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This One's For Thucydides: Green Air Force

Thucydides said:
I would have to do a lot of reading to find the references, but I recall the RAF was pretty dead set against Autogyros back in the 1920's and 30's

Perhaps for good reason.

If there was any real benefit to autogyros, there would be several manufacturers producing them for commercial sale. Why are none doing so, despite James Bond?

Thucydides said:
(despite thier obvious uses as helicopter analogues for liason, spotting etc.)

They are not helicopters. They cannot hover. They rely on forward movement for flight, thereby combining the limitations of seized-wing aircraft with the complexities of rotary-winged ones.
 
SherH2A said:
Looking at the Bushcaddy sport I was interested by the possibility of buying a kit for around 25,000$.  I was just thinking how nice it would be for a Reserve unit to be bought the kit and have them assemble it.

Having spent eighteen years in a Reserve-heavy unit, "nice" would not be my first choice of adjectives, although most choices higher up the list would have the same number of letters.

It's not like our techs have too little to do as it is.

SherH2A said:
I suspect it would be great for the unit's morale

You suspect wrongly.

Better for morale, by far, is a useful role and suitable equipment to perform it.

SherH2A said:
the ground and air crew would wind up knowing the aircraft better than any other type.

And we do not know our aircraft well enough now? Have you ever seen a Griffon in mid-600 hour inspection? There's not much that can come off without a chainsaw that doesn't come off during one of those.

SherH2A said:
I suspect we would also see some very interesting suggestions for adapting the plane to the unit's mission.

I agree. First get a useful mission and then a useful aircraft with which to do it.
 
Kirkhill said:
But I think I wouldn't have to go far to find people arguing that the situational awareness of an aerial observer with Eyeball Mk1 is greater than the view of the world gained "through a straw".

Chances are that none of those people have ever used modern EO/IR systems on an aircraft.

I've done the strictly-eyeball thing, a blend of both with police helicopter flying, and a tour with just a "straw".

One can see a lot with just an eyeball, in daylight, but not in really useful detail. What one sees cannot be transmitted to a ground commander or other interested parties in multiple locations. There is no night capability. The Kiowa that I used to fly would be of any value, in its original configuration, in today's world.

EO/IR systems have good zoom capabilities. One can scan wide areas, or narrow right in. They function during most times of the day or night in most environments. This is why manned aircraft have them, too.

"Straw" is not an accurate depiction at all.

Kirkhill said:
Is the level of risk associated with Ultra Light or Bird Dog operations different than that associated with LOH operations?

Yes. Much. Such seized-wing aircraft cannot use terrain masking when necessary, and have to keep moving which is tactically limiting.

Imagine the usefulness of a Coyote that could not park in one place, but had to keep driving around in circles at about 120 km/hr.

I would typically spend much of my time on a recce mission sitting on the ground at idle when able, conserving fuel and relaxing a little while still monitoring the tactical situation, plus I could dismount my Observer when necessary. An L19 Observer might object a little more to such a suggestion.
 
I'll add another  :2c: about the Flight Safety SA thing.  If there was a way for UAVs to get TCAS and a way of "slaving" (automatically pointing-to) a selectable target on the TCAS, that may solve a lot of the issues of Flight Safety SA.  Or, similarly, with a radar instead of TCAS. 

The thing with UAV/RPA tech right now is that it's much like in the early days of manned flight.  Lots of things to be worked out, and eventually they will be.
 
Hand up in the back of the class here Dimsum.

What is TCAS?
 
Traffic collision avoidance system.  Works on mode 3 IFF to prevent aircraft collisions.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
Traffic collision avoidance system.  Works on mode 3 IFF....
Ah....explains acronym by using more acronyms.  ;D
 
Hey dude, last time looked, google worked for everyone on the Internet....

;D
 
Just teasin'  --- I'd actually heard of IFF somewhere before  ;)
 
Google returns the following:

Tricyclic Anti-Depressants
Student Accomodation Management Systems (by TCAS)
Transactions on Circuits and Systems
Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems.

I was just wondering why three wheeled landing gear would incur depression and so I sought clarification.

My apologies for the lack of google-fu this evening. ;D
 
Loachman said:
We do not have the luxury of filling "niche roles" with multiple fleets of capability-limited aircraft.

We certainly can't IF we also wish to maintain a full range of military capabilities.  However, if we were to make the conscious decision to focus on a few niche roles and do them well at the expense of being fully capable across the spectrum then some of these lower-tech, lower-cost solutions might be very viable choices.  Perhaps there is something to be said for having a capability that is different and complementary to the capabilities and equipment of our allies (especially the United States).

I'm not saying that this is a path that Canada SHOULD take but it is possibly a path that Canada COULD take.  The biggest problem and fear that I have (if history is any guide) is that we would likely purchase less capable equipment to save money without truly accepting/acknowledging that fact and acting in a way that recognizes the self-imposed limitations we've placed on our military.  You can't trade in your F1 for a VW Beetle and expect to stay in the Grand Prix circuit.  That however is what we'd likely try to do...at the expense of military effectiveness and unfortunately the lives of our service people when we throw them into a type of conflict for which they are not properly equipped.
 
On the other hand, depending on the "niche role," might there be benefits to maintaining some "less capable" platforms, on the same basis as land transport runs the gamut from blue fleet through MilCOTS to APCs and the like? Whether the bottom-end capability should look like a Herc, a Beaver clone, or a leased Boeing or Antonov cargo-hauler is beyond me.

With the occasional murmurs of maintaining/expanding our Arctic presence, would there be some utility in a "bush pilot auxiliary?" Consider the Rangers, WWII militarization of fishing vessels, CASARA, and similar examples, and apply it to light aviation support in the North?
 
Loachman said:
I always liked to take "hostages" along on flights anyway. It doesn't have to be a post-initial-assembly flight to give a tech some incentive.

Not that I ever really thought that they needed any. They are professional enough, and there are decent checks in the system. I have never had less than full confidence in our maintainers.

And we thank you for that Sir.    :bowing:
 
The whole thing seems vaguely familiar  :)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vV427haEN2k


As for people telling a world that won't listen, just remember the armoured exercises in england interwar, well at least some Germans were listening.
 
I've been trying to figure out where I am coming from on this issue myself.  I guess I am primarily in data gathering mode.  Which seems appropriate.

There is the Canadian Army and there is the Canadian government.  The two are not the same although one works for the other.

Sometimes the Army is tasked by HMCG to work overseas in places where people shoot at it.  Other government departments, exclusive of the RCN and the RCAF are seldom tasked in that fashion.

Sometimes the Army (or the RCN or the RCAF) is tasked by HMCG to work within Canada.  Very occasionally this is because they may get shot at but usually it is just because the existing domestic agencies are temporarily short of manpower or lack a capability held by the CF.

When the CF works overseas or domestically it needs data to conduct operations effectively.  The more data (arguably) the more efficient operations can be.  They won't necessarily be more efficient but they can be.  It is probably easier to stipulate that a lack of data will guarantee an inefficient and ineffective response.

When data is not readily available (intelligence is readily available data) then the CF has to go out and find it for itself (conduct reconnaissance and surveillance).

It seems reasonable that if that recce and surveillance has to be conducted in a "non-permissive" environment then the equipment provided should ensure to the greatest extent possible that its operators will come home safely to the wife and kids.  No argument on that from this corner.

But there are two other aspects to this discussion:

1. Canada doesn't have to operate overseas at all.  It chooses to operate overseas.  It chooses, to a great extent, the threat environment in which it wishes to operate.

2. Canada does have to operate domestically.

HMCG decides IF Canada is going to operate overseas, IF it is going to operate in a "non-permissive" environment and what level of threat they are willing to manage.

Those decisions are driven strictly by how much money HMCG believes they can extract from the Canadian Taxpayer.

ERC's Two Harolds (Wilson and MacMillan) have more to say about domestic operations.  Domestic operations are event driven and occur at short notice.  HMCG is required to react in a timely and effective fashion. 

The Canadian Taxpayer demands that their money be used first to meet the domestic need and only secondarily to meet expeditionary needs.

The good news for HMCG is that domestic operations generally occur in a permissive environment where people are not shooting.  If there is a data shortfall (lack of intelligence) then reconnaissance and surveillance operators have a reasonable expectation of coming home to the wife and kids.  This suggests that the platforms used to conduct recce and surveillance domestically do not have to be as robust as those that are deployed overseas.


But.

Domestically HMCG expects to have a detailed intelligence picture on a continuous basis throughout the national territory.  That means the government needs to employ many eyeballs on an ongoing basis.  Not all of those eyeballs need to be in the military.  Not all of those eyeballs need to be in protected platforms.

HMCG can employ civilian suppliers of intelligence.
It can employ civilians on a part time basis, like the Canadian Rangers, to keep their eyes open as they go about their daily lives.
It can employ people in CSIS, CSCE, the RCMP and the Coast Guard to keep their eyes open and act within approved limits in low threat environments.
It can employ people in the CF to use available resources, even if they are overkill for the task on hand to add to the intelligence picture.
It can employ the Militia and CASARA and the CCGA and similar agencies to keep their eyes open for a short period of time during a crisis.


Where am I going with this?

It is about sensors not platforms.

It is more important that HMCG's spending priorities focus first on providing Binoculars, Night Vision Devices, EO/IR turrets, Acoustic Detection Systems and Radars to provide intelligence than focusing on the platforms that carry the observers.

A user of the intelligence doesn't particularly need to know, or concern themselves with, how the intelligence was gathered, only that it is available so that they can plan and act.

If taxpayers are only giving HMCG a limited number of dollars to work with, and they expect a domestic focus, then HMCG is quite within its rights to focus on supplying lots of sensors to people who can employ them domestically from their jeep, their ATV, their snowmobile, their boat or their ultralight.

If it needs additional sensors for the domestic gaps then it seems to me it is valid to mount those sensors on the least expensive platform available so that more sensors can be bought and deployed. 

Once those needs have been met (although the probability of those needs ever being met is equivalent to meeting the health care needs of Canadians), once those needs have been met then residual dollars can be spent on the expeditionary role.

Because the expeditionary role is a discretionary item then there is no reason why Canada couldn't decide to limit its contribution to the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance to a single, massively armoured and well armed mobile observation post, or a single well defended ship or a satellite surveillance system.

HMCG doesn't have to do anything overseas.  It doesn't have to send a Division, Brigade Group, Battle Group or Combat Team. 

But if it chooses to send something overseas, in harms way, then it has a duty of care to ensure that it is the most survivable system available.


I don't think that the kitting problem can be addressed first by looking at the discretionary requirements of an expeditionary force.  I think that it is critical to focus on the domestic requirement first,  that that requirement be met with the least cost expenditure on systems, that the expertise gained by meeting the domestic need be made available to the international community, and that the funds made available for expeditionary purposes be allocated on the basis of protecting that expertise so that it can be returned, intact, to Canada and the wife and kids.


In this particular case this would result in HMCG ensuring that the Canadian Rangers, CASARA, Coast Guard, Mounties and Militia were well equipped with sensors.  That those same sensors would be mounted on cheap platforms for use by those agencies domestically.  That those same sensors would be utilized on better protected systems for use by the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Those portions of the CF that focus on domestic ops, like the Militia, could be equipped with the same sensors and cheap platforms to learn transferable skills that could be employed with the expeditionary troops.

Which would you rather have?  100,000 pairs of binos and cameras (with radios) reporting from multiple locations or a single Global Hawk cruising over a limited area, occasionally and looking at a series of points.



 
Kirkhill said:
Which would you rather have?  100,000 pairs of binos and cameras (with radios) reporting from multiple locations or a single Global Hawk cruising over a limited area, occasionally and looking at a series of points.

The Global Hawk. 100 000 binos with cameras and radios cannot even begin to provide the coverage and perspective, peristance and day/night capability, 24 hours + that a GH can. Them i can relocate my GH to anywhere in the country faster should the need arise.

[sarcasm]
Let's talk about the Army while we're at it. I think the CA should concentrate on "niche" roles. let's get rid of the CMBGs and concentrate on C-IED and SF. Stop trying to have capabilities in everything.
[/sarcasm]

 
CDN Aviator said:
[sarcasm]
Let's talk about the Army while we're at it. I think the CA should concentrate on "niche" roles. let's get rid of the CMBGs and concentrate on C-IED and SF. Stop trying to have capabilities in everything.
[/sarcasm]

We are not of the same opinion.
 
We had the equivalent of 'Dragoon' operating over us in NI in Belfast and elsewhere way back when. Usually a 'top cover' Gazelle, with two crew, hovering at 5000ft (SA-7 y'know) over foot patrols protecting PC Plod doing his job.

Three patrols per company per day, at about 1 hour per patrol, were the usual 'ration' of heli hours. We ran triple that number of 'programmed' patrols daily, but only about 3 were covered by heli.

We had 4 companies. That's 12 patrols per day, at least, with a state of the art chopper overhead. In addition, of course, to a network of permanent and heavily fortified high tech OPs atop the highest buildings in town, stuffed with all the latest and greatest high tech observation gizmos. And this went on for decades. I can't imagine the costs invovled.

Did it help? Sure, but the IRA still ran hundreds of operations against us. Most they called off for various reasons, but they still took us on and, when they did, usually did the business about 50% of the time; top cover or no top cover.

Drones and other small aircraft for overwatch? Great. Good tactics and enough troops and police combined with a long term, war winning, fully integrated politico-military strategy supported by a first class intelligence network? Even better. ;D


 
D&B,

Bernadette notwithstanding:  NI was/is a Domestic Operation.

Also, disregarding Martin's Tommy Gun and nasties in culverts, do you think that the threat level to the Squaddie rose to the level of Afghanistan?  How about Iraq?  Would you have been able to fully utilize the capabilities of Warriors, Challengers and AS90s in Derry?  On second thought, don't answer that.    You probably would.

Better question, while it would have done wonders for your morale, would it have either reduced the threat or hastened the glorious Millenium that is upon us?  (The odd knee-capping and bombing aside).

As miserable as NI was, it was a police action with emphasis on mobility, light infantry, light cavalry and intelligence.  N'est ce pas?

 
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