Retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, who led 1991 Operation Desert Storm, dead at 78

[Maxadia]

http://www.edmontonjournal.com/news/world/source+Retired+Norman+Schwarzkopf+1991+Operation+Desert/7750033/story.html

WASHINGTON - A U.S. official says retired Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded the U.S.-led international coalition that drove Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait in 1991, has died. He was 78.

The official tells The Associated Press that Schwarzkopf died Thursday in Tampa, Fla. The official wasn't authorized to release the information publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

A much-decorated combat soldier in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf was known popularly as "Stormin' Norman" for a notoriously explosive temper.

He lived in retirement in Tampa, where he had served in his last military assignment as commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command. That is the headquarters responsible for U.S. military and security concerns in nearly 20 countries from the eastern Mediterranean and Africa to Pakistan.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Changing forum

 

[Edward Campbell]

The media is reporting that Gen (ret'd) Norman Schwarzkopf has died at the age of 78.


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Edit to add: Oops  :-[ this should be in Thoughts and Prayers where a thread on this already exists; perhaps a Mod could merge this thread with that one.

 

[Stoker]

Rest in peace Stormin Norman 

 

[Jarnhamar]

I loved how he used the media to trick Saddam into thinking the US were going to do an amphibious landing.

 

[cupper]

 

[ModlrMike]

RIP 

 

[OldSolduer]

RIP General. 

 

[The Bread Guy]

R.I.P. 

 

[tomahawk6]

Mixed feelings about the General. But you cant argue with success. RIP General Schwartzkopf.

 

[jollyjacktar]

He wasn't one of ours, but I liked his style.  Condolences to his family. 

 

[SOES_vet]

R.I.P. Sir!

 

[Journeyman]

Schwartzkopf is generally credited with the quote, "going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion."

According to Snopes, it was actually said by the former Deputy-Undersecretary of Defence Jed Babbin, but I like to think it was Stormin' Norman anyway.

:cheers:  Cheers, General.

 

[Old Sweat]

RIP, General. You sure kicked butt when the situation called for exactly that! 

I wonder if he ever regretted ending the shooting war about 24 hours too soon? And that isn't revisionism or using the benefit of hindsight on my part. At the time of Gulf 1 I was a member of a team tracking the pace of operations in NDHQ and when word of the ceasefire came down, the general reaction was that it was a day or so premature. Our assessment before the start of hostilities was that any outcome that left Saddam in power and with his military still strong enough to crush any internal resistance would be a strategic defeat for the US.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Mixed feelings about the General.

Might I inquire why?

 

[tomahawk6]

As a promotable LTC when he came to Alaska demanded Colonel housing,although he wasnt eligible until he was actually promoted.He ruffled some feathers amongst the other Colonels in the command. The 172d LIB at the time was the largest brigade in the Army commanded by a BG. As deputy he was the nominal commander.His first FTX was a real cluster.Units were lost or at least not where he was supposed to be.Not his fault I know of one battalion commander who should have been relieved,but went on to become a LTG. It didnt take Schwartzkopf long before he got a brigade at Ft Lewis. He didnt care much for special forces,but that was a common theme with general officers of the period. But maybe he was still embarrassed by getting captured while he was on the shitter by an SF unit that got inside the perimeter on that FTX.

 

[Old Sweat]

I had seen in a number of sources that he had a hate on for SF. This apparently resulted in a failure to use the coalition SF resources to full advantage chasing down SCUDs and other threat systems. Can you throw any light on that?

 

[Edward Campbell]

RIP, General. You sure kicked butt when the situation called for exactly that! 

I wonder if he ever regretted ending the shooting war about 24 hours too soon? And that isn't revisionism or using the benefit of hindsight on my part. At the time of Gulf 1 I was a member of a team tracking the pace of operations in NDHQ and when word of the ceasefire came down, the general reaction was that it was a day or so premature. Our assessment before the start of hostilities was that any outcome that left Saddam in power and with his military still strong enough to crush any internal resistance would be a strategic defeat for the US.

I was told, in DC, by a reasonable well placed official, that the PR machine wanted a "100 Hour War" to hold up against the now iconic Israeli "Six Day War" and that folks in the political centre in Washington were unaware of and unconcerned about military views and problems ~ they just wanted a short, snappy, "shock and awe" victory.

The problem was: no one outside of DC was very impressed by the victory ~ it didn't seem to mean much because it didn't seem to accomplish much.*

Of course that was before Gulf War II which seems, now, to mean even less and to have accomplished about the same.


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*It (GWI) accomplished, expeditiously, exactly what the UNSC Resolution that "authorized" it wanted: it pushed Iraq out of Kuwait and restored the status quo ante.

 

[Old Sweat]

I was told, in DC, by a reasonable well placed official, that the PR machine wanted a "100 Hour War" to hold up against the now iconic Israeli "Six Day War" and that folks in the political centre in Washington were unaware of and unconcerned about military views and problems ~ they just wanted a short, snappy, "shock and awe" victory.

The problem was: no one outside of DC was very impressed by the victory ~ it didn't seem to mean much because it didn't seem to accomplish much.*

Of course that was before Gulf War II which seems, now, to mean even less and to have accomplished about the same.


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*It (GWI) accomplished, expeditiously, exactly what the UNSC Resolution that "authorized" it wanted: it pushed Iraq out of Kuwait and restored the status quo ante.

It did that, but it did it by invading Iraq in order to outflank the strong part of the Iraqi defence in Kuwait. The key terrain was the area SW of Basra and north of Kuwait and that is where 7 Corps was socking it to the RG forces when the cease fire was called. There was some concern expressed a bit after the event that if Saddam fell, it would destabliize the region. Maybe, and no one can really predict the what might have beens, but a regime change or even a break up of the country probably would not have made things worse than they are now.

While strategically not much had changed, the euphoria in the west and especially in the US military, which had exorcised the spectre of Vietnam, was very real. The propaganda machine made hay while the sun shone and as all this came shortly after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, it looked like a new age of peace and security was just over the horizon.

 

[tomahawk6]

I had seen in a number of sources that he had a hate on for SF. This apparently resulted in a failure to use the coalition SF resources to full advantage chasing down SCUDs and other threat systems. Can you throw any light on that?

He did not let his bias dictate the operation.He signed off on the use of Apache's to knock out the forward radar site's to create a hole for the USAF to use to enter Iraqi airspace undetected. Due to political pressure it was a full court press to find and take out the mobile scuds. This was accomplished with US and UK SOF on the ground and A-10's.