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Tactical Nukes in 4 brigade (a split thread)

Humphrey Bogart

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Old Sweat said:
Probably not tactical nukes, so the army won't have to dust off CAMT 1-8 The Brigade Group in Battle which was our doctrine on how to fight on the nuclear battlefield. Frankly, as one of the few surviving nuclear target analysts, I thought we tended to fling them around rather indiscriminately on exercises in Canada. Four brigade was a different story.

Going for a next generation Bomarc makes as much sense as trying to create Son of Arrow. The threat is a lot different than in the fifties.

So there was a point in time when the DS solution was "Just Nuke Em"  >:D >:D
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
So there was a point in time when the DS solution was "Just Nuke Em"  >:D >:D
Edit to insert: The commander's estimate assessed approaches and then selected killing grounds which became potential targets for tactical nukes. (Normally a brigade might be allotted one low yield device for planning purposes.) Contingencies were developed to channel the enemy and hold them in the target area until they could be attacked. Often the targets were based on a natural obstacle and/or a minefield to force the enemy to concentrate to assault our position.

Our tactics were built around the use of tactical nuclear devices and then using manoeuvre by tanks and mechanized infantry to exploit the advantage created by blowing a fair sized hole in the enemy.
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
So there was a point in time when the DS solution was "Just Nuke Em"  >:D >:D


You must remember that the big, high level plan was a tactical withdrawal from the Inner-German Border (IGB), across the Wester and, eventually, even across the Rhine, by which time, one hoped (and hope was, indeed, an acceptable course of action) formations like 3rd US and 2 BR Corps and a French Army would have arrived and, maybe, we would have inflicted enough damage on both first rate East German and barely second rate Russian armies to be able to launch a counter-offensive (not just local counter attacks).

It wasn't a bad plan ... it was, in my quesstimation, the only useful alternative to MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), which was a totally nihilistic concept, but the prevailing strategy in the 1960s and '70s.

As Old Sweat says, nuclear tactics in 1(BR) Corps, at least, were for limited use where really significant damage could be done and there was a practical, tactical necessity for us to delay, defeat (locally) and continue our somewhat (we hoped ~ there's that word, again) stately withdrawal.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
You must remember that the big, high level plan was a tactical withdrawal from the Inner-German Border (IGB), across the Wester and, eventually, even across the Rhine, by which time, one hoped (and hope was, indeed, an acceptable course of action) formations like 3rd US and 2 BR Corps and a French Army would have arrived and, maybe, we would have inflicted enough damage on both first rate East German and barely second rate Russian armies to be able to launch a counter-offensive (not just local counter attacks).

It wasn't a bad plan ... it was, in my quesstimation, the only useful alternative to MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), which was a totally nihilistic concept, but the prevailing strategy in the 1960s and '70s.

As Old Sweat says, nuclear tactics in 1(BR) Corps, at least, were for limited use where really significant damage could be done and there was a practical, tactical necessity for us to delay, defeat (locally) and continue our somewhat (we hoped ~ there's that word, again) stately withdrawal.
The problem became, later, a purely political one in which one could not give up West Germany to the Soviets to then turn around, drop nuclear warheads around and then strike back and claim possession of the smoking ruins.  So, a political tone of "forward defence" emerged.  It of course was nonsense, but it did lead to the US doctrine of "Air-Land battle" and the notion of "fight outnumbered and win". 
 
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