Time to invest in more CAF logistics?

[MilEME09]

Question - I thought one of the major goals of streamlining things was to get rid of excess civilian contractors? 

I understand that people from Lockheed Martin, for example, are going to be needed for high-end systems, IT support, etc.  But contracting out some of the services on base - is this not what the CF just tried to get rid of?  (Or am I thinking of something different?)

Some Civilian involvement is unavoidable, for while I can't speak for Log, on the Maintenance side anything under warranty we cannot touch thus some civilian from company X has to fix it. We also are tasking Service Battalions to do first, second, and some third line work, with Workshop 202 in Montreal being the only 3rd/4th line shop in the country. If something goes there, don't expect it back for 8 months at the earliest in my experience. I agree that base services, and the tactical level service battalion needs to be separate. Can a Service Battalion still help out? yes if base support services is overwhelmed with work of course lend a hand but the primary role of the CSS unit is the tactical support for the Brigade, or division (though we have no division assets, or a deployable division for that matter)

 

[Edward Campbell]

The article seems to indicate that the CSS of the Army, specifically the Service Battalions, are going to be stretched to support elements in Latvia, Ukraine and somewhere in Africa.  Is the Service Battalion model itself not able to handle multiple missions, or is the organization sound and we've simply resourced it inadequately?

The CS Bn is 100% focused on supporting the brigade, it can deploy to and move in the field, it is 100% military (less maybe the CO’s secretary that every unit seems to have), and it would be responsible to FG second line CSS to land operations.  The GS Bn would be mostly focused on institutional support but it would retain some deployable capability (a Fd Sp Coy?); the deployable component would be able to deploy to but not necessarily able to move in the field, and it would be responsible to FG third line CSS (ie. the JTFSC/NSE) to land and joint operations.

Most bases have robust tech services companies as they do not host a Service Battalion.  Edmonton, Valcartier and Petawawa seem to be the only ones that have this double-hatted role.  How about cutting the tech services function away from the Service Battalions and "civilianizing" it.  If not 100%, then perhaps 20%mil/80% civilian.  Managing a garrison stores counter seems to be something suited to a civilian who isn't moving.

This would give us civilian Tech Services Companies in each garrison, tailored in size to the demand, while each Brigade has a Service Battalion dedicated to training for operations and not shuffling people to fix the base bus or issue socks.

While we are at it, move the Field Medical Coy to the Service Battalion as well and we can rid ourselves of excess units (the Field Ambulance).  Last I checked, Medical was one of the four pillars of Sustainment.

OK, helmets on ...  :warstory:

Back in the 1960s I had some, limited (junior officer), involvement with the EBSB (Experimental Brigade Service Battalion) in Gagetown and I observed the "stand up" of 4 Svc Bn in North Germany. Later, in the 1970s, I had some (still slight) involvement in helping to organize the "re-casting" of 1st Cdn Sig Regt, then deployed to Ismailia as the lead unit of UNEF II, into 73 Sig Sqn and 73 Svc Bn.

The initial (1960s) idea was for an organization that could support a brigade group on the West German nuclear battlefield ~ more effectively and more flexibly, because the brigade Ordnance Field Park, brigade S&T Coy and brigade Field Workshop were already doing good jobs. The organizational structure was fairly obvious, I think, but there were, doctrinally, some concerns about the duties of the service battalion command team and 'regimental' staff and the brigade SQ (admin and logistics) staff. My personal observation was that things worked quite smoothly in 4 CMBG on the North German plain: the division of planning and resource control (brigade staff) and conduct of logistics operations (battalion staff) was easy to manage on the ground, but I'm told (did not observe, myself) that things fell apart, abit, when the brigade moved to CENTAG and the staff system/structure changed.

It was very, very obvious, very, very soon after deployment that UNEF II needed more than just Canadian Signals support. The CO of 1CSR (then LCol, later BGen George Simpson) had more "signals" than UNEF II really needed, but he soon found himself tasking his Sp Sqn to provide logistic support to others. He reinforced his support squadron (with Signals people hastily retrained as apprentice supply tech, etc) and then recommended, and Ottawa (DCDS, I suppose) agreed, that what was really needed was a signal squadron, rather than a regiment, and a logistics battalion, rather than a company sized unit. My memory says ~ and I'm happy to be corrected ~ that Simpson handed over to two units at the end of Roto 0: 73 Sig Sqn and 73 Svc Bn.

The point is that the basic structure of a service battalion: a supply element, transport element, maintenance element and other elements, is infinitely flexible and can provide 2nd and 3rd line support. In 1980 we concluded, in a FMC HQ study, that a Canadian division of three brigade groups, each with its own service battalion, would still need some div troops and they would need a small div troops service battalion but, in fact, we would actually need a big div troops service battalion because it would provide both 2nd line support to div troops and 3rd line support to the brigade group service battalions.

... /war stories

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/08/14/logistics-woes-could-strain-military-deployments.html

Is it time to invest more into the CAF's logistics?  This is an area where we always force the personnel to do more with less.  When resources are available for investment, there is also a tendency to invest those resources into Op functions with the idea that the CSS stuff will be sorted out later ... but "later" never happens and the logisticians are called to sp new capabilities with out new resources of their own.

In the Army, we have 4 GS Arty Regt as a Div Arty asset.  But we do not have a Division Support Group (DISGP) to provide a Div CSS asset.  4 ESR exists as a Div Engr asset, and it is posturing itself as the force generator for the JTFSC theatre opening function.  But we do not have a Joint Services Battalion to function as the CSS force generator for the JTFSC (and, CSS is the biggest part of what the JTFSC is).  Instead, we have three service battalions - each one with bi-polar responsibilities to support their brigade, support their garrison/base, provide Div CSS functions on Ex MR, and force generate the CSS to both the tactical and operational level on deployed operations. 

I don't know that we necessarily need a "J Svc Bn" but I do think we are overly thin on our CSS force generation base.  Partially this is because of the double hatting of field and garrison support personnel.

We don't have fully deployable CSS organizations because the units all retain significant garrison responsibilities.  Is that a problem?  The experiment to split field and garrison between a CS Bn and a GS Bn (~12 years ago) failed when it was not resourced adequately.  Should we try this again with an investment of PYs?

... and then there are the strat assets mentioned in the article - the airlift and sealift.

I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.

I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.

Where we tend to run in to issues WRT sustainment is at the tactical level, I think part of this problem is due to trainingisms, I wouldn't use Ex MR as a gauge for how well/not well we do tactical level sustainment.  MR is a glorified dog and pony show and isn't resourced or designed to really set the Bde up for success.  Politically speaking, it's the Army's way of showing the Political Mandarins in Ottawa that we are capable of moving a large body of troops and equipment over a large distance and then doing something with them.  The most important piece of that exercise is the Deployment Order, what happens after that is of less concern. 

I'm about halfway through Colonel John Conrad's book called "What The Thunder Said" which has to do with logistics support to TF Orion in Afghanistan.  Colonel Conrad pinpoints two problems which he believes are responsible for our logistical woes in the CAF:

1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.

Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.

Bottom line:  We've got combat arms officers that haven't been properly taught to know when they are taking risks against the capacity of our supply chain.  We've also got Logistics soldiers that have not been held up to the right standards of, as Colonel Conrad put it, weaponeering, fire and tactical training.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.

I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.

Where we tend to run in to issues WRT sustainment is at the tactical level, I think part of this problem is due to trainingisms, I wouldn't use Ex MR as a gauge for how well/not well we do tactical level sustainment.  MR is a glorified dog and pony show and isn't resourced or designed to really set the Bde up for success.  Politically speaking, it's the Army's way of showing the Political Mandarins in Ottawa that we are capable of moving a large body of troops and equipment over a large distance and then doing something with them.  The most important piece of that exercise is the Deployment Order, what happens after that is of less concern. 

I'm about halfway through Colonel John Conrad's book called "What The Thunder Said" which has to do with logistics support to TF Orion in Afghanistan.  Colonel Conrad pinpoints two problems which he believes are responsible for our logistical woes in the CAF:

1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.

Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.

Bottom line:  We've got combat arms officers that haven't been properly taught to know when they are taking risks against the capacity of our supply chain.  We've also got Logistics soldiers that have not been held up to the right standards of, as Colonel Conrad put it, weaponeering, fire and tactical training.

Great book HB.  The highlighted area is without a doubt a major problem and its not strictly an Army issue.  We have similar problems in the RCN as well, when it comes to logistic functions and importance.

 

[Lumber]

Great book HB.  The highlighted area is without a doubt a major problem and its not strictly an Army issue.  We have similar problems in the RCN as well, when it comes to logistic functions and importance.

Just stop hoarding all the Coke Zero for the JR's Mess, and we won't have any reason to not respect you. It's that simple.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Just stop hoarding all the Coke Zero for the JR's Mess, and we won't have any reason to not respect you. It's that simple.

1)  I am not a member of the JRs; and
2)  Storesman don't look after pop and chips, stewards do; and
3)  Commissary supplies are hospitality and not a logistic function; and
4)  Stewards are not members of the Logistics Branch; and
5)  Thank you for reinforcing my point that the RCN does not grasp logistics lol

 

[SeaKingTacco]

1)  I am not a member of the JRs; and
2)  Storesman don't look after pop and chips, stewards do; and
3)  Commissary supplies are hospitality and not a logistic function; and
4)  Stewards are not members of the Logistics Branch; and
5)  Thank you for reinforcing my point that the RCN does not grasp logistics lol

I am pretty sure that the stewards are part of the Department on a ship, that is headed by the person called the LOGISTICS Officer....

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

I'm about halfway through Colonel John Conrad's book called "What The Thunder Said" which has to do with logistics support to TF Orion in Afghanistan.  Colonel Conrad pinpoints two problems which he believes are responsible for our logistical woes in the CAF:

1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.

Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.

Bottom line:  We've got combat arms officers that haven't been properly taught to know when they are taking risks against the capacity of our supply chain.  We've also got Logistics soldiers that have not been held up to the right standards of, as Colonel Conrad put it, weaponeering, fire and tactical training.

Number 2 is a big problem within the Logistics branch and there are a lot of "civilians in uniform" who have no desire to do field logistics type work. Mix in the fact that it is a purple trade where soldiers aren't allowed to develop field/sea skills over the course of a career (Sup Techs posted to Svc Bn may learn field skills at a low level, be posted to ships and air bases, then come back as a WO and be expected to site a field platoon) and CFLTC has no NCM courses that teach tactical skills and the problem becomes exacerbated.

Finally, there is a disconnect in the logistics world to combat arms matters as well (due to the civilian in uniform mentality of some and other factors) where you often hear "that's combat arms stuff" when discussing any field related skill. Even leadership principles were once described by a Logistics person to me as being "combat arms things" since the Logistics "works differently".

 

[Halifax Tar]

I am pretty sure that the stewards are part of the Department on a ship, that is headed by the person called the LOGISTICS Officer....

You are correct.  Having said that, they do not wear the LOG Cap Badge, get coursing through CFLTC or belong to the LOG Branch.  They belong to D Nav Pers.  Their belonging to the Log Dept is a legacy issue.  Ask them how their future looks Maybe they should have stayed with LOG.

Firefighters fall under the engineering dept, does that make them naval engineers ?

Sorry for the derailment I will back away

 

[SeaKingTacco]

You are correct.  Having said that, they do not wear the LOG Cap Badge, get coursing through CFLTC or belong to the LOG Branch.  They belong to D Nav Pers.  Their belonging to the Log Dept is a legacy issue.  Ask them how their future looks Maybe they should have stayed with LOG.

Firefighters fall under the engineering dept, does that make them naval engineers ?

Sorry for the derailment I will back away

Further derail- the firefighters are almost all gone and have been replaced by hull techs. So, yes! 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I did a stint with 1 Svc Battalion in Germany in 1986, what an eye opener, a good 50% of the NCM were ex-combat arms. All of them were very dedicated to providing excellent support to the frontline units. Quite changed my impression of Svc Battalions. Some cross pollination I think is in order to break down the walls. 

 

[MilEME09]

I did a stint with 1 Svc Battalion in Germany in 1986, what an eye opener, a good 50% of the NCM were ex-combat arms. All of them were very dedicated to providing excellent support to the frontline units. Quite changed my impression of Svc Battalions. Some cross pollination I think is in order to break down the walls.

I agree, more so in the reserves, problem is, doctrine makes proper CSS in the PRes next to impossible. By this i mean units are to keep 72 hours worth of stores on hand, that covers your weekend exercises, so only on a brigade EX would they need resupply, so that is one time a year they need the service battalion. Which always is a gong show because they do not practice any of the procedure for ordering supplies.

 

[Kirkhill]

A modest proposal for a new department in National Defence -

Invite WalMart and Amazon to compete for Logistics Support
Task them with remote, timely delivery.

Then build the CAF around that spine.

Walmart will deliver anything in their inventory anywhere - and they don't own the stuff they ship.

 

[AmmoTech90]

A modest proposal for a new department in National Defence -

Invite WalMart and Amazon to compete for Logistics Support
Task them with remote, timely delivery.

Done, to a certain extent.  I was in Haiti when one of the guys on gate guard came in and said DHL was at the gate with some ammo.  Turns out that was a cable cutter or fire extinguisher cart for one of the Griffons.  The part had been automatically delivered to where the aircraft was, DHL got it in to PAPIA two days after the airport reopened.

I guess it's part of the procurement contract.  Not sure if it works work for C7 ammo...

 

[MJP]

Great discussion!

I guess the question then would be is, "What is the tactical function of the Service Battalion"? To me, there needs to be a split between the IS and the tactical support. By doctrine, the Svc Bn should be focused solely on providing second line support to the Brigade only. By that logic, there should be an organization solely focused on that tactical field function (The doctrinal S&T Coy). The doctrinal S&T Coy works in the construct of a CMBG within a Div with a Div support group on top of it. In that case, the Div support group should be doing the majority of the contracting function. Second line, then, would focus solely on bringing materiel from third line to first line and managing it in between. For this, supply needs to manage the materiel and transport needs to deliver it.

That is the doctrinal answer unfortunately the PYs don’t exist to calve off the IS pieces and do the tactical ATT. 

The problem is we try to do third line and second line with some IS thrown in. If we want to be serious about having a fully deployable second line than there needs to be an actual deployable third line support element to provide the higher level support (unlike our JOSG).

Again it comes down PYs too maintain that 3rd line capability and not created it every deployment on the back of the Svc Bn or stealing from the IS. 

I'm also a fan of taking most base IS functions and making them mostly civilian where it makes sense. For example, there's no reason why base supply, food, and transport in Shilo couldn't be mostly civilian. Ammo and finance still need some military presence, mostly due to the needs of the trades, and maintenance would need some military due to the training requirements for military assets (Leopard 2's for instance).

You’ll hear little argument from me for many IS but it comes with the understanding that you limit employability with civilians (IE changing job desc, work hours etc).  The plus side is generally because they don’t have military admin commitments their overall productivity is usually greater.  A civilian mechanic is turning wrenches 70-80% productive (direct and indirect labour) if not more in a work day.  A military mechanic rarely hits 60% day in day out due to the military component of the job.

I'm not sure if the parallel with what you guys are talking about really exists, but incorporating civilians into your structure shouldn't be too much of a stretch.

It isn’t and we have a good number already. 

Question - I thought one of the major goals of streamlining things was to get rid of excess civilian contractors? 
But contracting out some of the services on base - is this not what the CF just tried to get rid of?  (Or am I thinking of something different?)

Completely different things.  The civilians being discussed here are fully employees of the Dept of National Defence.  But even there we have to be careful, some contracting makes sense.  We had a contract with SNC-Lavalin for mechanics, most of the guys were ex-military with a great deal of quals and experience.  They were more productive than military pers for reasosn stated above and they helped keep some of our fleets running because they had the expertise.  They were cut in the name of “getting rid of evil contractors” and our VOR climbed exponentially.  Not all pigs are the same.

Some Civilian involvement is unavoidable, for while I can't speak for Log, on the Maintenance side anything under warranty we cannot touch thus some civilian from company X has to fix it. We also are tasking Service Battalions to do first, second, and some third line work, with Workshop 202 in Montreal being the only 3rd/4th line shop in the country. If something goes there, don't expect it back for 8 months at the earliest in my experience.

A Svc Bn will always do 1st line work, they need to take care of their own equipment just like everyone else.  In my experience they don't and shouldn't do 1st line work for other units however the Res side of the house may be different.  2nd line is a given and the 3rd line piece while small is that natural piece that needs to be picked up when Svc Bn is doing the IS on top of field tasks.

I feel as if this article is presenting a false dichotomy.  None of of the operations mentioned above are anywhere near as taxing as Afghanistan was.  Take, the year 2010 for instance, The CAF ran three different operations involving nearly 10,000 personnel, simultaneously, in three different parts of the world, all the while carrying on as if it was business as usual at home.

I'm talking about Op HESTIA in Haiti, Op ATHENA in Afghanistan and Op PODIUM in support of the Vancouver Olympics.  Did we run in to sustainment problems during these operations?  Sure, but our logisticians worked through them and got the job done.  When it comes to Strat Level sustainment, the CAF is world class.  There aren't many countries in the world capable of doing what we can do and we are probably one of the best at sustainment for a military of our size and capability.

Where we tend to run in to issues WRT sustainment is at the tactical level, I think part of this problem is due to trainingisms, I wouldn't use Ex MR as a gauge for how well/not well we do tactical level sustainment.  MR is a glorified dog and pony show and isn't resourced or designed to really set the Bde up for success. 

Agreed about the strat level, but it goes back to our greatest strength is we always get things done and our greatest weakness is we always get things done.

Ex MR is not perfect but is highlighted some deep flaws in our CSS thought processes, knowledge and equipment.  Regardless if it is Ex MR or a deployment in Africa, maintainers need to order parts against a work order and Sup techs need to hand out/order a new part and take in the old parts for return to the system.  We weren’t able to do that very well for a variety of reasons.  The tanks and LAVs still ran but it took a ton of collective effort that wasn’t very efficient or effective and much of that boiled down to lack of solid processes and knowledge to use tools (not maint tools) properly.

1.  A lack of respect amongst Combat Arms Officers for Logistics; and
2.  The Degradation of Battlefield Logistics within the Logistics Branch and a lack of willingness on the part of the Logistics Branch to professionally self-reflect and learn.

Logistics isn't some dark art, if you are presented with a logistical dilemma you do one of two things, dedicate either more resources or more time and the problem will be solved.  The trick is knowing which one to do.

Bottom line:  We've got combat arms officers that haven't been properly taught to know when they are taking risks against the capacity of our supply chain.  We've also got Logistics soldiers that have not been held up to the right standards of, as Colonel Conrad put it, weaponeering, fire and tactical training.

Great book and a great guy to talk too.  Both points are bang on in my experience, fixing it is the issue.

 

[dapaterson]

Great book and a great guy to talk too.  Both points are bang on in my experience, fixing it is the issue.

He is at least some part the problem; Col Conrad (like no small number of Cbt Arms officers) seems to take some pleasure in never serving in Ottawa.  "I don't want to go solve the problems or at least understand them better, I'd rather sit on the sidelines and snipe."

#Tangent Beyond a certain point, senior officers and SNCOs should become custodians of the institution.  That means making efforts to make changes that will happen long after your tenure, and taking a perspective beyond next week / next year.  It may also mean taking positions that are less glamorous, but more capable of influencing change - and might involve getting a phone number in the 613 area code.*


*Or possibly in the 343 overlay

 

[Kirkhill]

Done, to a certain extent.  I was in Haiti when one of the guys on gate guard came in and said DHL was at the gate with some ammo.  Turns out that was a cable cutter or fire extinguisher cart for one of the Griffons.  The part had been automatically delivered to where the aircraft was, DHL got it in to PAPIA two days after the airport reopened.

I guess it's part of the procurement contract.  Not sure if it works work for C7 ammo...

So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?

 

[Lumber]

So the remaining question is: How far forward will they deliver?  Are their drivers and pilots willing to wear body armour?  If not how big is the gap the Service Battalion has to fill?

Hey, if DHL/Wal-Mart is willing to deliver to Chicago, Flint, Detroit and Milwaukee, then they brave more danger than most members of the CAF.

Bring 'em on.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Ref Amazon and WalMart and so on ... one might want to consider that the last really great revolution in logistics occured in the USA, mainly, but, thanks to CD Howe, in Canada, too, and it was driven by "dollar-a-year men" who were business/industry executives who came to Washington (and Ottawa) during World War II to help the government integrate the national industrial base and a reformed (largely by better (civilian) management) military logistics system to create a (relatively) seamless, modern logistics system that used both "pull" (user demands) and "push" (data driven) techniques to ensure that Pte Bloggins had (roughly) what he needed when he needed it. It was a quite amazing thing and those same business leaders, in the 1950s, revolutionized American (and later European and Japanese) industry, too, based upin their "lessons learned" from the wartime exercise.

 

[PuckChaser]

DHL was flying into Kabul.... If they can get it that far, why can't our logistic chain take over?

Meanwhile, I could get things through US APO from Amazon in under a week to a small outpost outside of Kabul, but mail through the CAF system took 2 months. Granted the US has a heck of a lot more strat airlift capability, but even mail to Kandahar was a lot quicker.