Michael O'Leary said:
An interesting look at the bombing campaign can also be found in:
Castles, Battles, and Bombs: How Economics Explains Military History
Jurgen Brauer & Hubert Van Tuyll
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0-226-07164-2
"Chapter 6. The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II"
I read it online today. An American book which relies heavily on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey: "Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea, its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy’s greatest naval threat – the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority made possible the success of the Allied invasion in Normandy (June 6, 1944). It brought the economy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy’s front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces. It brought home to the German people the full impact of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will be lasting."
Also recommended: "No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945"
When one reads about the economics of the Battle of Berlin, Harris seemed like a gambler doubling up on every throw:
"It will be seen that the enemy has irretrievably lost 1,000,000 man years. This represents no less than 36 per cent of the industrial effort that would have been put out by these towns if they had remained unmolested. ... Expressing these losses in another way, 2,400,000,000 man-hours have been lost for an expenditure of 116,500 tons of bombs claimed dropped, and this amounts to an average return for every ton of bombs dropped of 20,500 lost man-hours, or rather more than one quarter of the time spent in building a Lancaster. ... This being so, a Lancaster has only to go to a German city once to wipe off its own capital cost, and the results of all subsequent sorties will be clear profit." -- Air Staff Intelligence Report, February 19, 1944
The electronic aids, such as
Oboe which had ensured victory in the Battle of the Ruhr, were not available over Berlin.
Political as well as economic reasons were explained at aircrew briefings:
"As far as Dresden goes, that was the first time that the commander of the station came and gave us a political reason for the raid. It only happened just prior to take off on the Dresden raid. He came to explain to us that the Nazis had convinced the German people that at the end of WW1 their armed forces had remained still on foreign soil and basically undefeated and that they had been betrayed by politicians at home. He then pointed to the cord running across the map to Dresden and said, 'Never again will any future German government be able to say that the country was fairly well intact but still undefeated."
"Battlefields in the Air: Canadians in the Allied Bomber Command":
http://books.google.ca/books?id=NH1wx1cF7x0C&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=%22as+far+as+dresden+goes,+that+was+the+first+time%22&source=bl&ots=q1gGWXGC0B&sig=ae-2awJd0ApK7O3eSXuUWPsnqU0&hl=en&ei=LzvgTfr-KufY0QGBrJG_Cg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22as%20far%20as%20dresden%20goes%2C%20that%20was%20the%20first%20time%22&f=false
The briefing notes went on to say, "...and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."
Perhaps most significant of all, in a 1971 interview, Albert Speer stated that strategic bombing created "an armaments emergency in Germany which ruled out a major program to develop the atomic bomb."
"Bomber Harris" by Dudley Saward ( 1984 ) page 308.