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Troops die as UK holds back Afghan reinforcements
Michael Smith, Times Online (UK), 10 Sept 06
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2350705,00.html
BRITAIN agreed to provide an extra 800 troops to allied forces fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan but later withdrew the offer, Nato officials disclosed last week.
Lieutenant General David Richards, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, planned to use the 800-man force as troubleshooters, sending them into any area where fighting broke out.
However, John Reid, then the defence secretary, was so angry at the reluctance of other Nato countries to supply troops that the offer was retracted.
Reid, who famously said that he hoped British troops would leave Afghanistan without firing a single shot, indicated that the UK would send no more troops other than the 3,300 men to be based in Helmand province.
Last week the US general in charge of Nato made the obvious link between the shortage of troops and the casualties faced by the allied forces in southern Afghanistan.
Appealing to Nato countries to send more soldiers, General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: “It will help us to reduce casualties and bring this to a successful conclusion in a short period of time.”
A total of 33 British servicemen have died since UK troops deployed to Helmand province, which has seen the bulk of the recent fighting in southern Afghanistan. Another Nato soldier died yesterday and more than 40 Taliban militants were killed in fierce fighting in an area patrolled by Canadian troops. A photograph was released of Lance Corporal Luke McCulloch, 21, of the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, who was among those killed last week.
Ministers have repeatedly insisted that they have provided all the troops that the commanders on the ground wanted. But Nato officials said the men they desperately needed were the 800 originally promised by Britain.
The presence of a “tactical theatre reserve battalion”, the quick reaction force which the British had offered to provide, was factored into all the computer generated exercises during which Richards and his commanders prepared to fight the Taliban. The need for the quick reaction force was driven home by Jones in a series of interviews last week. The Ministry of Defence has complained that it was other Nato countries that were not pulling their weight. Asked which countries needed to do more, Jones replied: “All of them.”
During a visit to London in July, just a week before he took over, Richards told the Royal United Services Institute that Nato forces in Afghanistan were short of equipment and time and implied that he needed more troops.
Two weeks earlier Des Browne, the defence secretary, had announced that Britain was sending 900 more troops to Helmand, giving the impression that this was a substantial reinforcement. But last week, in response to a written parliamentary question, he admitted that just 260 of them would be “dedicated to force protection or security tasks”. The remainder would be engineers to help with reconstruction and medics to tend to the wounded.
This cut the ground from under Richards’s feet so he called in Nato’s heavy guns. Jones, a hard-talking US marine, was briefed by Richards during a three-day visit to Kabul last week. He flew back to Brussels and demanded that every one of the countries taking part in the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force “make good” on their promises. “It is not that we are making new demands,” he added. “I am asking for the forces we asked for 18 months ago.”
That was hammered home at a meeting of defence chiefs from all the Nato countries in Warsaw yesterday.
Yet it has been the British forces who are based in Helmand, the centre of the Taliban insurgency, who would have benefited most from the quick reaction force which their own government decided not to provide.
According to Nato officials, the British made an ill-advised decision to place small numbers of troops in the centres of the two districts of northern Helmand where the Taliban were strongest. The officials made it clear that the creation of the controversial “platoon houses” at Sangin, Musa Qala and Nawzad was never part of their original plan.
The policy was a disaster, providing the Taliban with tempting targets which they presumably thought they could easily overrun. Certainly they have made determined, if as yet unsuccessful, attempts to do so.
All 16 of the British ground troops killed in action since the British deployed to southern Afghanistan have died in one or other of the northern outposts.
The insurgents have been mounting repeated attacks on the British troops in Musa Qala and Sangin. The fact that the Taliban have not overrun them is evidence of the bravery of the paratroopers, Gurkhas and Royal Irish sent to defend the bases.
A lack of serviceable helicopters has frequently left the troops in the remote outposts short of supplies, food and water. In telephone calls home to their parents or loved ones, soldiers have described horrific conditions. The troops in Sangin had an average of three “contacts” with the Taliban a day.
The return to Camp Bastion of the first few groups of gaunt, bearded soldiers who had finished their stints in one or other of the outposts was greeted with shock.
“My son was very slim anyway and now he’s a bag of unshaven bones,” said one mother after taking a satellite phone call from her son. He was working under terrible conditions at Sangin. He has had hardly any rest, working all hours and is suffering from a severe lack of sleep.”
In temperatures of up to 50C, the lack of water has been one of the most debilitating factors. At one point troops were forced to boil water from a stream running through the base.
One Canadian officer, who found himself and his men trapped in Sangin after running supplies into the base, described the British paras as “impressive to watch . . . unbelievable soldiers”.
Sangin resembled the Wild West, he said. “When we arrived in Sangin the locals began throwing rocks and anything they could at us. This was not a friendly place.”
His men came under mortar fire as they approached the British compound. They forced their way through, but it was too dark to leave so they had to stay the night.
“We were attacked with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars three times that night. I still can’t believe that the Brits have spent over a month living under those conditions,” the officer said.
A few days later, the Canadian troops were ordered back to Sangin to help the British paras fight off another sustained attack. “For four days I didn’t get a chance to take off my frag vest [body armour], helmet or change my socks,” the Canadian officer said.
“We were attacked two to three times a day, and always repelled them decisively.”
Nato intelligence suggested that Afghan fighters would mount hit-and-run raids, quickly dispersing and disappearing once they came under fire. “We expected it to be rough but we didn’t expect it to be as rough as it is,” said a British official. “In particular, we didn’t expect them to stand and fight.”
Over the past week Richards has been commanding the largest ground combat operation Nato has ever mounted, the Canadian-led Operation Medusa.
It began badly with a number of setbacks for the Nato forces, notably the deaths of 14 British servicemen when a Nimrod MR2 spy plane crashed after a fire broke out on board. Five Canadian soldiers were also killed, one of them in a friendly fire incident when a US aircraft strafed his position.
However, the Canadian, Danish and Dutch troops — backed by British and US special operations forces — claim to have killed several hundred Taliban fighters.
“The next three to six months is a crucial period here,” said Richards yesterday. “We are establishing pschological ascendancy over the Taliban. That has convinced the people that the Nato troops can defeat the Taliban. If I had those 800-1000 troops I could do it by the autumn.”
Troops die as UK holds back Afghan reinforcements
Michael Smith, Times Online (UK), 10 Sept 06
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2350705,00.html
BRITAIN agreed to provide an extra 800 troops to allied forces fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan but later withdrew the offer, Nato officials disclosed last week.
Lieutenant General David Richards, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, planned to use the 800-man force as troubleshooters, sending them into any area where fighting broke out.
However, John Reid, then the defence secretary, was so angry at the reluctance of other Nato countries to supply troops that the offer was retracted.
Reid, who famously said that he hoped British troops would leave Afghanistan without firing a single shot, indicated that the UK would send no more troops other than the 3,300 men to be based in Helmand province.
Last week the US general in charge of Nato made the obvious link between the shortage of troops and the casualties faced by the allied forces in southern Afghanistan.
Appealing to Nato countries to send more soldiers, General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: “It will help us to reduce casualties and bring this to a successful conclusion in a short period of time.”
A total of 33 British servicemen have died since UK troops deployed to Helmand province, which has seen the bulk of the recent fighting in southern Afghanistan. Another Nato soldier died yesterday and more than 40 Taliban militants were killed in fierce fighting in an area patrolled by Canadian troops. A photograph was released of Lance Corporal Luke McCulloch, 21, of the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment, who was among those killed last week.
Ministers have repeatedly insisted that they have provided all the troops that the commanders on the ground wanted. But Nato officials said the men they desperately needed were the 800 originally promised by Britain.
The presence of a “tactical theatre reserve battalion”, the quick reaction force which the British had offered to provide, was factored into all the computer generated exercises during which Richards and his commanders prepared to fight the Taliban. The need for the quick reaction force was driven home by Jones in a series of interviews last week. The Ministry of Defence has complained that it was other Nato countries that were not pulling their weight. Asked which countries needed to do more, Jones replied: “All of them.”
During a visit to London in July, just a week before he took over, Richards told the Royal United Services Institute that Nato forces in Afghanistan were short of equipment and time and implied that he needed more troops.
Two weeks earlier Des Browne, the defence secretary, had announced that Britain was sending 900 more troops to Helmand, giving the impression that this was a substantial reinforcement. But last week, in response to a written parliamentary question, he admitted that just 260 of them would be “dedicated to force protection or security tasks”. The remainder would be engineers to help with reconstruction and medics to tend to the wounded.
This cut the ground from under Richards’s feet so he called in Nato’s heavy guns. Jones, a hard-talking US marine, was briefed by Richards during a three-day visit to Kabul last week. He flew back to Brussels and demanded that every one of the countries taking part in the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force “make good” on their promises. “It is not that we are making new demands,” he added. “I am asking for the forces we asked for 18 months ago.”
That was hammered home at a meeting of defence chiefs from all the Nato countries in Warsaw yesterday.
Yet it has been the British forces who are based in Helmand, the centre of the Taliban insurgency, who would have benefited most from the quick reaction force which their own government decided not to provide.
According to Nato officials, the British made an ill-advised decision to place small numbers of troops in the centres of the two districts of northern Helmand where the Taliban were strongest. The officials made it clear that the creation of the controversial “platoon houses” at Sangin, Musa Qala and Nawzad was never part of their original plan.
The policy was a disaster, providing the Taliban with tempting targets which they presumably thought they could easily overrun. Certainly they have made determined, if as yet unsuccessful, attempts to do so.
All 16 of the British ground troops killed in action since the British deployed to southern Afghanistan have died in one or other of the northern outposts.
The insurgents have been mounting repeated attacks on the British troops in Musa Qala and Sangin. The fact that the Taliban have not overrun them is evidence of the bravery of the paratroopers, Gurkhas and Royal Irish sent to defend the bases.
A lack of serviceable helicopters has frequently left the troops in the remote outposts short of supplies, food and water. In telephone calls home to their parents or loved ones, soldiers have described horrific conditions. The troops in Sangin had an average of three “contacts” with the Taliban a day.
The return to Camp Bastion of the first few groups of gaunt, bearded soldiers who had finished their stints in one or other of the outposts was greeted with shock.
“My son was very slim anyway and now he’s a bag of unshaven bones,” said one mother after taking a satellite phone call from her son. He was working under terrible conditions at Sangin. He has had hardly any rest, working all hours and is suffering from a severe lack of sleep.”
In temperatures of up to 50C, the lack of water has been one of the most debilitating factors. At one point troops were forced to boil water from a stream running through the base.
One Canadian officer, who found himself and his men trapped in Sangin after running supplies into the base, described the British paras as “impressive to watch . . . unbelievable soldiers”.
Sangin resembled the Wild West, he said. “When we arrived in Sangin the locals began throwing rocks and anything they could at us. This was not a friendly place.”
His men came under mortar fire as they approached the British compound. They forced their way through, but it was too dark to leave so they had to stay the night.
“We were attacked with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars three times that night. I still can’t believe that the Brits have spent over a month living under those conditions,” the officer said.
A few days later, the Canadian troops were ordered back to Sangin to help the British paras fight off another sustained attack. “For four days I didn’t get a chance to take off my frag vest [body armour], helmet or change my socks,” the Canadian officer said.
“We were attacked two to three times a day, and always repelled them decisively.”
Nato intelligence suggested that Afghan fighters would mount hit-and-run raids, quickly dispersing and disappearing once they came under fire. “We expected it to be rough but we didn’t expect it to be as rough as it is,” said a British official. “In particular, we didn’t expect them to stand and fight.”
Over the past week Richards has been commanding the largest ground combat operation Nato has ever mounted, the Canadian-led Operation Medusa.
It began badly with a number of setbacks for the Nato forces, notably the deaths of 14 British servicemen when a Nimrod MR2 spy plane crashed after a fire broke out on board. Five Canadian soldiers were also killed, one of them in a friendly fire incident when a US aircraft strafed his position.
However, the Canadian, Danish and Dutch troops — backed by British and US special operations forces — claim to have killed several hundred Taliban fighters.
“The next three to six months is a crucial period here,” said Richards yesterday. “We are establishing pschological ascendancy over the Taliban. That has convinced the people that the Nato troops can defeat the Taliban. If I had those 800-1000 troops I could do it by the autumn.”
