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SORD 05-06

Matt_Fisher

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Anybody read this report or its abridged version on the Maple Laugh?

Army, Maple Leaf, 07 July 2004, Vol. 7 No. 25

Armée, La feuille d'érable, Le 07 juillet 2004, Vol. 7 No. 25

Army Transformation to begin affectingmore units, branches
By Paul Mooney

Army Transformation will affect an increasing number of soldiers and units over the next two years as the medium-weight, knowledge-based force takes shape.

Defence and international policy reviews are underway and the Army continues to experience funding pressures. Senior commanders say, however, that the Army is moving in the right direction and transformation must continue.

Colonel Mike Kampman, Director of Land Strategic Planning, said recently that the senior leadership of the Army recognizes that change is difficult, disruptive and causes uncertainty.

â Å“But this is absolutely essential,â ? he said. â Å“It is being done for the future relevance and capability of the Army. So everything that has been introduced in the last year and a bitâ ”in terms of movement of vehicles and so onâ ”is about to become bigger. The Transformation agenda will expand to include more and more parts of the Armyâ ”more branches and more units will be affected.â ?

Plans for Fiscal Year 05-06 and beyond are contained in the annual Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD) released in late May. (See below). The SORD is the first step in a process which sets out the Army's operations and spending plans. Area commanders and their staffs are now being consulted about the plan and their input will help shape the final draft of the directives, which will be issued in December. While the SORD may be modified after the consultations with Area Commanders, it represents the overall intent of the Army's senior leadership.

Soldiers will begin to see more of the ways transformation will affect units next year. For example, plans include the creation of a single Long-Range Anti-Armour Weapon company (LAV TOW Under Armour) within the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), manned by personnel from Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry battalions. In FY 06-07, they will be joined by air defence soldiers as ADATS (later MMEV) becomes part of the Army's medium-range direct fire â Å“System of systemsâ ?. Armour soldiers from LdSH (RC) will man the planned Mobile Gun System, the third platform in the direct fire system, when that vehicle is integrated into the field force. Soldiers from branches that have not normally served together will be working together in the same unit with new, powerful capabilityâ ”the real face of Army Transformation.

Col Kampman explained that the elimination of mortar and pioneer platoons was done in order to base the force generation of those capabilities in branches where those skills were part of their core business, as well as to reallocate resources to new capability. That transformation is continuing with the concentration of the long-range anti-armour capability, the TOW capability, in Western Canada.

â Å“That means the anti-armour platoons in Infantry battalions are about to disappear,â ? he said. â Å“It is not, however, a net loss to the infantry. We're taking all of those people and resources and reinvesting them back in the rifle companiesâ ”we're reinforcing the rifle companies.â ?

Col Kampman said he knows people are impatient for orders and want to get on with it. But it will take time to work through some of the complex planning involved and do it right.â Å“

A lot of the detail about many of the changes will be coming out in directives over the coming months,â ? he said. â Å“Up to now we've been dealing a lot with the infantry and armour. Now we're about to really tackle the artillery and engineer branches. The other one that is looming is the Army Support Review and its impact on the logistics and EME branches.â ?

SORD 05-06

The 2005-2006 Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD), was released at the end of May. The commander is now consulting the areacommanders and their staffs; a final plan will be drafted later this year to include their input. The SORD includes:

Combat Capability

The development of the Medium Direct Fire System of systems will continue with the concentration of medium direct fire platforms in the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), (LdSH(RC))including:

The creation of a single Long Range Anti-Armour Weapon (LRAAW) company (LAV Tow Under Armour) within the LdSH(RC) structure manned by personnel from Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry battalions.

The elimination of anti-armour platoons in the infantry battalions with personnel not required to establish the LRAAW company being reinvested back into the rifle companies.

The reassignment of select positions in the LdSH(RC) RHQ from armour to infantry and artillery in order to establish the appropriate combination of direct fire expertise in the C2 structure.

The planning for the integration of an ADATS (later MMEV) battery into the LdSH(RC) structure with implementation expected to begin in FY 06-07.

Reconnaissance-Surveillance. As components of the ISTAR system, RECCE and surveillance structures will evolve, including:

The elimination of the assault troops in the three Regular Force armoured regiments.

The conversion of the LdSH(RC) RECCE squadron to the same Transitional Surveillance Squadron structure as the Coyote squadrons in RCD and 12 RBC.

The development of new structures for Coyote squadrons in accordance with the evolution of the ISTAR capability.

The completion of the conversion of Regular Force infantry RECCE platoons from Coyote to LUVW (C&R).

The completion of the conversion of Reserve Armoured Corps units to LUVW (C&R) to include the removal of AVGP Cougar from service.

The establishment of a tactical unmanned air vehicule (Spewer) sub-unit.

Ground-based Air Defence. The transformation of GBAD will progress pending ministerial approval and DND direction, including:

The removal of 35mm gun/Skyguard from service.

The removal of Javelin MANPADS from service and the assignment of Reserve air defence elements to new roles based on LFRR planning and consultation.

The continuation of ADATS involvement in direct fire system of systems trials, slated for this fall, with the expectation of implementation of ADATS integration into the direct fire unit commencing in FY 06-07.

Indirect Fire. The transformation of the indirect fire capability will continue in FY 05-06, including:

The elimination of the last mortar platoon structure in the Infantry with complete responsibility for mortar force generation transferred to the artillery.

The completion of the artillery branch restructure plan, including the development of structures for target acquisition, observation, fire support co-ordination and close support, with select implementation in FY 05-06 and the expectation of full implementation in FY 06-07.

Engineer Capabilities. The transformation of Engineer capabilities in 05-06 will include:

The establishment of a single Armoured Engineer Squadron in 1 CER with the concentration of all AEVs and AVLBs.

The completion of plans for intimate and close support capability force generation, with an expectation of restructure implementation starting in FY 06-07.

The completion of plans for general support capability force generation.

Command Support. The development of Command Support in 05-06 will include:

The completion of plans for Command Support capability force generation with select implementation of 05-06 and full implementation starting in 06-07.

Combat Service Support. Combat Service Support transformation in 05-06 will include:

The completion of restructure planning resulting from the Army Support Review with select implementation in 05-06 and the expectation of full implementation in 06-07.

Institutional Capability

The Army will continue to develop and improve institutional capability including:

Further development of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), the Army's state-of-the art training facility at Wainwright, Alta

The evolution of LFC Command and Control.

The Army Support Review will lead to select implementation of improvements to Garrison Support with the expectation of full implementationin 06-07.

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Seems kinda interesting in regard to moving all the different MOC's around.  Gotta wonder if TOW will be retasked to armour as mortars and pioneers were to infantry?

The same goes with armoured reserves all being recce. now and the only reg. force units using LUVW for recce. are the Reg. Force Infantry.  Replace the black beret with a green one for the reserve armoured units?

 
Interesting read, but shouldn't this go under "News" ?
 
My apologies if this should have been posted in the News forum.  If the moderator so wishes, please move this topic.

The more I read this the more my eyebrows get raised.  This plan seems more like a Liberal inspired "shell game" of moving troops around while reducing the force and expenditures and capabilities.

TOWS to LdSH (RC).  I can see how having an anti-armour capability may improve the capabilities here, but what's going to provide anti-armour support for the infantry units?  Also, if I'm doing my math correctly, each infantry battalion is supposed to have a TOW platoon.  9 infantry battalions should equal approximately 9 TOW platoons.  What's happening with the 5-6 other TOW platoons that are not going to the Strathconas?  What will happen when 2 or 5 brigade units deploy?  Will the Strathconas be expected to constantly chopping a TOW platoon for battlegroup deployments?  Talk about crazy optempo for the TOW gunners. If that's the case, then why not keep the TOWS where they are or if it's considered more applicable to have them in the armoured corps, move the TOWS to the respective brigade's armoured regiment.

The "reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies"  seems to be another case of DND robbing Peter to pay Paul to make up for personnel shortages that are not being addressed in a meaningful way.  Improve and streamline the recruiting process and invest more resources into the training establishment to ensure that the CFs have the soldiers/sailors/airmen necessary to do the job tasked with.

As far as the reserve armoured units losing the Cougar, does anyone know if the order of LUVW (C&R) variants will be increased, or will units be expected to pool equipment?

If the Javelin is removed, what will the CFs use for short-range air defence?  The same with the Skyguard?  While it may not seem likely that the CFs will encounter a situation where Allied air supremecy is challenged, the threat of UAVs has greatly increased over the last decade. 

It just seems that while the CFs are tyring to modernise and become a force more suited to network-centric warfare and is moving away from the 4CMBG fighting against the Sovet 8th Shock Army in Germany, the manner in which they're doing it is limiting their capabilities even more by reducing capabilities such as TOW, mortars, and pioneers.  The units that they're making these roles responsible for are not receiving additional resources.  The CERs haven't received an additional Squadron/Company for the pioneer taskings.  The Artillery hasn't received additional batteries for the mortars, and we're reducing our TOW platoons from 9 to 3 or 4?

I'm not a big opponent of the rationale of putting these jobs where it seems better suited to their core business (Engineers/Pioneers and Mortars/Artillery and TOWS/Armour), but the reduction of the troops needed to do the jobs is disgusting.
 
The Army is considering only producing 33 LAV TUA.  We currently have about 73 M113 TUA.  It is expected that the rifle companies will get a MRAAW to make up for this change.
 
Any idea on the MRAAW will come into service and what the procurement state is?

This is again one of these "never neverland" projects that NDHQ is muttering quietly about in terms of future capabilities, but little is being done to actually bring it into service.

From what I've heard the most likely candidates are the US Javelin and the Israeli Gill-Spike, but that's just conjecture and nothing official 

MRAAW is not even showing up on the radar screen on the Defence Planning & Management's procurement site.

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/annex/ct04_e.asp

It seems that for the next 5-10 years that the infantry will not have any anti-armour capability other than Eryx and Carl Gustav if the TOW platoons are removed.
 
reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies
Gotta love that... take away assets from battalion, turn them into brigade assets that may or may not always be there for a Bn CO to call on and call the reintroduction of the soldiers that use to be in combat support "reinvesting in...and reinforcing the rifle companies".    


From what I've heard the most likely candidates are the US Javelin and the Israeli Gill-Spike, but that's just conjecture and nothing official
Those are the only two of heard that seem to be in the running.   We'll see like you said if they plan on giving it to us anytime in the next few years.  
 
My understanding of the reinforcing of the Rifle Coy issue is that the LAV and Light bn rifle coys are well understrength.   Orbats have not evolved at the same rate as equipment and tactics and thus there is a significant delta between current orbats and the desired orbats.

These people (or PYs) have to come from somewhere unless the CF is authorized an expansion of its current numbers.   PYs have been taken in part from the infantry in the past to create CMTC and the command and support bns if I am not mistaken (from Pnr and Mors I believe).   At least this time we may see some of the PYs coming back to the infantry.

A Lav coy should have in the neighbourhood of 155 all ranks vice the current 125ish.

A light coy is gearing towards the 140ish range vice the current 107-121 range.

I will trade the Bn level TOW platoons for larger rifle coys equipped with US Javelin or Spike/Gill any day.
 
Devil, while I agree that right now pers. may be better used in rifle companies, the places from which they're grabbed is setting a bad precedent, and we've got to remember that MRAAW (Gill-Spike/Javelin) are years away from acquisition and fielding.

Expanding the strength of the CFs is not the issue here.  The Forces are well under their authorised strength now.

What I'd like to see is how the forces plan to increase the efficiency of the recruiting training processes to fill the gaps that exist now.
 
Yea what Matt said..... :)

While greater numbers in any the rifle coy is great, the ability for that Coy to have attachments that will enhance its capabilities(TUA, Pioneers, Mortars) is slim considering they are all either gone or brigade assets.  There is even scuttlebutt of the sniper cells becoming brigade assets. 

Overall for what it's worth it may work out and when a Bn/Coy/Pl needs support it will get it.  But whats happens at brigade level if tasks outstrip assets.  Choices will have to be made and assets doled out leaving someone short.  Before at the Bn level a CO could have some indirect(81mm mortar), direct(TUA for tank/bunkers) fire capabilities, to protect his troops till the armoured/arty was available he now has nothing in his hip pocket.

I will trade the Bn level TOW platoons for larger rifle coys equipped with US Javelin or Spike/Gill any day
Except we don't have them and won't anytime soon.  No one can tell me that 60mm mortars are great for indirect fire.  They serve the purpose but the bipods themselves are old and starting to go and the rounds themselves don't pack the punch a 81 would.  Not to mention that with the loss of the advance mortar course, the ability to properly and safely use these weapons in the indirect role is deteriorating.
 
Matt_Fisher said:
Devil, while I agree that right now pers. may be better used in rifle companies, the places from which they're grabbed is setting a bad precedent, and we've got to remember that MRAAW (Gill-Spike/Javelin) are years away from acquisition and fielding.

Expanding the strength of the CFs is not the issue here.   The Forces are well under their authorised strength now.

What I'd like to see is how the forces plan to increase the efficiency of the recruiting training processes to fill the gaps that exist now.

Matt, this however is not an issue about recruiting.  The current authorized strength of these rifle coys has nothing to do with how we are recruiting or how we are processing the recruits.  This is the PML( preferred manning list?), this is the allowable manning level.  In order to put more troops in a rifle coy, we have to steal the people from somewhere else.  Any time we start up a new organization we have to take the people (PYs or Person Years) from somewhere, and this has to be at the expense of an existing unit unless the CF is allowed to increase its manning level to accommodate for this new organization.  

This is why we have lost Mortars, Pnrs and now TOW.  Mortars and Pnrs were by some considered somewhat of a duplication of effort, tasks that could be carried out by Arty and Engrs respectively.  We know this is not exactly true, however it is a workable solution in the meantime.  The PYs are freed up to be applied to whatever is the priority  

These PYs go to setting up CMTC, Comd and Sp bn orgs, etc.  And now we may see some PYs come back to the infantry to increase the authorized manning levels of the rifle coys.  This is not something that we can do on our own unless we wish to reduce to zero strength one of the rifle coys in each Bn.  

Right now a LAV coy of 125ish is all we are authorized.  When we dip underneath that by any significant margin this is a problem of the training system.  To be truly effective 125 man LAV coys is not going to cut it.  I believe this is well understood at the higher levels of the Army.

I think if we really needed US Javelin or Spike/Gill (ie a shooting war with enemy tanks present) we could get them rather quickly.   In my opinion TOW is junk compared to the capability and man portability of the newer generation of anti tank wpns such as Javelin or Gill.   Once we get Javelin/Spike-Gill, the TOW should go the way of the Dodo unless they come up with a 8km, wireless and fire and forget version of Tow compatible with the existing launchers.
 
As I understand it, the decision to reduce to 33 TUA will be dependant on the decision to acquire a MRAAW (and not just in hopes of a decision to acquire MRAAW).  So it may be a while before anything is set in stone.

The way the Army looks at this is that it has 77 TUA, but at any given time (over the last decade) it only has up to 4 crews deployed on Ops.  This identifies the TUA crews as being a resource that can be reduced to achieve better PY efficiency.  If the government ever wants to deploy full brigades, this decision will come to haunt us.  If we continue on with only one battle group deployed at a time, we might get by.

BTW: Have any Comd Sp Bn actually been established?
 
Right now a LAV coy of 125ish is all we are authorized.  When we dip underneath that by any significant margin this is a problem of the training system.  To be truly effective 125 man LAV coys is not going to cut it.  I believe this is well understood at the higher levels of the Army.

Not to hijack the thread but where do they plan on putting the extra twenty five people or so for a LAV Coy?  The only truly understrenght part of a LAV Pl is it's weapons det, which really only consists of 2 men, including the commander.  So we add two more people to it and we now have four full LAVs with ten men in each including crews.  That accounts for 6 of the twenty five so we (theoretically) have 19 more bodies to be put in spots.  When we get MRAAW I can see some of these 19 fulfilling roles using this weapons system like a mini AT unit within the Coy(or at least a Coy WPNs det), But where do they ride? The Coy CP variants don't have space for them or are they planning on adding more LAVs to a Coy?


Has anyone read this article?  I thought is was well done for a HS student and presents a slightly different look at reorganization.
http://www.ccs21.org/articles/mar04/Proposed%20Force%20Structure.pdf
 
Maybe it will be one more guy in every rifle section?
 
No room each Mech section has ten pers;
1 Sect Comd
1 Sect 2IC(second in command)
1 LAV driver
1 LAV gunner
2 C9 gunners
4 C7 rifleman

Pl HQ
1 Pl Comd
1 Pl WO
1 Lav Sgt
1 Pl Signaller
1 Wpns Det Comd
1 C6 gunner
1 Lav Gunner
1 Lav Driver=
room for two more people.



Now we all know that more people can fit into any vehicle, I'm sure anyone with any sort of TI has seen M113s and AVGPs packed full of troops.  But the safety aspect of some training now a days it's getting harder to get waivers to put one or two extra troops in the back of a LAV(let along safety staff for live fires). 
 
MJP said:
Now we all know that more people can fit into any vehicle, I'm sure anyone with any sort of TI has seen M113s and AVGPs packed full of troops.  But the safety aspect of some training now a days it's getting harder to get waivers to put one or two extra troops in the back of a LAV(let along safety staff for live fires). 
Most of my LAV experience has been in the turret, but I've known the sardine feeling in the back of a 113 on a few occasions.  I can't help but think we are putting fewer people into the back of a much roomier vehicle.

Ah, well . . . just thinking aloud. 
 
I read this too on the DND site, what struck as rather odd (I am surprised it was not mentioned yet) was while the TUA was being moved to LdSH(RC) the troops using them would be taken from the PPCLI (1/2/3).  I find this rather perplexing, they are taking TUA away from the Infantry regiments, giving it to an armour regiment but manning it with some of the very same soldiers from an Infantry regiment that just lost the capability. ??? Am I the only one completely baffelled by this? It reminds of the scam were a conman asks for change for a $20 bill and winds up swindling the owner to the tune of $40. Guess who we are in this game.
 
The Armoured do not have soldiers that are trained & experienced on the TUA.  It makes sense that infantry soldiers man the TUA Coy (or would it be Sqn?) and gradually be replaced by armoured soldiers.

A lot of soldiers recommend using armoured to crew the LAV III.  If we did go to an Army in which the infantry did not fight thier own vehicles, would it still make sense for the infantry crew TUA?  (However, I always thought armoured soldiers would be posted in to infantry battalions)
 
I acknowledge the fact that armour soldiers may not be trained on TUA, but would it make a little more sense to train them first, then send them the TUA vehicles.  Rather than the infantry battalions losing firepower and manpower at the same time
 
It would take a few years for the corporate knowledge to be passed.  Not going through a period of "mixed" crews would result in corporate knowledge being lost.

But, I don't know if it is planned that the armoured will eventually crew TUA.
 
Just a little note about the javelin, the US Army Technology has this quote on their site.
"In September 2003, Canada requested the Foreign Military Sale of 200 launchers and 840 missiles."

so maybe they might be in service sooner than expected?
( http://www.army-technology.com/projects/javelin/ )
 
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