Now, I've made my opinions on our training system clear many times on these threads, but in the interest of conversation, I've cut-and-pasted my thoughts from a previous discussion as they pertain here. I know some, who have intimate knowledge of CFLRS, debate the validity or reality of some of my proposals, but I'm thowing them up again for the sake of debate (again
).
Now, don't get me wrong, I'm a full supporter of Unification and Jointness. However, I believe that Unification is a top-down process, not a bottom-up one. Hellyer unified the CF because he was frustrated with the inability of the services to give him cohesive advice on National Defence and with the duplication and triplication of certain services. I believe Hellyer was wrong because he attacked Service-based organizations related to specific identity and culture of each Service in an effort to achieve his required unified Defence team - this was simply not needed (IMHO).
Basic Training is one of these institutions I believe would be better off separated. This means that their is no "Purple" trades - we can have "Purple" Schools to teach Army, Navy, and Air Force trades, but career patterns and service identity are locked into the Army, etc. Basic Training is an institution that takes civilians and transforms them into soldiers (or sailors, or airmen). It is different then "Skills Training" as the main effort is not to teach the soldier skills (any idiot can learn to march... well, almost any idiot) but to inculcate them into the institution of the Service they will belong to.
This is why I've consistently argued (as above) for something similar to USMC Basic or RM Commando Course - it takes basic training to the next step; rather then just spitting out a untrained soldier that can do the basics, it spits out soldiers who are Riflemen first - they've been introduced to high-intensity combat training and are ready to receive their trades training (remember, they are tradesmen second). Like the RM course, Army recruits are grounded in patrolling, raids, ambushes, convoys, air mobility, defensive, ruck-marching, 3-Block War, Urban Ops, platoon fire and movement and live fire training. Whatever their trade is, they can be depended upon to act as a rifleman in a pinch - requiring Mechanics and Air Traffic Controllers in Italy or the crew of the HMCS Calgary to kick it up to this level is (IMHO) not a very good use of resources.
The "Purple" branch simply does not work in our modern conflict envioronment where every soldier is required to be a rifleman first (this is clearly stated in the Army Force Employment Plan). How are we to insist that every soldier be a Rifleman first (with requisite annual training and testing) if they are fired off into a Navy or Air Force billet for a a few years? Can we have a logisitics Sergeant who spent 15 years on a boat or at CFB Bagotville suddenly chucked into a Land Envioroment and leading a convoy from Kabul to Kandahar? A recipe for disaster if you ask me. In order to have an Army support system that is robust enough to handle CS/CSS duties in a modern combat environment, there needs to be specific Army cultural traits that can only be addressed thorugh dropping the "cross-pollination" (for lack of a better term) effect of a "purple" branch.
Doing this doesn't eliminate the ability of the CF to unify "Purple" schools around common skill sets - if certain equipment or techniques are utilized Forces wide (catering, medical, admin) then unify the school for the Army, Navy, and Airforce to send their recruits to (after being inducted properly in a Service-based basic training environmentI am unsure of official definitions, but I see a difference between "unified" and "joint".
Unified is a blending of Service institutions while
joint is an interlocking of Service capabilities. The U.S. is not a Unified Service, but it is farther down the Joint road then us in many respects (The same could be said about the UK and the Aussies).
Another call for support of Unified Basic Training is that all service personel need to gain the fundamentals in how do defend themselves and protect their units/ships/bases from enemy threats. However, Force Protection does not necessitate the need for a common training curriculum. As I mentioned above, I am in favour of the Army handling its own Basic Training in order to allow it, in a two phase process (Rifleman First, Tradesman Second), to kick "Ground Operations" training up to a higher level - a higher level that would be a waste both for the Naval/Air Force Recruit (teaching them a skill they will most likely never need) and the Army (having to dedicate extra NCO's and Officers to train them).
The Navy and the Air Force have their own specific Force Protection requirements. This can be taught in Navy/Air Force specific courses that can tailor training to what they need. Perimeter security, Shore Party, Small Craft Patrols (in order to prevent attacks similar to the one on the USS Cole), etc, etc. Perhaps the Army can loan out a few NCO's to their schools as "SME - Tactics" to oversee their training. As well, some proposals which may be valid would require specialists (either a specific MOC or an additional qualification for tradesmen) for Navy/Air Force Force Protection (RAF Regiment/USMC Security Teams) - these would either be their own unit or attached out to deployed units and bases/dockyards.
Sure, this may not be as efficient as the lowest common denominator approach we have now, but I think it will prove to be more effective in producing soldiers, sailors, and airmen ready for the specifics of their service (in Navy/Airforce case, it may be less on the general stuff and more on technical trades training). Edward Campbell once told me that efficiency (of the kind Hellyer threw on us) doesn't always equal increased effectiveness. This is one case where I think his observation sticks.
As I said earlier, I believe unification should be a top-down endeavour and not a bottom-up one. We need
unified regional commands to oversee
joint forces to ensure a cohesive employment of National Defence assets. It is essential to "unify" operational procedures and doctrine to ensure this (and perhaps career patterns - see my proposal on "Operational" and "Tactical" Officer MOC's), but we don't need "unified" force structures to do so. It is important for the Lieutenant Colonel and the Commander in the Command/Staff element to be on the same page because they are both doing the same task (administering a unified defence structure). It isn't so important for the Rifleman and Naval Electronic Technician (Acoustic) to be (and I argue that it is infact inefficient to demand that they both be), because one will fight the Land Battle and the other will fight as part of the Ship.
Forces will not be unified at the lowest levels - we do not expect Army soldiers to fill in jobs in the ships company or vice versa. Within the Army however, the demand is there (every soldier a Rifleman first) - hence my argument above. Sending Recruits to different recruiting programs/centers (thus de-unifying basic training) will not degrade jointness - this is a principle that is reinforced in the Force Generation/Employment process.
I would venture that senior NCO positions (MWO/CWO/both grades of CPO) would have to be semi-unified, as they can be expected to fill on as "top enlisted" NCO of a mix-force (TF RSM?).
Officers can be exposed to the top-down unification as Lts and Captains (within a military education). As Platoon and Company Commanders, they will command Army pure (and most likely MOC pure) units. Once they've been elevated to Major, the path to unified command should start - we do this fairly well (better then the US, or so the literature seems to point out) with a common Command and Staff College and War College (CFC). By the time they hit General, they should almost be indistinguishable.
