Status of American Field Artillery

[jeffb]

I came across this article that others might find interesting. Apparently, the US Field Artillery has lost most of its ability to actually do indirect fire. The main culprit seems to be the pilfering of gunners to fill other duties resulting in a generation of officers and even NCOs with limited to no experience working within their MOC.

This article is a paper written by a Colonel as part of his time at the US Army War College in 2010. All in all some very depressing points.

While I do not think that many of these points apply to Canadian gunners, it is still an interesting read and a fascinating insight into the inner workings of the artillery in the army of our greatest ally.

Key points from the article with more at link:  http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA518063

The erosion of core competencies cannot be overstated. FA, or fires battalions, have in recent years had significant issues performing the basic tasks required to deliver fires in support of their maneuver commanders....In the artillery community,senior fire support trainers at the Combined Training Centers (CTCs) monitored the decline of lethal fire support skills, both on the gun line and amongst fire support teams. In an unpublished monograph written by the senior fire support trainers at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) approximately 90% of enlisted and commissioned fire support personnel are tasked by the maneuver unit commanders at the echelon they are now assigned to perform missions outside their fire support planning and execution duties, to great or total exclusion of their Military Occupation Skills (MOS) duties.

...What the Wolf (fire support observer controller (OC)) team found was that the soldiers on the guns, as well as the officers in leadership positions, were actually unaware or untrained on the basic skills required to conduct delivery of fires. The majority of units observed at the NTC had significant problems in technical gunnery and collective crew tasks. Units were not only unable to perform simple firing tasks, such as howitzer calibration prior to a rotation, it was even not uncommon for batteries to fire rounds out of the safety box during on-site training prior to the start of the rotation.

 

[Lightguns]

When I joined the RCA we were 5 regts of 12 field and 2 Ad btys, 1 locating bty.  We are now 3 mortar and 3 gun btys are we heathy?  Yes we got observation and locating but not single PY increase.

 

[GnyHwy]

I think a large and potentially dangerous assumption that has been made by the Comds is that technology and automation will expedite future training and the ability to reintroduce the capability;  I do not subscribe to that. 

Another assumption is that technology makes processes simpler; I do not agree with that either.  While it may make things quicker and all knowing (after training and practice), it still requires a deep understanding of the procedures and technology that are executing it.

For us, I believe our fundamental skills may have degraded over the last few years, but we are far from danger of getting to levels mentioned in the article, especially if we avoid the erroneous assumptions I mention above.

 

 

[Old Sweat]

I have only given the paper a once over, but a couple of points got my attention. The first, and lesser, point is the posting of the FSO teams to the maneuver units, which led to a degradation in their fire support expertise and value. The more serious point was the chronic employment of field artillery units in other tasks which at least in part resulted from a conscious policy decision not to employ field artillery in what was perceived as low intensity operations. This, coupled with the rotation tempo, caused a huge degradation of artillery skills.

GnyHwy's point re the misappreciation of the benefits of technology is a good one. I believe that it was felt that the amount of time devoted to mastering technical gunnery could be reduced because of this factor, but this was proven to not be the case in action and the pendulum has swung back. I am also aware that regiments are back to practicing the conventional gunner stuff to reestablish skill levels and this has been fairly successful.

 

[jeffb]

I am also aware that regiments are back to practicing the conventional gunner stuff to reestablish skill levels and this has been fairly successful.

While Regiments are, and I would argue that the gun Btys are probably pretty good (I know those at 2 RCHA are), it's important to remember that of the 20 or so Reg force Btys (not including the school) there are only 6 gun Btys. That means that the vast majority of gunners currently in the Royal Regiment probably have low to middling skills in the provision of indirect fire support. This is amplified even further by the merging of the AD and FD MOSIDs and the cross pollination that has already occurred. The knock on effect of this is that we have an ever shrinking pool of people to draw on who are experts on fire support to acts as BCs, BSMs, TSMs etc of gun Btys. I wondering if someone who came up through say the STA stream is automatically disqualified to command 1 or 2 RCHA or 5RALC for example? It's quite conceivable that there will be a number of officers at the LCol level in the next 10 years will have spent zero time on a gun line or in an OP party after their phase training/FOO course. I wonder how they will be able to provide advice beyone that which they have acquired through osmosis as my guess from my lowly perch is that maneuver commanders in a peer/ near-peer threat environment will be primarily interested in the support that the guns provide vice STA assets beyond UAV.

I think that the one thing that will help insulate the Royal Regiment from many of the effects in this article is our small size. It is really hard to insulate oneself completely. With such a small senior NCO and officer pool, I think that we will all be able to keep a foot in each others stream for the foreseeable future. I have heard rumours that officers are going to be more streamed in the future. I hope that this is not the case in order to avoid the situation above. Another factor that may help to buffer this is the command team concept that has been around for a few years now. Perhaps having a CO with a strong background in the FOO/gun line stream paired up with a RSM with some STA experience or vice-a-versa would alleviate this? Just one more wrinkle to throw into succession planning eh?

 

[Infanteer]

While Regiments are, and I would argue that the gun Btys are probably pretty good (I know those at 2 RCHA are), it's important to remember that of the 20 or so Reg force Btys (not including the school) there are only 6 gun Btys. That means that the vast majority of gunners currently in the Royal Regiment probably have low to middling skills in the provision of indirect fire support.

This is something that has been an interesting topic of discussion that I've had with some gunner officers.  There is the impression that the Corps is making up sub-units just to preserve sub-units and PYs.  Not counting the school, there are 19 batteries IIRC.  Each Horse Regiment has five and 4 AD has four.  However, four of these are administrative, three are formed out of FOO/FACs skimmed off the firing batteries (the OP Batteries), three are guys with microphones on sticks (STA Batteries) and three are ad hoc combinations of UAVs and AD Radars (AD Batteries).

Some obvious issues out of this that are brought up is the proliferation of sensors and the decline in shooters.  In a brigade setting, this means more FOOs competing for less fire support.

A third firing battery could be reformed in each Horse Regiment by having them man the 81 mm mortars (although I'd like to see these returned to the Infantry, having somebody man them is critical to remind us all of how important they are).  This would, however, require a rethink of how to divide up manning of all the various sensor pieces.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

While Regiments are, and I would argue that the gun Btys are probably pretty good (I know those at 2 RCHA are), it's important to remember that of the 20 or so Reg force Btys (not including the school) there are only 6 gun Btys. That means that the vast majority of gunners currently in the Royal Regiment probably have low to middling skills in the provision of indirect fire support. This is amplified even further by the merging of the AD and FD MOSIDs and the cross pollination that has already occurred. The knock on effect of this is that we have an ever shrinking pool of people to draw on who are experts on fire support to acts as BCs, BSMs, TSMs etc of gun Btys. I wondering if someone who came up through say the STA stream is automatically disqualified to command 1 or 2 RCHA or 5RALC for example? It's quite conceivable that there will be a number of officers at the LCol level in the next 10 years will have spent zero time on a gun line or in an OP party after their phase training/FOO course. I wonder how they will be able to provide advice beyone that which they have acquired through osmosis as my guess from my lowly perch is that maneuver commanders in a peer/ near-peer threat environment will be primarily interested in the support that the guns provide vice STA assets beyond UAV.

I think that the one thing that will help insulate the Royal Regiment from many of the effects in this article is our small size. It is really hard to insulate oneself completely. With such a small senior NCO and officer pool, I think that we will all be able to keep a foot in each others stream for the foreseeable future. I have heard rumours that officers are going to be more streamed in the future. I hope that this is not the case in order to avoid the situation above. Another factor that may help to buffer this is the command team concept that has been around for a few years now. Perhaps having a CO with a strong background in the FOO/gun line stream paired up with a RSM with some STA experience or vice-a-versa would alleviate this? Just one more wrinkle to throw into succession planning eh?

The plan for the future is to go back to a common 1.1, and then have officers branch off into field artillery, STA, or AD 1.2 with seperate DP 2 level courses for each officer stream (Battlespace Management Course for AD, STA CC course for STA, and FOO course for Field). At this time, the BC course and the Arty Ops/FECCO/Artillery Duty Officer course (whatever name it goes ahead with) will fill the role of teaching pers from each stream the "basics" of Field, Air Defence, STA, and Targeting.

Once the AD capability returns in 2021 than the picture becomes more muddled. In near peer operations AD will play a larger role to counter the UAS and Counter Munitions fight, and will require more technical expertise. I would suggest your right about the STA in that outside of the UAS capability manoeuvre commanders are going to have little interest. In this, my point is that it is EQUALLY as important for the Field guys to speak about UAS and AD (in the future) as it is for the AD and STA guys to speak about Field arty. No piece is more important than the other. I understand your comment was largely about the future of the CS Regiments,  but integration between the gun Regiments and 4 RCA (GSR) will be equally as important. Already we're seeing more cross polinating. A Gun officer with a strong OP and gun line experience will benefit immensely from spending time in a "Top 3" job at 4 RCA.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

This is something that has been an interesting topic of discussion that I've had with some gunner officers.  There is the impression that the Corps is making up sub-units just to preserve sub-units and PYs.  Not counting the school, there are 19 batteries IIRC.  Each Horse Regiment has five and 4 AD has four.  However, four of these are administrative, three are formed out of FOO/FACs skimmed off the firing batteries (the OP Batteries), three are guys with microphones on sticks (STA Batteries) and three are ad hoc combinations of UAVs and AD Radars (AD Batteries).

There will likely be a 20th Battery added once the AD capability comes back as well....

 

[Infanteer]

To be built with all those spare PYs sitting around?

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

To be built with all those spare PYs sitting around?

There's 181 PYs associated with the future AD Battery. Where they will be drawn from is anyone's guess, BUT we were briefed they will be from outside the arty... perhaps you guys?

 

[Infanteer]

CFD is building up a reservoir of PYs for future capabilities.  We already paid our pound of flesh for CSS revitalization; you're probably getting the posties, TDO and court clerk PYs!

So is the plan for the Arty, by 2021, to have 6 firing batteries, an AD Battery (with some sort of missile or gun), 6 STA batteries (varying from CB radar to UAV to AD radar) and 3 OP Batteries?

 

[jeffb]

I have no inside track on any of this but I suspect that you will see the OP Btys at some point being dissolved. This will not really free up that many PYs as the OP parties will just go back to the gun Btys where they belong IMO. It will free up a Major slot though. Maybe we will get an Ops O who is a Major with an A/Ops O Capt? I've never really understood the utility of seperating the FOOs from the guns administratively.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

CFD is building up a reservoir of PYs for future capabilities.  We already paid our pound of flesh for CSS revitalization; you're probably getting the posties, TDO and court clerk PYs!

So is the plan for the Arty, by 2021, to have 6 firing batteries, an AD Battery (with some sort of missile or gun), 6 STA batteries (varying from CB radar to UAV to AD radar) and 3 OP Batteries?

I'm with Jeff B on that one... the magic 8 ball hasn't given me a satisfactory answer for how the arty will be organized in the future.

The composite nature of 4 AD at the moment doesn't really allow for an AD capability to be factored in. Particularly troubling will be the desired CB/AD nature of the radar....

For example- if the MRR is an AD surveillance radar used for cueing GBAD systems than it should, by rights, be grouped with the AD Battery for common C2 as the 2 must work together. The ASCC portion of the composite batteries would also likely roll into the AD Battery as ASCC=AD in its purest, non-Afgahnistan form. 

I could as easily see 4 AD going back to a full AD Regiment and the UAS going to the field regiments, or even the Armour regiments, as I could see the OP Battery going away. With the HALO capability being min funded and already broken, the UAS would make a convenient replacement for it to keep the STA batteries alive...

 

[Old Sweat]

I think we are getting off the subject into possible organizations of the RCA. There is a lesson in the paper that we well should take note of, the unintended consequences of employing units out of role and then not allowing them to at least maintain basic skill sets.

Having said all that, the current regimental organization is designed to provide the plug in to the fire support world for the supported arm, hence the third BC/FSCC for the third battle group in each brigade. Grouping the FOOs in the third battery is one solution; another is the one adopted by the RAA which has one gun battery and two (or more) BC/FSCC/FOO batteries to work with the supported arm.

The STA mix is, to my tiny Cold Warrior mind, acceptable and the ability of the battery in each regiment to generate tactical as well as artillery intelligence is remarkable. I am not a locator (old word for a STA gunner) but we spent a fair amount of time (roughly 40% of the content) at it on my IG course. Many of us will recall that the Canadian Corps artillery silenced 85% of the German guns before the assault on Vimy Ridge. While the use of sound ranging gets much of the credit, the staff system to handle the information so that our guns were able to convert the raw data to targets was at least as remarkable. As for the tactical information, STA can identify boundaries, groupings and regroupings and identify the enemy's planned operations. I am aware of at least two instances in Korea (Hill 355 in October 1952 and Hill 187 in May 1953) where the STA world identified forthcoming attacks despite no apparent increase in enemy artillery activity by analyzing the fresh craters which indicated target adjustment from Chinese guns spread all across the front.

I ain't competent to discuss any ASCC matters, so I am prepared to read and learn.

 

[jeffb]

OS is right in that the primary lesson learned is that of failed competency. My connection to the organization of the Royal Regiment is that I think that it is a mistake to streamline our soldiers too heavily. Kit changes and capabilities evolve. The artillery has had a long affiliation with employing limited air assets (all the way back to WW1) but evolutions in UAV technology or prioritization of assets may result in the SUAV being moved to the Air Force or the creation of a new MOSID for example. What is unlikely to evolve, or be taken over by another MOSID as MAY  be the case of UAVs, is our ability to provide indirect fire support. The gunner cap badge should always represent someone who can provide at least the minimum  level of advice regarding the employment of systems across the Royal Regiment with an expert level of advice in one of the streams. While some specialization is necessary, I think that the trend should be towards formal training that provides, at least on the officer and SNCO level, a common baseline of all systems starting at the earliest level. I can attest that the solid knowledge of gunline operations that I gained on DP 1.1 and DP 1.2 allowed me to be an effective STA officer. Without understanding how guns deploy, move and operate in detail, I can not understand how one can be expected to find enemy gunners so that our assets can kill them.

To use an analogy, this would be sort of like having infantry officers streamed into a recce role without having a solid grasp on platoon and company tactics. To gunners, our bread and butter always has been, and always will be, the provision of indirect fire support.

 

[Infanteer]

Do you think this will be endangered by the fact that the Regiment only has 24 fancy guns?

 

[Ralph]

Maintaining sufficient qualified Det Comds and 2ICs is a constant struggle - for the soldiers we have, there are more than enough guns...

 

[Petard]

Maintaining sufficient qualified Det Comds and 2ICs is a constant struggle - for the soldiers we have, there are more than enough guns...

Except in P Res units;, the C3 is gradually eliminating itself without replacement. P Res Arty units are supposed to fill out the 2nd gun Bty in ea Reg F Regt however (a consequence of increase in capability but not PYs)
Not sure how that FG for Reg F Regt's might work given this situation, since P Res gunners will almost certainly be manning only mortars in the near future, and will arrive with zero experience in deploying towed artillery or digital fire control; quite the training delta.
which kind of ties into the subject, of the artillery trade losing even the basic skillsets

My suggestion would be to actually fill out that 2nd gun Bty on a rotating basis, with short term class B (6-9 months), as that Regt goes into high readiness cycle.  This would mean P Res gunners getting training on a "fancy" gun every 2-3 yrs, in ea Div, The skill level would still be marginal, but would at least establish some depth to the Fd gunner stream, and reduce the training delta somewhat.

A tough sell, maybe, as the funding evaporates.