This One's For Thucydides: Green Air Force

[daftandbarmy]

D&B,

Bernadette notwithstanding:  NI was/is a Domestic Operation.

Also, disregarding Martin's Tommy Gun and nasties in culverts, do you think that the threat level to the Squaddie rose to the level of Afghanistan?  How about Iraq?  Would you have been able to fully utilize the capabilities of Warriors, Challengers and AS90s in Derry?  On second thought, don't answer that.    You probably would.

Better question, while it would have done wonders for your morale, would it have either reduced the threat or hastened the glorious Millenium that is upon us?  (The odd knee-capping and bombing aside).

As miserable as NI was, it was a police action with emphasis on mobility, light infantry, light cavalry and intelligence.  N'est ce pas?

Yes, pretty much. The 'bad old days' of the 1969-80/81 period were, as far as I can estimate, on par with a Baghdad type situation, but on a much smaller scale, with far more troops per capita to deal with it all. It's all ugly when you're in the middle of it, of course.

As for the effectiveness of the 'overwatch' I found that it was interesting to see what effect it had on people.  Some disregaded it and relied mainly on their own tactics and knowledge of the terrain, leaving the pilots to get bored out of their skulls. Others relied heavily on it and wandered around as if God Himself was casting his benevolent gaze upon them and enveloped them in HIS loving protection. Others actually blended the two, and got the pilots involved fully in every patrol, and put police and others (int cell types etc) onboard with the pilots.

We tended to do the latter, and sent multiple 'int' tasks up to the pilots who provided us with all kinds of other informaiton as well as providing overwatch on the patrol. We also encouraged the taking of zillions of photos.Note: the pilots were expert observers, unlike grunts like me, and added alot of value from that perspective.

I'd still prefer a division of 'snitches' to a thousand 'gizmos', as that's the kind of int you really need to be proactive and deal with the root of the problem. But, yeah, if you had some small drones that could be used by foot / mobile patrols, great. I'm not sure that the CSM in an ultralight is the way ahead though as you still tie down manpower.... even if it's only the CSM  ;D

 

[ArmyRick]

Just curious and throwing it out there. What are the resources we are protecting up north and what are the threats (most likely and least likely)? I can guess at a few but those in the know may have some light to shed.

My guess as to our resources is
1. Land
2. Fresh clean water
3. Animals
4. Mineral/metal deposits?
5. Wood (in some areas)?
6. Is there oil up north?

Threats? I have to admit beyong criminal activity I am not sure of what the threats are. Anyone?

 

[cphansen]

There is oil up there, but you did miss at least 1 item from your list i.e. people.  The forces seem to fly quite a few SAR missions for missing lost snowmobilors.

Also there is more than 1 diamond mine up there.

At the current rate of ice melting there will soon be an open water summertime northern passage.

 

[a_majoor]

I don't see this as entirely either/or.

We already have some "light" capabilities in our airforce for such tasks as operations in the far north and SAR (using Twin Otters and Buffalo), so an aircraft like the Caravan (or different platform, but I'll use the Caravan for simplicity) is needed anyway. If we choose the platform intelligently, then we can also use it for other roles, some of which are complimentary with existing capabilities and some of which might be "new".

Looking at the Caravan we see a rugged transport aircraft with a limited "footprint" so it can operate in austere environments and out of small(ish) airfields. It has demonstrated the ability to act as a transport, carry parachutists, act as a weapons platform and a sensor platform. If we simply buy enough to replace the elderly airframes then we don't loose anything and have the potential to shift them for other uses the current fleet cannot do if there should be a need. If we buy more (say for the Air Reserve) then we gain additional capabilites that we don't already, at a relatively modest cost.

I also look at aircraft more as platforms these days, since many aircraft (of all types) can be fitted with "kits" that allow them to do missions that they might not have been designed for. The F-22 can be made to carry bombs, and the USMC has a kit that turns the C-130 into a gunship at a fraction of the time and cost of creating a AC-130 Spectre. Once again, using the Caravan as the example, there are many airforces which have created "kits" to turn the Caravan from a simple cargo hauler into something else. Given the climactic conditions and ranges that need to be covered in Canada, there will be a certain minimum size and capability that is needed to fly safley and do useful work (specialized drones being the exception).

 

[GR66]

I think the risk is doing the job in half measures.  There is no doubt that it is possible to have a small fleet of Caravans along with the kit to modify them for a wide variety of roles.  It that enough airframes though to do ANY of those roles very well?  Is having a such a small fleet spread across our huge geography, with the support required for the fleet AND all the various specialty equipment very cost effective?  Can we afford both this light fleet AND the major platforms to do all the other "primary" tasks in this environment of shrinking budgets?

My take on the article is that they are suggesting that you can REPLACE the high-priced, cutting edge platforms with a larger quantity of cheaper platforms so that you can actually EXPAND your capabilities in many areas.  More, cheaper, low(er)-tech, lower overhead platforms providing maybe the 70-80% solution in much higher volume than a few, expensive, hi-tech, hi-overhead platforms providing the 90-95% solution are able to do.

Don't get me wrong.  If Canada has a need for a Caravan (or insert alternate airframe here) then by all means make it as flexible as possible so that we can get the most bang for the buck out of it.  I just don't think that having a few "light" aircraft to supplement our "heavies" is in any way doing what the article is suggesting.  To do that we'd need far more light aircraft (at the expense of heavy/hi-tech aircraft) and a completely new set of strategies and tactics to make effective use of them.

 

[ArmyRick]

How would a brand new Twin Otter fair out if Viking built them in terms of price and operational capability? It seems the Twin Otter has a proven record of success for operating in the far north. Thoughts? Ideas?

I also agree that UAVs (Part of JUSTAS?) will be needed to provide more effective situational awareness up north.

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/US-SDAF-Buying-Cessna-C-208B-Caravan-Light-Planes-07419/

The link references a US government purchase of 4 Caravans with training for overseas operators maintainers.

The purchase price is given as 12 MUSD for the complete package.

Assume  a least cost price of one Global Hawk at 35 MUSD, or an F-35 at 60 MUSD.  Is it worth reducing a Global Hawk purchase by one aircraft (from 5 to 4 for example) or one F35 (from 65 to 64 a/c) to buy 12 to 20 Caravans?

Is the availability of the primary platform greatly disadvantaged?
Do the numbers of the less survivable (when bullets fly) a/c add resources that could be exploited domestically and release the more capable a/c for the harder environments?

With Thucydides, I am not proposing either/or.  I am wondering if there is a different mix of platforms that presents a better option.

I am not in favour of a mixed fleet of (for example) Super Hornets and F35s as their prices and capabilities are too similar.  But perhaps foregoing a couple of F35s to buy a couple of dozen Caravans might produce a useful outcome.

And even Global Hawks / BAMS / Maritime Predators have their role and I agree they are required in the Canadian mix.  But.  Do they need to be supplied by "Unlimited Liability" personnel?  Or can the service be supplied by civilian contractors flying out of Ottawa, Goose Bay or even Nevada?

 

[Kirkhill]

How would a brand new Twin Otter fair out if Viking built them in terms of price and operational capability? It seems the Twin Otter has a proven record of success for operating in the far north. Thoughts? Ideas?

I also agree that UAVs (Part of JUSTAS?) will be needed to provide more effective situational awareness up north.

I like both ideas.... assuming the price is right.  Viking would be worth supporting as a strategic asset on a par with Bombardier, Irving and Washington Marine.  The Twin Otter is proven.  Assuming they can build good ones.... Why not?

 

[a_majoor]

Here is a article about the French experience with creating and using a "green" airforce during the end of the colonial period. The primary issue for the French turned out to be a lack of suitable platforms. There were never enough aircraft to do all the things French COIN theory of the day called for, and the aircraft the French were able to get their hands on were generally not the right kind to do the job.

Superannuated WWII figher planes were the first wave in Indochina, and were not designed for "low and slow" flight from austere airfields (maintainence issues were a large part of the problem). Other issues included insufficient range or weapons loads that were not appropriate. The French had similar issues in Algeria, especially with the jet aircraft the Armée de l'Air operated during the period. The most capable aircraft turned out to be the Skyraider and re engined T-28 trainers.

The ultimate fate of the French COIN philosophy was failure. The doctrinal underpinnings were weak, and the examples of French scrambling to source aircraft to support the actual work on the ground suggests that there were never enough resources committed to do the job either.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n1/frcoin.html

Related link about "Combat crop dusters", a little known branch of COIN aviation:

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n3/articles/ayres.html