stoker dave said:
Pardon we while I introduce some drift.
In another discussion, there was debate about nuclear powered submarines. I pointed out that DND does not have the internal discipline to safely operate nuclear reactors. That is, the rules that determine the operation of a nuclear reactor cannot, shall not and must not be violated. No one can order the change to those rules, no matter their rank or position. No one can violate those rules. Processes for changing the rules exist but the rules, as published and approved, have to be followed.
So while we are talking about names of ranks - not nuclear power plants - this speaks to me of a culture that acknowledges that changes are difficult, time consuming and bureaucratic. So short cuts are sought to achieve the desired changes. This may be ok for some minor administrative things but it is not ok for critical safety-related items.
So my take-away is again a further reinforcement that DND has to stay away from nuclear power plants if this is the culture.
Sorry for the drift.
While I certainly understand where you're coming from, I don't think that this is a completely fair comparison. At the very least it in my opinion it does not completely reflect the nature of policy and procedural compliance in large organizations/bureaucracies.
There is a significant difference between adherence to administrative policies, and adherence to policies which directly affect operational safety. The question of whether an organization which routinely violates non-operational/safety policy as a matter of necessity (or perhaps more accurately perceived necessity) fosters an organizational culture which thus makes it susceptible to accepting violations of safety-critical policies is an interesting one, and a component of the study of organizational behaviour, but I don't think that we can say that it is a simple direct relationship.
To your example, the USN operates more nuclear propulsion than anyone else in the world, and they have an impressive safety record on this front. Conversely, the USN when viewed as a whole is also an organization which in the last few years has been repeatedly stricken by preventable, tragic accidents (e.g. USS
Fitzgerald, USS
McCain, etc.) as well as other significant controversies which are at least partially related to deviation from policy and law (e.g.
"Fat Leonard" Scandal,
Bahrain Prostitution Scandal, USS
Theodore Roosevelt/COVID issue, etc.).
It's been some time since I've read the accident reports for
Fitzgerald and
McCain as well as the associated investigative reporting, but whereas the senior leadership of the USN and DoD focused their investigation of those accidents on errors made by the most proximate operators to the events (e.g. the Officer of the Deck, Combat Information Center personnel, Commanding Officer, etc.), ProPublica and other investigative reporting media organizations made a compelling case for significant systemic issues within the broader 7th Fleet and USN senior leadership. If I recall correctly, those issues included direct operational considerations such as ignoring individual and collective training qualifications and certifications stemming from crewing shortages in order to get a ship out the door on an "essential" mission.
The point I'm trying to make is that the USN is an organization which seems to simultaneously have institutional rot in certain areas, while being able to maintain a strong safety record with their nuke fleet (both surface and subsurface). I can't say for sure why this is, as I have next to no exposure to the USN nuke world, but my suspicion is that the nuke community has instilled an effective safety culture when it comes to maintenance and operation which can robustly defend itself against the seduction to deviate from policy in the interests of efficiency or "mission success". To develop the same organizational sub-culture within DND would take concerted effort to make sure that we are approaching it correctly, but I don't think it's fair to dismiss it as unachievable.
Back to the original discussion, I don't necessarily see an issue with the manner in which Comd RCN instilled this rank change.
Do I think that he was likely advised by his staff of the formal procedure for effecting a change of this nature (as described by dapaterson)? Yes.
Do I think that he assessed that such a relatively minor (with respect to cost and political capital) change required full OiC concurrence (with the associated multi-year timeline prior to announcing it)? No.
Do I think that he likely briefed this plan and received concurrence from the CDS and MND? Yes.
Do I think that this change will be rubber-stamped by the government without much fanfare much like the RCAF Aviator rank change? Also yes.
Again, all of the above are just my :2c: as an interested, outside observer to the process.
P.S. If anyone is interested in organizational behaviour in a military context, and how a number of seemingly minor operational deviations can result in a fatal accident, I strongly recommend the book
Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq by Scott A. Snook. It was recommended to me by a former CO of mine, and has dramatically impacted how I view risk, blame, and accountability in a professional context as a Naval Officer.
