Old Sweat said:
What’s Lt.-Col. Brian A. Reid, Our Little Army in the Field, 1996, narrative on the incident?
I am a few thousand kms away from home so I can't consult the book, but I recall the first person narratives and the battalion's "war diary" I consulted when drafting my passage on the incident made no mention of any such refusal of orders. A book by a war correspondent did suggest Otter refused the order, but I can't recall if the journalist was present at the time. I suggest the members of the battalion, thoroughly indoctrinated in the militia myth, would have jumped at the chance to see action.
If in doubt, go for the simplest and most logical choice, which was the Brits went for the best military solution.
Incidentally this is not the only case in the Boer War of rumour gaining the strength of dogma by repetition. The Strathconas were believed to have executed Boer prisoners for luring British troops into an ambush by using a white flag in 15 August 1900 in the Transvaal. There are many second hand reports by people who weren't there but heard of it, and Breaker Morant tried to use it at his court-martial. A number of years ago, when Sam Steele's papers were opened, many historians hoped to find confirmation. I was the lone man out, because I had written the South African Military History Society for information.
No one in South Africa had every heard of the incident. Furthermore, examination of the Boer casualty records, which were very detailed, found there had no Boer fatal casualties that day, not only in the area, but anywhere in South Africa.
Hi, well…hope you’re having fun in the sun…Fri., night -30 Sat. ca -25 with WC. I fully understand, without notes, etc., although clear first you gotten wind on my narrative concerning the incident at Orange River Station. Found the below, on old notes 45-47?
Lt. –Col. Reid, p. 48: — By 09 December The Royal Canadian Regiment was at Belmont, a small town on the Western Railroad, 560 miles north of Cape Town and 30 miles south of the Modder River. At this time the Modder River marked the demarcation between British and Boer spheres of control in this particular theatre of operation. For the next two months the Canadians would garrison Belmont, man defences and carry out patrols and outpost duty. More importantly, the Battalion was undergoing training in new tactics. Standing shoulder to shoulder and firing in volleys was abandoned. Skirmishing, moving forward in short rushes and firing from the prone, were all adopted and practiced.
Otter 1901: — At Orange river we only remained a couple of days, but during that time earned some little credit for the smart and effectual manner in which we built a long platform at the railway station. At 8 a.m. on December 9, the Headquarters and Right Half Battalion moved by rail some 40 miles to Belmont, followed the next day by the Left Half Battalion, where we relieved the Royal Munster Fusiliers, who proceeded higher up the line, and we then found ourselves relegated to the line of communication, Orange river-Modder river, under Colonel Miles, C.B., and later on Major General Wood, R.E. We were now enabled to settle down under canvas and devote some time to drill, although the duties of outposts, &c., were very heavy. We found at Belmont a…..
First informed by the SP’s on SSAW CDN accounts throughout time been subjected too 2nd Batt. SS RCRI, mainstream narratives with differences…left DeAar detrained at Orange River Station, met 1st GH, “question was decided in favour of the Gordons, who took over our train.” Taken into consideration, overwhelming losses in the Battles of Colenso and Stomberg, while evidence suggests slightly longer for Britannia too re-supply, send ample drafts, Artillery. Therefore my observations…the interpretation of Otter’s official 26th Jan., 1901 Report A, incidents were, whitewashed, embellished, omitted, vague on why; they had official orders too move forward. Noted…Otter 11 January, 1900, the incidents are forthcoming, not counting his personal critical critics on the Battlion, as the years fallowed…“Disembarked 30th, Nov. 7 a.m. marched to Green Point Cammon, and encamped that evening orders were issued. On the morning of December 1, tents were struck, and preparations made for marching out from Green Point Common. At noon the Battalion paraded with forty officers, 933 N.C.O’s and men in light marching order”…no mention on what occurred with 1 Off., and 65 OR’s.
In NAC, William Otter Papers, Lieutenant-Colonel Vidal (for Chief Staff Officer) to Otter 11 January 1900…covered in Hubly, p. 38: — As Otter’s Papers, 11 January 1900, Provides and explanation why only 40 officers and 933men paraded that day… On 30 November 1899 the Battalion landed at Cape Town and was at once ordered upcountry where they would have the opportunity to train and acclimatize while protecting British lines of communication. A small rear party under a subaltern was left behind in Cape Town to secure excess baggage that would not be used on campaign. As well, when the main body proceeded north by train on 01 December, 33 soldiers were temporarily left behind when, after a night out on the town, they were AWOL or simply too drunk to move. Soldiers will be soldiers.
Obvious question unaware of the above…couldn’t 2nd Batt., RCRI catch the next train, considering Lord Methuen urgency, at Modder river, in dire need of supplies, artillery power and as many men as he could muster. While at Cape Town within over 24hrs the battalion was hastily ordered forward. The British drafts, capable of drill, discipline, with or without battle experience, as long as they were fallowing orders willing too fight, all that was required. I’ll check…British drafts sent were mainly green, as for the Regiments reputation, doesn’t stop arrogance, ignorance or bullets…look at the aftermath of Magersfontein, 11th December, aka Black Week’ 10-17. With an overwhelming horrific slaughter, using GW, the highly decorated British Highland Bridge, included the Black Watch were humiliated…Boer kicked Tommy Atkins lovely derrière on those dates. The snippet on the “incident,” refusal of orders by half left flank, wrote long time ago similar to the below…
Stanley McKeown Brown, With The Royal Canadians (Toronto: The Publishers Syndicate, 1900), pp.103-104…On 07 December the Canadians were temporarily located at Orange River Station some 55 miles south of the Modder River. Here a fierce and fateful debate took place as to whether The Royal Canadian Regiment or the 1st Battalion The Gordon Highlanders would be sent north to join Lord Methuen's command with a major battle looming. The RCR had received minimal training and as yet were anything but a cohesive unit. Major Buchan now refused point blank to take the left half of the battalion, E, F, G, and H Companies northwards when ordered out by Lieutenant-Colonel Otter. This was insubordination pure and simple, but, it was inspired insubordination. The Gordons, a regular British battalion, went instead and were decimated along with the Highland Brigade four days later at the Battle of Magersfontein.......This act undoubtedly saved a great many Canadian lives. The RCR could not possibly have been ready for battle. There had been no opportunities to train either as a battalion or as companies since the unit had mustered. With the exception of the small handful of officers and NCOs who were Permanent Force, the large majority of personnel were civilian volunteers or non-permanent militiamen with little or no military background. It would have been short sighted in the extreme to send such novices against the crafty Boer without first giving them a chance to absorb the new tactics and battlecraft required in this war.
The death-trap at Magersfontein. 1899-1901.
It’s a crying shame she’s not mentioned in Canada’s Big Book, her father and brother are, considering the footing, foundation, of FWW CEF and CF Nursing Services.
Canadian Forces in South Africa Report B. Jan 17th, 1901. p.63. — Later in the same day we received orders to proceed to Wynberg for duty in the large base hospital there called No. 1 General. We found our services were greatly needed here, the wounded from Graspan and Belmont, etc, having been brought down recently, and the number of sisters very small. I might here add that the total number of sisters sent from home at this early date was 40, while a year later, including ourselves and other colonials, we numbered 1,000.
At No. 1 General, we nursed in huts, finding the work at times very heavy, oftentimes having our dinner between 9 and 10 p.m. We received our first convoy of wounded a few days after the battles of Magersfontein and Modeler River, when our beds were filled with the men of the Highland Brigade who suffered so severely at the former place. We remained at Wynberg for nearly a month……. We found ‘Tommy Atkins’ a very good patient and a tine fellow, always grateful, generally cheerful, bearing loss of limb, loss of health and many minor discomforts with a fortitude that satisfied our best ideas of British pluck, while his consideration for the presence of ‘the Sister’ was at times quite touching……
• I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant, GEORGINA FANE POPE, Supt. 1st Contingent of Canadian Nursing Sisters to South Africa. Colonel J. L. H. Neilson, G.G.H S., Director General Medical Services, Ottawa, Canada. 35a—3.
The wounded overwhelmed the aide stations and base hospitals, Canadian Nursing Sister Lt. Georgina Fane Pope, head nurse accounts: — “At Wynberg we found our services greatly needed, the wounded from Graspan and Belmont having recently been brought down in large numbers. A few days after our arrival a large convoy brought in the wounded from the battle at Magersfontein and Modder River, when all my empty beds were filled with men of the Highland Brigade, which suffered so severely in the engagements. The arrival of this convoy was a most pitiful sight, many of the men being stretcher cases, shot through thigh, foot or spine. What struck one most was the wonderful pluck of these poor fellows, who had jolted over the rough veldt terrain in ambulances and then endured the long train journey, also the utter self righteousness of everyone else, surgeons, sisters, and orderlies, all of whom worked on regardless of time or hunger until everyone was as comfortable as they could be made. Tommy made the least of all his woes. A drink first, then after his wounds had been attended to, ‘a bit of tobacco’ for a smoke, and a piece of paper to ‘send a line so they won’t be scared at home,’ were invariably the first requirements.”
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