What is the British Army really for today?

[MarkOttawa]

Sir Humphrey's Thin Pinstriped Line blog is back (could we deploy even a brigade?)--excerpts:

How Do You Solve a Problem Like a Deployable Division?
...
What this quick canter through history shows us is two key issues -firstly the UK has sustained an Army of a size to combat external threats, and deployed them primarily overseas. As the threats have receded, so has the size of the Army. The second issue is that the Army remains determined to see the deployment of a division globally as the benchmark against which its performance is measured.
The manpower issue is the first challenge – the Army has not responded well to attempts to reduce its size, and has fought a strong rear-guard action to prevent further headcount reductions. The 2015 election was fought on a clear promise to not cut the size of the Regular Armed Forces, and to keep the Army at a strength of 82,000 people.

The problem for the planners is twofold. Firstly, there is no clear sense of what these 82,000 people are needed for. Secondly, there isn’t enough money to equip all of them to the right standard to be uniformly deployable...

The commitment in 2015 to not cutting the Army ahead of the SDSR led to the outcome where the Army was forced to keep soldiers it couldn’t afford to equip, and perhaps more importantly couldn’t easily identify a role for, in its structure for primarily political reasons. Speak candidly to most Army officers and many of them recognised that an Army of 82,000 makes sense if you have a clear role for it, and can afford to give everyone the same level of equipment.

Instead the outcome was a fudge, whereby the two-tier Army was formalised as a small high readiness force, with a much larger regeneration force with lower readiness and equipment held behind to do defence engagement roles. The various restructuring seemed aimed at trying to maximise some form of warfighting capability, while recognising that politically it would be impossible to carry out deep reform of the Army by scrapping ‘capbadges’ – nothing riles the Conservative backbenches more than knowing their local Battalion of ‘Loamshires’ is at risk.

How do we solve a problem like a Division?

The 2015 SDSR also committed the Army to be able to deploy a Division globally at 6 months’ notice as a ‘best effort’ commitment. This felt like a sop to the Generals and backbenchers who felt that this was the ‘great power’ standard to which the Army should be judged [Canadian reserve regiments?]...

This...leaves the Army in a bit of a quandary. It has focused on delivery of a global division as its benchmark at a time when the Politicians simply do not want to do this. It has focused on keeping 82,000 troops when it can’t afford to keep them all equipped, and to meet the political priority of protecting certain Regimental capbadges, it has been forced to sacrifice its far more valuable logistics, communications and other enablers that keep it as a genuinely effective force...

The Army today faces a structural and existential crisis. Too large to be properly funded, and politically barred from restructuring itself (although the recent 2017 manifesto pledge is merely to preserve the headline strength of the forces, not the individual services, so there is still hope). Denied a credible enemy that it can prepare to fight against, it has no clear rationale for why it needs to operate at a large scale when the political decision makers are increasingly set against boots on the ground for long term commitment...
https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.ca/2017/08/how-do-you-solve-problem-like.html

And note Canadian politicians' increasing reliance on our special forces.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[daftandbarmy]

Sir Humphrey's Thin Pinstriped Line blog is back (could we deploy even a brigade?)--excerpts:

And note Canadian politicians' increasing reliance on our special forces.

Mark
Ottawa

This is a good problem: no threat to national/ global survival on the scale of the Cold War. However, the challenge for all of us remains... how to be ready without costing too much....

 

[Kirkhill]

There is no need for an army.

Is there a need to be able to destroy an army?

And what is the most efficient, fastest, cheapest means of doing that?

 

[MarkOttawa]

Friend of mine commented:

The issue can be re-thought by asking whether a modern army should think of deployable divisions or brigade combat teams.  The US went heavily towards brigade building blocks but seems now to think that possible confrontations in Korea, "elsewhere in Asia" or NATO area Europe will require divisions.  However, service and national cultures weigh heavily and Sir Humphrey describes these pressures very well.

While the future is not that predictable, can anyone see a requirement for Canada to deploy a combat division anywhere?  We might need a divisional HQ [i.e. fausse division--regional command not a true formation] in the event of natural disaster but before our two-thirds brigade in Afghanistan, the last real combat role in Korea was a brigade in a composite division.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[George Wallace]

And what is the most efficient, fastest, cheapest means of doing that?

A civilian bureaucracy overseeing purchases and training.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

While history does not repeat itself it does rhyme. The British have deployed divisions abroad on combat operations in each of the last three decades (Falklands, Gulf War, Iraq War 2003). It would be a mistake to think of war in terms of only brigades.  It seems that larger NATO formations with a conventional high-intensity focus may be back in business.

I understand that their are all sorts of organizational pressures within the UK military, but I think it makes sense for the UK to maintain the capability to deploy a Division. You can't just stand that capability up overnight, but you might just need it quickly.

 

[pbi]

There is no need for an army.

Is there a need to be able to destroy an army?

And what is the most efficient, fastest, cheapest means of doing that?

OK: I'll bite.

And how many times have  we heard that statement, and how many ill advised force restructure programs or "economies" have been inflicted on (Western) militaries, only to have to be reversed or undone when reality rears Its ugly head.

I would offer two examples:. The first of these was the belief in the 1930s that airpower in general, and the multi-engined bomber in particular, had rendered ground combat at least "secondary" and possibly obsolete. It took WW2 and the massive destruction of cities and military targets to prove this belief misguided. Armies survived and became even more lethal.

Later, in the 1950s, when the threat of atomic war began to evolve into a real strategic consideration, similar arguments arose again. Ground combat and armies were once again suspect: why keep big ground forces around when you can just drop a few nukes? As usual, the Air Force was only too happy to step up and do it all.

And, while we certainly can't dismiss the political and thus strategic value of nukes, war since those days has relied to the greatest extent on ground forces of various sorts.

I don't think there is a really "efficient and effective" way to destroy an army simply because of all the services it is the most resilient, the most flexible and the most capable of absorbing large amounts of damage but continuing to fight.

 

[pbi]

While history does not repeat itself it does rhyme. The British have deployed divisions abroad on combat operations in each of the last three decades (Falklands, Gulf War, Iraq War 2003). It would be a mistake to think of war in terms of only brigades.  It seems that larger NATO formations with a conventional high-intensity focus may be back in business.

I understand that their are all sorts of organizational pressures within the UK military, but I think it makes sense for the UK to maintain the capability to deploy a Division. You can't just stand that capability up overnight, but you might just need it quickly.

:goodpost:

Both the UK and Canada would do well to remember this. If you read about the Canadian Army in 1939 to 1942 as it built up and prepared to go into major combat operations, the biggest problem was not the courage and skill of the troops, nor the ability of the leaders at unit and below.  As Montgomery observed when he had the CA in Southeastern Command, it was their poor formation C2, weak or nonexistent higher staff skills, and bad formation command. Not too surprising from an Army that had not even had a "real" Div HQ since 1919.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

OK: I'll bite.

And how many times have  we heard that statement, and how many ill advised force restructure programs or "economies" have been inflicted on (Western) militaries, only to have to be reversed or undone when reality rears Its ugly head.

I would offer two examples:. The first of these was the belief in the 1930s that airpower in general, and the multi-engined bomber in particular, had rendered ground combat at least "secondary" and possibly obsolete. It took WW2 and the massive destruction of cities and military targets to prove this belief misguided. Armies survived and became even more lethal.

Later, in the 1950s, when the threat of atomic war began to evolve into a real strategic consideration, similar arguments arose again. Ground combat and armies were once again suspect: why keep big ground forces around when you can just drop a few nukes? As usual, the Air Force was only too happy to step up and do it all.

And, while we certainly can't dismiss the political and thus strategic value of nukes, war since those days has relied to the greatest extent on ground forces of various sorts.

I don't think there is a really "efficient and effective" way to destroy an army simply because of all the services it is the most resilient, the most flexible and the most capable of absorbing large amounts of damage but continuing to fight.

Humans live on land and while they must be able to fight in the air and on the sea, the ability to take and hold ground is ultimately what determines the outcome of wars.

This being said, Canada is far from our adversaries.  We have time to build an Army, we don't necessarily have time to build an Air Force or Navy which is why I think these services should take primacy over any Army.  Offence wins games, Defence wins championships. 

 

[Infanteer]

Offence wins games, Defence wins championships.

Old dead Carl and I both disagree.  Go the Book 6, Chap 1.  Clausewitz states defence is the stronger form, but the negative form.  Offence is the positive form, because it is the decisive form.  All good defences must ultimately go to the offence.

Defence wins games, Offence wins championships.

Case in point 1:  1941-45.  Defending Britain from air attack in the Battle of Britain won the "game" (preserving the UK), but attacking into Central Germany won the "championship" (ending the war).

Case in point 2:  1973.  Holding the Sinai from the Egyptians won the "game" (giving Israel mobilization time), but attacking across the Suez and encircling a field Army won the "championship" (ended the war).

Case in point 3:  1965-1975.  Defending Vietnam from North Vietnamese guerrilla (NVA) and main force (NVA) infiltration may have won "games" (repeated operations in South Vietnam preserved it), but the failure of the US to affect the behaviour of North Vietnam through offensive action led it to lose the "championship" by leaving the field (North Vietnam ended the war on its terms)

Case in point 4:  1982.  Trying to defend the Falklands with a small Marine force and relying on diplomacy lost the Brits the "game," but the Task Force sailed and conducted an amphibious assault on the Falklands to win the "championship" (causing an Argentine surrender).

 

[daftandbarmy]

Britain's great existential crisis, one they've been experiencing since WW2, is the transition from an independent world power with its own colonies to, like Canada, a political and military sidekick of the USA.

A colonial power requires an 'Expeditionary Army' army, like they had prior to WW1. These are, essentially, conflict tourists who drift in and out as the political situation demands. Regardless, the size of their Empire, and relative thriftiness because the Navy was always the main effort in the global empire business, meant that they needed an approach to recruit and maintain a large Army cheaply through an extended network of relationships (the people supply chain) which, of course, led the to a regimental system based on local armouries and highly identifiable regiments connected (politically and tenaciously) with specific geographical areas of the country (sound familiar?).

Since WW2, they've been an army to defend the withdrawal from empire while ramping up to defeat Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This gave them delusions of American like grandeur as they filled up BAOR with thousands of troops, tank, guns, planes and the like. When The Wall came down, they essentially reverted to pre-WW1 imperatives.... without the massive empire. Then, when Northern Ireland went quiet in the early 2000s (and they had 16 + battalions of Infantry plus other arms and services there at any one time for over 30 years), they had even less reason to keep the 'fish and chip mobs' in full pay.

The Falklands War may have, in fact, been an impediment to modernization as it's frequently invoked as a reason to maintain a global strike force that is not too dissimilar to the US Marine Corps. Various bumps up to cover Afghanistan and Iraq haven't helped either, as they've essentially been impediments to longer term strategic rationalization.

And then add the independent nuclear deterrent, and Brexit, and the lowest recruiting levels in decades, to all that and you have a great career for military bureaucrats who are required to figure it all out for them  

 

[pbi]

This being said, Canada is far from our adversaries.  We have time to build an Army, we don't necessarily have time to build an Air Force or Navy which is why I think these services should take primacy over any Army.  Offence wins games, Defence wins championships.

As far as the Defence of Canada goes, I agree 100% that it is primarily the job of the RCF and RCN. If the CA is doing it, it's too late.

But, since the actual defence of Canada has really occupied so little of our military history in terms of combat operations, we can't abandon the other major consideration: the need to live up to our obligations and committments (and to be ready for gthe Unexpected) by having a solid and credible land expeditionary capability.  I think the UK retains a similar expeditionary requirement.

It is a good question how much time we (or, in the case of this discussion, the UK) might have to build up an army of any credibility (much less mount, deploy and sustain it) should Mr Putin and Gang decide to act up. Or North Korea. Or wherever.

"Events, dear boy, events"

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Old dead Carl and I both disagree.  Go the Book 6, Chap 1.  Clausewitz states defence is the stronger form, but the negative form.  Offence is the positive form, because it is the decisive form.  All good defences must ultimately go to the offence.

Defence wins games, Offence wins championships.

Case in point 1:  1941-45.  Defending Britain from air attack in the Battle of Britain won the "game" (preserving the UK), but attacking into Central Germany won the "championship" (ending the war).

Case in point 2:  1973.  Holding the Sinai from the Egyptians won the "game" (giving Israel mobilization time), but attacking across the Suez and encircling a field Army won the "championship" (ended the war).

Case in point 3:  1965-1975.  Defending Vietnam from North Vietnamese guerrilla (NVA) and main force (NVA) infiltration may have won "games" (repeated operations in South Vietnam preserved it), but the failure of the US to affect the behaviour of North Vietnam through offensive action led it to lose the "championship" by leaving the field (North Vietnam ended the war on its terms)

Case in point 4:  1982.  Trying to defend the Falklands with a small Marine force and relying on diplomacy lost the Brits the "game," but the Task Force sailed and conducted an amphibious assault on the Falklands to win the "championship" (causing an Argentine surrender).

I like "Old Dead Carl" going to use that one

Ultimately, all of the examples you cited were won or lost through attrition, either physical or moral. 

Having a strong Defence buys time to allow sufficient combat power to be massed to defeat an adversary. 

Nazi Germany was on the Offensive for the first three years of WWII; however, strong Defence and Geography hemmed them in and they were unable to break out.  They were never able to secure key terrain or vital ground necessary to achieve actual victory.

Offence and defence are complimentary; however, strong Defence affords protection of key terrain and vital ground which is what will ultimately allow a nation to win a war. 

I believe Western militaries overly concern themselves with the Offence because of our false belief in "decisive battle" and the idea that we can deliver a quick blow to defeat an adversary.  An idea that is all the more ridiculous given the possession of nuclear weapons by basically anyone with any sort of real military power.

As far as the Defence of Canada goes, I agree 100% that it is primarily the job of the RCF and RCN. If the CA is doing it, it's too late.

But, since the actual defence of Canada has really occupied so little of our military history in terms of combat operations, we can't abandon the other major consideration: the need to live up to our obligations and committments (and to be ready for gthe Unexpected) by having a solid and credible land expeditionary capability.  I think the UK retains a similar expeditionary requirement.

It is a good question how much time we (or, in the case of this discussion, the UK) might have to build up an army of any credibility (much less mount, deploy and sustain it) should Mr Putin and Gang decide to act up. Or North Korea. Or wherever.

"Events, dear boy, events"

The one thing about land powers that nobody really ever admits is that all roads have an end.  I can sail a boat or fly a plane around the world, a road will only take me so far.  Putin can drive his tanks all the way to Charbourg, from a Canadian perspective, big deal.

Anglo-Saxon military prowess is built on control of the sea and now the air, this should remain our strategy for the future.

 

[Infanteer]

Having a strong Defence buys time to allow sufficient combat power to be massed to defeat an adversary.

...by doing what?

Offence and defence are complimentary; however, strong Defence affords protection of key terrain and vital ground which is what will ultimately allow a nation to win a war.

...by doing what?

The one thing about land powers that nobody really ever admits is that all roads have an end.  I can sail a boat or fly a plane around the world, a road will only take me so far.  Putin can drive his tanks all the way to Charbourg, from a Canadian perspective, big deal.

Anglo-Saxon military prowess is built on control of the sea and now the air, this should remain our strategy for the future.

Read Mackinder.  Depends on one's perspective of geopolitics.  A few games of Axis and Allies shows the importance of the Heartland.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

...by doing what?

...by doing what?

I see your point, in order to win, you must by necessity be able to generate offence.  I agree with this; however, I guess where my contention with this discussion is the how?  I don't see a need for Canada to possess a large standing Army based on our geographical location.  Likewise, I don't see the need for the UK to maintain a large standing army at the expense of their other services which provide far better guarantees to their security.   

France doesn't even pretend to want or need to fight a large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy.  Their army is for intervention in their overseas possessions or internal security, for the rest, this is what Nuclear deterrence is for.

Read Mackinder.  Depends on one's perspective of geopolitics.  A few games of Axis and Allies shows the importance of the Heartland.

Played probably about a hundred games of A&A over the years.  Endless amounts of cheap Infantry in Moscow does a pretty good job protecting the heartland while a focus on sea power eventually wins the day for the Allies.  I also have a love hate relationship with that game because it essentially ignores the geographic realities of combat. 

I took a lot of geography courses in University so I'm familiar with Mackinder (thanks Dr. Luciuk).  A good book to read is "The Revenge of Geography" by Kaplan which I think does a very good job in the first part of the book outlining the limits of land based combat power. 

Talking about Mackinder:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island commands the world."
(Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150)

Napoleon and Hitler both tried and failed.  The Soviets were more successful but even they failed.  Trying to command the Heartland is a fool's errand as there are too many cultural intersections and different groups of people for it to be even possible.  It's why the Stans are all screwed up, the Caucusus is a quagmire, the Chinese are having trouble controlling the Uyghurs. 

 

[Kirkhill]

MacKinder's Problem: Population of Eurasia = 4.618 Billion ca 2011.  Population of the Oceans = 0.

MacKinder's Rulers have to secure the consent of 4.618 billion independent actors in order to implement their strategy.

Mahan's Rulers only have to keep other Rulers off the waves.

 

[Infanteer]

Trying to command the Heartland is a fool's errand

Lol.  A few games of classic Risk makes that one apparent.

Can the argument be made that North America is the new Heartland....  Probably not, with the way world economic power is shifting to SE Asia.  :dunno:

 

[Infanteer]

I don't see a need for Canada to possess a large standing Army based on our geographical location.  Likewise, I don't see the need for the UK to maintain a large standing army at the expense of their other services which provide far better guarantees to their security.

That's one approach.  The leadership of Canada and the UK were saying that in the 1930s, and it didn't help them very much.  One could also argue that there is need for a respectable intervention element and the capability to raise and direct "large standing forces" so we're not forced to relearn things (at the cost of blood and treasure) if we need to mobilize again.
   

France doesn't even pretend to want or need to fight a large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy.  Their army is for intervention in their overseas possessions or internal security, for the rest, this is what Nuclear deterrence is for.

Not quite accurate.  The new reforms (Au Contact) balance the two Divisions with heavy, medium, and light formations.  The 2 x Heavy Brigades (2 and 7) along with the NATO/EU HQs they maintain are very much oriented towards "large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy."

 

[Kirkhill]

That's one approach.  The leadership of Canada and the UK were saying that in the 1930s, and it didn't help them very much.  One could also argue that there is need for a respectable intervention element and the capability to raise and direct "large standing forces" so we're not forced to relearn things (at the cost of blood and treasure) if we need to mobilize again.
   

Not quite accurate.  The new reforms (Au Contact) balance the two Divisions with heavy, medium, and light formations.  The 2 x Heavy Brigades (2 and 7) along with the NATO/EU HQs they maintain are very much oriented towards "large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy."

Large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy.....

The French Army on the eve of the German attack in 1940 was commanded by General Maurice Gamelin with its headquarters in Vincennes, on the outskirts of Paris. It consisted of 117 divisions with 94 committed to the North-Eastern front of operations.

I keep hearing about this "large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy"  but when France goes from 117 Divs to 2 with a total of 2 Heavy Brigades,  when Russia has 33 Motor Rifle Brigades and a couple of Tank Divisions, all mostly equipped the same as they were in Brezhnev's day but with less than a million troops - when both Russia and China have to be concerned about the nonsense on the Korean peninsula - I am not really seeing much of a "large scale" tendency any where.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy.....

I keep hearing about this "large scale conventional land war against a peer enemy"  but when France goes from 117 Divs to 2 with a total of 2 Heavy Brigades,  when Russia has 33 Motor Rifle Brigades and a couple of Tank Divisions, all mostly equipped the same as they were in Brezhnev's day but with less than a million troops - when both Russia and China have to be concerned about the nonsense on the Korean peninsula - I am not really seeing much of a "large scale" tendency any where.

I see it the same way Chris Pook.  We keep talking about this large scale conventional war but all the signs point elsewhere and everyone seems to be downsizing, even the PLA.

That's one approach.  The leadership of Canada and the UK were saying that in the 1930s, and it didn't help them very much.  One could also argue that there is need for a respectable intervention element and the capability to raise and direct "large standing forces" so we're not forced to relearn things (at the cost of blood and treasure) if we need to mobilize again.

Or did it help them?  Operation Sea Lion never happened and the Germans were never even really close and most historians agree that it would have failed.  Stay the heck out of the continent has been the British way long before WWII and the proof is in the outcomes.