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Small Arms and Combat Marksmanship

Old Sweat said:
There must be some logic behind the designated marksman concept. What is the expected frequency of an enemy appearing in the 300-500 metre window, and remaining in view until it can be acquirred, indicated and engaged by the designated marksman? Heresy time: maybe the answer is the XM25 instead of a 7.62 rifle.
Not heresy at all. 
The reason that 7.62 is bantered about is because it already exists in our toolkit as a munition, and all we would need is a rifle.  Having said that, if we went the XM25 route, just look how long it is taking us to acquire a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher: seven years and counting.
Of note, the concept has been proven, but given our assets available, we have mis-employed snipers to conduct the "marksman-like" task at subunit level and below.  So, instead of elevating a rifleman up to the skillsets required for a marksman, we have lowered snipers to the skillset required.
 
Speaking to Afghanistan, and hopefully not too far out of my lane - also, what about the occasional reports of Taliban engaging from beyond Canadian (or US) effective range; not snipers, per se, but using arms that out-range the C7, M16, or M4? Is that a situation where the ability to fight fire with fire is necessary, or one where crew-served weapons are a more effective counter?
 
quadrapiper said:
Speaking to Afghanistan, and hopefully not too far out of my lane - also, what about the occasional reports of Taliban engaging from beyond Canadian (or US) effective range; not snipers, per se, but using arms that out-range the C7, M16, or M4? Is that a situation where the ability to fight fire with fire is necessary, or one where crew-served weapons are a more effective counter?

This is one of the arguments for a designated marksman/7.62mm battle rifle (or some new intermediate round like 6.5mm). A DM armed with a more powerful rifle can, in theory, engage a fleeting target like a Taliban fighter at 300+ m faster than the C-6 can be brought into action. In another thread I argued for this point for that very reason. Of course, since a section can volley fire on a target at up to 600m, all is not lost without a DM or C-6.

OTOH, nasty people with rifles generally move in groups, so even if a DM is answering fire initially, opening up with the C-6 or C-9's, M-203's and calling on mortars or artillery is probably the smart thing to do, to ensure his friends are not going to join the party. The ability of the DM to rapidly locate and indicate the target (or even a non DM rifleman) brings all the other assets into play that much faster.

As an even farther aside, Infidel-6 has posted on various "hot" 5.56m rounds which do have greater terminal effects out to 300m and beyond (Although we need to keep this in perspective. Even a hot 5.56 is not going to have the same effect on a target at 400m as a 7.62mm round).

So the pros to extensive marksmanship training (for all) is to be able to rapidly engage fleeting targets, but more importantly, to rapidly bring all assets to bear. This second skill-set is independent of the weapons system, a "battle" of longbowmen in 1500 needed this just as much as a platoon of Infantry in 2010
 
Thucydides said:
This is one of the arguments for a designated marksman/7.62mm battle rifle (or some new intermediate round like 6.5mm). A DM armed with a more powerful rifle can, in theory, engage a fleeting target like a Taliban fighter at 300+ m faster than the C-6 can be brought into action. In another thread I argued for this point for that very reason. Of course, since a section can volley fire on a target at up to 600m, all is not lost without a DM or C-6.

Seems like a fairly narrow set of circumstances to justify beginning an entire program that costs millions of dollars. Adding a C6 to the section would reduce the time required for it to get into action to nothing.

4.5 years in the army and I hadn't heard that the C9/Minimi was terribly inaccurate. Can anyone tell me why its so bad?  Too light to handle the recoil? Design flaw? How does issuing short heavy barrel's overseas effect their accuracy?
 
Haligonian said:
4.5 years in the army and I hadn't heard that the C9/Minimi was terribly inaccurate. Can anyone tell me why its so bad?  Too light to handle the recoil? Design flaw? How does issuing short heavy barrel's overseas effect their accuracy?
It's not that they are inaccurate.  It's just that they are meant as area weapons, given their characteristics.  As for the short barrelled C9, given the internal ballistics, I would offer that it has a lower muzzle velocity.  This would adversely affect its accuracy at longer ranges.
 
Technoviking said:
Disagree on the notion that marksmanship "...was of little help" for the British.

Consider this snippet:
This is from here

Anway, I think that it is highly illogical to consider musketry to not be of worth. 

Bear in mind that the British in 1914 were trained to employ a high volume of fire - the emphasis was on rate of fire. The Germans were advancing and thus not ensconced in hard cover. If the Taliban advance in the open they will get cut down just like those Germans.

Continuing on a history tangent, here are a couple of observations from before the Great War based on South Africa and the Russo-Japanese War:

  a.  "Invisibility has become an essential condition. It is the dominant fact of the whole war." - French Report on the Russo-Japanese War

  b.  "It was not yet realized that the defender, occupying ingeniously constructed trenches and useing smokeless powder, is practically invulnerable to both gun and rifle" - Col Henderson reporting on the Boer War.

Facing an opponent who cannot be dislodged by small arms alone is not a new problem.
 
Old Sweat said:
On the other hand, and I would appreciate some input from those who may have been there, what about the assaults in August and September by the 1 PPCLI and 1 RCR battle groups?

I was crew commanding my LAV as part of 9Pl on Aug 03 2006 as part of the assault on the White School.  (I will hasten to add that a certain 'brass' type paid little attention to the results of that one, hence what happened to Charles Coy on 03 Sept).

Locating the enemy was the hardest thing.  Even with all the optics available to me and my gunner, we did not see a single enemy until we made it up to the school itself and were engaging enemy from 20-25m with the cannon (awesome results).  Their prepared positions allowed them to shoot and scoot while concealed.  Signature from an RPG launch would be engaged but muzzle flashes did not exist.  We shot where we saw the dismounts shooting, or we shot in the direction from where rounds where striking the car.  HUMINT and other sources say we whacked a lot of dudes that day, but it was nothing more than luck.  But I guess over 500 rounds of 25mm and almost 2500 rounds of 7.62mm will have some result.
 
Excellent discussion and I commend all for the good input on the various topics.  Some thoughts/clarification:

1.  The notion of marksmanship that I first mentioned is starting to get a little clouded.  I was not referring to the ability to see a target or not or if it is a suspected or confirmed enemy position, which is where the conversation went.  My critique was against two things that seem to happen often, despite the amount of time Western armies dedicate to training.  The first is something like this:

http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/20100902214645.aspx

Obviously, he isn't going to hit anything and is wasting ammo. 

The second type is rapidly putting rounds down range in a manner that is ineffective - the famous Kesterson video has a good example at the 58 second mark:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2r3C0PJ1LM

This video (despite the lame music) also has some example at the 1:10 mark and beyond:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-wHaPl7Ibo

I don't know how people expect to hit something by taking up a hasty sight picture and loosing off 5-10 rounds.  The rifle is not meant to create a beaten zone.

Undoubtably, this phenomenon likely occurs due to the stress of battle.  Remember the one note from the Storr article which pointed out that seasoned Marine squads would only expend 3-4 mags after long TICs - once soldiers (and leaders) become more accustomed to battles and recognize when they are taking effective or ineffective fire, they can get into the right zone (to take a page from Grossman) and start acting effectively.  So, if we know this happens, we should try our best to "train it out" of guys in training - this likely means evaluating training to make sure we are not conditioning bad drills that lead to wasted shots and higher ammo consumption (hence my mentioning of the run down).

2.  That being said, it is hard to get around the stressors of combat - as Haligonian correctly surmised, the rifle isn't much of a decisive factor on the battlefield due to the the "rifleMAN" and not the "rifle".  This doesn't excuse poor marksmanship training, and we still need to train to avoid the things I listed above (if anything, to avoid wasting rounds) - I don't disagree with Technoviking at all when we still need top notch individual rifle skills, especially at the 0-100m fight where the rifle will be more of a factor.

The real point is that we need to recognize the limitations of the individual rifleman.  He isn't going to kill much when he's doing things properly, taking aimed shots at known or suspected enemy - but he still contributes to the fight, and his key ability is to move that rifle onto the enemy when he has to.  He isn't going to kill anything if he's just rattling rounds off for the sake of shooting back.  I've spoken to some Marines about their facination with Marksmanship - apparently there is some contention in the USMC as the "Mafia" that controls the doctrine/school system and some pointy end guys don't agree on what's important.  500m with an iron sight seems like a waste of time and effort to me.

3.  On the ineffectiveness of the C9, I've never heard of any real complaints either, but have we ever really objectively tested the thing?  After reading that test results show it scored poorly in the section context, I thought for a bit on the weapon; it's a machinegun, but we employ it like a rifle.  Why don't we just give the guy a rifle (which the USMC did)?

4.  Moving on, some have discussed the nature of firefights in Afghanistan and the "shoot and scoot" tactics of the enemy.  The salient points that I think that have fallen out of the contributions are:
  • It is very hard to locate the enemy (he moves, like we do);
  • The firefight must be constantly won and re-won; and
  • the insurgent's primary TTP is to shoot and get out of dodge when our firepower comes on line; I haven't seen very many cases of "hold to the last" since 2006 - the good ones learned and know things like CAS response times, etc, etc
 
The two "so what's" that come out of this to me are maneuver and cut-off.  To the first point, there is certainly nothing wrong with using CAS/Air/Arty to pound the enemy, but we must remember that it isn't an end in itself (shock only lasts for a while) and that firepower is only good if supports maneuver; some of the historical examples provided here show how hard it is to kill people in strong defensive postions and Afghanistan is one big defensive position.  Aggresive maneuver will undoubtably be better than stopping and waiting for enablers to stack up.  As to the second point, much of what I've seen (AARs/Lessons Learned/Reports/Etc) show that cut-offs are effective killers.  I tried cut-offs lots both in work-up and in theater, but it always seemed like they weren't out when the enemy decided to make an appearance.  It was frustrating, but its something we must continue to try to get better at.  A good "play-book" of getting various types of cut-offs into play at various phases of the battle is a must have and a must rehearse.

5.  Finally, we need to recognize what is unique to our collective experience and what is generally applicable.  We fight and low-quality insurgent with minimal equipment in a dense, rural floodplain.  Some Americans I speak to recount battles in the rugged mountains of RC East that show some similarities but some vast differences in the way the enemy fights.  We need to be concious of this; the Korengal Valley and the grapefields of Panjwayi are two different fights.

Anyways, my 2 cents.
 
A few more 'so what's', at least further questions, are to be taken from this discussion I believe.

If the rifle is not decisive in battle until within 100m then how should we be equipping and organizing our sects and platoons in order to take into consideration this fact? We could consider placing a C6 with each section, and forming a support and assault group. Perhaps it wouldn't be necessary to to add a C6 to the section but simply group the C9's together as a support group perhaps with the two M203 gunners. Is the C9 even worth keeping considering what the research has shown?  I think what I would like to see happen is placing a C6 with the sect, ditch the M203's, and acquire something along the lines of the M 32 MGL. The MGL would give the section the ability to inflict a level of shock on the enemy by delivering HE 40mm grenades in rapid succession. The sect would be broken into assault and support groupings with the C6 number 1 and 2, MGL gunner and likely the sect 2IC in the support group.  The asslt group would entail the sect comd and the remaining riflemen.  At the pl level the C6 could be removed as I think it would be redundant with there now being 3 C6's within the platoon.  This would free up men for the bearing of more 84mm and mortar ammunition, and allowing for more flexibility on which natures are to be brought, thereby giving the platoon more potential to bring shock action down onto the enemy. The question would be how does the pl comd hastily regroup the sects machine guns and MGL's into a single pl firebase if he wishes to employ them all for assaulting an objective? That would require solid drills and strong communication which can only be arrived at by training I would suggest.

I think this would restore manoeuvre to the section and considerably increase its firepower. It obviously would require some tinkering with doctrine and TTP's but other than acquiring the MGL, nothing major.
Sorry if this has been beaten to a dead horse on the form but I thought it was important to mention.

(Edited for spelling.)
 
Those are good points, Haligonian, but as a reminder, grouping of the section by weapons is up to the commanders.  For example, if the commander decides to group his C9s and M203s as you say, then he can do so.  Retaining flexibility is key.  In any event, to stay closer to the topic (re: marksmanship), we shouldn't sluff off the requirement to hit within 100m.  Consider the close terrain in which many of our guys are fighting.  From my perspective, it comes down to applying the training regime we have in place.
For those unaware, we have elementary application of fire to start for the new shooter.  Here they learn the basics of holding, aiming and firing, and get a type of coaching focussing on the holding and firing.  Then comes the advanced application of fire, where the coaching focusses on the aiming.  From there, to the PWT and then the various field firing (individual and collective).  But the ability to hit that at which you are aiming is a losable skill.

 
Technoviking said:
Those are good points, Haligonian, but as a reminder, grouping of the section by weapons is up to the commanders.  For example, if the commander decides to group his C9s and M203s as you say, then he can do so.  Retaining flexibility is key.  In any event, to stay closer to the topic (re: marksmanship), we shouldn't sluff off the requirement to hit within 100m.  Consider the close terrain in which many of our guys are fighting.  From my perspective, it comes down to applying the training regime we have in place.
For those unaware, we have elementary application of fire to start for the new shooter.  Here they learn the basics of holding, aiming and firing, and get a type of coaching focussing on the holding and firing.  Then comes the advanced application of fire, where the coaching focusses on the aiming.  From there, to the PWT and then the various field firing (individual and collective).  But the ability to hit that at which you are aiming is a losable skill.

From this I take it that you would advocate following the CFOSP? In my experience the operational units are skipping the PWT's 1 and 2 along with their subordinate applications and going directly to PWT 3 in order to tick the box.  I get the feeling that the general consensus is that the applications and PWT 1 and 2 are for support trades and not for the infantry.  What's your thoughts on this and does it really matter if you do the previous applications if everyone is passing PWT 3 anyway?

What sort of further training should we be conducting in order to further hone our battle shot at the 100 m distance?
 
I believe you don't need to fire PWT1 again if you passed PWT2 the previous year to qualify on the weapon. Hence to get troops deployed if they already have PWT2 they just skip to PWT3. If people are just jumping ahead without being able to fire a group at 100m, thats another issue.
 
Haligonian said:
From this I take it that you would advocate following the CFOSP? In my experience the operational units are skipping the PWT's 1 and 2 along with their subordinate applications and going directly to PWT 3 in order to tick the box.  I get the feeling that the general consensus is that the applications and PWT 1 and 2 are for support trades and not for the infantry.  What's your thoughts on this and does it really matter if you do the previous applications if everyone is passing PWT 3 anyway?

What sort of further training should we be conducting in order to further hone our battle shot at the 100 m distance?
Yes, following the CFOSP is, IMHO, a necessity.  If they pass PWT 3 anyway, I would offer that they are relying on their previous experience.  If they fail to get perfect on it, then there is room for improvement, and given that our job is life and death....

Further training?  Just lots of individual and collective field firing.  Lots of good stuff.  The imagination is the limit.
 
As an aside, many units and courses often "shoot" PWT-1 on the SAT to conserve ammunition and training funds. I'm sure there are other "shenanigans" out there WRT rifle training on ranges. I recall hearing about an interesting conversation in 31 CBG where the ammunition usage was compared to claims that all units had 90% or whatever shoot and qualify on the CFOSP. Rumor has it the usage was far short of what would have been needed for the number of shooters claimed.

On a more serious note, ammunition allocations and training time is so restricted there is little ability to put people through proper CFOSP training, particularly once you go past rifles. When was the last time you ever saw people actually zeroing C-6 or C-9's? Firing groupings on the corners of a 4' screen?

IF we are only willing to spend the bre minimum of time and resources to teaching and training marksmanship (or shooting in general), then the people trying to sell us on XM-25's, CASW and other area effect wonder weapons might actually be making sense.
 
If I can add to the noise on this topic, I'd like to comment as a non-combat trade soldier who was attached to a Rifle Coy, patrolled with them in Zhari and was involved in numorous TICs.

From what I saw time and again the Infantry was mainly there as bait to get the enemy to reveal themselves. Due to the nature of fighting insurgents, it was vitually impossible to find the Taliban until they pulled out weapons and starting shooting.
Even then we rarely ever SAW them, muzzle flashes and a face poping up for a second were the occasional exception. Engagements where mostly from 300m to 600m, with the enemy making exellent use of the cover and concealment of the mudwalls, wadis and vegetation.
So how do you aim at a target you rarely see but is pouring fire at you? We typically used the sound of enemy gunfire to get a rough range and bearing to the target and retuned fire at that.
Echo location with the Mark 1 eardrum not being the most precise instrument most fire from the infantry was SUPPRESIVE in nature.

Example: Gunfire snapping past us from the East, there's a wadi lined with trees and heavy brush in that direction, we think that's where they are shooting from. The platoon turns and fires into the wadi. This all happens in a the space of a few seconds.

The fire fight would continue, our guys engaging with C7, M203, C9, m72, Carl G, Mortars and C6, of these I've only heard the C6 getting kills on the rare idiot who exposed himself. Used in small numbers the Carl Gs firing rate was too slow and the Mortars wildly innacurate to be much help.

From there the FOO tech would start to spool up a fire mission over the radio, get the control sation to take a look with a UAV, and if we got lucky the enemy would stay in that one spot long enough to drop 155mm HE on them, or if they were really dumb they would try to slug it out until we finally got an airstrike in. I rarely saw the enemy continue to put up a serious fight after the bombs started dropping. When enemy casualties occured it was nornmally from the Artillery and Air Force.

More often then not the enemy would do a Mexican Unload on us for a few minutes, then use the wadi network to run to a new fire position, avoiding the artillery and airstrikes from being delivered effectively. They knew what to expect from us just like we knew what they would do.

So how do you train for this? Do better ranges help you was you return fire at a target you cannot see? Do you change your weapons loads?
We tried forming a fire platoon that was heavy with support weapons, large numbers of Carl Gs, C6 and Mortars and it was very effective if the enemy CHOSE to attack them while they were already set-up, otherwise by the time the fire platoon manouevered into position, loaded and engaged the enemy was already repositioning using the conceilment of the wadis.

So would more crew served weapons help? Only if the enemy sticks around long enough for those weapons to be brought to bear and held still to take the punishement.
Is there something that you can fire while dismounted, requires no setup time, powerfull enough to blast through mud walls or could fire over them, but still have a high rate of fire to be effective?

I'm not sure, it's not my area and I can only speak as to what I saw directly. In that I can say that marksmanship was not an issue, we had several snipers with us who had no better luck then the riflemen. What seemed to work repeatedly was layered effects; the infantry returnings high volumes of fire with multiple weapon systems, preventing the enemy from exposing themselves long enough to shoot at our guys accurately, and the rapid arrival of fire support from the artillery and air force to finish the contact.

 
kile:
did your platoon ever use manoeuvre on the enemy?  Or did they just fire on him?
 
New article to fuel the debate here folks.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_1/CAJ_vol13.1_full_e.pdf

Some key points from the article:

1.  The author identifies what he sees as a gap in the sections capability to engage targets 500-600m. He also emphasises the need for the capability to be precise vs. suppressive. (I believe he really means capable of hitting point targets instead of area targets.) He states that the ability to bring precise effects to fleeting targets is now more important that to be able to suppress the enemy.

2.  He reviews some of the characteristics of the C7, it's sight, and its ammunition then goes into detail of the capabilities of the weapons system at 600m, concluding that the rifle, and optic are more than capable of engaging targets out to that distance, however, the C77 Ball ammunition is not.

3. To cover this capability gap he sees 3 options. More snipers, sharp shooters (he prefers the term sharp shooter over marksman as marksman refers to a generic CF skill), or raising the marsmanship standard across the CF/Infantry.

4. Options 1 and 3 he sees as not realistic due to resource and time constraints. He believes that sharpshooters should be trained at a level of 2.5 per section. (He also considered 1 for the pl wpns det but this would not cover the sects capability gap.) He believes training sharpshooters would be fairly cheap and proposes a two week course based off of Sniper PO's.  The Sniper Cell at the Inf school would generate the course and it would be run by the 4 area training centers.

5. In his conclusion he advocates the CF adopts sect sharpshooters using whatever weapon is chosen as the Short Range Sniper Weapon by the Small Arms Replacement Project.  He claims that marksmanship standards through the CF must be raised in general.


I'm not sure I'm sold on the sect sharpshooter idea. I'm not convinced we can reliably get that many personnel up to a standard where they are firing out to 600m reliably.  Also the greater importance of delivering precise fire versus area/suppressive fire is something I'm not sure about. How often are INS popping shots at patrols while surrounded by civilians? I don't believe its very common in Afghanistan, maybe in Iraq or against the Palistinnians? I have a hard time imagining a sharpshooter who is under contact being able to reliably deliver that one shot one kill in a non combatant rich environment while being shot at.
 
How do you train 2.5 sharpshooters?




On the last summer roto, ''marksman'' were used to good effect. Sure they may not have accounted for alot of kills, however terry taliban, hiding in an orchard, sees a dude with a gun with a FOGB scope on it climb onto a roof to provide overwatch for a shura/patrol/CIMIC handshake patrol, and then thinks twice about lighting us up. The marksman rifle was often either only a C7CT or AR-10 borrowed from the sniper det, given to a senior rifleman. Remember it's not always about the punchups, convincing the other dude that he will only get a 7.62 spanking if he starts something works just as well in COIN.
 
Towards_the_gap said:
How do you train 2.5 sharpshooters?




On the last summer roto, ''marksman'' were used to good effect. Sure they may not have accounted for alot of kills, however terry taliban, hiding in an orchard, sees a dude with a gun with a FOGB scope on it climb onto a roof to provide overwatch for a shura/patrol/CIMIC handshake patrol, and then thinks twice about lighting us up. The marksman rifle was often either only a C7CT or AR-10 borrowed from the sniper det, given to a senior rifleman. Remember it's not always about the punchups, convincing the other dude that he will only get a 7.62 spanking if he starts something works just as well in COIN.

The 2.5 shooters is used to attain an average at higher levels as I understand it.  So yes it doesn't make sense at sect level because you can't half train someone or train half a person, but at pl level it means the pl has 10 shooters/gunners/drivers/crew commanders. Then at coy level you'd have about 40, meaning pl WO's and the CSM can juggle guys with qualifications around once leave hits or attrition or whatever.  We try to attain this with the necessary qualifications.

Great point on the psychological effect a "sniper" can have on the enemy.  I'll point out, however, that this article was aiming to have the sharpshooter in order to cover a capability gap within the section and not so much have a psychological effect on the enemy. 
 
After reading this, a few thoughts come to mind:

There is a need for rapid suppressive fire to fix or destroy an elusive enemy. Has anyone considered shoot through rifle grenades? They can even be fixed to the weapon while on patrol, so the first round downrange will be the grenade itself (might want to watch that "double tap", though). Rifle grenades come in all sizes, so it is possible to have even bigger warheads than a 40mm grenade from an M-203, if desired.

Some of what is being discussed in terms of enemy tactics is distressingly familiar from reading accounts of battles in the Viet Nam war. The French  and Americans seemed determined to only move in the open, while the "Popular Force" and NVA moved and set up in concealed positions, with predictable results. If we know the enemy is using the wadi system to infiltrate and exfiltrate, then rather than trying to shoot them out of the wadi with rifle fire (about as possible as shooting people out of trenches in 1915) we should be down there rooting them out. Since this is now a trench fight, short range weapons with high volumes of fire (like shotguns or SMG/PDWs) are the order of the day. A support platoon or team in overwatch can deal with people jumping out of the wadi to flee. Other tactical problems will need different solutions.
 
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