• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Small Arms and Combat Marksmanship

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
I have nothing to add at this point; however, I find this discussion very interesting and informative.  I would simply "mark" this thread; however, I hate the flood of emails to let me know that there is a post.

So, to stay on target (somewhat), I will disagree from this earlier assertion:
c.  The PWT-3 "Run-Down" is a stupid test - it encourages soldiers to run and shoot when they clearly are not in a position to suppress, let alone kill, the enemy.  "Shooting and moving" is best reserved for the 0-100m fight where the rifle becomes useful.  Anything past that is "any necessary, well-aimed fire to support a crew-served weapon."
Allow me to explain.
First of all, it's a test, not a teaching tool, and if done correctly (eg: following all the work up applications, scored properly, with coaches when required, etc), it assesses, accurately, marksmanship from 300 m in to 10 (?).  Now, in our conventional ranges, there is no method to induce the stress of combat, so instead of that, artificial stressors are introduced.
During the run-down, your breathing increases and you have the stress of making shots within a time limit.  This assesses the shooter's ability to control his or her breathing, as well as to make "naturally aimed" shots at all ranges out to 300m.  (OK, not ALL ranges, I mean, we don't fire at 246.5 metres for example, but I think you all understand what I mean...).  As well, due to the ammo distribution, we are forced stoppages.  Yes, it is the empty mag stoppage, and a good shot will count his or her rounds and know when it's coming; however, suffice it to say that stoppages are programmed into the test.
So, this test is not designed for combat marksmanship, but rather for "stressed musketry", I suppose, which in turn makes one a better shot in combat, or so the theory goes.  In other words, if one's aim is instinctively following the marksmanship principles, then one will score higher on the PWT 3.  And if one aims instinctively, even under the artificial stress of the PWT, then one can induce that that same shooter's marksmanship should be better under the very real stress of combat.

(I hope that this made sense.  It is the holidays, after all)

And having said all that, I wholeheartedly agree that the 100m + fight is best suited for the crew-served weapons.  As I've often said, half-jokingly to candidates in the past, riflemen are "glorified bodyguards" for the crew-served weapons. 
 

McG

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
1,965
Points
1,160
Wonderbread said:
We need to be careful here that we don't blur the line between spec fire and simply shooting in the direction of the enemy.  While I agree that a significant amount of shock, suppression, and neutralization we produce is the result of careful speculative fire against possible or likely enemy positions, I think that very little can be accounted for by rounds that have been "fired in their general direction and found their way home."
Spec fire is shooting at "things" when contact has not been established with an enemy in order to elicit a response that would indicate an enemy is present.  The Vietnam "mad-minute" was a form of spec fire.  The term "spec fire" implies a certain ignorance of the target area, and the conditions under which to appropriately use of such fire would be very limited in an environment that is full of non-combatants.

I think Kiwi99 has appropriately described what he wanted to describe. 
 

Fusaki

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
0
Points
410
MCG said:
Spec fire is shooting at "things" when contact has not been established with an enemy in order to elicit a response that would indicate an enemy is present.  The Vietnam "mad-minute" was a form of spec fire.  The term "spec fire" implies a certain ignorance of the target area, and the conditions under which to appropriately use of such fire would be very limited in an environment that is full of non-combatants.

Semantics aside, my point is that there is a big difference between rounds fired at likely enemy positions and rounds fired in the general direction of the enemy.  It's tough to quantify this sort of thing, but I believe that the former accounts for a significant portion of the effects we have on the enemy, and the latter is usually a waste of ammo.

In MSG Paul Howe's Leadership and Training for the Fight, he recounts his experience as a Delta Force Operator fighting his way across Mogadishu to reach a downed Blackhawk in Oct '93.  One of his lessons learned is the importance of putting aimed fire into windows,  dark corners, and other likely enemy positions.  Reaching back, I've read of similar lessons learned in an article on the Rhodesian Light Infantry.  I'll see if I can dig that one up.  Drawing on my own experience as a LAV Gunner in Kandahar, I think it's likely that for every Taliban that we're sure we got, there were probably a few more that met their end not by being directly observed, but by being too close to what looked to us like a good firing position.
 

Infanteer

Moderator
Staff member
Directing Staff
Donor
Reaction score
4,105
Points
1,160
Kiwi99 said:
I would say that 7 out of every 10 enemy killed by small arms fire was not killed by a deliberate aimed shot.  More than likely it was from a round fired in his general direction that found its way home.

Do we have any proof for this - there is no way to show this is even close to being true so we'll have to treat this as speculation.

As for other points:

1.  100% agree on the hard to detect and repeatedly win the firefight.  A smart enemy has TTPs like ours which teach a guy to shift fire positions.  This should be made more clear in the section battle drills; essentially, the win the firefight and approach are done together.

2.  There should be no semantics about spec fire - it is fire at potential enemy positions before contact is made.  The distinction between "shooting in the general direction of the enemy" and "shooting anywhere because you don't know where the enemy is" can be made, but I'm not sure it should as neither is likely to suppress or kill.  Shooting at a known enemy position can be effective if you know he's still there.

3.  Shooting when you don't have a target is a waste of ammo, or just throwing rounds done range without taking up a site picture (I've seen footage of both by Brits, Americans and Canadians) is a waste of ammo.  The other problem I have is with shooting like this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go

What are we expecting to hit when we wrap off 5-10 rounds like this?  Even if this soldier has an enemy/enemy position identified, one or at most two shots are all that are likely to be hit - this is another practice that has to be stamped out.

4.
Technoviking said:
So, this test is not designed for combat marksmanship, but rather for "stressed musketry", I suppose, which in turn makes one a better shot in combat, or so the theory goes.

Why would we want to condition bad habits (cracking 6-8 rounds off that are not likely to hit a real enemy or firing on automatic) for the sake of "stressed musketry"?  There are other ways to induce stress.  "Marksmanship" should be aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits.
 

HItorMiss

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
1
Points
430
Infanteer said:
3.  Shooting when you don't have a target is a waste of ammo, or just throwing rounds done range without taking up a site picture (I've seen footage of both by Brits, Americans and Canadians) is a waste of ammo.  The other problem I have is with shooting like this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go

What are we expecting to hit when we wrap off 5-10 rounds like this?  Even if this soldier has an enemy/enemy position identified, one or at most two shots are all that are likely to be hit - this is another practice that has to be stamped out.


Infanteer there is an actual shooting drill for firing that fast with relative accuracy, called rhythm drills. I am not saying that guy is doing it only that there is a system for it and when taught and practiced and done properly can be very effective for quick rounds in a relatively accurate area for killing and suppression.  Certainly better then the current drill of double tap 2 rounds in the general direction of the contact.... IMO of course
 

Fusaki

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
0
Points
410
Infanteer said:
The distinction between "shooting in the general direction of the enemy" and "shooting anywhere because you don't know where the enemy is" can be made, but I'm not sure it should as neither is likely to suppress or kill.  Shooting at a known enemy position can be effective if you know he's still there.

But "known enemy positions" just don't come around very often.  90% of the time there's some level of guesswork involved.

"is that hotspot a head or a rock?"

"was that dust kicked up by muzzle blast or just a stray round?"

"was that movement in the grape row or are my eyes just playing tricks on me?"

There's a lot of grey area between "There's a badguy and I just blew him in half" and "I can't ******* see a thing so I'm just going to start shooting."  Between those two extremes there's a spot where you're killing and suppressing the enemy, but you're never really sure exactly when and where.  That's what I mean in the difference between shooting at possible enemy positions, and the kind of shooting we see in the youtube video you linked.
 

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
Infanteer said:
Why would we want to condition bad habits (cracking 6-8 rounds off that are not likely to hit a real enemy or firing on automatic) for the sake of "stressed musketry"?  There are other ways to induce stress.  "Marksmanship" should be aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits.
The PWT only tests individual skills, vice collective skills.  I know this sounds mundane and all, but it's simply a controlled test that can be done en masse with controlled parameters.  In other words, whether it's done in BC, NL or in Afghanistan, it's the same test with the same standard.  And all it does is test the shooter's ability to hit a man-sized target in a variety of conditions from 300 metres and in.  So, in that sense, it indeed is "aimed at inculcating and conditioning good battlefield habits": or at lease one habit: automatic application of the marksmanship principles.  That's all.

Having said that, the PWT is only a gateway and not the "be all, end all" for battle preparation (as some think that it is).  And remember, the targets on the PWT are popping up in a known location, are quite visible, etc.  And it only tests ability to shoot.  The next step is to teach when and how to shoot.  And with that comes further collective training, with proper fire control, etc.

BulletMagnet said:
Infanteer there is an actual shooting drill for firing that fast with relative accuracy, called rhythm drills. I am not saying that guy is doing it only that there is a system for it and when taught and practiced and done properly can be very effective for quick rounds in a relatively accurate area for killing and suppression.  Certainly better then the current drill of double tap 2 rounds in the general direction of the contact.... IMO of course

The "double tap" has more to do with psychology of the soldier than in killing of the enemy.  It is simply a method for the soldier to "take control of his own destiny", as it were, or breaking the seal in terms of shooting.  But it shouldn't be confused with any type of shooting meant to kill or suppress an enemy.

 

TangoTwoBravo

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
1,232
Points
1,110
I'm not an infantryman, but this is an interesting thread and I'd like to contribute. My experience in Afghanistan is now over four years out of date, but I recall observing that long firefights occured when the enemy was in good cover. When we was moving in the open he was quickly taken down by all manner of direct fire weapons, so I'm not sure that marksmanship is the issue.

I've been reading some WW2 stuff, and a British manual from 1944 offers the following on small unit infantry tactics: "remember that if the enemy is dug-in, covering fire seldom kills him; it merely makes him keep his head down so that he is unable to shoot back." Dug-in enemy being able to absorb prodigious amounts of small arms fire without lasting harm is not a new problem (I'l pick 1900 as the kick-off), and I don't think that marksmanship alone is going to resolve the issue.

Before I went to Kandahar I thought of "find, fix, strike" in terms of finding the enemy by advancing to contact, fixing him with a firebase and indirect fire and then striking him with an assault (combined arms or not). What I observed, though, was fixing with infantry fire and striking with artillery/CAS. This brings me back to the WW2 doctrine I was reading. US, German and British doctrine all stressed the importance of the assault. If our enemy stands about in the open then we can certainly kill him with direct fire alone. If he takes sensible precautions to ensure his surviviability in the face of our firepower, though, we need to be willing to press home the assault if we want to achieve decisive combat results with infantry weapons. Having said that, there is a certain sense in using weapons for which the enemy has little counter (tank fire, artillery, CAS) rather than expose ourselves to casualties in a fair fight at close range. Its easy to sit back here and urge people in the field to assault a la Grandmaison, but its rather different out in the grape fields.
 

Edward Campbell

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Mentor
Reaction score
1,312
Points
1,160
Tango2Bravo said:
...
I've been reading some WW2 stuff, and a British manual from 1944 offers the following on small unit infantry tactics: "remember that if the enemy is dug-in, covering fire seldom kills him; it merely makes him keep his head down so that he is unable to shoot back." Dug-in enemy being able to absorb prodigious amounts of small arms fire without lasting harm is not a new problem (I'l pick 1900 as the kick-off), and I don't think that marksmanship alone is going to resolve the issue.
...


That was certainly how I recall the Canadian Army being trained circa 1960. I think the 1939-45 experience was validated in Korea and we had, by 1960, no reason to believe anything else.


 

Old Sweat

Army.ca Fixture
Donor
Reaction score
99
Points
480
I have also followed this debate with a lot of interest, but up to now have managed to stay in my lane. For the past 100 years plus, the battlefield has been a very empty place. That doesn't mean that there are not lots of troops in a relatively small area. Rather it means that anyone who exposes himself stands a pretty good chance of paying the price. A couple of things come to mind, one is that modern infantry small arms can produce a tremendous volume of fire, incoming and outgoing. In the early eighties I read a piece by a British officer who had been seconded to a local army in the Gulf which had been fighting Marxist rebels. The rebels carried AK47s while the locals used FNs. The difference in the amount of fire each side could produce did not work in the locals' favour.

The second thing is a throw away remark by a classmate's father-in-law who had been a FOO in Normandy until he was wounded in Operation Tractable. He claimed to have never seen a German soldier while actually FOOing. He was on the receiving end of lots of fire and he saw plenty of corpses and prisoners, but nary an infantry soldier actually fighting did he see.

As for using artillery and air to destroy the enemy, why not? If it saves Canadian lives in the process, all the better. We used that tactic in the Second World War at least to soften up him up before the assault, and while critics have carped about it since then, it worked and it worked well. Maybe the circumstances have changed and we can now cause sufficient casualties with fire support to tip the balance before the assault. It appears to work in the war, and maybe it will work in a war. On the other hand, and I would appreciate some input from those who may have been there, what about the assaults in August and September by the 1 PPCLI and 1 RCR battle groups?
 

Haligonian

Sr. Member
Reaction score
92
Points
430
With regards to the 84 mm my platoon carried it on all clearance ops that we conducted. We carried 5 rounds.  3x HEDP and 2x airburst. I never had the chance to fire the airburst ammo in combat but I was assured by the pl I RiP'd with that it quickly will cause the enemy to break contact when used. I fired it on the range and the effects I saw there made me believe it would be highly effective. We also considered employing it in the defence at my COP.  We took contact from the same grapewall twice and were going to place the 84 with the airburst with the range preset on the round, instead we destroyed the grapewall. The issue with the 84 of course is weight. On sect sized ptrls, which is the majority of operations currently, there just isn't the man power to lug that thing around with ammo. In addition, I know that my platoon during 1-07 took the 84 on almost all operations and employed the HEDP on several occasions with good effect.

IMO the assault is paid lip service to currently in theatre. This is for two reasons: 1. The enemy rarely sticks around for an assault or even a firefight really. 2. We use CAS/CCA/Arty/Armed UAV in place of an actual assault. The one prolonged TIC my coy found itself in lasted for 1 hour - 1 hour and a half I believe (to some of you this probably would not qualify as "prolonged", however, it did present the possiblity of maneouver vs a 1 min shoot and scoot where that opportunity is absent). As far as I know the platoon manoeuvered little to none and made no attempt to assault the enemy. What they did do was call in attack choppers (Kiowa's) and employed alot of 40mm HE and 40mm red smoke for marking enemy posns to the choppers. This, I believe, represented how most TIC's were dealt with during my tour.

Having said all this we must continue to train for the assault and perhaps should start employing it more in theatre vice constantly relying on higher assets to destroy or break contact with the enemy. Its my belief that breaking contact is all these assets achieve, during a tic, most of the time anyway. During the above example the helo's were on station for almost the entire TIC and to my knowledge did not kill a single INS. The enemy knows the strengths and weaknesses of our platforms and the limitations on our use of them and picks their ground wisely. In the above example the platoon and the enemy were firing N-S and S-N respectively.  Each side was using E-W grape rows and walls as cover.  How effective would it have been to place a section to the E or W of the enemy firing straight down those grape rows? In addition this may have a much larger psychological effect on the enemy than some impersonal helicopter flying over head spitting out .50 cal rounds whenever it gets a glimpse of red smoke.
 

a_majoor

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
30
Points
560
I'm thinking of other historical examples, and WWI comes to mind.

The Germans routinely assaulted positions (even in 1914-15, before the development of Sturmtruppen) using a heavy proportion of high explosives delivered by artillery, mortars and grenades to cover the advance. Marksmanship wasn't a deciding factor, and as the war progressed, it was steadily replaced by increasing volumes of HE, machine gun fire and special weapons like flamethrowers. Of course, this also made German defenses very difficult to assault, given the attackers were advancing into a wall of fire. (Oversimplification, but stressing the point about firepower)

Pre war, the British Army trained in classical musketry, and riflemen were trained to identify targets and engage then with aimed fire at what today would be considered ridiculously long ranges (if anyone has a copy of "On Infantry", the actual figures are in there). Given open field conditions were no longer in effect even in 1914, marksmanship was little help to the BEF. The AEF received their training from the French, who had shifted towards a more German "firepower" based philosophy as the war progressed (although prewar French thought had been trending in that direction, with the introduction of automatic "Chauchat" rifles down to squad level. If the Chauchat had been a workable weapon, things might have gone a bit differently).

Fast forward a century, and many of these lessons still seem to be applicable. The enemy is either elusive or dug in, so opportunities to take accurate rifle shots are rare. HE firepower works both to stop the enemy from shooting at us and to prosecute the enemy. Stressing marksmanship is still worthwhile, in order to identify targets and minimize ammunition expenditure, but to think marksmanship alone would win the battle would be to suggest the battle devolves into "sniper duels", where soldiers patiently hide and wait for a target to identify itself.
 

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
Thucydides said:
Pre war, the British Army trained in classical musketry, and riflemen were trained to identify targets and engage then with aimed fire at what today would be considered ridiculously long ranges (if anyone has a copy of "On Infantry", the actual figures are in there). Given open field conditions were no longer in effect even in 1914, marksmanship was little help to the BEF.
Disagree on the notion that marksmanship "...was of little help" for the British.

Consider this snippet:
The attacks began along a much narrower front on 31 October when German cavalry drove a smaller British cavalry unit from its position on the Messines Ridge at the southern end of the salient.  Shortly thereafter, German forces engaged General Douglas Haig's First Corps further to the north, but a ferocious British counterattack repelled the Germans.  Thanks to superior British rifle fire, they were able to hold this sector.  The British rifles were so fast and deadly that the Germans mistakenly believed they were facing British machine guns.

This is from here

Anway, I think that it is highly illogical to consider musketry to not be of worth.  The inability to hit that which you wish to hit suggests to me that we may as well revert to clubs.  Though rifle fire alone will not win a war, and the entire toolbox of "things" all contributes, but musketry, combined with effective fire control suggests, to me, that musketry, though not sufficient, is necessary.
 

a_majoor

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
30
Points
560
That one battle might be the exception that proves the rule. British tactics after that point began devolving towards increasingly massive artillery barrages, and the substitution of technology like gas and tanks. Down in the trenches, British Empire troops reorganized the platoon around a Lewis gun and rifle grenadiers, with the riflemen acting as ammunition load bearers and escorts for the more powerful weapons.

Now that I think about it, "Men against Fire" suggested some of the same factors in WWII, claiming that most of the platoon fire was concentrated on the automatic or crew served weapons. The argument is a bit different, suggesting that soldiers with the powerful weapons felt they could influence the battle and crew served weapons had a powerful morale effect, each man encouraging the other to stay in the fight. Riflemen were thought to take cover but not expose themselves to fire their weapons, believing they could not influence the battle. (SLA Marshal's historiography has come under fire, so the actual percentages he quoted in "Men against Fire" may be questionable. The basic argument makes sense, however)

I am not suggesting that marksmanship is irrelevant; using the principles to identify targets (even if for the other weapons systems) and to conserve ammunition makes a great deal of sense.
 

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
Thucydides said:
Now that I think about it, "Men against Fire" suggested some of the same factors in WWII, claiming that most of the platoon fire was concentrated on the automatic or crew served weapons. The argument is a bit different, suggesting that soldiers with the powerful weapons felt they could influence the battle and crew served weapons had a powerful morale effect, each man encouraging the other to stay in the fight.
This part is key, I believe.  Of course, marksmanship with rifles isn't the "be all-end all" for war fighting, and one must be careful not to over-emphasise the rifleman's contribution to the fight. 
I believe personally that this over-emphasisation led to the demise of the support platoons in the Canadian Infantry.  Infantry should, in my opinion, be considered as a set of capabilities, not just the number of riflemen.  Anyway, that's another thread.

Having said all this, we do have the tools to train our riflemen to be better shooters.  We just need to really hone in on that, I believe.


Edit: the word in yellow, those simple three letters, are VITAL to my argument.  Many thanks to OS for pointing that out.  :cheers:
 

Old Sweat

Army.ca Fixture
Donor
Reaction score
99
Points
480
Technoviking said:
This part is key, I believe.  Of course, marksmanship with rifles isn't the "be all-end all" for war fighting, and one must be careful to over-emphasise the rifleman's contribution to the fight. 
I believe personally that this over-emphasisation led to the demise of the support platoons in the Canadian Infantry.  Infantry should, in my opinion, be considered as a set of capabilities, not just the number of riflemen.  Anyway, that's another thread.

Having said all this, we do have the tools to train our riflemen to be better shooters.  We just need to really hone in on that, I believe.
Could you run this argument by me again? Did you mean "careful not to over-emphasise?"
 

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
Old Sweat said:
Could you run this argument by me again? Did you mean "careful not to over-emphasise?"
Yes, I did mean that.  I've edited the post.  Thank you!  :salute:
 

Haligonian

Sr. Member
Reaction score
92
Points
430
This debate raises some questions about the Squad Designated Marksman program.  At the end of the tour each Coy had to conduct a post operational report (POR) on equipment, tactics, and everything you can imagine. Upon completing it we sat down together with the officer in charge of compiling these reports and forwarding them to Ottawa for future action. The issue of having a squad designated marksmen came up and initially many people thought it was a good idea. As did other coy's apparently.  One of the Coy's NCO's then spoke up who is sniper qualified and expressed that training one soldier in the section and giving him a special site, or weapon like a C3, would be a waste of time and money, as our current weapons should be able to reach out to the ranges that designated marksmen shoot for and all riflemen should be able to accomplish this with the right training. For the most part everyone thought this to be a good point and what went into the report finally was that riflemen need more time at the range.

This discussion and the articles posted by Infanteer would imply that we were all wrong, and that the squad designated marksman program is a waste of effort as getting rifleman to shoot accurately and reliably out past 100m is a fools errand. The same could be said also about the marine corps entire marksmanship philosophy. In the Dec 2010 issue of the Marine Corps gazette Maj Barger argues that the Corps must continue practicing their high standards of marksmanship.  The Corps puts the resources into having all personnel shoot past 300m with iron sights.  Their Fundamental Rifle Marksmanship (FRM) course that all Marines must complete has them shooting at 500 yards (457 meters). He does admit that the FRM does not try to emulate battle conditions (thereby implying that performance would decrease in actual combat) but he insists that the FRM along with more advanced training (for cbt arms/infanteers) is key to allowing marines to put down accurate rifle fire over long distances.

Part of me is sceptical that rifle fire is ineffective past 100m (due to the rifleMAN, not the rifle).  There is no doubt that crew served weapons and HE are more effective at creating shock and suppressing the enemy but our allies have invested significant resources into the belief that riflemen can have a significant impact on the battle well past 100m. I wonder if the research that Dr. Storr cites would have had different findings if they had used a Marine squad? Doesn't it seem odd that this is even a debate?  Shouldn't we have this figured out by now after having fought with rifles and machine guns for over 100 years now?
 

vonGarvin

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
20
Points
430
Haligonian.
The designated marksman may be a product of the current war, but there is some merit.  As your sniper said, issuing him with a C3 would be a waste.  Instead, it's not so much marskmanship that's the issue, it's the external and terminal ballistics that are at issue, two things beyond the scope of the firer's ability to affect, no matter the training.

So, the idea is that one person per section is the "marksman".  He carries a rifle that allows him to participate in all section rifleman tasks (section fire out to 300m).  However, due to the fact that his weapon fires perhaps a 7.62mm, combined with his marksmanship training, he can hit individual targets out to 500m?  600m?

Your NCO is correct in that the C7 can shoot out to 600m, but only in massed fires.  Even if we trained all our people properly (as per the CFOSP), the furthest they can be expect to hit a man-sized target is only 300m.  So, your NCO wasn't 100% correct.  Yes, with specialised training, all riflemen could hit out to 500-600m reliably; however, we cannot train all firers to that standard.

Now, marksman or no-marksman, rifle training is still a must, for all the right reasons.  One thing to remember about the PWT, and I cannot stress this enough, is that it is only a gateway to individual and collective field firing.  Too often do people see it as the final check: it's not.  As Infanteer stated earlier, it doesn't teach when to shoot in a tactical situation.  That's true, it doesn't.  All it does is assess one person's ability to fire up to 300m in a variety of positions, with measurable and universally applicable stressors and standards.  Once a soldier passes that, then it's time to move out into the field ranges to do some real work up.

 

Old Sweat

Army.ca Fixture
Donor
Reaction score
99
Points
480
There must be some logic behind the designated marksman concept. What is the expected frequency of an enemy appearing in the 300-500 metre window, and remaining in view until it can be acquirred, indicated and engaged by the designated marksman? Heresy time: maybe the answer is the XM25 instead of a 7.62 rifle.
 
Top