TangoTwoBravo
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
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I just came out of an excellent presentation made by a Maj from the USMC regarding urban operations in Iraq. He had been a Weapons Company Commander during the opening phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then returned as the S3 (Ops O) of a Bn. He served in the initial fighting in Falluja last April and he had some excellent points to make.
It came as no suprise that he emphasized that the battle was a Cpl's fight, with the four man team as part of a three team squad as the focal point. Low level leadership and the importance of being able to deal with casualties and death were brought out.
He didn't get into the mechanics of house clearing etc, but he had several points regarding tactics and equipment:
a. Precision small arms fire is crucial. They tried to get optical sights for every Marine and this allowed the teams and squads to take out the enemy quickly and with little collateral damage. Aimed shots appear to be better than sheer volume (no big suprise but worth noting).
b. Artillery was not used, 81mm mortars were not used, although the 60mm mortars were employed in a "direct, observed fire" role.
c. Fast air is very useful as long as the pilots have the right "graphics." Helicopters are less useful as they are vulnerable, get shot down and then need rescuing. The AC-130 was outstanding and they would call in fire against targets across the street from friendlies with confidence (He said just keep your head down and open your mouth). The insurgents hated moving around at night because of the Spectre.
d. Tanks are critical! He had a platoon of M1s attached to his battalion and they were vital. They were usually employed as single tanks but always in the company of light infantry. He is a big believer in the tank/light infantry team (and he is infantry).
e. Your CSS people must be trained and equipped to defend themselves. His were and this meant that he did not have to devote infantry to convoy escort. His Heavy Guns Platoon with HMMVWs did escort convoys but all the CSS folks were "riflemen."
f. Snipers are critical (bit of an extension of the first point but worth bringing out). The FACs were sometimes located with the snipers.
g. UAVs often provided misleading information.
h. Adjust positions at night to catch the enemy off guard. The insurgents would determine were it was "safe" to move and would move up with little caution in those areas. If the Marines moved up by night they could catch the insurgents off-guard.
i. His attached engineer platoon was critical.
I've probably missed some points but I wanted to give the flavour of his presentation. The leadership part was critical and he emphasised several times the vital importance of "letting the Cpls fight the battle." He recounted one account of a platoon that responded to a downed-helicopter and sustained 1 x KIA and several WIA when returning from the crash site (they had been told to stay at the site by higher to ambush insurgents). They had a couple of hours to clean the vehicles and talk about what had happened when the same platoon had to act as a QRF to rescue two AAV crews who had been ambushed and were cut-off in the middle of the city. They went in with an M1 platoon, rescued their fellow marines and recovered a marine who had been killed manning his veh MG to cover the move of the crews to a nearby house. He talked about the importance of an organization "getting back in the saddle" after casualties are sustained.
It was an excellent presentation and my understanding of the first Fallujah battle has been greatly deepened. I'll try and buy him a beer but I imagine that there will be a big line-up!
Cheers,
2B
It came as no suprise that he emphasized that the battle was a Cpl's fight, with the four man team as part of a three team squad as the focal point. Low level leadership and the importance of being able to deal with casualties and death were brought out.
He didn't get into the mechanics of house clearing etc, but he had several points regarding tactics and equipment:
a. Precision small arms fire is crucial. They tried to get optical sights for every Marine and this allowed the teams and squads to take out the enemy quickly and with little collateral damage. Aimed shots appear to be better than sheer volume (no big suprise but worth noting).
b. Artillery was not used, 81mm mortars were not used, although the 60mm mortars were employed in a "direct, observed fire" role.
c. Fast air is very useful as long as the pilots have the right "graphics." Helicopters are less useful as they are vulnerable, get shot down and then need rescuing. The AC-130 was outstanding and they would call in fire against targets across the street from friendlies with confidence (He said just keep your head down and open your mouth). The insurgents hated moving around at night because of the Spectre.
d. Tanks are critical! He had a platoon of M1s attached to his battalion and they were vital. They were usually employed as single tanks but always in the company of light infantry. He is a big believer in the tank/light infantry team (and he is infantry).
e. Your CSS people must be trained and equipped to defend themselves. His were and this meant that he did not have to devote infantry to convoy escort. His Heavy Guns Platoon with HMMVWs did escort convoys but all the CSS folks were "riflemen."
f. Snipers are critical (bit of an extension of the first point but worth bringing out). The FACs were sometimes located with the snipers.
g. UAVs often provided misleading information.
h. Adjust positions at night to catch the enemy off guard. The insurgents would determine were it was "safe" to move and would move up with little caution in those areas. If the Marines moved up by night they could catch the insurgents off-guard.
i. His attached engineer platoon was critical.
I've probably missed some points but I wanted to give the flavour of his presentation. The leadership part was critical and he emphasised several times the vital importance of "letting the Cpls fight the battle." He recounted one account of a platoon that responded to a downed-helicopter and sustained 1 x KIA and several WIA when returning from the crash site (they had been told to stay at the site by higher to ambush insurgents). They had a couple of hours to clean the vehicles and talk about what had happened when the same platoon had to act as a QRF to rescue two AAV crews who had been ambushed and were cut-off in the middle of the city. They went in with an M1 platoon, rescued their fellow marines and recovered a marine who had been killed manning his veh MG to cover the move of the crews to a nearby house. He talked about the importance of an organization "getting back in the saddle" after casualties are sustained.
It was an excellent presentation and my understanding of the first Fallujah battle has been greatly deepened. I'll try and buy him a beer but I imagine that there will be a big line-up!
Cheers,
2B
