• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Report of the SC on National Defence: "Canada and the Defence of North America"


Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
News media coverage of the 19 September Standing Committee on National Defence report is focused on accusations that the government rigged the report to justify a sole-source contract for Super Hornets.  But for a more informed opinion, one could read the report itself at:  http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/NDDN/Reports/RP8406082/421_NDDN_Rpt02_PDF/421_NDDN_Rpt02-e.pdf

... and see the thirteen recommendations:
Recommendation 1
That the Government of Canada conduct a thorough review of
Canada’s international and domestic capability requirements for the
replacement of the CF-18 fighter jets; that the Government select a
replacement which satisfies both Canada’s international and domestic
needs by being capable of effectively exercising Canada’s sovereignty
in the high Arctic and remote regions of the country while remaining
interoperable with our allies; and that the CF-18 replacement:

a) Possess an active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radar and beyond line of sight communication equipment;

b) Work to a high degree with Canada’s existing infrastructure;

c) Be interoperable with the United States of America’s NORAD

d) Provide sufficient fighter capability to ensure NORAD and
NATO commitments can be fulfilled as currently defined; and

e) Have well defined capital and sustainment costs as to not
jeopardize the recapitalization of other much-needed military

Recommendation 2
That, for procurement contracts pertaining to aircraft utilized in the
context of the far North region, pilot safety be a key consideration.

Recommendation 3
That the Government of Canada decide on the replacement of the
current fleet of CF-18 fighter jets within the next 12 months.

Recommendation 4
That the Government of Canada recognize the importance of air-to-air
refueling as it relates to the Royal Canadian Air Force’s number one
priority, which is sovereignty.

Recommendation 5
That the defence policy review evaluate the primary locations of
Canada’s Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) assets to ensure they are
optimally positioned to respond to asymmetric threats under the
auspices of Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE).

Recommendation 6
That the Government of Canada recognize the proliferation of cruise
missiles, and related emerging technologies, as a threat to Canada and
take the necessary action to protect Canada from this threat.

Recommendation 7
That the Government of Canada recognize emerging ballistic missile

Recommendation 8
That the defence policy review reconsider Canada’s position with
regard to ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the context of Canada’s
defence priorities and limited financial resources.

Recommendation 9
That, in terms of Canada’s potential role in ballistic missile defence,
Canadian research and development be a consideration.

Recommendation 10
That the defence policy review take into account that witnesses have
questioned the efficacy of the ballistic missile defence program.

Recommendation 11
That the Government of Canada recognize the detrimental effects of
climate change in our North; and that the Government quickly adapt
our northern surveillance and defences to a potential Russian threat.

Recommendation 12
That, with the end of the North Warning System’s operational life
approaching, the Government of Canada recognize the need to
maintain and improve all aspects of Arctic domain awareness.

Recommendation 13
That the Government of Canada ensure that adequate safeguards are
in place to protect Canada and Canadians from, and respond to, cyberattacks
by foreign governments and non-state actors. 
There is certainly something funny about the first three recommendations.

Recommendations 5, 6, 7, and 8 all seem pretty good to me.  We should be examining the threats of ballistic and cruise missile threats, and we should be deciding how we want to defend against these.

Recommendation 11 is schizophrenic. Is it about climate change or Russian threats?  Do we think it is the same resource that addresses either?  Do we need a fleet of combat science vessels for the north?
Don't see a sole-source jusrification for SH in that.. :dunno:

Good2Golf said:
Don't see a sole-source jusrification for SH in that.. :dunno:

Unless the opposition is reading the 12-month recommendation for a decision in #3 as a defacto "can't do it any other way"?
Pilot safety is a code word for twin engines. In part that is how we got the CF18 to begin with - in trying to stack the deck against the F16, to get the preferred COA of the F15, that requirement was part of the RFP.
Number 4 is the kicker.  Canada does not have boom refueling at this time.  The F-45A is boom refueled. I know the F-35C is but that is not the model we are looking at. 
Nothing about the need to invest in defence at the levels expected by our allies at 2% GDP, or any levels for that matter.
jollyjacktar said:
Nothing about the need to invest in defence at the levels expected by our allies at 2% GDP, or any levels for that matter.
Both the current and previous governments have made the argument that Canada's contribution to NATO should not be measured by 1% or 2% but by the quality and capability of the contributions we make.  There is some merit to that argument, but:

[The SC recommends] that the CF-18 replacement ... Have well defined capital and sustainment costs as to not jeopardize the recapitalization of other much-needed military equipment. 
What we are saying internally is that we need to trade-off capability to stay around 1%.  These positions, while maybe not mutually exclusive, are strongly working against each other.
With the air to air refuelling bit Boeing could justify a twofer.

Buy 60 SuperHornets. Get two tankers free.
What quality and capacities do we provide when our Army doesn't have boots, and our Navy is running out of serviceable ships?

Sent from my SM-G935W8 using Tapatalk

PuckChaser said:
What quality and capacities do we provide when our Army doesn't have boots, and our Navy is running out of serviceable ships?

Sent from my SM-G935W8 using Tapatalk

The RCN just celebrated the 20th anniversary of the MCVD hulls, so we should get another 15 years out of them.  [:D
Conclusion of presentation to Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence by CGAI Senior Analyst Dave Perry (note links at end):

Canada and Missile Defence plus Russian Cruise Missile Threat

Lots on NORAD and growing, scary Russian cruise missile threat (ALCMs and SLCMs):

Beyond NORAD and Modernization to North American Defence Evolution

Very relevant, note links at end:

NORAD and Russian Cruise Nukes: “de-escalation”? Part 2

NORAD commander warns of growing threats to North America--when will our gov't do something serious about NORAD?  E.g. upgrading North Warning System, missile defence, Arctic FOLs (not to mention new fighter, note new F-16 radar and cruise missiles):

‘The homeland is no longer a sanctuary’ amid rising near-peer threats, NORTHCOM commander says

The U.S. “homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” according to the four-star general in charge of both U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

Air Force Gen. Terrence O’Shaughnessy ended a speech at the 140th National Guard Association conference in New Orleans this weekend with a warning that the era of great power competition doesn’t leave the U.S. mainland uncontested.

Peer-level adversaries are probing U.S. defenses in multiple domains, and the continental United States is well within their sights.

“We’re in a changing security environment,” O’Shaughnessy said. “We used to think about the sanctuary we had with oceans and friendly countries to our north and south, but that’s changing with adversaries that are actually able to reach out and touch us now.”

The concern falls in line with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' new National Defense Strategy, which prioritizes peer-level adversaries as greater threats than lower-end insurgent forces like those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.

These peer-level foes are Russia and China, according to O’Shaughnessy and Mattis.

“We have to think about our defense in different ways than we have in the past. That means we need to fundamentally re-think when we say homeland defense how we’re going to do that against a peer competitor," O’Shaughnessy said.

“A good example is the new AESA radars we’re trying to put in the F-16s, and we’re making progress on [it],” he added, referencing Northrop Grumman’s APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar with an active electronically scanned array, or AESA.

The Air Force originally selected that system to upgrade 72 Air National Guard F-16 Falcons for the air defense mission, according to a joint press release in June 2017.

Those systems aren’t needed for traditional intercept missions, like that of a hijacked airliner. Instead, the new radars are designed for cruise missiles [emphasis added--that includes both Russian ALCMs and SLCMs].

The AESA radar is able to detect and track a greater number of targets, faster and at longer ranges. Additionally, it can operate in hostile electronic environments, according to Northrop Grumman...

An example of capabilities that may be able to penetrate U.S. defenses is Russia’s development of hypersonic glide missiles [emphasis added], which pose a space-borne threat. The glide vehicle could allegedly fly an arced trajectory high into the atmosphere, near or into space, atop an intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby avoiding existing missile defense systems, according to a March speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin...

Important, excellent paper (note attention to air and naval command structures):
NORAD: Beyond Modernization
Andrea Charron, PhD
Jim Fergusson, PhD
Centre for Defence and Security StudiesUniversity of Manitoba
31 January2019
Executive Summary

This  analysis  examines  current  and  future  issues  facing  the binational  command  within the  context  of  the  Permanent Joint Board  on Defense  (PJBD) mandated Evolution  of North American Defense (EvoNAD)study. It critically examines the three primary areas of  North  American  defence  concerns:  the  modernization  of  the  North  Warning System (NWS), plans  for  a  new  NORAD  Combined  Forces  Air  Component  Commander (NORAD CFACC),and other issues related to the EvoNADstudy ongoing by NORAD, Canadian    Joint    Operations    Command    (CJOC) and U.S.    Northern    Command (USNORTHCOM).  In  addition,  it  provides  political  context  for  these  issues  in  terms  of the  threat  environment,  sovereignty  considerations  on  both  sides  of  the  border,  political and organizational barriers to change, and the tri-command relationship.

The main conclusions of this study are as follows:

1) NORAD remains the primary driver of North American defence adaptation;

2) It  is  vital  Canada  and  the  U.S.  remain  fully  engaged  in  NORAD  Modernization, North Warning System Renewal,and adapt to the continental threat environment (for example,the sea-launched cruise missile threat);

3) Canada  and  the  U.S. need  to  maintain  close  attention  to  the  multi-domain  threat environment -including cyber, next-generation weapons and terrorismas  well as remain abreast of the all-perils threats to North America, and the evolution of the procedures, capabilities andcooperation required to meet these threats head-on.;

4) There  are  still  questions  regarding  the  role  of  the NORAD  CFACC (Combined Forces Air Component Commander) and how it will affect/plug into the NORAD structure. A  communication  and  education  plan  will  be  essential if  it  comes  to fruition; and

5) There  is  no  political  appetite  to  open  the  binational  agreementgiven  the  current President and Prime Minster in power...

Now note this regarding command structure from recent CANFORGEN:

Gen Vance announces CAF General and Flag Officer senior appointments, promotions, and retirements for 2019



2nd Fleet putting big emphasis on Russkie sub/cruise missile threat from North Atlantic, noted in paper above. Hence a focus on ASW (e.g. new FFG(X) frigate program) that probably should be RCN priority as in Cold War.

Report to Congress on U.S. Navy Frigate (FFG(X)) Program

NORAD update well in works--how much will next Canadian gov't be willing to pay for?

Canadian, U.S. military leaders agree on framework to retool Norad
Defence command deal comes as new threats emerge from ballistic and advanced cruise missiles

Military leaders from the U.S. and Canada have come to an agreement on the nuts and bolts retooling of Norad, CBC News has learned.

It is a milestone that could end up pitting the next government in Ottawa against both the Trump administration and perhaps even northern Indigenous communities at home.

Now over six decades old, the bi-national air and maritime defence command — and its associated airfields, radar stations and satellite network — has been in need of a major overhaul in the face of emerging threats, such as North Korean ballistic missiles and rapidly advancing cruise missile technology.

Word of the understanding comes as two Canadian CF-18s and two American F-22 Raptors intercepted two Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers, which pressed close to North American airspace, on Thursday.

The agreement of "what's in and what's out" of the new North American Aerospace Defence Command was struck a few months ago, said a defence source in Ottawa, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

Separately, the Canadian general who is the deputy commander of Norad confirmed the two countries are on the same page when it comes to the new framework needed to defend the continent, but cautioned there is still a lot of work and negotiation ahead over capabilities and what is affordable.

"We have established the operational requirements," Lt.-Gen. Christopher Coates in an interview with CBC News.

A bi-national panel is examining the specifications and make recommendations to both the Pentagon and the Department of National Defence in Ottawa [emphasis added].

Eventually, Coates said, each government will have to "determine whether or not those capabilities will be provided — or some other option" will be pursued.

And that is where things could potentially get messy, according to defence experts.

James Fergusson, of the University of Manitoba, one of the pre-eminent researchers on Norad, said the price tag will be substantial.

Replacing the North Warning System chain of radar stations, alone, could cost as much as $11 billion, he said.

The Liberal government has made much of saying its defence plans are fully costed, but it deliberately did not include the calculation for Norad modernization in its policy
[emphasis added].

There will have to be some negotiation with Washington, even though the cost sharing formula (60-40 split between the U.S. and Canada) has long been established...

Military officials would not say precisely what capabilities they are proposing, but among the biggest open question is whether a re-equipped Norad will mean an end to Canada's long-standing prohibition on participating in ballistic missile defence [emphasis added]. Gen. John Hyten, who has been nominated to be vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told his confirmation hearing on July 30 that U.S. cannot do missile defence alone anywhere in the world.

"Missile defence needs to be an international capability," Hyten testified.

"We need to be able to partner with our allies in terms of how we defend ourselves, too."

The Liberal government's defence policy was explicit, saying Canada would not change course on missile defence, but dramatic nuclear and rocket tests by the rogue regime in North Korea have prompted both the House of Commons and the Senate defence committees to recommend a change of heart.

The DND info-machine version ...
“Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy, clearly sets out our country's commitment to be strong at home and secure in North America.

“The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces play an important role in projecting Canada's worldwide engagement, while working with allies to address common security challenges.

“Canada's new defence policy presented a new vision and approach to defence by the Government of Canada, while offering clear direction on Canadian defence priorities over a 20-year horizon.

“This commitment affirmed Canada’s unwavering commitment to its long-standing alliances and partnerships. As stated in Strong, Secure, Engaged, Canada will continue to cooperate with the United States to examine what is needed to meet all threats and perils to the continent through NORAD modernization efforts.

“While we continue to work with the United States on challenges to continental defence, we have not entered into formal bilateral discussions or negotiations on specific requirements, nor have we established any agreements on the way forward.

“NORAD has served the citizens of Canada and the U.S. as the first line of defence against an air attack on their homelands since 1958.  It has served us well for generations.

“Through outstanding cooperation and cohesiveness between the two countries, we will ensure that NORAD will continue to play an important role in our collective safety and security.”

- 30 -​
milnews.ca said:

In other words: Please, please don't ask us anything until after the election ... the Minister hasn't been given any lines from the PMO/campaign team to recite and the CDS and DM, very properly, are staying silent. Nameless, faceless people continue to beaver away, out of sight, out of mind.
E.R. Campbell said:
In other words: Please, please don't ask us anything until after the election ... the Minister hasn't been given any lines from the PMO/campaign team to recite and the CDS and DM, very properly, are staying silent. Nameless, faceless people continue to beaver away, out of sight, out of mind.
AKA "Ted's Notes" :)
Meanwhile MITRE Corp. says Boeing/Saab T-X trainer could be used as light fighter for USAF's CONUS NORAD mission:

MITRE study recommends US Air Force procure armed F/T-X aircraft

Key Points

    A study commissioned by Congress recommends the US Air Force acquire an armed variant of the T-X trainer aircraft
    This would better utilise fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft for missions in the Pacific where airspace is more threatening

The US Air Force (USAF) should procure an armed fighter variant of the Boeing T-X trainer aircraft to serve homeland defence missions and free up fourth- and fifth-generation fighters to fight in more threatening environments [emphasis added], according to a federally funded research and development centre (FFRDC) study.

David Gerber, MITRE Corp senior principal systems engineer, said on 5 September that an armed F/T-X, if adapted to carry armament, onboard sensors, and air refuelling capabilities, could adequately defend the United States while being cheaper to operate than fourth- or fifth-generation fighters...


Report says Boeing/Saab T-X trainer would make an ideal light fighter


And see these:

US Air Force’s new trainer jet could become its next light-attack or aggressor aircraft

Boeing touts light attack, Aggressor potential for T-X trainer [foreign sales too]