Ukraine - Superthread

[daftandbarmy]

Conditions in the field

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/z6re6j

BV 206 would do just fine there... if they had them.

 

[Kirkhill]

Scholz has been getting a lot of FLaK over both his slow pace on upgrading the Bundeswehr and supplying Ukraine. He pledged about another 100 BEUR per year.

But what if there just isn't that much stuff to buy? What if that amount of cash were to be dropped into a supply chain that is already stretching beyond capacity?

Germany needs $20.5b to replenish 'depleted' ammunition, says top official

Eva Hoegl, a defence oversight official of the German parliament, has criticised the government's "lack of action" to fully equip members of the military, calling it "unacceptable".

www.trtworld.com

Pentagon, U.S. arms makers to talk Russia, labor and supply chain

Pentagon leaders plan to meet with defense industry executives next week to discuss ways to tackle supply-chain problems, a U.S. official told Reuters, amid an expected surge in demand for weapons from U.S. allies due to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

www.reuters.com

 

[Czech_pivo]

Scholz has been getting a lot of FLaK over both his slow pace on upgrading the Bundeswehr and supplying Ukraine. He pledged about another 100 BEUR per year.

But what if there just isn't that much stuff to buy? What if that amount of cash were to be dropped into a supply chain that is already stretching beyond capacity?

Germany needs $20.5b to replenish 'depleted' ammunition, says top official

Eva Hoegl, a defence oversight official of the German parliament, has criticised the government's "lack of action" to fully equip members of the military, calling it "unacceptable".

www.trtworld.com

Pentagon, U.S. arms makers to talk Russia, labor and supply chain

Pentagon leaders plan to meet with defense industry executives next week to discuss ways to tackle supply-chain problems, a U.S. official told Reuters, amid an expected surge in demand for weapons from U.S. allies due to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

www.reuters.com

And its crickets here about replacing a single boot, sleeping bag, C Gustav or 155mm....

 

[Staff Weenie]

Today's random thought - is Bakhmut becoming a modern day Verdun - a fight which consumes personnel and material at a frantic rate, over a site of lesser strategic importance, but growing national/emotional relevance? Falkenhayn wanted to bleed the French white, but instead locked his own forces into a battle of attrition that Germany could not afford. Is the same thing happening here?

 

[Skysix]

Today's random thought - is Bakhmut becoming a modern day Verdun - a fight which consumes personnel and material at a frantic rate, over a site of lesser strategic importance, but growing national/emotional relevance? Falkenhayn wanted to bleed the French white, but instead locked his own forces into a battle of attrition that Germany could not afford. Is the same thing happening here?

Only if the West continues to support Ukraine in the haf assed way they have been.

If all the weapon types etc that NATO et al have supplied to date were made available last spring hundreds of thousands of lives would have been spared (from both sides). *And if Germany had ever actually delivered in a timely manner)

And the reconstruction would be a small fraction of the expense it now is, less people in Africa etc would have lost their food supply, inflation and economic effects would be lower. By half assing it we have prolonged and allowed the intensification if Putin's Genocidal War.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The indirect approach:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1597216240921358338

 

[Skysix]

Wow. Just wow. Cognitive dissonance or delusional or just a party liner....

 

[Quirky]

Wow. Just wow. Cognitive dissonance or delusional or just a party liner....

Baghdad Bob is in the UK now.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Baghdad Bob is in the UK now.

Or "How do I answer these questions without falling out of a window?"

 

[CBH99]

Or "How do I answer these questions without falling out of a window?"

Probably crossed his mind, and I can’t blame the guy for even pondering it.

It’s crazy how 2 sides of a conflict can look at the ‘cause’ & be so convinced that the other side started it.

 

[Quirky]

Or "How do I answer these questions without falling out of a window?"

I’d be moving my office to the first floor after that interview.

 

[McG]

The BTG is no longer a thing. I guess Russia will be going back to regiments in a division structure.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1597482502200983552

 

[Spencer100]

The BTG is no longer a thing. I guess Russia will be going back to regiments in a division structure.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1597482502200983552

They'll be studying that in war colleges and such for decades to come.

Question: was the BTG a Russian response to what they saw in wars by the US in the mideast etc? Smaller faster moving units that can take advantage the modern battlefield? Or just a cost saving measure to look bigger than reality? See I have 180 BTG's we are strong?

 

[KevinB]

They'll be studying that in war colleges and such for decades to come.

Question: was the BTG a Russian response to what they saw in wars by the US in the mideast etc? Smaller faster moving units that can take advantage the modern battlefield? Or just a cost saving measure to look bigger than reality? See I have 180 BTG's we are strong?

I suspect it was also due to their experience in Chechnya, and Syria. Pushing down enablers to allow for rapid reaction when dealing with relatively small engagements.

Works great in smaller conflicts, but not against a Peer Army that will contest larger areas.

I’m not sure it will help much at this point, other than keep some of their Arty out of spitting ranges. I’m not sure if they can coordinate fires well in a larger formation given they had terrible issues even coordinating with internal units.

It will however make Russians bombardment method easier - so while it may not directly help close support at the front, it makes wiping a grid square easier in theory.

 

[FJAG]

I suspect it was also due to their experience in Chechnya, and Syria. Pushing down enablers to allow for rapid reaction when dealing with relatively small engagements.

Works great in smaller conflicts, but not against a Peer Army that will contest larger areas.

I’m not sure it will help much at this point, other than keep some of their Arty out of spitting ranges. I’m not sure if they can coordinate fires well in a larger formation given they had terrible issues even coordinating with internal units.

It will however make Russians bombardment method easier - so while it may not directly help close support at the front, it makes wiping a grid square easier in theory.

This is one of those big "I told you so moments" that I think anyone who hadn't drunk the "big wars are over Kool-Aid" at the turn of the last century could see coming. Unfortunately Canada was one of those. Gunners and Tankers rolled over on their backs and let the infantry rub their tummies.

It's a simple fact of life. It's far, far easier to decentralize assets to form small battle groups when needed than to concentrate a whole bunch of small battle groups of this and that into a large conventional force when needed. In some case the latter becomes near impossible because of equipment and skill fade in the army as a whole.

I guess it's basic psychology. Infantry grows up learning to fight at the company and battalion level. Tankers, and even more so, gunners think in terms of mass and flexibility on a grander scale starting at the brigade level. We've raised a generation of officers that thinks small for 2.75 years out of every 3.0. The odd CAX, isn't enough to get a handle on capability gaps and large scale logistics.

🍻

 

[rmc_wannabe]

They'll be studying that in war colleges and such for decades to come.

Question: was the BTG a Russian response to what they saw in wars by the US in the mideast etc? Smaller faster moving units that can take advantage the modern battlefield? Or just a cost saving measure to look bigger than reality? See I have 180 BTG's we are strong?

IMHO, I think they were trying to do what most Western militaries were doing in the latter part of the Cold War and assuming that the next conflict would be a joint/combined arms campaign that would require smaller detachments of forces dispersed over multiple fronts; not the sprawling armies of yore.

The structure of a BTG is about on par with what we would have in a Company Group, but with the enablers of a Battle Group. The 2 main problems are that:

-with roughly 200 infantry folks per BTG, none of which are conscripts, they rely heavily on paramilitaries or proxies for flank and rear guard security. Not a lot of depth for reinforcing the Tank and Fires folks.

and

-where as NATO will exercise and encourage Mission Command down to the Detachment level, the Russians still subscribed to the centralized C2 familiar to most Soviet-style armies. Couple that with their abysmal GLONASS TacC2IS, the flexibility of a BTG commander to direct fires and other support enablers is significantly reduced.

I could see the structure working if they had competent and professional forces, coupled with a reliable C2 structure; that said, the Russo-Ukrainian War will probably be a prime example of victory coming from your enemy sucking more than you expected and capitalizing on it.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is one of those big "I told you so moments" that I think anyone who hadn't drunk the "big wars are over Kool-Aid" at the turn of the last century could see coming. Unfortunately Canada was one of those. Gunners and Tankers rolled over on their backs and let the infantry rub their tummies.

It's a simple fact of life. It's far, far easier to decentralize assets to form small battle groups when needed than to concentrate a whole bunch of small battle groups of this and that into a large conventional force when needed. In some case the latter becomes near impossible because of equipment and skill fade in the army as a whole.

I guess it's basic psychology. Infantry grows up learning to fight at the company and battalion level. Tankers, and even more so, gunners think in terms of mass and flexibility on a grander scale starting at the brigade level. We've raised a generation of officers that thinks small for 2.75 years out of every 3.0. The odd CAX, isn't enough to get a handle on capability gaps and large scale logistics.

🍻

Then. your problem is easily solved. Separate the Infantry from the Real Army. The Infantry seem to have regular jobs sorting out the locals. The Tankers and Gunners can then focus on the Next Big Thing.

Quick question though: Who gets the budget for operations and inconsequentials like drones, ATGMs, mortars, MANPADS? I mean after you have bought the Tanks and SPHs that you might need in the future?

 

[McG]

This is one of those big "I told you so moments" that I think anyone who hadn't drunk the "big wars are over Kool-Aid" at the turn of the last century could see coming. Unfortunately Canada was one of those. Gunners and Tankers rolled over on their backs and let the infantry rub their tummies.

It's a simple fact of life. It's far, far easier to decentralize assets to form small battle groups when needed than to concentrate a whole bunch of small battle groups of this and that into a large conventional force when needed. In some case the latter becomes near impossible because of equipment and skill fade in the army as a whole.

I guess it's basic psychology. Infantry grows up learning to fight at the company and battalion level. Tankers, and even more so, gunners think in terms of mass and flexibility on a grander scale starting at the brigade level. We've raised a generation of officers that thinks small for 2.75 years out of every 3.0. The odd CAX, isn't enough to get a handle on capability gaps and large scale logistics.

🍻

Infantry are not the only orgs to have been too focused on making Canada an army of sub-unit level competence. Everyone thinks small when it comes to logistics, and we have been too ready to sacrifice logistics to protect shiny toys. As long as we can support a combat team from a static start point, the rest of the echelon does not need enough weapons, radios, night vision, or truck to protect itself while supporting a battalion in mobile operations. We have also taught ourselves that a service battalion could simultaneously support a mobile brigade and act as its own DSA without leaving a FOB.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Infantry are not the only orgs to have been too focused on making Canada an army of sub-unit level competence. Everyone thinks small when it comes to logistics, and we have been too ready to sacrifice logistics to protect shiny toys. As long as we can support a combat team from a static start point, the rest of the echelon does not need enough weapons, radios, night vision, or truck to protect itself while supporting a battalion in mobile operations. We have also taught ourselves that a service battalion could simultaneously support a mobile brigade and act as its own DSA without leaving a FOB.

Totally agree. A friend told me that a lot of folks on AOC struggled with the "other things" involved in Brigade level operations; mainly Logistics and Communications.

Its probably a byproduct of our "Battle Group and below" mentality for 20 years that has caused this kind of stunted thinking with our future strategic planners.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Speculation that the US is ready to supply Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) to Ukraine.

Exclusive: U.S. weighs sending 100-mile strike weapon to Ukraine​

By Mike Stone

WASHINGTON, Nov 28 (Reuters) - The Pentagon is considering a Boeing proposal to supply Ukraine with cheap, small precision bombs fitted onto abundantly available rockets, allowing Kyiv to strike far behind Russian lines as the West struggles to meet demand for more arms.

U.S. and allied military inventories are shrinking, and Ukraine faces an increasing need for more sophisticated weapons as the war drags on. Boeing's proposed system, dubbed Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), is one of about a half-dozen plans for getting new munitions into production for Ukraine and America's Eastern European allies, industry sources said.

Although the United States has rebuffed requests for the 185-mile (297km) range ATACMS missile, the GLSDB's 94-mile (150km) range would allow Ukraine to hit valuable military targets that have been out of reach and help it continue pressing its counterattacks by disrupting Russian rear areas.

GLSDB could be delivered as early as spring 2023, according to a document reviewed by Reuters and three people familiar with the plan. It combines the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) with the M26 rocket motor, both of which are common in U.S. inventories.

Doug Bush, the U.S. Army's chief weapons buyer, told reporters at the Pentagon last week the Army was also looking at accelerating production of 155 millimeter artillery shells - currently only manufactured at government facilities - by allowing defense contractors to build them.

The invasion of Ukraine drove up demand for American-made weapons and ammunition, while U.S. allies in Eastern Europe are "putting a lot of orders," in for a range of arms as they supply Ukraine, Bush added.

"It's about getting quantity at a cheap cost," said Tom Karako, a weapons and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He said falling U.S. inventories help explain the rush to get more arms now, saying stockpiles are "getting low relative to the levels we like to keep on hand and certainly to the levels we're going to need to deter a China conflict."

Karako also noted that the U.S. exit from Afghanistan left lots of air-dropped bombs available. They cannot be easily used with Ukrainian aircraft, but "in today's context we should be looking for innovative ways to convert them to standoff capability."

Although a handful of GLSDB units have already been made, there are many logistical obstacles to formal procurement. The Boeing plan requires a price discovery waiver, exempting the contractor from an in-depth review that ensures the Pentagon is getting the best deal possible. Any arrangement would also require at least six suppliers to expedite shipments of their parts and services to produce the weapon quickly.​

A Boeing spokesperson declined to comment. Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Tim Gorman declined to comment on providing any "specific capability" to Ukraine, but said the U.S. and its allies "identify and consider the most appropriate systems" that would help Kyiv.

GLSDB is made jointly by SAAB AB (SAABb.ST) and Boeing Co (BA.N) and has been in development since 2019, well before the invasion, which Russia calls a "special operation". In October, SAAB chief executive Micael Johansson said of the GLSDB: "We are imminently shortly expecting contracts on that."

According to the document - a Boeing proposal to U.S. European Command (EUCOM), which is overseeing weapons headed to Ukraine - the main components of the GLSDB would come from current U.S. stores.

The M26 rocket motor is relatively abundant, and the GBU-39 costs about $40,000 each, making the completed GLSDB inexpensive and its main components readily available. Although arms manufacturers are struggling with demand, those factors make it possible to yield weapons by early 2023, albeit at a low rate of production.

GLSDB is GPS-guided, can defeat some electronic jamming, is usable in all weather conditions, and can be used against armored vehicles, according to SAAB's website. The GBU-39 - which would function as the GLSDB's warhead - has small, folding wings that allow it to glide more than 100km if dropped from an aircraft and targets as small as 3 feet in diameter.

Link

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