- Reaction score
- 22,286
- Points
- 1,090
The flight safety report on the 18 May 2007 crash of a CT-114 has been released. A news article is online at http://www.ottawacitizen.com/Life/Somnia/1764177/story.html The Flight safety report is at http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/pdf/fsir/CT114159-eng.pdf
Of interest to me was the observation "Pilots at 431 (AD) Squadron had developed a somewhat complacent attitude towards the performance of the lap belt funcitonal checks". Earlier flight safety reports on other Tutor crashes had reported "The mission involved unbriefed and unapproved aerobatic manoeuvring", "Both survivors wore the UCLP which did not have all of the mandatory survival contents.", "The level of training and preparedness given to Snowbird passengers was inadequate to assure their safety.", "The life support equipment fitting of passengers flying with 431 (AD) Squadron was inadequate to assure their safety." (http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/pdf/fsir/ct114006.pdf). A 2005 catastrophic engine failure lead to numerous observations about ALSE equipment being out of spec (http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/ct/CT114120-eng.asp).
So my question: Is there a problem with 431 (AD) Sqn (The Snowbirds) and complacent attitudes towards flight safety? To me, the 2001 mid-air collision, the 2005 and 2007 incidents taken together are suggestive of a unit culture where flight safety is less of a priority than perhaps it should be.
Of interest to me was the observation "Pilots at 431 (AD) Squadron had developed a somewhat complacent attitude towards the performance of the lap belt funcitonal checks". Earlier flight safety reports on other Tutor crashes had reported "The mission involved unbriefed and unapproved aerobatic manoeuvring", "Both survivors wore the UCLP which did not have all of the mandatory survival contents.", "The level of training and preparedness given to Snowbird passengers was inadequate to assure their safety.", "The life support equipment fitting of passengers flying with 431 (AD) Squadron was inadequate to assure their safety." (http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/pdf/fsir/ct114006.pdf). A 2005 catastrophic engine failure lead to numerous observations about ALSE equipment being out of spec (http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/dfs/reports-rapports/I/ct/CT114120-eng.asp).
So my question: Is there a problem with 431 (AD) Sqn (The Snowbirds) and complacent attitudes towards flight safety? To me, the 2001 mid-air collision, the 2005 and 2007 incidents taken together are suggestive of a unit culture where flight safety is less of a priority than perhaps it should be.