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Ricks Napkin Challenge- The Infantry Section and Platoon

Kirkhill

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The second video about the experimentation at Bovington is, I think, the most relevant.

 

daftandbarmy

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The second video about the experimentation at Bovington is, I think, the most relevant.


Sounds like a pretty bog standard company level patrolling exercise to me, roaming around in 4 man teams, but 'whatev Royal' ;)
 

Kirkhill

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Sounds like a pretty bog standard company level patrolling exercise to me, roaming around in 4 man teams, but 'whatev Royal' ;)
But isn't that how you get to implement change? With minimal disruption to the order of things?

On the ground the soldiers and marines may be doing things much the same, but with new toys.

My sense of the difference is the acknowledgement of the need to stay flexible - effectively reflecting the experiences you have related about your times in Northern Ireland and the manner in which both the Paras and the Marines adapted their organizations to manning realities, the situation on the ground, "shift work", rules of engagement, variety of taskings.

The key element for me in that video was at the 0:45 second mark and the statement "Marines need to get used to working in formations of varying numbers."

The ground reality for most, if not all armies, is that they always work in formations of varying numbers. This is probably not news.

What might be news is that the Organization that supports that ground reality is more willing to accept, or accommodate, that reality, rather than demanding a rigidity that Frederick the Great would understand. A rigidity that makes life easier for the supply chain.

Which brings us to video three at the 2:30 mark - "We need to be better and quicker at adopting new technology into the battlespace."
 

Kirkhill

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OUR SKILLS​

We hold a unique capability within the Royal Artillery. We are the Commando Gunners and we provide offensive support to 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. We are a regiment of Army Commandos held at Very High Readiness (VHR) and we specialise in amphibious operations, mountain, desert, jungle and arctic warfare. Our skillsets include:
  • Light Gun Detachments
  • Fire Support Teams
  • Naval Gunfire Forward Observers
  • Joint Terminal Attack Controllers
  • Communicator
  • Logisticians
  • Commandos
  • Parachutists
  • Coxswains


Related to the Future Commando Force Vanguard Strike Company is the role of 29 Cdo RA. Given the Vanguard Strike Company (effectively a Light Company Combat Team) has a force size of 150, with only 60 of those organized for Close Combat or 40% of the force, that leaves 60% of the force, or 90 soldiers and marines in support.

One of those key support elements would be supplied by 29 Commando Regiment RA. Normally they would supply a Battery to support a Battalion Battle Group or the Regiment to support the Brigade Group. But the Brigade is now more likely to deploy Companies and Battalions so what is the most effective Troop 29 Cdo RA can offer to the Vanguard Strike Company Combat Team. And that is likely to be everything else but the Light Gun Detachments.

Which brings us to this statement, "29 Commando exists to deliver joint fires and targeting" and this video:


One of the specialist teams likely to be found working with the Platoon on a dispersed battlefield with a FOO/FAC/JTAC/STA team of some sort. Both mounted in their own specialty vehicles, or dismounted with the infantry on the ground or working independently in advance of the main body with the Recce and ISTAR elements. So how does that influence the organization of the Section and Platoon and what they need to bring to the fight to manage their assigned roles.

We talk a lot about Infantry-Tank Cooperation. A lot less, in my opinion, about Infantry, or Tank, co-operation with the Artillery.
 

daftandbarmy

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But isn't that how you get to implement change? With minimal disruption to the order of things?

On the ground the soldiers and marines may be doing things much the same, but with new toys.

My sense of the difference is the acknowledgement of the need to stay flexible - effectively reflecting the experiences you have related about your times in Northern Ireland and the manner in which both the Paras and the Marines adapted their organizations to manning realities, the situation on the ground, "shift work", rules of engagement, variety of taskings.

The key element for me in that video was at the 0:45 second mark and the statement "Marines need to get used to working in formations of varying numbers."

The ground reality for most, if not all armies, is that they always work in formations of varying numbers. This is probably not news.

What might be news is that the Organization that supports that ground reality is more willing to accept, or accommodate, that reality, rather than demanding a rigidity that Frederick the Great would understand. A rigidity that makes life easier for the supply chain.

Which brings us to video three at the 2:30 mark - "We need to be better and quicker at adopting new technology into the battlespace."

I smell a pile of marketing BS to keep the Royal Marines away from the 'remainder bin'.

The great advantage of the Commando Brigade, arguably, is 'the Brigade' part. They have a fantastic package of enablers there that are experts in combined operations in a maritime environment. With a reasonable work up period, any Infantry unit can be deployed as the RM deploy their Infantry.

Their greatest enabler of course is The Navy, their boss, and they're clearly trying to make themsleves more relevant to the Admiralty so they don't get traded in for an extra Frigate.
 

Kirkhill

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Sticking with my thesis on the value of the "large section or small platoon as a single element" in the ground combat role with a size of 12 to 20 I was also going to add the Troops of the SAS Squadrons.

22 SAS normally has a strength of 400 to 600.[86] The regiment has four operational squadrons: A, B, D and G. Each squadron consists of approximately 65 members commanded by a major, divided into four troops (each troop being commanded by a captain) and a small headquarters section.[87][88] Troops usually consist of 16 members (Members of the SAS are variously known as "blade" or "Operator")[89][90][91] and each patrol within a troop consists of four members, with each member possessing a particular skill e.g. signals, demolition, medic or linguist in addition to basic skills learned during the course of his training.[

Another example of 16 soldiers organized to work together is the Leo2 Troop.

When I look at videos from Ukraine what I am seeing is groups larger than 8 and smaller than 40. 12 to 16 seems to a fairly common element size for an element conducting autonomous, dispersed missions.
 

IRepoCans

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Sticking with my thesis on the value of the "large section or small platoon as a single element" in the ground combat role with a size of 12 to 20 I was also going to add the Troops of the SAS Squadrons.



Another example of 16 soldiers organized to work together is the Leo2 Troop.

When I look at videos from Ukraine what I am seeing is groups larger than 8 and smaller than 40. 12 to 16 seems to a fairly common element size for an element conducting autonomous, dispersed missions.
Both Hereford and Poole have bumped those numbers up (along with their international equivalents), 4-man dets / patrols went away long ago once FIBUA became a mainstay operating environment and a required increase in the number of specialist qualifications within each det / patrol; the contemporary UKSF tp is more like ~24-30 pers (not accounting for actual manning).

For your SA, the current working model for a LI Coy within 3RCR as of the last JRTC rotation was this:
  • Coy HQ (with the usual set of enablers)
  • CQMS (usual breakdown, handful of gators and MRZRs)
  • 2x Wpns Sects (C16, HMG, C6, ATGM-R*)
  • 3x Rifle Pls:
    • Pl HQ
    • Weapons Det ( 2x C6 1x 84)
    • 3x Rifle Sect
*The ATGM-R is something within the LIB's TOE for organizational purposes IOT facilitate an understanding of employment of said systems, also the Coy wpns grp sect comds are both DFS Comd qual'd. Ideally TOWs within the DFS Pl would find themselves on an all terrain vehicle capable of mounting them, and they would also employ ATGM-Rs. Even with the coy wpns gp, the DFS Pl would be retained to maintain the battle group to brigade group anti-armour /ISTAR assets they provide.
 

Kirkhill

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Both Hereford and Poole have bumped those numbers up (along with their international equivalents), 4-man dets / patrols went away long ago once FIBUA became a mainstay operating environment and a required increase in the number of specialist qualifications within each det / patrol; the contemporary UKSF tp is more like ~24-30 pers (not accounting for actual manning).

For your SA, the current working model for a LI Coy within 3RCR as of the last JRTC rotation was this:
  • Coy HQ (with the usual set of enablers)
  • CQMS (usual breakdown, handful of gators and MRZRs)
  • 2x Wpns Sects (C16, HMG, C6, ATGM-R*)
  • 3x Rifle Pls:
    • Pl HQ
    • Weapons Det ( 2x C6 1x 84)
    • 3x Rifle Sect
*The ATGM-R is something within the LIB's TOE for organizational purposes IOT facilitate an understanding of employment of said systems, also the Coy wpns grp sect comds are both DFS Comd qual'd. Ideally TOWs within the DFS Pl would find themselves on an all terrain vehicle capable of mounting them, and they would also employ ATGM-Rs. Even with the coy wpns gp, the DFS Pl would be retained to maintain the battle group to brigade group anti-armour /ISTAR assets they provide.

Clarification?

What does the R in ATGM-R signify?
 

Kirkhill

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And

Does that put the Swedish and Danish 6-man mounted section in play as a minimal ptl/det/tm/sect?
 

Kirkhill

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And another

Should line infantry have permanently assigned specialists within their patrolling ranks or should their organization and equipment just provide for the intimate integration of specialists on patrol?
 

FJAG

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One of the specialist teams likely to be found working with the Platoon on a dispersed battlefield with a FOO/FAC/JTAC/STA team of some sort. Both mounted in their own specialty vehicles, or dismounted with the infantry on the ground or working independently in advance of the main body with the Recce and ISTAR elements. So how does that influence the organization of the Section and Platoon and what they need to bring to the fight to manage their assigned roles.
One needs to be careful in making conclusions about arty structures. They have dramatically transitioned over the years and continue to do so.

Traditionally battery commanders and FOOs in the British structure have come from the close support battery. That was one of the key distinctions of a close support battery/regiment in that it provided liaison and observers to the manoeuvre units it supported as well as dedicated fire support. All other arty units (general support) merely provided fire support.

The Americans have been different for quite some time with close support regiments providing liaison and observers from the arty battalion rather than the battery by way of fire support coordinators and fire support teams. A FIST generally provides company level support with a FIST officer (FSO) and sergeant with the company HQ and an observer (FO) and RTO at each platoon. FACs are generally attached specialists.

The Brits and Canadians have changed their structure as well and have removed all FSCC and FOO functions from the gun batteries. They are now in their own batteries which in Canada are called OP batteries and with the Brit Army are called Tactical or Tactical Group batteries. In each case the battery provides all FSCC and observers to supported manoeuvre battalions. Canadians still call their observers FOOs while Brits are now gravitating to the Fire Support Team (FST) label. They are very similar, however, with a Capt as the FOO, a sergeant team commander, a sergeant FAC/JTAC (this role may also be in the FOO or his tech or both) and several drivers/signallers. There is no provision for observers to go with platoons although the team has the ability to split into a base and mobile parties which could (and in Afghanistan) frequently accompanied the lead elements. The basic concept however is that the observers basically chose their own location(s) within the company based on the tactical situation rather than a permanent affiliation. They do communicate intimately with the FOO/FST/FSCC, however, so that near and deep observation is seamless.

STA is not part of the FOO/FST structure. Their tactical and technical requirements differ completely from FOOs/FSTs. Radars, acoustic devices and drones are deployed based on where they can best support the force. Drones are frequently assigned to companies, radars and acoustics rarely - they are more "in location". Generally STA resources are coordinated by an STACC at the brigade level although during Afghanistan we pushed that down to the battlegroup. IMHO it overloaded the BG CPs and should have stayed with brigade.

All that to say that neither the Brits nor Canadians assign observer resources to a platoon. They are assigned solely to the company but may operate within a platoon's formation or position depending on the tactical situation. Platoons receive fire support through an all-arms call for fire which is picked up and technically managed by the FOO/FST. Personally I see no need for a specific fire support resource to a platoon. It would be idle for the vast majority of the time. In those rare circumstances where a platoon is separated far enough from the company to merit an accompanying observer, the FOO/FST can split to allocate one or two members for that role.

I can see that if the Marines do revert to a smaller team role that there may very well be FSTs or FST members assigned to those teams. One thing that gunners do is adapt to the tactical realities. As an example Canada's peacetime establishment called for two FOOs with an additional one for wartime. In Afghanistan, because of the dispersed companies, we ended up deploying four on occasion and changed the underlying structure of the regiments to provide the requisite number of FSCCs and observers and STA resources at the cost of cutting our deployable guns in half.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

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One needs to be careful in making conclusions about arty structures. They have dramatically transitioned over the years and continue to do so.

Traditionally battery commanders and FOOs in the British structure have come from the close support battery. That was one of the key distinctions of a close support battery/regiment in that it provided liaison and observers to the manoeuvre units it supported as well as dedicated fire support. All other arty units (general support) merely provided fire support.

The Americans have been different for quite some time with close support regiments providing liaison and observers from the arty battalion rather than the battery by way of fire support coordinators and fire support teams. A FIST generally provides company level support with a FIST officer (FSO) and sergeant with the company HQ and an observer (FO) and RTO at each platoon. FACs are generally attached specialists.

The Brits and Canadians have changed their structure as well and have removed all FSCC and FOO functions from the gun batteries. They are now in their own batteries which in Canada are called OP batteries and with the Brit Army are called Tactical or Tactical Group batteries. In each case the battery provides all FSCC and observers to supported manoeuvre battalions. Canadians still call their observers FOOs while Brits are now gravitating to the Fire Support Team (FST) label. They are very similar, however, with a Capt as the FOO, a sergeant team commander, a sergeant FAC/JTAC (this role may also be in the FOO or his tech or both) and several drivers/signallers. There is no provision for observers to go with platoons although the team has the ability to split into a base and mobile parties which could (and in Afghanistan) frequently accompanied the lead elements. The basic concept however is that the observers basically chose their own location(s) within the company based on the tactical situation rather than a permanent affiliation. They do communicate intimately with the FOO/FST/FSCC, however, so that near and deep observation is seamless.

STA is not part of the FOO/FST structure. Their tactical and technical requirements differ completely from FOOs/FSTs. Radars, acoustic devices and drones are deployed based on where they can best support the force. Drones are frequently assigned to companies, radars and acoustics rarely - they are more "in location". Generally STA resources are coordinated by an STACC at the brigade level although during Afghanistan we pushed that down to the battlegroup. IMHO it overloaded the BG CPs and should have stayed with brigade.

All that to say that neither the Brits nor Canadians assign observer resources to a platoon. They are assigned solely to the company but may operate within a platoon's formation or position depending on the tactical situation. Platoons receive fire support through an all-arms call for fire which is picked up and technically managed by the FOO/FST. Personally I see no need for a specific fire support resource to a platoon. It would be idle for the vast majority of the time. In those rare circumstances where a platoon is separated far enough from the company to merit an accompanying observer, the FOO/FST can split to allocate one or two members for that role.

I can see that if the Marines do revert to a smaller team role that there may very well be FSTs or FST members assigned to those teams. One thing that gunners do is adapt to the tactical realities. As an example Canada's peacetime establishment called for two FOOs with an additional one for wartime. In Afghanistan, because of the dispersed companies, we ended up deploying four on occasion and changed the underlying structure of the regiments to provide the requisite number of FSCCs and observers and STA resources at the cost of cutting our deployable guns in half.

🍻


While the platoon may not be assigned an Arty element, doing whatever Arty magic they do, what is the probability of an infantry platoon being allocated to an Arty element to supply it with close support and protection - defending all those sensors and radios and stuff?

The one thing I find consistent about the Royal Artillery is the dominance of ISTAR within all Regiments regardless of their "colours".

29 Regt RA

We are based on the South West coast and enjoy the unique role of supporting the Royal Marines in the amphibious assault and arctic specialist roles. The Regiment includes members of all three services and all undertake the Commando Course to wear the coveted green beret. The Commando Gunners coordinate fire support from aircraft, attack helicopters, Royal Naval ships, 81mm mortars and our own 105mm Light Guns. The Regiment trains and operates across the world and regularly serves onboard both Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships.

19 Regt RA

19th Regt RA is based in Larkhill, Wiltshire. We are organised into Fire Support Teams (FSTs) to FIND the enemy and our 3 x AS90 batteries provide the STRIKE. Our FSTs FIND the enemy on the battlefield in Warrior Observation Post Vehicles, using lasers and night vision equipment. Each gun Battery has 6 x AS90s. Once the enemy is found the FST coordinates guns, rockets, mortars, attack helicopters and fast jets to STRIKE effects in support of actions by the infantry and tanks.

5 Regt RA

5th Regiment is the Army's Surveillance and Target Acquisition regiment consisting of 3 batteries who support the Amoured Infantry Brigades, 16 AA Bde and a Covert Surveillance Battery (4/73). Equipped with a range of technical surveillance capabillities, the Regiment operates thermal and infra-red cameras, battlefield RADAR's and acoustic sensors. Working closely with intelligence and reconnaissance forces the regiment is trained to aggressively hunt down and FIND the enemy.

32 Regt RA

32 Regiment RA, are based in Larkhill, Wiltshire. The Army's first armoured aviation regiment that operates Mini Unmanned Aerial Systems (MUAS) supporting the Reactionary Force and 16 Air Assault Brigade. Whether directly supporting Infantry, Armoured or Airbourne Units our specialist soldiers fly the desert Hawk 3 MUAS providing live imagery to derive intelligence, enabling decision making on the battlefield. 32 Regiment RA soldiers also provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance advice to the Battle Group and Brigade Headquarters.

47 Regt RA

47 Regiment RA is based in Larkhill, Wiltshire. We are equipped with Tactical Unmanned Air System (TUAS). WATCHKEEPER UAS (WK) is a strip launched unmanned aircraft with a range of 150kms, It is fitted with cameras for day and night observation which stream a real-time live video image of the battlefield to a Ground Control Station. The imagery that we produce provides decision support to commanders at all levels, from battle group to division. Tp Comd ensure that all imagery and information is intergrated effectively into the tatical decision making on the ground,

HAC

Soldiering

As a regiment in the Army Reserves, today's HAC Regiment focusses on intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and gunnery and consists of an RHQ and 5 sub-units.

Isn't it likely that on a dispersed battle field, dominated by C4ISTAR and elements that are roving deep, that there will be a greater distribution of gunners downwards towards the patrolling platoon?
 

FJAG

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While the platoon may not be assigned an Arty element, doing whatever Arty magic they do, what is the probability of an infantry platoon being allocated to an Arty element to supply it with close support and protection - defending all those sensors and radios and stuff?
Just about zero. We're not important enough to merit that. As an example, during the early years of Kandahar the gun troops (that's two M777s and around 35 bodies) operated mostly from austere desert gun positions up to a hundred or more kilometres apart (some were within the FOB at Sperwan Ghar but most weren't) At times they were located with an echelon or sometimes a US SOF Det Alpha or two but just as often they sat on a flat piece of ground with a TLAV at each corner of a 100 metre square.

The one thing I find consistent about the Royal Artillery is the dominance of ISTAR within all Regiments regardless of their "colours".
Actually not so much. Canada has an STA battery within each of its three field regiments and additional resources with 4 GS. In the UK most of the STA is concentrated in 5 RA and 32 RA. There are certain sensors that sit with the FOOs/FSTs such as GPS and orientation systems, lasers, thermal imagery and ground radars, but not at the level of UAVs or counterfire radars. They're really more of a divisional resource tied to things like GS MLRSs. The US, like us, does have some counterfire radars and UAVs at the manoeuvre brigade level as well as in GS arty brigades.

My knowledge of modern Canadian ISTAR in general is somewhat lacking (and there is a difference between ISTAR and STA - the two are less related than you might think). It was a big issue back in the pre and early Afghanistan days when a lot of experimentation was going on but IMHO it seemed to fall down when the Army never really created the digital information management system that it was striving for. There are a lot of sensors spread throughout the brigades but you'd need to speak to some of the serving members about how well they are integrated.

Isn't it likely that on a dispersed battle field, dominated by C4ISTAR and elements that are roving deep, that there will be a greater distribution of gunners downwards towards the patrolling platoon?
I don't think so for two main reasons.

I don't think platoons will be distributed all that far away from their companies in the first place. They're not quite like the Marines who will operate in smaller more separated entities. Infantry platoons are designed to be part of a company and function trough the company's mutual support.

The other things is the dreaded PY count. No one is about to give the artillery more PYs. If a platoon needs an arty observer for a patrol then a member of the FOO team will be sent along. There are enough members in the team to have an anchor and a rover and in a pinch there are several members in every platoon that have the ability to make a call for fire if no gunner is there. Personally I'd like to see the return of the mortar platoon as it was in my day with an FSCC and several MFCs. That provided the battalion with organic fire support coordination, observer and delivery assets while the guns were the add-on that connected the battalion to the wider fire support resources available throughout the brigade and division. I'm not sure how much today's battalions are reconstituting all that what with manpower shortages and varying reliances on the reserves. It's hard to see a coherent picture from the outside looking in. Others might be able to talk about this more accurately than I.

🍻
 

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The Brits and Canadians have changed their structure as well and have removed all FSCC and FOO functions from the gun batteries. They are now in their own batteries which in Canada are called OP batteries and with the Brit Army are called Tactical or Tactical Group batteries.

Not sure if this is the case. The Gun Batteries still generate the FSCC through provision of an ATG to an affiliated manoeuvre unit. I suspect F2025 will put those FOO/FAC teams back in the battery as well.
 

FJAG

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Not sure if this is the case. The Gun Batteries still generate the FSCC through provision of an ATG to an affiliated manoeuvre unit. I suspect F2025 will put those FOO/FAC teams back in the battery as well.
You're right there. When we formed the OP batteries we gave it one BC and FSCC staff and all the OP dets. We left a BC and his FSCC with each of the two gun batteries. IMHO this had more to do with the administrative nature of having a major as a battery commander and that we couldn't simply shove three majors into the OP battery and leave the gun batteries under the command of senior captains. Its a Frankensteinian structure at the best of times.

IMHO, again, the US does have an argument for having senior captains as gun battery commanders (same for infantry companies) and having the captain FSOs and FISTs as part of the battalion staff and having a limited number of majors in battalion staff. Its more versatile and easier to force generate although it does trade off experience at the FSO/FSCC level (Depending on how much difference there really is between a senior captain ready for promotion and a newly promoted major)

I'm ambivalent to having FOOs go back to gun batteries even though that's my heritage. It seems a bit Titanic deckchairish.

There is a very clear separation, mentally as well as physically, as between the gunline and the liaison/observer elements in the field. Where fires come from doesn't matter as long as it comes. If we go back to our 20th century system we'll now be officially different from both the Americans and the Brits. I'm much more bullish on getting six guns back into a battery and three gun batteries back into a regiment (not to mention various types of rocket and other munitions delivery systems). Numbers and types of delivery systems matter. Where the BC and FOOs hang their hats in a peacetime establishment is really not very important in the big picture.

🍻
 

daftandbarmy

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Both Hereford and Poole have bumped those numbers up (along with their international equivalents), 4-man dets / patrols went away long ago once FIBUA became a mainstay operating environment and a required increase in the number of specialist qualifications within each det / patrol; the contemporary UKSF tp is more like ~24-30 pers (not accounting for actual manning).

For your SA, the current working model for a LI Coy within 3RCR as of the last JRTC rotation was this:
  • Coy HQ (with the usual set of enablers)
  • CQMS (usual breakdown, handful of gators and MRZRs)
  • 2x Wpns Sects (C16, HMG, C6, ATGM-R*)
  • 3x Rifle Pls:
    • Pl HQ
    • Weapons Det ( 2x C6 1x 84)
    • 3x Rifle Sect
*The ATGM-R is something within the LIB's TOE for organizational purposes IOT facilitate an understanding of employment of said systems, also the Coy wpns grp sect comds are both DFS Comd qual'd. Ideally TOWs within the DFS Pl would find themselves on an all terrain vehicle capable of mounting them, and they would also employ ATGM-Rs. Even with the coy wpns gp, the DFS Pl would be retained to maintain the battle group to brigade group anti-armour /ISTAR assets they provide.

That's a really effective looking orbat for a light company, IMHO. Too bad we couldn't add two or 3 x 60mm MOR to the weapons sections.

On talking to people I know in the UK, the UK SOF have had a good reality check as a result of working with the US throughout the GWOT and have seriously modernized their kit and training as a result. Otherwise the US will just sideline them as they can't interoperate safely and effectively.

As one US guy I know said 'I like those JTF 2 guys, but it's just too dangerous to bring them along as their gear is so out of date and their RoE is too restrictive.'
 

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Interesting article on AT weapons from Sweden and the resurgence of the Carl G. There is also some data on the NLAW in there not to sure on how accurate it is though.

The AT4 keyholing ammunition looks terrifying. Saab was marketing all these options heavily at CANSEC.

Saab Anti Tank systems
 

Kirkhill

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CEO Micael Johansson, who in late April said the company is looking to double production of the NLAWS, AT4 and Carl-Gustaf systems. Johansson noted the firm is working on new production lines at its Swedish facilities in Karlskoga and Linköping and at its US plants in Orlando, Fla., and Lillington, N.C, “as quickly as possible” to ramp up “within a year.”

“There is no one in the world who sells more ground combat systems and the training that goes with it than we do,” said the director of the Dynamics business area of Saab during the trip. “But our order book is currently at a record high level.

“We do not fully know what will happen since the [Ukraine] war has kicked off on Feb. 24. Karlskoga is unique in that we are self-contained in the R&D and production of our systems and we can expand our own production” without excessive reliance on multiple second- and third-tier suppliers, the director said.

“But to for us do so, there is the need to hire more people and to engage in more R&D – a need that is growing. To our credit, implementation problems in the field have been minimized, in that in the introduction of new launchers like the M4 we have ensured backwards compatibility in that they can still fire all of the previous-generation rounds.”

But, increasing Saab’s production will require long-range commitments to larger orders from the Swedish MoD and other customers – thereby creating the necessary economies of scale, said another Saab official.

More jobs for Quebec?


The issue of "back-blast" intrigues me.

First of all it is not a problem unique to the CG84.

The M72, AT4, NLAW, Javelin, Stinger, TOW, Hellfire and Brimstone, among others, all have to deal with it.

Secondly, is the back-blast issue related to the over-pressure condition that limits the number of rounds a gunner can put down range to something like 6 before his body has had enough punishment? And given the proximity of the number 2 to the gunner, according to remembered SOPs, isn't the number 2 going to be equally punished? In other words you can't swap Number 1 and 2 and get another 6 rounds down range because both absorb equal punishment with the first 6 rounds.

Thirdly, is the back-blast situation ameliorated with those munitions designed to Fire From Enclosures and Confined Spaces.

M72A8
M72A10
AT4CS HP
AT4CS RS
AT4CS ER
AT4CS AST
AT4CS HE
FFV655 CS
GMM-CS
NLAW*

*The NLAW is a man-portable, soft-launch, and confined-spaces (saltwater countermass) system, allowing the missile to be fired from almost anywhere; the operator can safely fire through any window of a room no bigger than 4 x 2.5 x 2.5 m (high).

the AT4-CS (confined space variant) uses saltwater, along with a lower-velocity projectile.

Risks to users. Soldier fires a Carl Gustaf. Note the significant back-blast. The overpressure or blast wave generated by the Gustaf, will cause blast and burn related injuries to those behind the gun, and is dangerous to 30 meters and hazardous to about 50 to 75 meters.

The Javelin backblast area extends 100 meters to the rear and up to 25 meters to the sides of the launcher and forms a 60-degree danger area. It is divided into a primary danger zone and two caution areas (Figure A-1A).

The M72 is an open-chambered weapon, so it has no recoil. The launcher's total back blast area extends 130 feet (40 m) to the rear. This back blast can damage equipment or seriously injure personnel who are too close to the rear of the launcher.
 

IRepoCans

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ATGM-R is the name of the project to replace our previous ATGM (eryx?) and potentially the TOWs (which honestly I think we should keep since there are very few systems that can stop a TOW II from killing a tank) since it may expand to vehicle born ATGMs, but the main effort for it is a dismounted MRAAW.

I might add is as long as ISSP delivers, and in a timely fashion sect comds / 2ICs and above will be fairly networked with ATAK and new purpose built leader radios, whilst individual section members will have a vhf radio as well which may see some experimentation on the frontage a section / pl / coy can occupy as far as communications are concerned.
 
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