply...

And yet they employ javelin in Bn and above AT platoons….

They do indeed. And machine guns are deployed at the team level, the section level, all the up to the battalion level. The same weapon is employed dispersed and concentrated. The commonality of the weapon eases logistics. The General Purpose Machine Gun is both a hose and a precision instrument.

Please read the above post. It’s about totality of the system and data synchronization.

I am fully aware of the advantages of data synchronization. However, I happen to believe at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, where time is scarce and OODA loops are short there are considerable advantages to having the necessary lethal effects immediately available to the operator under threat.

Yes it can, that’s what we are talking about. X number of sensors identify y number of targets and they are prioritized and disseminated. Who engages what gets sorted out via some kind of targeting node / cell. The job of picking that target and engaging it ought not be the job of a rifle section. It’s not “see it kill it” it’s “see 47 different vehicle, cross reference HPTL and unmask requirements, assign target to asset, assign engaging element.”

That works fine .... Which requisition do I have to submit to whom in order to remove that T72 50 meters to my front?

That was a lot of words to not answer a question. My point was that it is infact not quicker and easier to produce a drone than a shell. Because what you’re making when you build a shell or bomb is that effect on the target. The drone still requires a means of producing that effect. It’s merely the delivery system.

The shell is cheap. The gun is expensive. As is the 10 man crew.

Give me that crew, with 5 trucks and I can field a very large number of ready to launch packages of lethality in various configurations.

With the drone I do not have to build a precision engineered gun from exotic metals, find replacement barrels of similar exacting standards, replace buffer springs and train people to operate and maintain them.

By contrast the Javelin, and missiles of that ilk are described as "wooden rounds". They are not quite inert on the shelf but they are rugged, and robust and have a long shelf-life. Just take a look at those CRV-7s that we wanted to dispose of 4 or 5 years ago after sitting in storage for decades. The Ukrainians still want them. Because they are still useable by their citizen army soldiers after all this time.

They’ve essentially built a DATA synchronizing app like ATAK. That doesn’t mean it’s a flat control system, it’s simply allowing better sharing of information.

The system can be employed either way. It is all about the control hierarchy and who is allowed to do what.

.....


My general outlook can probably be described with the words "might be".

"Might be" might not be a valid course of action. On the other hand it might be the course of action adopted by the other side. My sense of wars gone by is that what might be often becomes what is. The losing side is often the one motivated to make that leap.

 

[Kirkhill]

I doubt the rifle section can function well if it's overloaded with capabilities. It might be workable in peacetime with the advantages of long training, but everything has to also work under wartime conditions, which I predict would result in foreshortened training times.

If it's still the case that anti-air and anti-armour weapons are most effective when used in salvos, grouping/control at a higher level is indicated.

If that is still the case....

But what happens if the rifle section becomes more effective, or for that matter the platoon? What happens if they don't have to call for support because they can manage the problem with internal resources in a timely fashion?

Javelins, Stugnas and NLAWs weren't concentrated in February '22. They were broadly distributed, one might even say scattered. Widely scattered and equivalent to intelligent off-route mines.

 

[markppcli]

I find it worthwhile to consider your responses before I reply...




They do indeed. And machine guns are deployed at the team level, the section level, all the up to the battalion level. The same weapon is employed dispersed and concentrated. The commonality of the weapon eases logistics. The General Purpose Machine Gun is both a hose and a precision instrument.

Fine, I disagree in the last point. It’s just a weapon that’s employed by different levels largely the same way. I haven’t seen anything on Ukrainian MG platoons existing but maybe I’ll dig a bit.

I am fully aware of the advantages of data synchronization. However, I happen to believe at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, where time is scarce and OODA loops are short there are considerable advantages to having the necessary lethal effects immediately available to the operator under threat.

Agreed, my point is that having that forward edge as the contributor to all those linked systems and targeting is going to attack their OODA loops. If we go back to the genesis of what we were talking about its dedicated platoon vs giving everyone the thing.

That works fine .... Which requisition do I have to submit to whom in order to remove that T72 50 meters to my front?

An all arms call for fire. But I’d hope you’d have sent it when they were a km or 5 out.

The shell is cheap. The gun is expensive. As is the 10 man crew.

Give me that crew, with 5 trucks and I can field a very large number of ready to launch packages of lethality in various configurations.

Again this was about your assertion that it’s quicker to make drones than bombs. Not that it’s quicker to make drones that artillery pieces. I’m simply pointing that out. You still need to make the bomb. And drones aren’t going to replace artillery, not until they can provide consistent suppression anyways.

With the drone I do not have to build a precision engineered gun from exotic metals, find replacement barrels of similar exacting standards, replace buffer springs and train people to operate and maintain them.

No you still do. Different jobs.

By contrast the Javelin, and missiles of that ilk are described as "wooden rounds". They are not quite inert on the shelf but they are rugged, and robust and have a long shelf-life. Just take a look at those CRV-7s that we wanted to dispose of 4 or 5 years ago after sitting in storage for decades. The Ukrainians still want them. Because they are still useable by their citizen army soldiers after all this time.

Do then Ukrainians want them? I seems more like a group of people trying to push them on Ukrain than anything else.

My general outlook can probably be described with the words "might be".

"Might be" might not be a valid course of action. On the other hand it might be the course of action adopted by the other side. My sense of wars gone by is that what might be often becomes what is. The losing side is often the one motivated to make that leap.

If that is still the case....

But what happens if the rifle section becomes more effective, or for that matter the platoon? What happens if they don't have to call for support because they can manage the problem with internal resources in a timely fashion?

There will always be an upper limit, and a lot of those assets will mean that rifle man X isn’t using his rifle to take and hold ground.

Javelins, Stugnas and NLAWs weren't concentrated in February '22. They were broadly distributed, one might even say scattered. Widely scattered and equivalent to intelligent off-route mines.

That’s a miss characterization I think. Tank hunting teams were employed, but describing the Ukrainian defence in those terms is largely incorrect. But we’ve been down this road before.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think we might be approaching each other cautiously here... I shall continue cautiously.

Fine, I disagree in the last point. It’s just a weapon that’s employed by different levels largely the same way. I haven’t seen anything on Ukrainian MG platoons existing but maybe I’ll dig a bit.

I'll stipulate that I can tend towards hyperbole. Having said that some levels, are using the MG from the hip while in motion while others tend to use it from static positions on a tripod. Sometimes the guns are employed individually while sometimes they are massed. And sometimes the same guns that are issued individually can be employed en masse.

With respect to the Ukrainians and the MG, I don't know about the MG platoons but they do seem to rely on their MGs to hold their positions. To the extent that they are employing both fixed and mobile remote MGs in their trenches. Along with their ATGMs

Agreed, my point is that having that forward edge as the contributor to all those linked systems and targeting is going to attack their OODA loops. If we go back to the genesis of what we were talking about its dedicated platoon vs giving everyone the thing.

But if the same CLU is employable as both an LOS and a Non-LOS system would that be a reason to deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops? Or would it be a reason to buy one missile system and issue it to rifle sections as well as the platoon weapons section or company weapons platoon?

Back to the C6/GPMG analogy. On bipods and slings in the section but tripods in the support elements.

An all arms call for fire. But I’d hope you’d have sent it when they were a km or 5 out.

Unless it is a meeting engagement in a coulee.

Again this was about your assertion that it’s quicker to make drones than bombs. Not that it’s quicker to make drones that artillery pieces. I’m simply pointing that out. You still need to make the bomb. And drones aren’t going to replace artillery, not until they can provide consistent suppression anyways.

If that is the way that I phrased my argument then I apologize. My assertion is that the supply chain for the shells and their launchers made out of steel is more complex than the equivalent supply chain for missiles and UAVs made from plastics, fibers and soft metals, all of which can be printed.

And the route to consistent suppression is large number of munitions, either shells or drones. In the case of the shells you need to deliver a large cache of shells to a gun with a crew and expose the crew to enemy fire while launching them. In the case of the "drones" you deliver the cache of drones to a site in a ready to launch container. You didn't have to buy the gun, or the gun tractor, or the spare barrel or the crew or its rations.

As to the cost of the munition itself,

The shell rises through the $1,000 ball park for the a dumb M107, to $10,000 for dumb shell with a low cost precision guidance kit to something in the $50,000 to $100,000 for exquisites like Excalibur and Vulcanos and, potentially, hypervelocity ramjet rounds.

Meanwhile missiles and UAVs are moving downwards in cost after they started in the 5 to 6 zero range and are now moving down towards the 3 to 4 zero range.

The howitzer is to the drone as the Tommy Gun was to the Sten Gun.



The cost is not the unit cost. It is the cost of delivery.

No you still do. Different jobs.

We will continue to disagree on that one, I think.

Do then Ukrainians want them? I seems more like a group of people trying to push them on Ukrain than anything else.

Apparently the guy running the drone fleets and the Kraken units wants them.

A Ukrainian military leader is asking Canada to hand over tens of thousands of rockets that are awaiting demolition at a Saskatchewan military base.

In an exclusive interview with Global News, Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov urged the government to let Ukraine have the decommissioned CRV7 rockets.

Doing so would help Ukraine fend off Russian forces and save taxpayers the cost of destroying them, said Lt. Gen. Budanov, chief of the Ukrainian defence ministry’s intelligence directorate.

Exclusive: Ukrainian general wants Canada’s 83,000 decommissioned rockets | Globalnews.ca

Ukraine is asking the Canadian government for 83,000 mothballed CRV7 attack rockets to meet urgent military needs. Ottawa is concerned the rockets may be unsafe to ship.

globalnews.ca

There will always be an upper limit, and a lot of those assets will mean that rifle man X isn’t using his rifle to take and hold ground.

The rifleman might be better served with the rifle to take ground, assuming that bunkers don't need to be busted and enemy tanks aren't in evidence, but having the ATGMs in the section might be useful in holding the ground in the face of an enemy counter-attack during the re-org.

That’s a miss characterization I think. Tank hunting teams were employed, but describing the Ukrainian defence in those terms is largely incorrect. But we’ve been down this road before.

I give the Ukrainian artillery its due. It did the killing. However the ATGM teams complicated the ability of the Russian forces to manoeuvre, slowed them down and created concentrations for the artillery to neutralize.

And you are right, we have been down that road before.

Cheers.

 

[markppcli]

I think we might be approaching each other cautiously here... I shall continue cautiously.



I'll stipulate that I can tend towards hyperbole. Having said that some levels, are using the MG from the hip while in motion while others tend to use it from static positions on a tripod. Sometimes the guns are employed individually while sometimes they are massed. And sometimes the same guns that are issued individually can be employed en masse.

With respect to the Ukrainians and the MG, I don't know about the MG platoons but they do seem to rely on their MGs to hold their positions. To the extent that they are employing both fixed and mobile remote MGs in their trenches. Along with their ATGMs

Yes the sight their section MGs when in the defensive. They move.

But if the same CLU is employable as both an LOS and a Non-LOS system would that be a reason to deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops? Or would it be a reason to buy one missile system and issue it to rifle sections as well as the platoon weapons section or company weapons platoon?

Back to the C6/GPMG analogy. On bipods and slings in the section but tripods in the support elements.

I don’t want my section to have a javeline because I want the section AT weapon to be point and shoot. I want to be able to carry lots of reloads and want them very packable.

Unless it is a meeting engagement in a coulee.

To your analogy that tank is too close for the arming distance of the Javeline. Hence my above post. And also why the Ukrainians keep those ATGMs in dedicated units.

If that is the way that I phrased my argument then I apologize. My assertion is that the supply chain for the shells and their launchers made out of steel is more complex than the equivalent supply chain for missiles and UAVs made from plastics, fibers and soft metals, all of which can be printed.

And the route to consistent suppression is large number of munitions, either shells or drones. In the case of the shells you need to deliver a large cache of shells to a gun with a crew and expose the crew to enemy fire while launching them. In the case of the "drones" you deliver the cache of drones to a site in a ready to launch container. You didn't have to buy the gun, or the gun tractor, or the spare barrel or the crew or its rations.

As to the cost of the munition itself,

The shell rises through the $1,000 ball park for the a dumb M107, to $10,000 for dumb shell with a low cost precision guidance kit to something in the $50,000 to $100,000 for exquisites like Excalibur and Vulcanos and, potentially, hypervelocity ramjet rounds.

Meanwhile missiles and UAVs are moving downwards in cost after they started in the 5 to 6 zero range and are now moving down towards the 3 to 4 zero range.

That is a highly cherry picked bit of information. The cost of the shell is in its explosive fill, the howitzer can fire hundreds of rounds. You need to add the cost of munition to your UAV and multiply it across those round counts. Similarly I can’t jam a shell.

The howitzer is to the drone as the Tommy Gun was to the Sten Gun.

View attachment 83836View attachment 83837View attachment 83838

The cost is not the unit cost. It is the cost of delivery.

We agree, if I need 15 minutes of suppression how many drones is that ? How many pilots?

We will continue to disagree on that one, I think.



Apparently the guy running the drone fleets and the Kraken units wants them.

Exclusive: Ukrainian general wants Canada’s 83,000 decommissioned rockets | Globalnews.ca

Ukraine is asking the Canadian government for 83,000 mothballed CRV7 attack rockets to meet urgent military needs. Ottawa is concerned the rockets may be unsafe to ship.

globalnews.ca

Fair point.

The rifleman might be better served with the rifle to take ground, assuming that bunkers don't need to be busted and enemy tanks aren't in evidence, but having the ATGMs in the section might be useful in holding the ground in the face of an enemy counter-attack during the re-org.

We agree there. Once again I’m talking about the idea of a section serving networked fires.

I give the Ukrainian artillery its due. It did the killing. However the ATGM teams complicated the ability of the Russian forces to manoeuvre, slowed them down and created concentrations for the artillery to neutralize.

And you are right, we have been down that road before.

Cheers.

Well I’d argue Russia attacking in Spring, not leaving roads, and not having gas did as much as anything else to complicate their manoeuvre.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

How many times do we, sailors (you know, the people wearing black and spending their time on the oceans) have to remind every body that (1) we don't have a "common border" with the Russians, and (2) the Russian hordes are NOT coming at us across the Arctic. Heck! They would have a hard time defending their own Arctic coast.

There are more than 1,800 (yes, that is eighteen hundred) kilometers between the two closest land points of Russia and Canada, over the world's most (OK second most, but just, to Antarctica) hostile environment. At such distances, even if the Arctic ocean was ice free it would be beyond Russia - or just about any country in the world - to mount an operation against Canadian Arctic lands.

The Soviets/Russians have been known to exceed peoples expectations. A Sino/Russian alliance would be capable of many things.

 

[Kirkhill]

XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

• November 2002 – First guided flight of Precision Attack Missile.[3]
• December 2005 – Successful Loitering Attack Missile Boost Test Vehicle (BTV) flight test at Eglin Air Force Base, FL.[4]
• April 2007 – Successful test launch of a Precision Attack Missile from a CLU at White Sands Missile Range.[5]
• June 2007 – Successful test of Precision Attack Missile warhead against a fortified bunker.[6]
• November 2008 – Successful first test of Precision Attack Missile fired from Container Launch Unit. Scores hit on T-72 tank.[7]
• May 2009 – Captive flight test clears way for over-water flights to test capability against small boats.[8]
• Feb 2010 – Four out of six missiles fail to hit their targets in a Limited User Test.[9]
• April 2010 – US Army calls for program to be canceled.[10]
• 3 May 2010 – The U.S. Army removes the system from their website.[11]
• 12 May 2010 – House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee moves R&D funding to Navy budget.[12]
• 18 May 2010 – Defense Department approved an Army recommendation to cancel the program[13]
• 6 Jan 2011 – DefSec Gates announces end of program.[14]
• 2012 – US Navy was to begin at-sea testing of LCS surface missile module.[15]

Loitering Attack Munition (LAM)[edit]​

A loitering munition designed to fly to a preset area and loiter while autonomously seeking out targets.

• Datalink:> Networked for in-flight updates, retargeting and images.
• Motor: Micro turbojet.
• Range: 45 mi (72 km) with 30 min loiter time.

Precision Attack Munition (PAM)[edit]​

Used to attack vehicles, armor, bunkers, and other targets of opportunity. Uses 3 modes of guidance, GPS/INS, semi-active laser homing, and autonomous imaging infrared. Carries a multi-mode warhead effective against several types of targets. It also includes an online library of pictures of targets, so that it can visually identify what it is homing in on.

Specifications[edit]​

• Weight: 117 lb (53 kg)
• Diameter: 7 in (180 mm)
• Length: 60 in (1,500 mm)
• Guidance: GPS/INS, imaging infrared, semi-active laser homing.[2]
• Datalink: Networked for in-flight updates, retargeting and images.
• Motor: Variable thrust rocket motor.
• Range: 25 mi (40 km)

It has taken a decade more to develop both the LAM (Hero-120 / Switchblade 600) and the PAM (Strix / Javelin / Brimstone) munitions. You don't need a separate pilot for each individual drone. You can deliver them by the swarm and have them locate their own targets, or designate them with the LAM.

Those are definitely not jobs for a rifleman in the section. How about the AT Gunner using either the CG84 or the CLU in LOS mode? And the Weapons det using the CLU in N-LOS mode?

 

[FJAG]

But if the same CLU is employable as both an LOS and a Non-LOS system would that be a reason to deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops?

I'm not sure how you see having Javelin in an AA platoon or company results in "deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops". This is simply a matter of how you employ and deploy specialist resources throughout the FEBA. In fact by having specialized platoons, rather than having the Javelins in every rifle platoon, means that you can concentrate more of them where needed rather than leaving large numbers "inactive" with rifle platoons etc that are deployed in depth or in reserve.

My assertion is that the supply chain for the shells and their launchers made out of steel is more complex than the equivalent supply chain for missiles and UAVs made from plastics, fibers and soft metals, all of which can be printed.

I like UAVs and missiles as much as the next guy but for some reason you seem to see a need to replace existing artillery systems. These are not either or resources except in a cockamamie organization like Canada where political leadership can't get it into their heads that often you need both items from complimentary systems. This was a problem in the early 2000s when we threw much of the artillery under the bus for some mythical precision munition system that was still in its infancy.

As @markppcli has pointed out several times, there are indirect fire effects needed at the front that missiles and UAVs can't deliver. Just try to lay a smoke screen and 20 minutes of suppressive fire while a company manoeuvres into assault positions. You need "dumb" rounds for that and plenty of them. Don't even get me started on jamming and weather of electronic components.

To address the supply chain issue - in short, I think you are wrong. There's a reason why dumb rounds are a lot cheaper than missiles and UAVs when you look at them for their equivalent payloads. I'm not talking little quad copters dropping hand grenades here. Dumb rounds and their propellants are easy to produce in bulk using moderately skilled workforces once the machinery is in place. Reliable guidance system that can work through jammers is a different issue. GPS systems can be spoofed and satellites taken out. A fired dumb round will blissfully continue on to its target.

I give the Ukrainian artillery its due. It did the killing.

It did most of the killing. Take a look at any of the videos of a drone flying and you'll see hundreds of craters from dumb rounds. The fact that so much of the killing is done by dumb artillery (and dumb mines) should really settle the argument.

I'll say it again, these are complimentary systems and both are critical to the proper indirect fire support provided to our forward troops. IMHO, both are "artillery" weapons. They both require an "observer" system to locate and identify targets and engage them. They both need a coordination system which provides advice to supported arms commanders and overall management of their employment. Its these coordination and observer capabilities which then select the appropriate system to provide the required effect.

I do want to make one thing clear, however. While precision munitions delivered by indirect fire ("artillery") are now more capable than ever of providing point destruction of individual targets, I still see a continuing need for conventional artillery delivered by guns and rockets in mass.

I also see a continuing need to have direct fire weapons for use by both the infantry and the armoured corps. Some of these systems are falling into a bit of a grey area as they may very well be launched indirectly notwithstanding that we may think of them as "direct fire".

For me, the distinction has more to do with their assignment as organic systems dedicated to a given unit and commensurate with the area of influence of that unit than how they are launched. Artillery systems are generally equipped and organized to operate at further ranges and to be able to rapidly move their fires and effects from one area of concern to another. They are not tied down to supporting one unit. They provide flexibility (besides all-weather effects).

One final thought. These systems are maturing at a rate much faster than our doctrinal system is capable of adjusting to them as long as we leave things to the UOR process. We've become locked into doctrinal structures that have most of their roots in WW2. A lot of the basic concepts are still sound, but if we want FOOs and MFCs to be the controllers of precision guided indirect fire resources then we better define that capability and start equipping and training them for the role and set up the launcher capability at an appropriate level. If we want to add these systems to a recce or mortar capability then lets do that. The tools themselves don't matter that much. They'll probably change before the first trainees graduate their basic courses. What matters is that we design the system(s) now, not later.