Jungle
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 12
- Points
- 430
This is largely the reason we went through the unification process.
For 21-year old Paul Theodore Hellyer the conscription was a time of frustration and revelation. It helped shape convictions which in the 1960s led him, as minister of national defence, to launch a program to unify the three Armed Forces.
From "The search for identity", by Blair Fraser.
... Hellyer originally enlisted in March 1944 in the RCAF. He went through the basic training that was essentially the same for all three services, then passed the examination that would let him start learning to be a pilot.
By that time, there were not enough aircraft in the whole commonwealth for the stream of young men pouring out from the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.
Meanwhile, defense minister Ralston and air minister Power were confering on the problem of transferring to the Army some 4500 young men the RCAF did not need. It was impossible. The only way to make a soldier out of an airman, they found, was to give the airman a discharge and let him re enlist, as a civilian, in the Army. Hellyer was one of the 4500 who did.
It was explained to the young would-be pilots how urgently they were needed in the Infantry, how imperative the duty to switch. But those patriotic appeals were not borne out by what happened.
First, the young Army recruits were put through basic training - the same basic training they had just completed in the RCAF, but that made no difference. The book said basic training comes first, so basic training came first.
Then young Hellyer‘s academic record showed he was above average in mathematics. The book said recruits with an above-average for mathematics should go to the Artillery. In 1944 the Artillery did not need men, at least not acutely, and the Infantry‘s need was desperate, but that made no difference. Hellyer was sent to the Artillery. He never did get overseas.
When Lance-Bombardier Paul Hellyer finally was discharged in April 1946, he took away a vivid impression of military organization and military thinking. According to his personal experience, it was not merely stupid, it was imbecile...
For 21-year old Paul Theodore Hellyer the conscription was a time of frustration and revelation. It helped shape convictions which in the 1960s led him, as minister of national defence, to launch a program to unify the three Armed Forces.
From "The search for identity", by Blair Fraser.
... Hellyer originally enlisted in March 1944 in the RCAF. He went through the basic training that was essentially the same for all three services, then passed the examination that would let him start learning to be a pilot.
By that time, there were not enough aircraft in the whole commonwealth for the stream of young men pouring out from the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.
Meanwhile, defense minister Ralston and air minister Power were confering on the problem of transferring to the Army some 4500 young men the RCAF did not need. It was impossible. The only way to make a soldier out of an airman, they found, was to give the airman a discharge and let him re enlist, as a civilian, in the Army. Hellyer was one of the 4500 who did.
It was explained to the young would-be pilots how urgently they were needed in the Infantry, how imperative the duty to switch. But those patriotic appeals were not borne out by what happened.
First, the young Army recruits were put through basic training - the same basic training they had just completed in the RCAF, but that made no difference. The book said basic training comes first, so basic training came first.
Then young Hellyer‘s academic record showed he was above average in mathematics. The book said recruits with an above-average for mathematics should go to the Artillery. In 1944 the Artillery did not need men, at least not acutely, and the Infantry‘s need was desperate, but that made no difference. Hellyer was sent to the Artillery. He never did get overseas.
When Lance-Bombardier Paul Hellyer finally was discharged in April 1946, he took away a vivid impression of military organization and military thinking. According to his personal experience, it was not merely stupid, it was imbecile...