US Marines Study 2 Gun Platoons

[tomahawk6]

This article was taken from Janes Defense Weekly.

USMC studies two-gun howitzer platoons

Daniel Wasserbly JDW Staff Reporter
Quantico, Virginia

Key Points

The USMC is experimenting with small M777 howitzer platoons tailored to support distributed operations
Plans would see current six-gun batteries split into three platoons
The US Marine Corps (USMC) is working to determine the validity of creating M777 howitzer platoons to provide fire support during highly distributed operations like those in Afghanistan.
An initial experiment began during the last week of August and runs through the first week of September at Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in California. These preliminary assessments are focusing on the organisation of personnel and equipment that is required for an artillery unit to operate at the platoon level.
Officials hope to determine the necessary manpower that platoon commanders would need to constantly operate this unit in combat scenarios. Artillery batteries generally have six howitzers and the USMC is looking at a battery organised around three two-gun platoons.
Vince Goulding, director of the USMC Warfighting Lab's experiment division, said: "We have companies operating literally 100 miles from their battalion headquarters" and a unitary artillery battery with six howitzers simply cannot support all of those units.
"What we're trying to figure out are ways to provide timely, accurate, volume surface fires on the distributed battlefield," he told Jane's on 25 August at an annual expeditionary warfare wargame in Quantico, Virginia.
Close air support (CAS) is another option to reinforce those manoeuvre elements but it is beholden to environmental conditions, whereas surface fires from the M777 can be used at night or in poor weather.
Still, Goulding noted that adding artillery platoons would introduce a new level of complexity to the commander's job and would probably require some personnel shifts.
For example, a howitzer platoon probably needs other troops from the company to provide local security because artillerymen would be busy with their specific tasks and this sort of unit - with multiple trucks and noisy 155 mm guns - would draw attention to itself.
To better understand this and other challenges, the next step is to evaluate an infantry company commander's ability to lead this sort of formation during an experiment as part of the 'Rim of the Pacific' exercise in Hawaii in July 2010. Among other things, this exercise will provide a forum to assess how a commander would deploy the platoons and associated equipment.

 

[GAP]

I think it still comes down to mobility and footprint....Marine operations are still based on high mobility...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Up here we call them a reserve artillery battery 

 

[Old Sweat]

This often was the situation for our guns, especially in the early days. At certain stages, the use of two gun troops (a troop is the same as a platoon in general) was the norm for Canadian batteries with surprisingly large distances between the two or three troops. Gun positions were either located with other Canaidan and/or Allied elements or deployed by themselves. I won't get into organizational or tactical details of the deployment, but in the latter case the troop was responsible for its own defence.

 

[Kat Stevens]

I know absolutely Jack about Arty stuff, but I just have to ask;  Does it really take 30 plus people, all ranks, to serve two guns?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

For the 105 it was a 7 man crew, not sure for the 155, then you need a CP and a Troop Warrant/ TSM, that's at least 4 people. Add in the ammo resuppy means at least 2 trucks, 1 -2 persons each, so bare minumun is 20, although I have run a gun with 3 people, you are bound to make mistakes.

 

[Petard]

The USMC are adapting to the situation and are actively seeking assistance from Cdn Artillery units that have deployed.
The Cdn LO at the US Artillery School in FT Sill confirmed this recently with me while we were discusing some other issues with the Cdn Artillery School.

Unfortunately some people get the idea from a snippet they see on the news of gunners in a FOB blasting away without any PPE on, that they are experts on Artillery TTPs and the Artillery doesn't need as many people as they have.
Consequently I sill hear from time to time someone challenging the notion that the Tp needs 30 people or even 10 man gun dets.

The Cdn gun Troop has just enough to look after that brace of guns, barely, looking after their own security sometimes is a big factor in this. Gun postions have been attacked, and gun Tps on the move have been ambushed.
Anyone who has tried to manhandle the M777 in uneven ground, or worse in mud (and it does get muddy in Afghanistan too), wouldn't doubt this need for 10 man dets. I, along with 3 AIGs from the School, were the first ones trained by the US NETT in Ft Sill on the M777 in the late summer/fall of 2005, and despite our first hand experience we got challenged numerous times on the need for 10 man dets by our own Corps, telling people this need is valid still to this day sometimes doesn't get the point across, but seeing often is believing. Fortunately I got a video from the 1st roto's Battery Commander of one of his gun dets in Afghanistan struggling to shift their gun's bearing of fire, at one point the have to double man the gun to move it; invariably after watching it any critic of our numbers shuts his yap.

Our Gunners have seen a lot. The Marines have recognized the value of our gunners experience, and it says a lot that they are respectfully looking to them for lessons learned, hopefully our own Army won't forget them either or the important role the Artillery has played in this mission

 

[Kat Stevens]

Well consider my yap shut then.

 

[Petard]

Ahh, I ain't picking on you Kat!

When I wrote it I was thinking more about some Ottawa cats, who want to question something but don't want an answer.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't have ready access to Blackburn's WW2 trilogy to verify the info but I seem to recall a vignette late on in 1945 where he described his Regiment tasked to fire harassing fire.  The duty gun crew consisted of one (1) gunner on a 25 pdr setting, loading, laying, firing, discarding, setting and whatever else the arty types do to make things go bang.

Obviously not a recommended practice but it seems to suggest to me that large gun crews are designed to maintain a high rate of fire throughout a prolonged engagement - vice the short, sharp, shocks that seem to be the order of the day currently.

 

[Petard]

It is a busy gun det when they are firing, and sometimes even today the fire missions can last hours.

The M777, despite being called a Light Weight Towed Howitzer, and for a 155 it is, still is almost 5 tons.

The large gun det is needed to get it into and out of action, and to sustain fire, the ammunition is quite heavy too.

The newer aspect, being relearned, is force protection, which has been somewhat neglected over the years.

The issue did come up even in Blackburn's era, IIRC (help me out old sweat) a Gun Bty in early 45 once had to fight off a night long attack near a place called Otterloo, some of it involving close quarter fighting, while still doing fire missions.
I recall a PD session in 2004 where an American BSM described something similar happening to his Bty on the outskirts of Baghdad during the 2003 invasion.
Over the years many have thought that those types of incidents are such a rare occurrence that not much is needed to deal with it, and consequently over the years a Fd Artillery Battery's capability to defend itself  has deteriorated. It is changing, but even so some still can't get it into their heads a gun Bty, or Tp, is sometimes off on its own, not in a FOB, and not out of harms way well behind some imaginary FLOT, it has to be able to defend itself.

 

[a_majoor]

The only practical way to have a smaller gun det would be to mechanize the gun. The Swedish FH77 has a 155 mounted on a 6X6 chassis, and the gun is loaded from a 20 round "magazine" which the crew can manipulate from the cab (selecting the proper ammunition and rate of fire).

Of course you could point out the manpower reduction at the sharp end (3 man crews driving around and firing the 155 in "shoot and scoot" missions) is made up in the tail (mechanics and maintainers, truckers to carry fuel and ammunition etc).

 

[Kirkhill]

It is a busy gun det when they are firing, and sometimes even today the fire missions can last hours.

The M777, despite being called a Light Weight Towed Howitzer, and for a 155 it is, still is almost 5 tons.

The large gun det is needed to get it into and out of action, and to sustain fire, the ammunition is quite heavy too.

The newer aspect, being relearned, is force protection, which has been somewhat neglected over the years.

The issue did come up even in Blackburn's era, IIRC (help me out old sweat) a Gun Bty in early 45 once had to fight off a night long attack near a place called Otterloo, some of it involving close quarter fighting, while still doing fire missions.
I recall a PD session in 2004 where an American BSM described something similar happening to his Bty on the outskirts of Baghdad during the 2003 invasion.
Over the years many have thought that those types of incidents are such a rare occurrence that not much is needed to deal with it, and consequently over the years a Fd Artillery Battery's capability to defend itself  has deteriorated. It is changing, but even so some still can't get it into their heads a gun Bty, or Tp, is sometimes off on its own, not in a FOB, and not out of harms way well behind some imaginary FLOT, it has to be able to defend itself.

Actually, now that you mention it, I seem to recall the rest of the tale was that the rest of the Regiment was so done in after regular moves and firing missions and digging the guns out then digging them in again that this was their solution to letting most of the unit get some rest...... 

 

[tomahawk6]

A truck mounted gun would indeed be a good solution if the battlefield was Iraq or Europe,in Afghanistan with its limited roads you need something that can be lifted by Chinook.

 

[Old Sweat]

The incident Petard referred to took place at Otterloo on the night of 16/17 April 1945. On the 16th the 17th Field Regiment RCA, 5 Armoured Division, moved into gun positions near the village. Also in the area were the Irish Regiment of Canada and divisional headquarters as well as a British medium battery. To make a long story short, that night the regiment's position was attacked by 600-900 Germans trying to withdraw from a salient. There was heavy fighting all night, including some hand to hand combat around the guns. The situation was restored by a first light counter-attack by the Irish and the divisional headquarter tanks. The 17th Field had casuallties of three killed and 30 wounded as well as much damage to guns and equipment.

See The Gunners of Canada, Vol II, p 433-434.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am NOT a gunner, but I observed up close the Canadian artillery's adaptations to the Afghan battlefield back in 2006. The employment of independent self-contained Troops was, perhaps, the main adaptation (besides employing a new gun). I should add that I seem to recall our Kabul Gunners employing independent Troops in 2003 as well. To amplify Petard's comments, while some shoots were from FOBs/Patrol Bases, the vast majority of what I saw consisted of the Troop off on its own responsible for its own force protection (including during movement). The ability to employ self-contained Troops capable of protecting themselves means that the Commander can project his firepower wherever he wants instead of from fixed locations. I was very impressed and indeed proud of our young artillery officers and NCOs operating in this manner.

As an aside our ABCA allies were interested in this method of employment. I, for one, believe that the manpower bill for an M777 Troop is entirely justified by its effect.

 

[Petard]

The only practical way to have a smaller gun det would be to mechanize the gun. The Swedish FH77 has a 155 mounted on a 6X6 chassis, and the gun is loaded from a 20 round "magazine" which the crew can manipulate from the cab (selecting the proper ammunition and rate of fire).

The FH77 is not a very flexible system, its gun truck rivals like Caesar or the South African G6 aren't much better.

I would agree with you that the overall numbers would probably be a wash, I'm just not sure where they actually might be. The reason I say this is because I think a 3 man det, by itself, doesn't fit well in the contemporary operating environment, for exactly the reasons we're talking about, ie force protection, but also for the reason of sustained Ops.

I don't think putting the people you need to sustain ops in the Ech tail would work simply because an integral Arty Ech doesn't really exist right now (although by doctrine it does), and even if it did it might be some distance from the deployed Tp. The replacement crews, protection parties etc would have to travel with the Tp, so I would say the overall Bty numbers for this kind of systems con ops would need to be the about the same anyway


Two years ago the Swedes came to the Artillery School to show off the FH77, at the end of their presentation they took questions, in the audience there were some veterans of recent Afghan deployments, and they had at them.
As best I can remember the discussion kind of went like this:
Q. What happens if the digital gun laying system goes down, what's the back up?
A. It doesn't need one, its a very reliable system, and accompanying guns are able to cover it off while it is being repaired
Q. With just 3 people how can I do a cordon if something happens on the road?
A. That is an operational tactic your own Army will have to develop
Q. How long can you sustain Ops with just 3 people?
A. Again that is an operational question your own Army will have to answer
One crusty Snr NCO summed it up well "So, you have a gun that has the big disadvantage of a self propelled gun; when the vehicle breaks down it takes the gun with it, but doesn't have the protection level of a self propelled gun. It reduces none of the man power needed since we still have to sustain Ops day and night in an asymmetric environment. I can't do any helops with it so I have to stick to the road. Its got a lot of moving parts, which do not have any redundancy, so when it goes down it stays down until working full up again.. Hmm, interesting concept."

Even the Future Combat Systems are looking at the issue of sustained ops and crew size.
The lessons learned from the COE is affecting future design, and one of the biggest lessons is that you still need a fair sized crew to sustain Ops.

 

[Infanteer]

I would agree with you that the overall numbers would probably be a wash, I'm just not sure where they actually might be. The reason I say this is because I think a 3 man det, by itself, doesn't fit well in the contemporary operating environment, for exactly the reasons we're talking about, ie force protection, but also for the reason of sustained Ops.

Sorry, but this statement is one of the reasons I'm leery of the buzzword "COE" and lots of the other things that have sprouted from the COIN-fad movement.  As Old Sweat's previous excerpt shows, force protection and sustained operations were issues against a peer foe.  Would it be correct to state that these issues are probably important concerns in (more simply) the contemporary operating environment?

 

[a_majoor]

A truck mounted gun would indeed be a good solution if the battlefield was Iraq or Europe,in Afghanistan with its limited roads you need something that can be lifted by Chinook.

The gun has a range of 40 km with base bleed, and fires Excalibur rounds as well, so a two gun det can cover a lot of area. The chassis is based on an all terrain construction vehicle, so there is some cross country mobility available as well.

As usual, no one piece of kit can do everything, the point here is if you want to have smaller dets and less manpower you have to "bulk up" somewhere else. Light guns airlifted in by Chinook have a pretty big manpower footprint as well once you factor in the aircrew and their support.....

 

[tomahawk6]

If I am going to use a truck mounted weapon in Afghanistan I would take HIMARS hands down.