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MOUT Lessons Learned: Northern Ireland
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/nireland.html
Substantial British military involvement in Northern Ireland began in August of 1969 when the Army intervened “in assistance of civil authorities” after large-scale sectarian rioting in Belfast and Londonderry revealed the inability of the police to maintain public order. Indeed, some parts of both cities were declared “No Go” areas by paramilitary forces and the police dared not enter them. Eventually, British Army strength in Northern Ireland grew from a mere 3,000 in August of 1969 to a high of 32,000 in 1972. Subsequently, the maximum strength of British forces in Northern Ireland declined and has usually fluctuated between about 17,000 to 19,000 at any given moment.
From 1969 through 1976, the military had primacy in security operations in Northern Ireland with the police playing a supporting role. The British Army’s “policing” mission created a number of serious problems. Soldiers on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry needed to make arrests, but had no statutory authority to do so at first. Also soldiers had to use the right words when making arrests; failure to do so would lead courts to release the suspect and/or to award the detainee civil damages for breaching his rights. Worse yet, soldiers who overstepped the mark might face criminal charges in civilian courts for their use of deadly force. (Later this was amended so those soldiers would only go before military courts.)
Between 1972 and May of 1974, the British Army seriously reduced the level of urban violence to a point where the IRA had difficulty operating in Northern Ireland. At this point, the IRA shifted to British targets in Europe and within the United Kingdom. This ultimately led to a string of spectacular attacks which included the Brighton bombing in October of 1984 which was designed to kill the British Prime Minister and her cabinet and the February 1991 mortar attack on 10 Downing Street while John Major’s Cabinet was in session at the height of the Gulf War. IRA Active Service Units also began targeting individual British soldiers and airmen assigned to NATO roles in Europe during the same period.
Beginning in May of 1976, the police began to reassert their primacy over security operations in an effort to “criminalize” paramilitary operations, thereby robbing their actions of political luster. Indeed, the idea was to treat terrorists like any other violent individual who had broken the law. Consequently, a reinvigorated and enlarged police force began to reenter the “No Go” areas. As this process gathered steam over the next three years, the Army lost its primacy over security operations in Northern Ireland. Post-1979 to 1997, the Army maintained a lower profile within cities and was called out only when events seemed to be getting out of hand. The military is also still responsible for “sealing” the border between the north and south to contraband weapons and the passage of terrorists bent upon mischief. The following lessons are drawn primarily from the period 1969-1976.
etc..........
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/nireland.html
Substantial British military involvement in Northern Ireland began in August of 1969 when the Army intervened “in assistance of civil authorities” after large-scale sectarian rioting in Belfast and Londonderry revealed the inability of the police to maintain public order. Indeed, some parts of both cities were declared “No Go” areas by paramilitary forces and the police dared not enter them. Eventually, British Army strength in Northern Ireland grew from a mere 3,000 in August of 1969 to a high of 32,000 in 1972. Subsequently, the maximum strength of British forces in Northern Ireland declined and has usually fluctuated between about 17,000 to 19,000 at any given moment.
From 1969 through 1976, the military had primacy in security operations in Northern Ireland with the police playing a supporting role. The British Army’s “policing” mission created a number of serious problems. Soldiers on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry needed to make arrests, but had no statutory authority to do so at first. Also soldiers had to use the right words when making arrests; failure to do so would lead courts to release the suspect and/or to award the detainee civil damages for breaching his rights. Worse yet, soldiers who overstepped the mark might face criminal charges in civilian courts for their use of deadly force. (Later this was amended so those soldiers would only go before military courts.)
Between 1972 and May of 1974, the British Army seriously reduced the level of urban violence to a point where the IRA had difficulty operating in Northern Ireland. At this point, the IRA shifted to British targets in Europe and within the United Kingdom. This ultimately led to a string of spectacular attacks which included the Brighton bombing in October of 1984 which was designed to kill the British Prime Minister and her cabinet and the February 1991 mortar attack on 10 Downing Street while John Major’s Cabinet was in session at the height of the Gulf War. IRA Active Service Units also began targeting individual British soldiers and airmen assigned to NATO roles in Europe during the same period.
Beginning in May of 1976, the police began to reassert their primacy over security operations in an effort to “criminalize” paramilitary operations, thereby robbing their actions of political luster. Indeed, the idea was to treat terrorists like any other violent individual who had broken the law. Consequently, a reinvigorated and enlarged police force began to reenter the “No Go” areas. As this process gathered steam over the next three years, the Army lost its primacy over security operations in Northern Ireland. Post-1979 to 1997, the Army maintained a lower profile within cities and was called out only when events seemed to be getting out of hand. The military is also still responsible for “sealing” the border between the north and south to contraband weapons and the passage of terrorists bent upon mischief. The following lessons are drawn primarily from the period 1969-1976.
etc..........
