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Medvedev: Russia may target missile defense sites

Thucydides said:
....but sometimes things get out of hand (G20 and anti WTO protests).
Refresh my memory; were those caused by Madonna, or was that Bono again? Ever since she stopped prancing about naked, it's difficult to muster much interest in her bleatings, and I find it hard to tell the two apart.
 
I was speaking about slacktivism in general. Regardless of what we might think of slacktivism or its spokespeople, they do have a disproportionate impact on  what others do or think, impacts that we usually don't like very much.....
 
Thucydides said:
.....they do have a disproportionate impact on  what others do or think...
I remain unconvinced that the impact is that great, particularly when it comes to motivating action.

It's much like the CF's growing IA crowd, which for at least three deployments were 'over-promised and under-delivered' -- and two of those deployments were before IA became "Reserve property" (which cynically, may just be the pre-amble to culling Reserve numbers).

Sorry, still not ready to drink that kool-aid. Whether it's Madonna or some Russian girl band, my money is still on Vlad.
 
More for the Russian Superthread, the former USSR had discovered trillions of carats of diamonds in the 1970's but concealed the find in order to protect the diamond cartel (and their own profits). The global diamond market will be in turmoil:

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2012/0917/Russia-reveals-shiny-state-secret-It-s-awash-in-diamonds

Russia reveals shiny state secret: It's awash in diamonds

'Trillions of carats' lie below a 35-million-year-old, 62-mile-diameter asteroid crater in eastern Siberia known as Popigai Astroblem. The Russians have known about the site since the 1970s.

By Fred Weir, Correspondent / September 17, 2012

Russia has just declassified news that will shake world gem markets to their core: the discovery of a vast new diamond field containing "trillions of carats," enough to supply global markets for another 3,000 years.
Fred Weir

Correspondent

Fred Weir has been the Monitor's Moscow correspondent, covering Russia and the former Soviet Union, since 1998.

Weekly Digital Edition

The Soviets discovered the bonanza back in the 1970s beneath a 35-million-year-old, 62-mile diameter asteroid crater in eastern Siberia known as Popigai Astroblem.

They decided to keep it secret, and not to exploit it, apparently because the USSR's huge diamond operations at Mirny, in Yakutia, were already producing immense profits in what was then a tightly controlled world market.

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The Soviets were also producing a range of artificial diamonds for industry, into which they had invested heavily.

The veil of secrecy was finally lifted over the weekend, and Moscow permitted scientists from the nearby Novosibirsk Institute of Geology and Mineralogy to talk about it with Russian journalists.

According to the official news agency, ITAR-Tass, the diamonds at Popigai are "twice as hard" as the usual gemstones, making them ideal for industrial and scientific uses.

The institute's director, Nikolai Pokhilenko, told the agency that news of what's in the new field could be enough to "overturn" global diamond markets.

"The resources of superhard diamonds contained in rocks of the Popigai crypto-explosion structure are, by a factor of 10, bigger than the world's all known reserves," Mr. Pokhilenko said. "We are speaking about trillions of carats. By comparison, present-day known reserves in Yakutia are estimated at 1 billion carats."

The type of stones at Popigai are known as "impact diamonds," which theoretically result when something like a meteor plows into a graphite deposit at high velocity. The Russians say most such diamonds found in the past have  been "space diamonds" of extraterrestrial origin found in meteor craters. [Editor's note: The original version misstated the type of deposit needed to create impact diamonds.]

They claim the Popigai site is unique in the world, thus making Russia the monopoly proprietor of a resource that's likely to become increasingly important in high-precision scientific and industrial processes.

"The value of impact diamonds is added by their unusual abrasive features and large grain size," Pokhilenko told Tass. "This expands significantly the scope of their industrial use and makes them more valuable for industrial purposes."

Russian scientists say the news is likely to change the shape of global diamond markets, although the main customers for the super-hard gems will probably be big corporations and scientific institutes.


 
Russia will withdraw from arms reduction treaties. While the author correctly suggests this is due to the perceived weakness of the United States, it should also be noted Russia is deathly afraid of the rising populations of Islamic peoples in the "Near Abroad" and the growing power and influence of China. As a Land power, Russia does not have the means to effectively project power far beyond its borders, and even the recent military build up will not change this much:

http://news.investors.com/print/ibd-editorials/101112-629062-obama-reset-with-russia-a-failure.aspx

Russia Withdrawal From Arms Deal Shows Failure Of Obama Reset

Posted 10/11/2012 07:20 PM ET

Foreign Policy: Russia announces it will withdraw from a post-Cold War deal to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons when it expires next year. Is this what President Obama meant by a "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations?

The so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which had been renewed twice by the U.S. and Russia, was a major post-Cold War success.

It led to the deactivation of more than 7,650 strategic warheads from the old Soviet Union, and seemed to put the former USSR onto a far more peaceful path. It helped seal President Reagan's hard-won U.S. victory in the Cold War against its former foe.

But after four years of Obama's weak stewardship of our nation's national security, the Russians are saying "nyet" to renewing the deal in 2013. It's easy to see why.

Everywhere they look, they see U.S. weakness and a failure to respond to overt provocations by others.

They see world affairs as the U.S. retreats from previous strong alliances, such as those with Britain and Israel, and ignores or downplays others, including our ties with Japan.

Why continue to disarm after losing a cold war if your enemy is already busy disarming itself?

In announcing the move, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov seemed to take a contemptuous dig at both the U.S. and the president. "The agreement doesn't satisfy us," he said, "especially considering new realities."
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Those "new realities" no doubt include Obama's feckless "reset" — another word for U.S. capitulation to the New Russia's neo-imperialism under its strutting dictator wannabe, Vladimir Putin.

It's enough to make you wonder, isn't it? From the very beginning, Obama's "reset" has included a series of diplomatic moves that clearly weaken the U.S. position in the world, particularly against Russia.

One of the first things Obama did on entering office was to break America's promise to its allies in Eastern Europe, Poland and the Czech Republic, to place missile interceptors and radar on their soil. This was a huge gift to Russia.

Not a year later, at the New Start talks in 2010, Obama gave away America's nuclear edge, agreeing to disastrous cuts in our nuclear arsenal far in excess of what Russia promised and putting missile defense on the negotiating table.

The idea, Obama says, is a nuclear-free world — a utopian idea that has proved dangerous as Iran, North Korea and other rogue nations pursue nuclear weapons. Not only is the world not "nuclear-free," but some of the most dangerous regimes on Earth are now on the verge of threatening us with nukes.

By setting a new tone, Obama suggested, Russia would be far more reasonable in its foreign policy.

Reasonable? In a bit of muscle flexing, it cut off gas supplies to Europe shortly after Obama was elected.

It has failed repeatedly to help the U.S. end Iran's nuclear program, and indeed has instead supplied the mullahs with nuclear know-how and fissionable materials.

Russia continues to stir up trouble in our own hemisphere, forging close ties with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who now surpasses even Castro as Latin America's No. 1 troublemaker.

We've asked for Russia's help in solving the murderous civil war in Syria, a country that Russia has particularly close ties to. It's done nothing.

Earlier this year, Obama's fixation with appeasing Russia became clear after he was caught whispering to Russian President Medvedev that after the election, he'd have more "flexibility" in his relations with Russia.

Given the record, it's hard to imagine Russia could get any more from a president. The ultimate "reset"? A new president in the U.S., one who understands reality and realistically calls Russia our "No. 1 enemy."

His name is Romney.
 
The long term outlook for Russia isn't good. Demographically, they could have lost half of their population by @ 2035. For those who remain, the resource wealth is going to be spread among fewer people. OTOH, there will be a lot more "non Russian" people eager to move in and get their hands on the wealth, including the Chinese in the East and various Islamic populations from the Caucus and "near abroad". For the remaining Russians, the choice comes down to who will man the factories and who will defend the borders?

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/12/23/putin-whistles-in-the-dark-over-mother-russias-demography/

Putin Whistles in the Dark As Mother Russia Declines

President Putin is doing his best to spin the numbers on Russian demography. After catastrophic declines in population since the death of the Soviet Union, Russia saw births outnumber deaths last year and, temporarily, the demographic numbers look better. As the Financial Times reports, the ebullient sounding President remarked that the solution to Russia’s demographic problmes ar at home: “Our women know what to do, and when,” he remarked.

In 2012, births outnumbered deaths in Russia from January through September — the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union that this has happened. Putin would like to claim this as a long term trend that could reverse Russia’s geopolitical slide, but there are two reasons for doubting that the baby boomlet means what he says it does.

The first is numbers: demographers note that the increase in Russian births this year reflects the coming of age of the relatively large generation of Russian millennials. These children of the optimistic perestroika years are now having children. Russia had something of a baby boom in those joyous and optimistic late Soviet days when the doors to a better life seemed to be opening wide. As the privations, lawlessness and social collapse of the ensuing era appeared, Russian women cut back on child bearing and once the echo of the perestroika baby boom fades away, Russia is looking at decades of shrinking numbers of women of child bearing years. The demographic good news is a blip, not a trend.

Much worse from President Putin’s point of view, one suspects, is the question — not addressed in the FT article or mentioned much in polite company in Russia — of just who is having babies in Russia today. Anecdotal evidence suggests strongly that the ethnic Russians are still dying out and that they are having many fewer children proportionately than the many non-Russian nationalities on the territory of the Federation. Muslim nationalities, in particular, may have substantially higher birthrates than Russian speaking Slavs.

Putin has to know this is true, and has to know something of what it means. Indeed, last week he announced proposals for additional incentives to promote more childbirth in fifty geographical areas in Russia where birth rates are particularly low. We suspect that the demographics of many of those districts look more like ‘Old Russia’ than like the multi-ethnic, multi-religious society growing up on the territory once held by the czars. While sounding bullish on Russian demography, Putin is also facing up to the (for him) grim fact that ethnic Russians continue to lose ground in what remains of the country.

Russia is a complex place and there are many currents and cross currents in Putin’s government these days, but it seems to us that the President and his inner circle must feel a great deal of pessimism as they look to Russia’s future. The population of the country as a whole remains set to shrink, and the Russians in Russia will be declining in percentage terms within that shrinking whole. The world energy market does not appear to be going Russia’s way. Islamist insurgencies and unrest in the Caucasus continue to threaten national unity. China shows little interest in a deep geopolitical partnership with Russia and looks more like a threat than an asset in the long run. Russia has not yet been able to translate its hydrocarbon wealth into the basis of a modern and dynamic economy, and even President Putin must understand how corruption is eating away ever more deeply at the structures of the state. The European Union shows no inclination to defer to him; Germany no longer seems to be toying with the idea of returning to a kind of Northern Courts diplomacy. Russia has had little impact on events in Syria and does not seem well positioned to play a decisive role as the Iranian situation unfolds. Russia dreads the prospect of a Sunni-dominated Middle East, but seems powerless either to strengthen the Shiite powers or to persuade the United States and western Europe to back away from the Sunnis. Closer to home, while Belarus remains under Moscow’s control and Ukraine has been unable to make a clear move west, Poland and the Baltic Republics have aligned themselves firmly with the west and Poland’s economic dynamism and political influence in Europe must be both galling and depressing to the Kremlin.

President Putin is too intelligent and clear eyed a man to miss these truths, however the propagandists and spinners around him try to paint a different picture. His foreign policy needs to be understood against this background of uncertainty and decline. Bluff, caution, patience and opportunism are the chief instruments of a power in Russia’s current position, and those (plus the diligent and determined use of the legacy intelligence and propaganda capabilities inherited from the Soviet era) are the instruments we expect President Putin to use.
 
A haunting photo essay of the last days of the USSR:

http://www.readability.com/read?url=http%3A//www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2255693/Last-pictures-life-iron-curtain-collapse-USSR.html
 
Thucydides said:
Russia will withdraw from arms reduction treaties.

Wow!

Since when non prolongation of an expired funding agreement is called "withdrawal from arm reduction treaties"?
Ah ok, the good old Western media selling news in a true bending style.

Why are we not talking about the real withdrawal of US from the missile defense agreement?

This is just to point to the real cause of why those pesky Russians suddenly decided to put tactical missiles on their own borders?
How dare they to react and protect their country?

Looks like this hypocritical song will continue until some Russian anti-missile defense squadrons appear near the US and Canadian borders (only to protect Russia from Iran's and Nort Korea's missiles  ::)).

As it happened in 1962, when Western governments pissed their pants and finally stopped their hypocrisy.







 
Thucydides said:
A haunting photo essay of the last days of the USSR:

http://www.readability.com/read?url=http%3A//www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2255693/Last-pictures-life-iron-curtain-collapse-USSR.html

Looks like thirty years later your are still trying to kick the dead lion.
Do you want me to post some not so pleasant photos from US and Canada?
 
Is there a point to your posts? (particularly the given the time interval)
 
Thucydides said:
A haunting photo essay of the last days of the USSR:

http://www.readability.com/read?url=http%3A//www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2255693/Last-pictures-life-iron-curtain-collapse-USSR.html


The picture of the Siberians in Novokuznetsk reminds me of the great Russian Army circa 1967, when we feared them most: a bunch of drunken bums, disciplined, if that's the word, with fists and knouts, poorly paid (when they were paid at all), essentially untrained, manning equipment which either didn't work at all or for which there was neither ammo or fuel.

Russia is, today, somewhat better off without the former "republics" but it is still socially and economically backwards - a second world state on its way to third world status - and militarily irrelevant. The poor beggars can't even keep their best (the world's best) ballerinas; they're fleeing to suburban Toronto!

It's best hope for the future is another Mongol invasion.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
The picture of the Siberians in Novokuznetsk reminds me of the great Russian Army circa 1967, when we feared them most: a bunch of drunken bums, disciplined, if that's the word, with fists and knouts, poorly paid (when they were paid at all), essentially untrained, manning equipment which either didn't work at all or for which there was neither ammo or fuel.

Russia is, today, somewhat better off without the former "republics" but it is still socially and economically backwards - a second world state on its way to third world status - and militarily irrelevant. The poor beggars can't even keep their best (the world's best) ballerinas; they're fleeing to suburban Toronto!

It's best hope for the future is another Mongol invasion.

Who is writing this? A first world guy?
Russia has seen several times self-proclaimed ubermensches - French ones, German ones - that were talking essentially the same language as the one quoted above.
They can tell their "success" stories.
Please do not repeat their errors.

As for military relevance, I am sorry but not Canada (being de facto an eternal US vassal and de jure still a British colony) will be talking about this.
 
Thucydides said:
Is there a point to your posts? (particularly the given the time interval)

Yes, many of them.

Point 1. Your post about "Retreat from arms reduction treaties" is misleading. There was no any retreat.
Point 2. Publishing thirty-year old pre-selected photos about a country that does not exist anymore looks like fueling anti-russian propaganda.
Point 3. The topic that criticizes Medvedev looks hypocritic as it conveniently avoids any mentions about US unfriendly actions causing this Russia's reaction.
 
You might wish to respond with facts and resoned argument then. If you are disputing the reasons that Russia took particular actions, then state how and why.

As for historical essays or photos, I deemed it interesting for fellow members, since many of us were trained and served during the Cold War. Seeing what conditions were actually like during that period is interesting, especially after clearing the filters of time, propaganda that was prevalent during the period and lack of opportunity for most members to have seen the USSR first hand.

Once again, if you have some sort of evidence that these are NOT pictures of the USSR during that period, then please present it.
 
More for the putative Russia Superthread. The US oil boom will have plenty of positive outcomes for the US and the Western world; not so much for the Russians:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2013/06/if-oil-prices-were-to-drop-important.html

If oil prices were to drop the important geopolitical impact would be on Russia

If shale oil, shale gas and synthetic biofuels were to rapidly scale and significantly lower the price of oil this would have interesting geopolitical impacts on Russia. The Iran, Saudi Arabia impacts would also be interesting but a weaker Russian economy would matter more for geopolitics. 20-25% of Russia's GDP is tied to the oil and gas sector.

The importance of oil exports and hydrocarbon exports in general to the Russian economy arises along several channels. Income from crude has accounted for a significant share of Russian export revenues increasing from 25 per cent in 2000 to more than 35 per cent in 2008. Total hydrocarbon exports (inclusive natural gas and petrochemicals) accounted for 65 per cent of total export revenues in 2008. Fjærtoft (2008) found evidence that the price of crude is a key driving force behind Russia’s trade flow driven exchange rate. This finding is supported in the present paper. Hydrocarbon exports generated 50 per cent of federal budget revenues in 2008 (EEG 2009) and the governments scope of manoeuvre is directly linked to the price of crude. On a larger scale the oil and gas sector is estimated to account for 20–25 per cent of GDP (Anker and Sonnerby 2008). The oil and gas sector also accounts for an important share of investment demand (World Bank 2008).

IEA oil projection to 2035 was for $125/barrel in real terms

Global oil demand grows by 7 mb/d to 2020 and exceeds 99 mb/d in 2035, by which time oil prices reach $125/barrel in real terms (over $215/barrel in nominal terms). A surge in unconventional and deepwater oil boosts non-OPEC supply over the current decade, but the world relies increasingly on OPEC after 2020. Iraq accounts for 45% of the growth in global oil production to 2035 and becomes the second-largest global oil exporter, overtaking Russia.

Oil demand was projected to increase by 14 percent between now and 2035.

Weaker economy and weak demographics could result in a loss of chunks of Siberia to China

Russia’s greatest geopolitical fear is fed by a very plausible scenario — China, populous and resource-hungry, taking over large chunks of Siberia, part of Russia’s failing and emptying East. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese have already crossed the border at the Amur River and set up trading settlements, intermarrying with Russians and Siberia’s native nomadic minorities. Russia has a nuclear arsenal with which to fend off formal threats to its sovereignty, but the demographic imbalance is to Russia’s disadvantage and could accelerate the economic shift in China’s favor. Russia’s far eastern outpost of Vladivostok is ever more distant from Moscow. Will it become a Russian enclave in a re-Sinofied “Outer Manchuria,” like Kaliningrad, 5,000 miles away on the Baltic Sea, a Soviet fragment stranded inside the European Union?

Prior to 1858, Primorye was part of the Qing Empire and known as Outer Manchuria

Primorye is a federal subject of Russia (a krai). Primorsky means "maritime" in Russian, hence the region is sometimes referred to as Maritime Province or Maritime Territory. Its administrative center is in the city of Vladivostok. The region's population is 1,956,497.

In 1858, Nikolay Muravyov-Amursky signed the Aigun Treaty with China, followed by the Beijing Treaty two years later. As a result of the two treaties the Sino-Russian border shifted south to the Amur and Ussuri Rivers; granting Russia full control of Primorye.

Primorskaya Oblast was established as the easternmost division of the Russian Empire in 1856. It included the territory of modern Primorsky Krai as well as the territories of modern Khabarovsk Krai and Magadan Oblast, stretching from Vladivostok to the Chukchi Peninsula in the far north.

The text of the treaty where Russia got control of Primorye. These were part of the same set of treaties where China was forced to lease out Hong Kong to the UK. China had Hong Kong returned in 1997.

Outer Manchuria is regarded by some Manchu, and for that matter Han Chinese, as territory that was unfairly taken away. However, outstanding boundary issues between China and Russia have been officially settled. Article 6 of the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship provides that the contracting parties, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, have no territorial claims.

As the Republic of China now based in Taiwan has never recognized the People's Republic of China or its border treaties with other countries, some Chinese maps published in Taiwan still consider the entire Heixiazi Island and the Sixty-Four Villages East of the Heilongjiang River to be Chinese territories, although these maps do show Outer Manchuria, sometimes called "lost territories in the Northeast (China)", to be Russian territory.

Could a vastly weaker Russia lose control of Siberia in some informal way.
Putin's term as president is to go to 2017. Putin is also getting older.
Other than Putin most Russian leaders have been relatively weak since the 1980s.
Even if formal control of that part of Siberia did not pass to China. Defacto control of those regions and Russia could be achieved through bribery of local officials, economic influence and economic dependence.
 
The crackdown against gay rights in Russia explained as a means of defining Russia as "Not the West". There are lots of other reasons to explain this turn of events; Russians are notoriously xenophobic and the gay population is both different enough to feel threatening, close enough to reach yet small and powerless enough to punish. The Islamic population of the "near abroad" is a different and much more dangerous group to unleash force on (even if that is probably the most frightening mid to long term issue among Russians), far better to leave that sleeping dog lie:

http://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamelder/why-russia-turned-against-the-gays

Why Russia Turned Against The Gays
Vladimir Putin’s new campaign for national — and political — survival.
posted on August 1, 2013 at 9:51pm EDT
Miriam Elder
BuzzFeed Staff

An anti-gay activist grabs a protester at an LGBT rights demonstration in central Moscow in May. Image by ANDREY SMIRNOV / Getty Images
Three months before Russia’s parliament unanimously passed a federal law banning the propaganda of “non-traditional relationships” — that is, same-sex ones — the bill’s sponsor went on the country’s most respected interview show to explain her reasoning.

“Analyzing all the circumstances, and the particularity of territorial Russia and her survival…I came to the conclusion that if today we want to resolve the demographic crisis, we need to, excuse me, tighten the belt on certain moral values and information, so that giving birth and raising children become fully valued,” lawmaker Yelena Mizulina told Vladimir Posner, Russia’s Charlie Rose.

Mizulina heads the Duma’s committee for family, women, and children and has become the stern face of Russia’s campaign against gays. But she would never call it that. Russia’s new laws — banning same-sex foreign couples from adopting Russian children in addition to banning LGBT advocacy — are part of the country’s very search for survival, according to her.

On the one hand, there’s its physical survival — Russia’s birthrate plummeted in the wake of the Soviet collapse and encouraging baby-making (through government grants as well as rhetoric) has been one of Vladimir Putin’s hallmarks. And then there’s its moral survival; if Russia is to survive as Russia it needs to reject the corrupting influences of the West.

The first form of reasoning is populist bluster. But the second goes some way toward explaining why Russia has stepped up its campaign against LGBT rights just as the European Union and the United States march in precisely the opposite direction. The violent images, restrictive legislation, and public humiliation that LGBT people in Russia now face isn’t the product of a traditionalist backlash as much as it is a vital part of the new politics of Putin’s Russia, a nation in search of someone to define itself against.

Homosexuality wasn’t really a topic of conversation in Russia for much of the last two decades. Laws banning gay sex were lifted in 1993, two years after the Soviet collapse. Slowly but surely, gay clubs began to appear in Moscow and St Petersburg, at first underground, eventually out in the open. Russian society remained widely homophobic, and there were many who saw gays and lesbians as an inevitable and evil Western import, but there were other things to worry about — recovering from the collapse of a political-economic system, clawing out of poverty, dealing with the explosion of violence that engulfed a country suddenly flowing with cash and corruption.

And then came Vladimir Putin.

Putin spent the first two terms of his presidency, from 2000 to 2008, ruling with no ideology. It was an explicit decision, his former campaign and political advisor Gleb Pavlovsky once told me, that took into account the fact that so many had grown tired of the empty shell that Communist doctrine had become by the end of Soviet times. Instead there would be Putin and just Putin. Putin and his bare chest. Putin-loving animals. Putin single-handedly building kindergartens and hospitals. Putin Putin Putin.

What that strategy didn’t take into account was that sometime, some day, someone would get sick of Putin. That finally happened late last year, when Putin announced he would return to the presidency following a four-year break as prime minister. A movement that largely comprised middle-class liberals took to the streets in the tens of thousands. It was a show of criticism that Putin thought would never come.

Part of his reaction has been reflexive and obvious to everyone — to launch a crackdown, arrest opposition leaders, arrest average protesters, adopt laws limiting future ability to protest. The second is more oblique: Putin has launched a campaign to shore up support in the Russian “heartland,” that mythical place far from the bustling streets of Moscow where headscarved peasants embrace core Russian concepts that don’t actually exist anymore.

In the absence of any ideology — any core belief to tie together the Russian state and nation — the easiest way to fill the vacuum has been by turning to the Russian Orthodox Church, a deeply corrupt, reactionary, and Kremlin-loving institution that has enjoyed a spike in support following the (atheist) Soviet Union’s collapse. Thus the arrest of Pussy Riot, the anti-Putin punk band whose members were sentenced to two years in prison for “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.” Thus the law passed by the Duma just hours after the anti-gay law was passed, making “insulting religious believers” an offense punishable by up to three years in jail.

The second easiest thing has been to demonize the “Other,” creating an internal enemy for everyone to fear. Jews are out — Putin, who values loyalty above all, has had an affinity for Jews since childhood, when he was reportedly saved from being beaten up by street kids by a Jewish neighbor. Migrants are out — Russia needs millions of them in order to carry out the mass infrastructure projects that the country needs to keep its economy afloat; and the nationalist card is simply too dangerous to play with anyway. Who’s left? Gays.

Demonizing gays allows Putin to tell the “heartland”: I will protect you and your “traditional” families; you are the real Russia. It also grows suspicion of the liberal opposition, presented as fundamentally “un-Russian” as they stand up increasingly for gay rights amid Putin’s growing crackdown. And finally, it allows Russia to do what it does best these days: present itself as Not The West.

It is no accident that Russia is stripping away gay rights as (popular and legal) support for gay marriage in the U.S. and Europe grows. The West is decadent, permissive, and doomed to orgiastic decline. As Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, recently put it: gay marriage is a “dangerous apocalyptic system” that leads a nation “on a path of self-destruction.”

And then there is Russia — not really standing for anything, but standing against a whole lot: gays, liberals, the West. It’s the strategy that Putin has chosen for his own survival.

“I think the most ridiculous questions come up during the decay of an empire,” said Anton Krasovsky, a prominent Russian journalist recently fired for being gay, when asked why the “gay question” had suddenly emerged in Russia. “It’s like when Judeo-Christians were fed to the lions in third-century Rome — it’s just the sunset of the empire.”
 
Although Mr Snowden provides the catalyst, the "hit" to Russo-American relations, which is outlined in this story which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail is, in reality, predicated on Russia's ongoing decline in pretty much every important measure:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/putin-isnt-just-humiliating-washington-hes-testing-it/article13621207/#dashboard/follows/
globe_logo.jpg

Putin isn’t just humiliating Washington – he’s testing it

AUREL BRAUN
Special to The Globe and Mail

Published Wednesday, Aug. 07 2013

Russia’s decision to grant temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, who has revealed vast documentation on U.S. intelligence gathering, speaks loudly both to Russian-American relations and Moscow’s domestic politics. What it especially tells us is that U.S. President Barack Obama’s policy of patient, deferential constructive engagements has basically failed.

Mr. Obama’s decision to press the “reset button” on relations with Moscow after Russia’s massive invasion of Georgia seemed to be a reasonable attempt to restore badly frayed relations, gain Russian co-operation on a variety of issues (from fighting terrorism to dealing with Iran, North Korea and various parts of the Middle East) and encourage Russia to return to the road of domestic democratization at a time when the Kremlin was clearly engaged in a major detour.

Had the plan worked even minimally, the Snowden imbroglio should have been easily resolvable. Instead, Mr. Putin has pulled the nationalism card and we have a major crisis.

Whatever noble goals Mr. Snowden may claim, the White House views his disclosures as an extremely grave breach and wants to see him stand trial. Let us not forget that the administration went so far as to have U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder promise the Kremlin that Mr. Snowden wouldn’t be executed or tortured. There is little doubt how badly it desires Mr. Snowden’s extradition.

The prism of the Snowden crisis, however, proves most revealing. We see Russia, which does not and cannot present a direct military threat, engaging nonetheless in risky international mischief, in addition to rampant domestic repression. Moreover, it’s doing so through odd domestic and international policy combinations that are ultimately damaging not only to the United States and the international system, but also to Russia itself.

Domestically, the repression has been combined with fantastical behaviour by Russian President Vladimir Putin. On one hand, media clampdowns, parliamentary and presidential elections largely viewed as fraudulent, trials for political opponents, draconian anti-gay laws, measures against human-rights organizations and accusations of political conspiracies. On the other, bizarre adventures such as Mr. Putin flying a light aircraft to guide rare cranes to their habitat, “finding” pre-positioned buried undersea treasures and catching gigantic pikes on programmed fishing expeditions.

It all leaves the impression that Mr. Putin magically floats above politics – an order that is both repressive and ridiculous, political magical realism that takes from Garcia Gabriel Marquez and Machiavelli.

In terms of foreign policy, it is true that Russia has co-operated to some extent on fighting terrorism and allowed U.S. transit flights to Afghanistan, although this was done out of self-interest and was quickly restricted whenever it impinged even minimally on the Kremlin’s concerns. However, Mr. Obama’s high hopes for Russian co-operation on the North Korean and Iranian threats have been regularly rebuffed. And Moscow’s continuing efforts to protect its Syrian client state, despite the killings of tens of thousands of civilians, shows how the Kremlin views Western democratic interests with undisguised contempt.

Mr. Obama, in his fifth year in power, has yet to exact any price for such deadly Russian obstruction – at best, confusing patience with fecklessness. In Mr. Putin’s eyes, the “reset button” has freed him to pursue his repressive policies at home and his mischievous ambitions abroad, without U.S. retaliation.

Whereas in 2001, George W. Bush risibly claimed that he looked Mr. Putin in the eye and was “able to get a sense of his soul,” Mr. Obama has simply acceded to the Russian leader’s games. American forbearance in these other matters has, in a sense, culminated in Mr. Putin’s cat-and-mouse game with Washington over the Snowden matter.

Mr. Putin isn’t just humiliating Washington – he’s testing it. If Mr. Obama is prepared to show that there are repercussions for gross Russian misbehaviour, next month’s G20 summit in St. Petersburg (and a possible follow-up meeting between the two presidents) presents an opportunity. At long last, Mr. Obama could send a corrective message by not attending.

Aurel Braun is Visiting Professor of Government at Harvard University and a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toronto. His most recent book is NATO-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.


The latest reports are that President Obama will attend the G8 in St Petersburg but he has nixed a bilateral meeting with Putin and will go to Sweden instead.

President Obama should propose, and Canada and I think Britain, too, would support expelling Russia from the G8 and the grounds that it is not a suitable member.

The Russians have two problems:

    1. The Russian people are catching on to the fact that the Russian government is corrupt and inept; and

    2. China remains, as always, a malevolent giant, pised on Russia's Eastern borders.

Russia is neither wholly European nor Asian but it needs to turn on way or the other, cap in hand.
 
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