Australian Defence Force Megathread

[dimsum]

I realize that I’m posting all of these separate threads, so here’s a Megathread.

First article:

Defence chief makes unreserved apology for 'deficiencies' in support for veterans

General Angus Campbell said the courage of those who have come forward to share experiences with the commission was "deeply admirable".

www.abc.net.au

Mods: You can move articles over if it makes it easier.

 

[Kirkhill]

Aussie direction

Multi-Domain Operations in Australia’s Maritime Strategy: The Army, Navy, and Air Force Orient Their Efforts | Defense.info

The focus of the April 11., 2024 Williams Foundation seminar was on multi-domain operations in support of a maritime strategy. But each service focuses primarily on a particular domain and sees its role in terms of a maritime strategy from their perspective. What then really does multi-domain...

defense.info

The Army Role​

....The Australian Army is slated to shift its focus to the littorals

....“optimized for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability.” Aside from reducing the procurement of infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers, some of the top recommendations for the Australian Army were to speed up the procurement and increase the quantity of HIMARS, land-based maritime Strike systems and amphibious vessels.

....The 1st Brigade will be transformed into a light combat brigade, which will allow it to be “light, agile and quick to deploy in the littoral environment” and “support land-based long-range fires.” While Australia has ordered HIMARS, under LAND 4100 Phase 2 the Australian Army is looking to procure a land-based maritime strike capability…

The 7th and 3rd will become motorized and armored combat brigades, respectively. However, like 1st Brigade, the two also will focus on littoral and amphibious operations. To address these littoral missions, brand-new littoral lift groups are also slated to be created and collocated with the brigades in their respective basing locations. Littoral lift groups will host Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels, including both landing craft medium and heavy, which will be procured in Phases 1 and 2 LAND 8710…

....“the majority of the infrastructure which supports a maritime strategy is on land.” In that sense, littoral maneuver from one land location to another within the littoral maneuver space. Ports, airports, sensors, satellite dishes, terrestrial launch and recovery are land-based. For context, Australia has 59,000 kilometers of coast and 50% of our population live within a few kilometers of our coasts. Beyond are shores but within our sovereign area are 8,222 islands and numerous offshore installations.”

... “This includes government direction to establish a new long range fires regiment equipped with 36 HIMARS launchers and a littoral group of 18 medium watercraft, pending approval of a second long-range strike regiment, and eight heavy landing craft will be in service from the end of the decade.”

The Air Force Role​

... Given that the RAAF provides the air element for the Royal Australian Navy this is somewhat equivalent to a discussion of how the U.S. Navy’s air arm works with the fleet and then with the USAF, but it is different because the integration of the RAAF and the RAN is a key element of the operational realities of the ADF.

Their integration already is multi-domain

... “From an airpower viewpoint, we will operate at distance from our home bases from austere and remote locations across our north and operate deep into the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and the surrounding areas.”

And closing kill chains across a vast region highlights the need to integrate sensors to deliver to weapons effects across the combat chessboard. In effect, the RAAF provides both sensors and shooters in the maritime areas of operation, and sensors to enable the fleet and its targeting efforts as well.

....“The ability for airpower to deliver impactful projection within our maritime approaches requires a combination of effective defence, combined with a series of highly integrated multi-domain offensive counters as part of the integrated force and in conjunction with allies and partners. This is how airpower will deliver a strategy of denial in our key maritime approaches.”

The Navy Role​

... when focusing on the maritime domain, one is inherently focused on multi-domain strike. The maritime warfighting domain is shaped by strike whether coming from land, surface, subsurface or air domains, as well the cyber and space domains.

“To attain long range strike capabilities allows us to move from a strategy of defense to a strategy of deterrence through denial which signifies a national shift that aims to hold an adversary at risk a greater range raising a question in the adversary’s mind about whether they want to attempt to act against us.

....“So what does the maritime force bring to the fight?

....“A maritime force is able to be agile, mobile expeditionary scalable, sustainable, versatile, networked, and lethal. Maritime force provides critical advantages through their ability to use the oceans to maneuver and hide in the case of submarines, and the airspace and the space above that domain. Maritime force combines distributed fleet operations, and mobile expeditionary forces with sea control and sea denial capabilities.

Maritime force controls or denies the seas by destroying an adversary’s fleet or their associated air support. And in in the modern battle space even extends into space. It can contain it in areas that prevents meaningful operations prohibited from leaving port by controlling sea lines of communication. Maritime forces capable of controlling critical choke points enable joint forces to impose military and economic costs on the adversary.”

....The future of our strike capability needs to include the use of uncrewed systems. Navy is working with industry in exploring solutions through the autonomous warrior series of experimental exercises. And such systems will have the ability to strike deep against an adversary by deploying mines (edit - XLUUVs?) and other guided weapons by using sovereign Australian capabilities.”

In line with independent analysis’ recommendations, Navy’s future surface combatant fleet will comprise:

• 26 major surface combatants consisting of:
• Three Hobart class air warfare destroyers with upgraded air defence and strike capabilities
• Six Hunter class frigates to boost Navy’s undersea warfare and strike capabilities
• 11 new general purpose frigates that will provide maritime and land strike, air defence and escort capabilities
• Six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs) that will significantly increase Navy’s long-range strike capacity
• 25 minor war vessels to contribute to civil maritime security operations, which includes six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs).

Under the Turnbull Government’s new strategic enterprise approach, the Government has now mandated that where the high-end warfighting capabilities of the Aegis system are not required, a SAAB Australia developed combat management system will be used on all of Australia’s future ship projects.

This includes mandating a SAAB Australia combat management system on the upcoming Offshore Patrol Vessels, which will be built in Australia from 2018, and an Australian tactical interface developed by SAAB Australia for the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers when their Aegis combat management system is upgraded in the future, consistent with the 2016 Defence White Paper.

Echidna - Australian Spiny Anteater (of porcupines and hedgehogs).

 

[FJAG]

The 1st Brigade will be transformed into a light combat brigade, which will allow it to be “light, agile and quick to deploy in the littoral environment” and “support land-based long-range fires.” While Australia has ordered HIMARS, under LAND 4100 Phase 2 the Australian Army is looking to procure a land-based maritime strike capability…

The 7th and 3rd will become motorized and armored combat brigades, respectively. However, like 1st Brigade, the two also will focus on littoral and amphibious operations. To address these littoral missions, brand-new littoral lift groups are also slated to be created and collocated with the brigades in their respective basing locations. Littoral lift groups will host Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels, including both landing craft medium and heavy, which will be procured in Phases 1 and 2 LAND 8710…

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-09-28/adapting-army-australias-strategic-circumstances

Asymmetric brigades - how about that. Canada, are you watching this?

 

[dimsum]

Asymmetric brigades - how about that. Canada, are you watching this?

FYI, I treat Aussie white papers with as much confidence as I treat ours.

So do most ADF members.

 

[FJAG]

FYI, I treat Aussie white papers with as much confidence as I treat ours.

So do most ADF members.

Not sure if the 2023 Strategic Review constitutes a White Paper or no but it seems to have kicked off several matters - reducing the number Redback IFVs by 2/3, cancelling the SP howitzer program in exchange for HIMARS and returning the structure of the three active brigades back to where they were a dozen years ago before doing the "Copy Canada" generalist brigade structure.

I think that they may be paying attention on those matters.

 

[calculus]

AUKUS nuclear sub program in trouble. Can't say I'm surprised.

Start thinking now about alternatives to AUKUS Pillar 1 | The Strategist

The program to equip the Royal Australian Navy with nuclear submarines is in trouble. The takeaway: Australia must begin thinking now about what to do to avoid program failure. Why has this situation arisen? First, ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[Kirkhill]

FYI, I treat Aussie white papers with as much confidence as I treat ours.

So do most ADF members.

One advantage the Aussies have is that they regularly generate plans and update plans. Even if the plan is wrong at least they have a current plan. They seem to advance their structures more regularly as well.

 

[suffolkowner]

Asymmetric brigades - how about that. Canada, are you watching this?

is this Australia's second or third go around on this too? Seems like its a hard nut to crack for small militaries

 

[dimsum]

One advantage the Aussies have is that they regularly generate plans and update plans. Even if the plan is wrong at least they have a current plan.

That is why I think that this budget, as flawed as it may be, is good in that it stipulates reviews every 4 years.

I had a snarky bit about changing structures but decided against it.

 

[Kirkhill]

That is why I think that this budget, as flawed as it may be, is good in that it stipulates reviews every 4 years.

I had a snarky bit about changing structures but decided against it.

I like the 4 year review. I hope I live long enough to see one.

 

[dimsum]

I like the 4 year review. I hope I live long enough to see one.

Then again, it’s all academic (and a waste of staff work) if 4 years later, the govt of the day doesn’t care and actually change anything.

 

[FJAG]

is this Australia's second or third go around on this too? Seems like its a hard nut to crack for small militaries

As at 2011, the Australian army was organized into 3 active brigades, one mech, one motorized and 1 light. In addition there were ResF bdes. In 2011 they reorganized under Plan Beersheba into three active multirole symmetric brigades (more like bde groups as they each had their own arty, engr and sustainment and were capable of independent deployment)

There have been some changes since then such as the restructuring of 1 Div and Forces command

The recent plan sounds like going back to something similar to pre-Beersheba days.

 

[Fabius]

Plan Beersheba, from my recollection was specifically undertaken in that 2010-2012 timeframe based on the requirements from Iraq and Afghanistan to provide constant and consistent 6 month rotational forces of relatively small strength.

In genesis it was a very similar response to strategic and operational realities as was undertaken by the US Amy in the adoption of BCTs in the 2004-2005 timeframe.

I would see this new shift in similar light to the US shift back to Division and Corps. Symmetric forces are good for relatively small persistent deployments of a relatively fixed tactical nature. They don’t necessarily work for the requirements of LSCO. Hence why I think we are seeing this shift.

Unfortunately it’s a shift that I am not even sure the CA understands or recognizes.

 

[dimsum]

Caitland's husband died in the Taipan helicopter crash. She was told she'd find someone new

The final moments of the four victims are revealed for the first time at an inquiry investigating what went wrong in the fatal MRH-90 crash during a training exercise.

www.abc.net.au

Not a good look for the Australian Army.

 

[dimsum]

https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/federal-government-is-allowing-international-soldiers-to-join-the-adf/video/9266cf8057e1f8fdfa67ca2af1ec219e

Australia allowing permanent residents from FVEY countries to join the ADF.

One caveat - they can’t have served in another military, or else that’s Lateral Recruitment

 

[dimsum]

Australian Defence Force to fast-track transfers for US troops

Australia is streamlining a program that allows American troops and soldiers from other nations to transfer to its army, navy or air force, according to Australian Defence Force officials.

www.stripes.com

Now they’re growing the Lateral Recruitment route.

 

[dimsum]

The AUKUS submarine deal has been exposed as a monumental folly – is it time to abandon ship?

The lack of debate, not to say outrage, about the sheer cost of the AUKUS project is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the sorry submarine saga.

theconversation.com

I’m not sure I agree with the author that Australia has no enemies, or that the French subs would have been a better fit, but an interesting counterpoint nonetheless.

 

[FJAG]

The AUKUS submarine deal has been exposed as a monumental folly – is it time to abandon ship?

The lack of debate, not to say outrage, about the sheer cost of the AUKUS project is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the sorry submarine saga.

theconversation.com

I’m not sure I agree with the author that Australia has no enemies, or that the French subs would have been a better fit, but an interesting counterpoint nonetheless.

He sounds like someone with an axe to grind. The only point he makes that even remotely raised my eyebrows was the issue of the cost but without a comparison to the French contract that's comparing apples to nothing. Sovereignty - really? Being tied to French technology?

This para -

I am not convinced Australia needs to buy any submarines. This will no doubt strike those in Canberra’s strategic bubble as heretical, ill-informed and irresponsible. But it is noteworthy that our overall security did not seem to suffer while the ageing Collins class submarines were unavailable for four years.

- really sets the tone overall. He left out the word "naive" when describing what others think of him.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

When was our last White Paper?

 

[dapaterson]

When was our last White Paper?

The "Our North Strong and Free" update to "Strong Secure Engaged".