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Sovereignty Requires More Than Lip Service

ruxted

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Sovereignty Requires More Than Lip Service

Canada’s Arctic has been in the news again. It has been suggested that climate change will reduce the range of threats to our sovereignty over Arctic waters because they (Canadian waters, per se) are less likely to be highly desirable transit routes, thus lowering the relative importance of e.g. Arctic/Offshore Patrol Vessels. At the same time, through a new National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, the USA is reasserting its claims of right of free passage in the Northwest Passage, making the need for a real Canadian presence more important.

Disputes between Canada and the USA are nothing new but they all have one thing in common: they are, inevitably – over the past century or so – resolved by negotiation.

But our sovereignty is not ‘threatened’ by just the USA.

Further, ‘sovereignty’ can no longer be confined to rigid zones. What a neighbour does or fails to do in its ‘sovereign’ territory and contiguous waters can have grave impacts on Canadians going about their lawful business in our sovereign territory – a ruptured oil well in Russia’s Arctic waters, for example, can (almost certainly will) pollute Canadian waters. Human smugglers in international waters may pose a real, immediate threat to Canada. Arbitrary lines on maps cannot be allowed to threaten our sovereign rights to manage our own affairs and resources in our own territory.

In many cases Canada can negotiate with those who ‘threaten’ our sovereignty. In some cases negotiation will fail.

Our sovereignty must be both asserted and protected. Asserting and protecting our sovereignty is a job for the whole of the Government of Canada, including DND. Diplomats, lawyers and various uniformed services (like the Coast Guard and the RCMP, as well as the Canadian Forces) are in the ‘front lines’ when it comes to asserting and defending our sovereignty.

The Department of National Defence is just that: the agency charged with defending the nation. The defence of Canada starts at those arbitrary lines but may well extend beyond that. The lines on maps define our ‘area of responsibility’ – the area in which Canada, without question, may assert its sovereign rights – even as they are being challenged in various international fora. But we also have ‘areas of influence’ where we may make our presence felt and ‘areas of interest’ where we will want and need to ‘see’ what is going on.

When we are in our ‘area of responsibility’ it is, broadly, most appropriate that regulatory and constabulary organizations (e.g. Coast Guard and RCMP) lead in the assertion and protection of our sovereignty – backed up and supported by the Canadian Forces. When we are in our ‘areas of influence’ and ‘areas of interest’ then agencies like Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) and DND will need to be in the lead because they have international recognition of their international roles and responsibilities.

Canada needs to be able to meet its sovereignty protection roles in all our areas of responsibility, influence and interest. That means we need strong, capable diplomatic services and equally strong and capable uniformed services, like the Coast Guard and RCMP, able to operate on the ground, in the air and at sea in and all the way around Canada. The Canadian Forces needs to able to support other agencies in Canada and play a leading role elsewhere to fulfil their role of monitoring, identifying and, ultimately, preventing unauthorized penetration of our territory, contiguous waters and the airspace over both.

To do this, the CF needs:

1. A capable intelligence gathering apparatus to monitor things happening in our areas of interest, influence and responsibility;

2. A real time surveillance and warning system that covers all our territory and the ‘approaches’ to it, all the time;

3. Ships, units and aircraft to patrol our territory and the approaches to it and to intercept, identify and deal with intruders of any and all types.

Parts of these requirements exist but none is complete.

The costs of ships, satellites, aircraft, ground stations and people are high but unavoidable if we want to maintain our sovereignty over and above the land and sea we claim, today, as our own.

Now, in a financial crisis, is not the time for false economies or lip service. Short term financial ‘gains’ achieved by reducing defence spending in 2009 could saddle Canada with some real long term ‘pain’ in the years and decades beyond 2010.
 
It looks like the Russians are putting their money (and trooops) where their mouths are:

Russia plans to create dedicated military force to protect Arctic interests


MOSCOW - Russia is reportedly planning to create a dedicated military force to help protect its interests in the disputed Arctic region.
The presidential Security Council has released a document outlining a policy for the Arctic that includes creating a special group of military forces.
The report, released this week and reported by Russian media today, comes as Canada, Russia and other countries try to assert Arctic jurisdiction.
The dispute has intensified amid growing signs that shrinking polar ice is opening up new shipping lanes and allowing natural resources to be tapped.
On Feb. 18, two Russian Tupolev 95 bombers were turned away from Alaska and the Yukon about 200 kilometres from Canadian and U.S. airspace.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper later warned of "increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace." In Ottawa on Monday, a Russian diplomat said Canada had reacted to the incident with what he termed a "deplorable" Cold War mentality.

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/090327/world/russia_arctic
 
Russia accusing Canada of having a cold war mentality? haha they've got to be kidding right?  I'm sure Russia's reaction wouldn't be friendly too if we were flying towards their air space...
 
From cbc.ca

Canada "will not be bullied" by Russia when it comes to staking claim over the Arctic, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon said Friday.

His remarks in Montreal came the same day as Russia said it would amass an army dedicated to protecting its interests in the Arctic.

The plan, revealed in a document released by the presidential security council in Moscow this week, was reported in the Russian media on Friday.

Speaking to the International Relations Council on Arctic Sovereignty, Cannon said he will make Canada's position clear to the Russian foreign minister at a meeting next week.

Canada is among several countries in the world, including Russia, the United States and a number of Nordic European nations that are seeking to assert jurisdiction in the disputed territory because it holds many untapped natural resources.

The dispute has intensified as shrinking polar ice has allowed the opening of new shipping lanes to those natural resources.

While sovereignty over the Arctic is of "uppermost" importance, Canada is committed to working with other countries on issues like environmental protection and economic development in the region, said Cannon.

The Arctic issue was highlighted when two Russian bombers were turned away from Alaska and the Yukon about 200 kilometres from Canadian and U.S. airspace on Feb. 18.

A spokesman for Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Friday the government is considering several options to improve surveillance and response capabilities in the North, including more patrol ships and training exercises.
 
I wonder what the Rangers up their will think, thats a bit to be going on for a small force up there.
 
Cormen said:
I wonder what the Rangers up their will think, thats a bit to be going on for a small force up there.

If the Russians show up on a cold winter night the Rangers should call their superiors, then make them hot chocolate.

Arctic sovereignty seems to be a catch phrase that perks up people's ears but as the area is occupied and controlled by Canadian authorities there is little legal risk.  There is little military risk because of inaccessibility.  If I remember correctly, Canadian Forces patrolling exercises have not gone well.  I can't imagine that the Russians could be any more successful. 

The risk is not to sovereignty.  The risk is unfettered access to Arctic waters by potentially iresponsible parties that could do environmental damage and a military approach might not be the best answer.  We are party to international maritime agreements and while we may diasagree with the northwest passage being considered a navigation lane, any decision will be based on law not military presence.

The problem may be moot as summer Arctic sea ice increased 40 % last summer and this spring has been cooler than average.

 
Further to Dennis Ruhl, much of the hoo-hah about so-called "arctic sovereignty" is politically-driven silliness.  A letter of mine in the Toronto Star:

Icebreakers best bet in Arctic 
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/602171

March 14, 2009

Re: Staking our Arctic claim, Editorial March 13
http://www.thestar.com/article/601467

I fear your editorial has fallen victim to the efforts of the Conservative government to stoke jingoistic "use it or lose it" fervour over our supposedly threatened "Arctic sovereignty." You write that "... we should aim to project a credible military presence in the Far North ..." But no one except the Danes (Hans Island) has any claim on any Canadian land in the North.

Foreign countries are about as likely to invade the North as they are to invade Newfoundland.

As the editorial notes, the only areas in dispute are at sea: the status in maritime law of the Northwest Passage; the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada; and the economic rights to the Arctic seabed in offshore areas beyond various countries' coastal 320-kilometre exclusive economic zones.

I agree that "Gunboats alone can't guarantee Canada's claim to the Arctic." In fact, naval power is essentially irrelevant to the resolution of those issues. They will in the end be settled by diplomacy – not unnecessary new Arctic patrol vessels for the Canadian Navy.

To the extent that a governmental marine presence might help our legal claim to the Northwest Passage, Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers would be more than adequate.

Mark Collins, Ottawa

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
As the editorial notes, the only areas in dispute are at sea: the status in maritime law of the Northwest Passage; the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada; and the economic rights to the Arctic seabed in offshore areas beyond various countries' coastal 320-kilometre exclusive economic zones.

I agree that "Gunboats alone can't guarantee Canada's claim to the Arctic." In fact, naval power is essentially irrelevant to the resolution of those issues. They will in the end be settled by diplomacy – not unnecessary new Arctic patrol vessels for the Canadian Navy.

I'm not certain why you consider maritime territorial disputes to be worthy of "only" status. Do you understand the basis of the dispute and the ramifications? Not trying be snarky here - I see you have a background in the civil service so I don't want to embark on a lecture to someone who already gets the basics. Are you saying that maritime disputes aren't a serious matter?

As far as settling the matter by diplomatic means alone, you must understand the role of estoppel in international law. If Canada doesn't make a real (rather than merely token) effort to control the maritime arctic, then any arbitral tribunal hearing the case (which, I agree, is ultimately how matters will be decided) is likely to find that Canada voluntarily waived it's sovereignty over the aspects it didn't seriously address. To whit: we have reason to believe that submarines of at least two nations use the maritime arctic regularly without advising Canada. If we don't seriously address that by acquiring a means to detect and prevent this, then we have in effect said that we don't mind if it continues to happen. Coast Guard boats can't detect or stop submarines.
 
hamiltongs: My point is that even on the maritime side there are limited areas in actual dispute (land is, Hans aside, perfectly secure though one might never know it from our politicians and press, hence the "only"). 

I think submarines are irrelevant to claims of sovereignty, since they almost never admit where they are--so no presence is established.  Besides which, if unacknowledged and undetected submarine passages became a basis for disputing claims to maritime sovereignty, much maritime sovereignty around the world might potentially come into question.

As for the surface of the NW Passage, civilian CCG activity is as useful as Navy activity in asserting our claim (which may be pretty thin in any event--the US, European countries, and Japan all do not recognize our claim) in terms of international law.  A government presence is a government presence.

Mark
Ottawa
 
MarkOttawa said:
I think submarines are irrelevant to claims of sovereignty, since they almost never admit where they are--so no presence is established.  Besides which, if unacknowledged and undetected submarine passages became a basis for disputing claims to maritime sovereignty, much maritime sovereignty around the world might potentially come into question.

But submarines are very germane to the question of whether or not the Canadian arctic falls under an "archipelagic waters" regime (as we claim) or whether the waters outside the 12nm limit are high seas (as most everyone else claims). The Law of the Sea Convention is clear that Canada isn't an "archipelagic state", but the provisions relating to archipelagos could probably do with revisiting. If Canada is serious about pushing the issue diplomatically and legally then it needs to be serious about trying to detect and stop submarines from transiting what we claim to be our archipelagic waters while submerged. Otherwise estoppel (or the international law equivalent) undermines our case.

From a maritime security standpoint, submarines are the issue in the Canadian arctic; you're right that a Coast Guard ship could adequately address the fishery and environmental enforcement aspects, though. That being said, the AOPS project is essentially a domestic capability that needs to be acquired/replaced outside of the arctic context as well. To the extent that the Kingston class needs to be replaced eventually, it makes sense that the next generation of ship be faster, have a longer range of endurance and be able to take on a certain amount of first year ice. I'd agree that billing them as "Arctic" vessels is mostly a PR move, but hey - calling the Halifax class "Patrol Frigates" (as opposed to "Guided Missile Destroyers") was, too. It doesn't mean we didn't need them.
 
hamiltongs: I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree about subs.  As for the A/OPS, my problem is that by giving them a limited ice-capability they will be slower and less capable as general patrol vessels (which will be what they do most of the time), and the added expense means we buy fewer of them.  Two Torch posts:

What the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPSs) are all about
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/07/what-arctic-offshore-patrol-ships-aopss.html

Let's stimulate the economy with those "Arctic offshore supply boats"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/12/lets-build-those-arctic-offshore-supply.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
The problem with creating an Arctic fleet of warships is that it is extremely unlikey it would ever be employed in it's designed role.  We will not arrest an American ship sailing through the NW Passage and we will never sink a submarine because even chances say it will be an ally.  No country is ever going to request permission  to sail through.  It would be a case of arming for no reason.  In the event of a real war no country is going to sail a surface ship through the Arctic because it would be too vulnerable and the only thing to chase out submarines would be nuclear subs and they aren't in the plans.
 
Dennis Ruhl said:
  No country is ever going to request permission  to sail through.

You would be incorrect. Furthermore, if we were to more closely track and indentify who passes in waters we claim as ours, then we will be in a better position to apply political pressure. Its hard to pint the finger when you dont know who to point it at. Enforcing our sovereignty doesnt always mean having to fire.


the only thing to chase out submarines would be nuclear subs and they aren't in the plans.

Oh really.........
 
CDN Aviator said:
You would be incorrect. Furthermore, if we were to more closely track and indentify who passes in waters we claim as ours, then we will be in a better position to apply political pressure. Its hard to pint the finger when you dont know who to point it at. Enforcing our sovereignty doesnt always mean having to fire.


Oh really.........

I was thinking ships, they can't sail through packed sea ice very well - I guess aircraft could do a job on subs.

If the "really" meant nuclear subs are in the plans - a lot of things are in the plans such as replacements for almost everything that flies, floats, or drives.

One Mountie on a snowmobile enforces sovereignty equally well.
 
Dennis Ruhl:

One Mountie on a snowmobile enforces sovereignty equally well.

Except that, as I have noted, land sovereignty is not an issue (Hans...).  And I don't think Mounties are sent out much on ice ;D.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Dennis Ruhl said:
I guess aircraft could do a job on subs.

Indeed an aircraft can.

If the "really" meant nuclear subs are in the plans -

No, it means that your assertion that only a nuke sub can chase out a sub is false.

[/quote]
One Mountie on a snowmobile enforces sovereignty equally well.
[/quote]

No. Once again you like to over simplify.
 
CDN Aviator said:
Indeed an aircraft can.

Aircraft can,but are our aircraft doing the job right now?Do we have near the numbers?Do we scramble aircraft to seek out unknown sea craft as we do with our bears nearing our airspace?
Serious question as I have zero idea what you guys can do/are doing. I worked with you guys once with the RCMP and other organizations IRT drugs,but thats it.
 
I am resuscitating this thread to post a report, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, about Arctic surveillance:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/us-arctic-plans-could-serve-as-a-wake-up-call-for-canada/article2377590/
U.S. Arctic plans could serve as a wake-up call for Canada

PAUL KORING

Washington— Globe and Mail Update
Posted on Thursday, March 22, 2012


The Pentagon wants to know what’s happening in the Arctic; there’s an app for that.

Well not yet, but Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency wants one in a hurry. In a call for proposals this week, it said it plans to pick, deploy and test two systems this summer.

“Remote sensing may offer affordable advantages over traditional methods of monitoring the region – aircraft, satellites or manned ships and submarines – due to the great distances in the Arctic,” the agency said in a call for bids. The U.S. military wants “new technologies to monitor the Arctic both above and below the ice, providing year-round situational awareness without the need for forward-basing or human presence.”


Nothing nefarious about that. Except that slicing up the Arctic as retreating ice heralds a 21st-century resources rush and shipping boom at the top of the world is shaping up as a race for riches and control.

The United States already knows more about what’s happening in the Arctic – including the vast swath Canada dubiously lays claim to – than any other nation.

U.S. nuclear submarines have been prowling the Arctic for more than half a century, U.S. satellites deliver real-time information on ship and ice movements, and an extensive, still-secret, string of sensitive listening tracks everyone else’s ships and submarines.

“The Arctic region is poised for greater regional significance as polar ice retreats in coming decades. Ship traffic likely will increase during summer months, and commercial activity focused on the sea floor is expected to grow,” said DARPA. Its vision is for a vast, integrated network of sensors watching, listening and reporting from both above and below the ice to generate a real-time, dynamic picture of all Arctic activity.

“It seems that the U.S. is preparing for a more militarized Arctic without actually sending its troops and ships there, let alone its mothballed icebreakers,” wrote Mia Bennett on the website of Foreign Policy Association, a U.S. non-profit organization.

“Unmanned detection systems, robots, and distributed remote sensing are preferred over expensive manned platforms and bases. Whereas Canada is busy building its High Arctic Research Station and Nanisivik Naval Base and Russia is investing in new types of equipment for civilians and soldiers to use up north, the U.S. is investing in more futuristic remote surveillance technologies.”

The little-noticed call for concepts, from DARPA, the Pentagon agency created after Russia’s Sputnik embarrassed Washington, should serve as a wake-up call to other Arctic nations.

Cutting-edge technology is what DARPA does. Remember those clumsy driverless trucks failing to negotiate an open desert course in 2004, despite a $1-million prize? Three years later, in a much-tough urban environment, the winners pocketed $2-million. Unmanned vehicles will soon be in use on battlefields.

DARPA funding will drive similar breakthroughs in remote Arctic sensing.

Given that the United States already has a huge lead in “aircraft, satellites or manned ships and submarines” the coming revolution in remote sensing will leave other Arctic players even further behind.

As a point of comparison, none of Canada’s four submarines (even when they are seaworthy and none of them are) is capable of under-ice operation. And Canada’s surveillance of foreign shipping in Arctic waters, the record is spotty. For instance, Canada’s military high command first became aware that a Chinese icebreaker was in Canadian waters when residents in Tuktoyaktuk noticed the hulking Xue Lon, or Snow Dragon, offshore one morning.


To repeat part of the Ruxted Group's shopping list, we need 24/7 network of near real time space based, terrestrial and underwater surveillance and warning systems that cover ALL of Canada's territory, contiguous waters, the airspace over both and the approaches to all three. We also need interceptors to positively identify intruders and, if and when necessary, escort them our of our territory, waters or airspace. Such a project should be, of necessity, an integrated, government wide initiative involving, especially but not exclusively, DND/the CF, the RCMP and the Coast Guard.

How much would it cost? Most likely more than the F-35 project.
 
An update on Nanisivik:

Reuters

Canadian navy delays opening of crucial Arctic facility to 2018

By Mike De Souza

OTTAWA (Reuters) - Canada's military has again delayed the opening of a major new Arctic port, a sign the government is struggling to assert sovereignty over a remote resource-rich region.

The planned deep water naval facility at Nanisivik - some 3,100 km (1,900 miles) north of Ottawa - is one of the key components of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's "use it or lose it" approach to the Arctic. The port, initially due to open in 2012, will now not be operational until 2018.

Nanisivik lies at the entrance to the Northwest Passage, which could become a shortcut for shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as global warming gradually opens up ice-clogged waterways.

Canada claims sovereignty over the passage and the port at Nanisivik would help to maintain a presence in the region. The United States disputes Canada's claim, saying the passage lies in international waters.

(...SNIPPED)
 
I seem to recal another article in the past few months indicated that the scope of development had also been significantly scaled back to keep the Nanasivik facilities under budget.
 
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