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A fine military history
Canada‘s Army argues that history has shown that professional soldiers
perform better than a citizen‘s army of amateurs, but there‘s also much
evidence to the contrary
YVES TREMBLAY
Freelance
Saturday, October 05, 2002
Canada‘s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace
By J.L. Granatstein
University of Toronto Press,
506 pages, $50
The name J.L. Granatstein is a familiar one to readers of Canadian military
history. His book The Generals is a fine collection of portraits of the
officers who led Canada‘s forces in World War II. As well, he is the author
of seminal works on Canadian history, among them A Man of Influence (a
biography of Norman Robertson), The Ottawa Men and Broken Promises (the last
co-authored by J.M. Hitsman).
Now, after a long career scrutinizing records and interpreting history, time
has come for synthesis. Granatstein‘s latest book, Canada‘s Army, is such a
synthesis but it is also, first and foremost, "an extended argument for
military professionalism." In making that argument, Granatstein takes on the
military myth that patriotic citizens can defend their liberty and their
values in any and all circumstances.
Although the emphasis is on the 20th century, Granatstein gives the reader
glimpses of what armies were before Confederation.
The War of 1812 illustrates his thesis. British regulars and
semi-professional provincial forces (Fencibles and Voltigeurs) won the war.
Then, most British regulars went back to Europe and the Fencibles‘ and
Voltigeurs‘ units were disbanded. The militia kept alive the tradition - its
tradition - with help from a few learned men like John Strachan, Upper
Canada cleric and "creator of the myth." Hence the illusion that spending on
a standing army was not necessary in any foreseeable future and that
government money was better spent elsewhere, a view shared by many today.
The argument continues with the South African War. Eight thousand
enthusiasts were rushed in, and the Empire won. It was a splendid little war
with few casualties and some well-deserved glory. True, many shortcomings
came to the fore, but a patchy reform to improve rear services, a slightly
bigger permanent force to act as the backbone for the militia and annual
summer exercises solved everything.
Unfortunately the next emergency, World War I, was on a scale unforeseen. It
rapidly became evident that something was wrong. It took two years to
untangle the mess made by the Militia Department and to raise the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF) to a decent level of performance.
One can argue that in WW II, from 1939 to 1945, Canadians reached a decent
level of performance only in the last months of the war, if we ever reached
it.
The post-1945 army suffered from cutbacks that hampered deployment in Korea
and Europe, but unlike previous experiences, sufficient resources were kept
to plan for contingencies. For the first time, the army was becoming a
professional one. It was not to last. The 1960s started a series of cycles
of budget and personnel cuts, recruiting problems and so on that continue
today.
In recent years, too much peacekeeping for our tiny army has caused morale
problems. Now, the so-called revolution in military affairs, with its focus
on high-tech weapons and systems (read $$$) forces the government to choose
between spending on having more men and women who are better paid, or on too
few "intelligent" weapons.
All this serves Granatstein‘s thesis. But does his argument about
professionalism carry the day? We should remember that the British Army -
the true professional army if ever there were one - did poorly in the first
years of World War II and that the French Army - a mixture of professionals
and conscripts - was wiped out in 1940. Why did professionals perform so
badly in 1940?
Quoting Canada‘s Army, we can read that "senior officers like Matthews and
Keefler, militiamen before the war and intelligent, adaptable wartime
officers, passed and surpassed many of their Permanent Force colleagues. In
effect, during a half-dozen years of active service, they became
professional soldiers, whatever their pre-war occupations."
If there is anything that brings misgivings in this book, it is that
professionalism is more or less equated to long-term service. If so, why is
Canada‘s Army so full of reservists facing the worst? With the same
evidence, one could conclude the direct opposite to what Granatstein
concludes: amateurs do best because they carry no misconceptions about what
to expect.
We ought not to create another myth, the myth of the omniscient professional
soldier. Andrew McNaughton‘s utter failure in 1942-43, when he was the
general in charge of Canadian troops in Europe, and an analysis of Guy
Simonds‘s failures at Falaise in August 1944 (he was the commander of the
Canadian Army Corps there) amply demonstrate that long-time service is no
guarantee of proficiency. Is it that professionalism might be an attitude
equally distributed among professionals, reservists and civilians?
To be fair, one can read Canada‘s Army as an appeal for a balanced
regular/reserve force, for good training, the right equipment with plenty of
spare parts and ammunition and for a sound doctrine and thorough staff work
to weld it together. Add annual exercises to test training, equipment and
staff work, and some political will to fund everything, and the army will
have the tools it needs.
Now put aside the thesis and let‘s go on reading. Granatstein‘s battle
descriptions are as good as they can be given the space allotted. For
instance, his treatment of Ypres in 1915, the first large-scale battle in
Canadian history, is a powerful opening on how shaken amateurs could
possibly react and fix problems, as Byng‘s and Currie‘s boys did in the
following years. His portrait of Sam Hughes, "the Canadian Munchausen,"
would amuse everyone if it were not for the minister‘s mishandling of
mobilization, officer selection, training and procurement. For years, the
CEF would suffer as a result of Hughes‘s way.
Canada‘s Army will appeal to professional historians and policy-makers as
well as the general public. All will find it a convenient one-volume history
of the Canadian Army, and a very well done one, indeed.
Yves Tremblay is a historian at the Department of National Defence in
Ottawa.
Canada‘s Army argues that history has shown that professional soldiers
perform better than a citizen‘s army of amateurs, but there‘s also much
evidence to the contrary
YVES TREMBLAY
Freelance
Saturday, October 05, 2002
Canada‘s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace
By J.L. Granatstein
University of Toronto Press,
506 pages, $50
The name J.L. Granatstein is a familiar one to readers of Canadian military
history. His book The Generals is a fine collection of portraits of the
officers who led Canada‘s forces in World War II. As well, he is the author
of seminal works on Canadian history, among them A Man of Influence (a
biography of Norman Robertson), The Ottawa Men and Broken Promises (the last
co-authored by J.M. Hitsman).
Now, after a long career scrutinizing records and interpreting history, time
has come for synthesis. Granatstein‘s latest book, Canada‘s Army, is such a
synthesis but it is also, first and foremost, "an extended argument for
military professionalism." In making that argument, Granatstein takes on the
military myth that patriotic citizens can defend their liberty and their
values in any and all circumstances.
Although the emphasis is on the 20th century, Granatstein gives the reader
glimpses of what armies were before Confederation.
The War of 1812 illustrates his thesis. British regulars and
semi-professional provincial forces (Fencibles and Voltigeurs) won the war.
Then, most British regulars went back to Europe and the Fencibles‘ and
Voltigeurs‘ units were disbanded. The militia kept alive the tradition - its
tradition - with help from a few learned men like John Strachan, Upper
Canada cleric and "creator of the myth." Hence the illusion that spending on
a standing army was not necessary in any foreseeable future and that
government money was better spent elsewhere, a view shared by many today.
The argument continues with the South African War. Eight thousand
enthusiasts were rushed in, and the Empire won. It was a splendid little war
with few casualties and some well-deserved glory. True, many shortcomings
came to the fore, but a patchy reform to improve rear services, a slightly
bigger permanent force to act as the backbone for the militia and annual
summer exercises solved everything.
Unfortunately the next emergency, World War I, was on a scale unforeseen. It
rapidly became evident that something was wrong. It took two years to
untangle the mess made by the Militia Department and to raise the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF) to a decent level of performance.
One can argue that in WW II, from 1939 to 1945, Canadians reached a decent
level of performance only in the last months of the war, if we ever reached
it.
The post-1945 army suffered from cutbacks that hampered deployment in Korea
and Europe, but unlike previous experiences, sufficient resources were kept
to plan for contingencies. For the first time, the army was becoming a
professional one. It was not to last. The 1960s started a series of cycles
of budget and personnel cuts, recruiting problems and so on that continue
today.
In recent years, too much peacekeeping for our tiny army has caused morale
problems. Now, the so-called revolution in military affairs, with its focus
on high-tech weapons and systems (read $$$) forces the government to choose
between spending on having more men and women who are better paid, or on too
few "intelligent" weapons.
All this serves Granatstein‘s thesis. But does his argument about
professionalism carry the day? We should remember that the British Army -
the true professional army if ever there were one - did poorly in the first
years of World War II and that the French Army - a mixture of professionals
and conscripts - was wiped out in 1940. Why did professionals perform so
badly in 1940?
Quoting Canada‘s Army, we can read that "senior officers like Matthews and
Keefler, militiamen before the war and intelligent, adaptable wartime
officers, passed and surpassed many of their Permanent Force colleagues. In
effect, during a half-dozen years of active service, they became
professional soldiers, whatever their pre-war occupations."
If there is anything that brings misgivings in this book, it is that
professionalism is more or less equated to long-term service. If so, why is
Canada‘s Army so full of reservists facing the worst? With the same
evidence, one could conclude the direct opposite to what Granatstein
concludes: amateurs do best because they carry no misconceptions about what
to expect.
We ought not to create another myth, the myth of the omniscient professional
soldier. Andrew McNaughton‘s utter failure in 1942-43, when he was the
general in charge of Canadian troops in Europe, and an analysis of Guy
Simonds‘s failures at Falaise in August 1944 (he was the commander of the
Canadian Army Corps there) amply demonstrate that long-time service is no
guarantee of proficiency. Is it that professionalism might be an attitude
equally distributed among professionals, reservists and civilians?
To be fair, one can read Canada‘s Army as an appeal for a balanced
regular/reserve force, for good training, the right equipment with plenty of
spare parts and ammunition and for a sound doctrine and thorough staff work
to weld it together. Add annual exercises to test training, equipment and
staff work, and some political will to fund everything, and the army will
have the tools it needs.
Now put aside the thesis and let‘s go on reading. Granatstein‘s battle
descriptions are as good as they can be given the space allotted. For
instance, his treatment of Ypres in 1915, the first large-scale battle in
Canadian history, is a powerful opening on how shaken amateurs could
possibly react and fix problems, as Byng‘s and Currie‘s boys did in the
following years. His portrait of Sam Hughes, "the Canadian Munchausen,"
would amuse everyone if it were not for the minister‘s mishandling of
mobilization, officer selection, training and procurement. For years, the
CEF would suffer as a result of Hughes‘s way.
Canada‘s Army will appeal to professional historians and policy-makers as
well as the general public. All will find it a convenient one-volume history
of the Canadian Army, and a very well done one, indeed.
Yves Tremblay is a historian at the Department of National Defence in
Ottawa.
