- Reaction score
- 2,526
- Points
- 1,260
This, of course, presumes they have public support now, but it was interesting to see a possible down side for the Taliban in their suicide bombing campaign....
What’s wrong with Afghanistan’s suicide bombers?
Afghanistan Watch, 15 Mar 07
Blog entry link
Afghanistan has seen a precipitous rise in suicide bombings (from 25 in 2005 to 136 in 2006) but they have failed to cause many fatalities among their targets: foreign and international security forces. And while they may have achieved their goal of impeding the goals of Karzai's government and its international backers, these tactics are earning the Taliban enmity among the people whose support they most need.
So conclude Brian Glyn Williams and Cathy Young of the Jamestown Foundation, who recently conducted a five month study on 158 documented suicide bombings in Afghanistan from 2001-2007. One of their conclusions is that despite surface similarities with Iraq, “the suicide bombing campaign in Afghanistan has its own specific dynamics.”
When you glance at the statistics, one thing is evident: suicide bombings in Afghanistan have had a shockingly low rate of success. During the first seven weeks of 2007 there were 22 attempted bombings (punctuating Mullah Hayat Khan’s claim that they Taliban has deployed 2,000 suicide bombers to make 2007 "the bloodiest year" in Afghanistan.) However, in 16 of these 22 cases the only fatality of the explosion was the suicide bomber himself, and in another two cases, the perpetrator was shot even before detonating his bomb.
The three “successful” attacks killed two policemen and eight civilians (Jan 23), three policemen (Feb 4), and 23 people, including several coalition soldiers. Such “numbers hardly compare to Iraq where suicide bombers often carry out synchronized attacks that regularly kill anywhere from 60 to 130 people.” And the eighteen failed attacks “translate to 19 Taliban suicide bombers for one Afghan policeman, hardly an inspiring kill ratio for would-be-suicide bombers.”
Why are suicide attacks in Iraq so much more lethal? Are Afghan bombers less experienced or poorly-coordinated? Are coalition tactics better at preventing attacks?
Perhaps, but the chief reason appears to be that in Afghanistan bombers are going after military targets rather than “soft” civilian targets. Of the 19 bombings in which a target could be identified, 16 aimed at foreign or Afghan security forces. In fact, of the 158 bombings reviewed by Jamestown since 2001, “in only two instances were civilians clearly the target of Afghan suicide bombers.” And on several occasions when bystanders have been injured, apparently as “collateral damage” of attacks on armed convoys, the Taliban apologized.
This pattern stands in sharp contrast to Iraq, where jihadi groups seek to maximize casualties by targeting crowds of civilians. Iraq insurgents have a dire model: create maximal chaos, impede reconstruction, destroy civil society, ignite civil war, and thereby make it impossible for the new government and its foreign backers to rule.
The Taliban have sometimes opted for these tactics, but they have balanced them with attempts to compete for “hearts and minds.” In the south they are destroying government schools--but they are also seeking to replace them with alternative madrassas. They are battling Afghan police even as they argue that they can better provide roads free of banditry and genuine justice. Especially in the south, the Taliban is walking a fine line: it wants to take back control of their “natal” territory from the Karzai government, but “does not want to be seen as destroying the local tribes' sense of security.” Their ultimate goal is to win the support of the Afghan people (even as they remain remarkably unpopular among them.
Has the Taliban/al Qaeda campaign of suicide bombings been a failure then? No, argue Williams and Young, since “one cannot overestimate the psychological damage that this asymmetric tactic has had on ISAF troops,” who have been forced to alter their tactics and have at times overreacted to suicide threats and killed innocent Afghan civilians. Perhaps more importantly, the threat of suicide attacks have made it difficult for civilian aid agencies and NGOs to interact with locals and bring development benefits to the provinces.
Yet even if the Taliban appear not to be targeting civilians, civilians are the overwhelming victims of their attacks. The “collateral damage” of these attacks has been far greater than the intended damage. The study corroborates the Pentagon claim that “as many as 84% of the victims of suicide bombings in Afghanistan are civilians” and notes that “this has caused widespread resentment and protests in several Afghan cities.” (Poster's emphasis - maybe good key message to share?)
It's very possible that if the Taliban continues to emphasize suicide tactics, it will reap a bitter harvest, undermine its remaining support.
What’s wrong with Afghanistan’s suicide bombers?
Afghanistan Watch, 15 Mar 07
Blog entry link
Afghanistan has seen a precipitous rise in suicide bombings (from 25 in 2005 to 136 in 2006) but they have failed to cause many fatalities among their targets: foreign and international security forces. And while they may have achieved their goal of impeding the goals of Karzai's government and its international backers, these tactics are earning the Taliban enmity among the people whose support they most need.
So conclude Brian Glyn Williams and Cathy Young of the Jamestown Foundation, who recently conducted a five month study on 158 documented suicide bombings in Afghanistan from 2001-2007. One of their conclusions is that despite surface similarities with Iraq, “the suicide bombing campaign in Afghanistan has its own specific dynamics.”
When you glance at the statistics, one thing is evident: suicide bombings in Afghanistan have had a shockingly low rate of success. During the first seven weeks of 2007 there were 22 attempted bombings (punctuating Mullah Hayat Khan’s claim that they Taliban has deployed 2,000 suicide bombers to make 2007 "the bloodiest year" in Afghanistan.) However, in 16 of these 22 cases the only fatality of the explosion was the suicide bomber himself, and in another two cases, the perpetrator was shot even before detonating his bomb.
The three “successful” attacks killed two policemen and eight civilians (Jan 23), three policemen (Feb 4), and 23 people, including several coalition soldiers. Such “numbers hardly compare to Iraq where suicide bombers often carry out synchronized attacks that regularly kill anywhere from 60 to 130 people.” And the eighteen failed attacks “translate to 19 Taliban suicide bombers for one Afghan policeman, hardly an inspiring kill ratio for would-be-suicide bombers.”
Why are suicide attacks in Iraq so much more lethal? Are Afghan bombers less experienced or poorly-coordinated? Are coalition tactics better at preventing attacks?
Perhaps, but the chief reason appears to be that in Afghanistan bombers are going after military targets rather than “soft” civilian targets. Of the 19 bombings in which a target could be identified, 16 aimed at foreign or Afghan security forces. In fact, of the 158 bombings reviewed by Jamestown since 2001, “in only two instances were civilians clearly the target of Afghan suicide bombers.” And on several occasions when bystanders have been injured, apparently as “collateral damage” of attacks on armed convoys, the Taliban apologized.
This pattern stands in sharp contrast to Iraq, where jihadi groups seek to maximize casualties by targeting crowds of civilians. Iraq insurgents have a dire model: create maximal chaos, impede reconstruction, destroy civil society, ignite civil war, and thereby make it impossible for the new government and its foreign backers to rule.
The Taliban have sometimes opted for these tactics, but they have balanced them with attempts to compete for “hearts and minds.” In the south they are destroying government schools--but they are also seeking to replace them with alternative madrassas. They are battling Afghan police even as they argue that they can better provide roads free of banditry and genuine justice. Especially in the south, the Taliban is walking a fine line: it wants to take back control of their “natal” territory from the Karzai government, but “does not want to be seen as destroying the local tribes' sense of security.” Their ultimate goal is to win the support of the Afghan people (even as they remain remarkably unpopular among them.
Has the Taliban/al Qaeda campaign of suicide bombings been a failure then? No, argue Williams and Young, since “one cannot overestimate the psychological damage that this asymmetric tactic has had on ISAF troops,” who have been forced to alter their tactics and have at times overreacted to suicide threats and killed innocent Afghan civilians. Perhaps more importantly, the threat of suicide attacks have made it difficult for civilian aid agencies and NGOs to interact with locals and bring development benefits to the provinces.
Yet even if the Taliban appear not to be targeting civilians, civilians are the overwhelming victims of their attacks. The “collateral damage” of these attacks has been far greater than the intended damage. The study corroborates the Pentagon claim that “as many as 84% of the victims of suicide bombings in Afghanistan are civilians” and notes that “this has caused widespread resentment and protests in several Afghan cities.” (Poster's emphasis - maybe good key message to share?)
It's very possible that if the Taliban continues to emphasize suicide tactics, it will reap a bitter harvest, undermine its remaining support.
