Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[Fishbone Jones]

Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.

David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role platform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?

Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.

I don't think UAVs will take our cockpits anytime soon.  But they will someday.

What? The end of the Rico Suave's. No more pilots at the bar waving their hands around like Kathleen Wynne, talking about their latest air encounter. Say it ain't so Max :facepalm: Give us some hope buddy.

 

[Baz]

David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role latform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?

No, that's the definition of the USAF's Global ISR.  Intelligence, surveillance, and recconaisance were defined long before that... that defintion came out of the first Persian Gulf War.

If that's what ISR is, why does the RCAF want to call MH and MPA ISR platforms?  Why does the USAF want to call AGS and Triton (BAMS) ISR.  To get control of them, that's why.

You keep licking that USAF ice cream; if you say it enough times, it must be true.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Baz,

Maybe that's why, but I hope not.  Should we call you ISR?  Probably not.  Are you capable of doing ISR? Yes.  In today's age, any platform is capable of doing ISR, passively or actively...  Your domestic affiliation should be based on your primary role.  In theater, it depends how we intend to use you.  Generally speaking, again, I think anything flying above a defined coordinated altitude should be under the theater ACC at the very least.

Army systems do ISR, so do hard Navy systems.  I don't think any Air Force is trying to control them. 

 

[rampage800]

Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.

and close proximity to troops, if it isn't in close proximity to troops then its BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction).

 

[Baz]

There are four main types of maneuvre formations in the US Army: Infantry, Armoured, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, plus the Combat Aviation Brigades.  All of the helicopters including Apches belong to Combat Aviation Brigades; should they belong to the ACC?

US Army Battlefield Surveillance Brigades have significant airborne ISR assets, including predators and the ability to control then.  As well, the ISTAR Battalions also have airborne ISR.  Should they belong to the ACC?

The Carrier Air Wing has four fighter squadrons, plus the Carrier Srike Group has up to four Tomahawk shooters.  Of course they should coordinate with the ACC for land strike, as part of the targeting, interdiction, and CAS plans, but should they belong to the ACC?  Even when doing maritme activites, like maritime strike, embargo, or convoy?  Isn't the expert for these activities the maritime surface warfare commander?


In the face of a true sub threat, should the MPAs belong to the ACC, even though the expert and main user is the MCC, who normally has a MAOC for just this purpose?

Would Air Forces give up control of fighters to the MCC in order to provide robust support for maritime strike ti a fleet in blue water, even though the MCC is the expert and has air control and tasking centers both ashore and afloat?  By the way, this is why Navies want to keep strike assets, including shore based, because they don't trust pure Air Forces to conduct maritime strike correctly.


However, Air Forces continuously fight to control all of that in the name of flexibilty and effeciency.  And that is why the other components don't trust the Air Forces to support, fight to keep their own platforms, and insist on keeping them under their control.

 

[SupersonicMax]

and close proximity to troops, if it isn't in close proximity to troops then its BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction).

This is not what every definition of CAS says, but if you say so...

Baz,

I think you are forgetting what the ACC is.  It doesn't mean Air Force.  He is just the commander of theater air assets.  He could be Navy or Army, depending on the focus of the operation.  To answer your questions:

1- If we don't want to employ them outside of Army support then no.

2- Airborne assets: yes (minus mini-UAVs). 

3- If they are purely employed in hard Navy roles, no.  Otherwise yes.

4- See 3.  If under ACC, a liaison team should be sent to CAOC.

5- No, they should be under the ACC, but the ACC should be a Navy Lt-Gen

Don't forget that the ACC is responsible for the coordination and employment of air assets to accomplish the mission as dictated by the JFC. 

 

[rampage800]

nah Max, actually it is the definition that all the ground guys use....I'm surprised with all your CAS experience you didn't know that though, you did work with SOF after all.

 

[SupersonicMax]

I have conducted type 3, bombs on coordinates CAS where there were no troops within 30 miles of the target.  While operations in proximity of troops is part of CAS , there is more to CAS than that...

 

[Baz]

He is not the commander of theatre air assets.  A theatre can have more than one JFC.

He is the JFCs Air Component Commander.  He executes  command and control over assinged assets, usually air but not always.  For instance, he may have C2 of theatre ballistic missile systems.

The other Component Commanders also execute C2 over assigned assets.  Those assets may be air assets, and frequently are.  The JFC will assign them as required for task completion.
Usuaaly, but not always, air will be coordinated by the ATO and ACO, published by the ACC, but that does not mean the ACC has C2 of assets not assigned.  A perfect example is srategic ISR assets.  They may show up in the ATO but they don't belong to the ACC, he is just coordinating them.

Therefore, it makes perfect sense to chop dedicated CAS to the LCC if/when required.  Land commanders want the leverage to ensure that happens so they fight the budget wars to have their own or at least have dedicated platforms.


Again, hard Air types continuously use flexibility, effeciency, and a warped view of unity of command in order to promote a view of the world that is contrary to true unity of command and span of control.

And a Naval MAOC would not be a LGen... it might be some type of Admiral but also could quite easily be a Naval Captain.


As well, if I were embarked and had to force a passage, I'd pray to god my maritimr strike assets were USN and controlled either embarked or from a MAOC, and not USAF or RCAF, whether they had Joint Strike Fighter or not; and not because I'm religious.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Again, the Air Force doesn't understand Joint. 

Pretty broad brush. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

What is an MPA?

And I for one never saw the point of giving the Air Force ISR control - I always figured that was best for ground folks (unless AWACS etc is considered ISR)

http://globalnews.ca/video/861997/tour-the-cp-140-aurora/  for a brief look inside. 

I'd say you need both ground and air right?  I don't know of many battlespaces that are 1 dimensional afterall.

We (the LRP "we") are capable of providing "stuff" that a ground unit simply can't.  And vice versa of course; like any Army, Navy or Air Force asset, we have our own Cap's & Lim's.

LRP assets work with ground units.  You just don't see it in the news.  Here's a short read on the stuff from the Libya/ OP Mobile.

http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/2012-Vol1/Iss3-Summer/Sections/05-Punching_Above_its_Weight_The_CP140_Aurora_Experience_Within_Task_Force_Libeccio_and_Operation_MOBILE_e.pdf

:2c:

 

[SupersonicMax]

Replace theater by operation.

From the JP 1-02 (yeah a US doc...  The only thing I can find on GP Net) JFACC: The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

Bottom line:  it depends how you define Air Operations.  In the end, the "J" in JFACC means joint.  It will be operation dependant (as it should).

The JP 3-30 (again, US) really highlights that C2 relationships depend upon what you intend to do with the assets.  It also says that army air/avn assets should always be under the ACC, which I disagree.  It should be, like with other services, situation dependant. 

 

[Baz]

...and the JFC is free to assign his assets as he sees fit, within the limitations set by the force provider.

A full up ACC is capable of C2 of an air heavy jpint force by itself;  and conversely full up LCCs and MCCs are capable of doing the same, including of assigned air forces.  That is the current NATO command structure.

But you are continuing to miss the point, the other environments don't trust the Air Force to think jointly, and so continually take measures to ensure they have support when having it is life or death. 

 

[SupersonicMax]

You keep saying that other services don't trust the Air Force in providing adequate Air.  Can you expand on why or when this distrust started happening?

 

[Baz]

It's not that people don't trust the Air Forces to provide adequate air.  Its that they don't trust that when it isn't dedicated, during certain parts of the fight, that the Air heavy ACCs will prioritize it correctly.  Therefore they want their own.

As I've said, the accuracy of the modern weapons and the flexibility of delivery has given the commanders the capability to directly strike the adversaries center of gravity at a time and place of their choosing.  This is an incredible strength of modern air power.

However, that isn't always the tool required.  When other commanders are the supported one, and the ACC is supporting, those other commanders want control of the assets as part of their plan, so they aren't assuming too high risks.  Ironically, you've reinforced the concern with this chain of posts: "the best way to employ CAS is to retask aircraft going to strike other targets."  Problem is, that leaves the priority decision to some faceless Air guy on the ACC floor.

This isn't new... its been going on ever sense the advent of operational air power.  Strategic vs operation vs tactical: heavy bombers in direct support in Normandy and the resulting problems, tactical air in France and how deep they should be allowed to interdict, weight of effort in Vietnam between supporting air and strikes against the north.  In the first Persian Gulf war there was a realization that Air had become precise enough to in effect win the operational battle, and ever since the USAF's mantra has been "everything to support the operational air plan."  The continuing undertone that guys in contact want, in this order (my understanding, again I'm not a CAS guy), Apache, Cobra, A-10, Marine Harrier, Marine F/A-18, USN F/A-18, Strike Eagle, (Spectre somewhere in there but I'm not sure where) and then whatever else is available.  The unfortunate lack of support from the USAF for Joint STARS, as its forte is battlefield interdiction and direct support of the Air-Ground war, and the USAF don't see those as core roles, and they don't think J-STARS is a very good ISR platform (I've had long talks with JSTARS on this subject because NATO AGS, where I worked for a while, is a J-STARS like Global Hawk... the Air types think its a horrible ISR platform but then can't understand why it could be given up to the Army or Navy for surveillance ops, even though it is Alliance Ground Surveillance).

Everything you are saying about the operational use of Airpower is correct, and its an incredible tool.  But when Commander's have planned for direct support of their maneuver plan they want direct support, not support at the discretion of the ACC, because they are assuming the risk.


Edited to add: There's two reasons I care about this subject: in NATO at both AGS and Targeting I was at the heart of these types of discussions, and too many Air types are literally willing to give up everything else to enable Operational use of Air power, leaving us with only one tool; and my home community, MH, has been withering on the vine because good chunks of the RCAF don't care because its not their core role, and good chunks of the RCN don't care because they don't control it.

 

[Edward Campbell]

... the RCAF don't care because its not their core role, and good chunks of the RCN don't care because they don't control it.

This takes us all the way back to 1975, when the unified (joint) commands, MARCOM and MOBCOM, were stripped of their organic air components in order to create a three star "air command" of equal status to the other two. It was both operational and administrative nonsense, but it satisfied the egos - nothing more was at stake - of a couple of elderly air element generals. Several air element generals argued, vociferously, against it ~ and then were posted into dead end jobs.

What Baz is describing - lack of support from anywhere, for maritime and army aviation, was the result.


Edited to add:

Mods: should/could this thread be moved to a Canadian Air Force page?

 

[Baz]

ERC: Yep... because we had to create an Air Force that controlled all air assets we put everything else 2nd string to the "core" Air Force roles.

 

[Journeyman]

I have planned and executed CAS probably a hundred times with Special Forces .......

Really?  In a real-world combat operation?  ???

You keep saying that other services don't trust the Air Force in providing adequate Air.  Can you expand on why or when this distrust started happening?

As I've mentioned, painfully often now, when we had to rely on the USAF because the CF-18 world didn't show up for "Canada's longest war." 

Fortunately, we could rely upon them; again, as mentioned, the A-10 and F-15E people appeared to enjoy actually applying their profession.

 

[Transporter]

Really?  In a real-world combat operation?  ???
As I've mentioned, painfully often now, when we had to rely on the USAF because the CF-18 world didn't show up for "Canada's longest war." 

Fortunately, we could rely upon them; again, as mentioned, the A-10 and F-15E people appeared to enjoy actually applying their profession.

I don't believe you can blame the CF-18 community or the RCAF for the fact that the CF didn't have fast air in the fight. I know from experience that as early as 2002, the CF-18 community and Air Force were chomping at the bit, looking for every possible angle to exploit, in an effort to be involved in Afghanistan. I can't vouch for their veracity to do so in later years, but had they shown up, maybe you'd have gotten all the support you needed, when you needed it. I get your overall point, but I don't believe you can say you don't trust them if they never had an opportunity to gain that trust. I guess we'll never know what might have been.

 

[tomahawk6]

The Army and Air Force had an agreement where the former wouldnt have fixed wing combat aircraft.This left the USAF with the CAS role.With the advent of attack helos,the Army has been able to provide close support of ground units.The arrangement has worked well IMO.