Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Kirkhill]

    5. Question: Is there a "master plan" for a complete, mixed fleet of "heavies" with support ships, subamrines, tenders, training vessels and small combatants (1,000± tons) and even an
        "intermediate" class of ships like the UK proposal for the Black Swan class of ships?

Are there serving members that see value in the Black Swan approach? 

To wit:  3000 - 4000 tonne relocatable platforms, lightly manned, built to SOLAS standards, capable of maintaining a presence and being adapted to a variety of roles.

The 3000 - 4000 tonne range seems likely to improve the stability issues and the range of sea states in which operations can be conducted.

The small crew (as small as eight) would seem to reduce personnel issues - and with good Ship to Shore connectors permits the crew to be swapped on station.

Any serving champions for the concept?

 

[Infanteer]

Good thread, and maybe soon worthy of a split.

Are there serving members that see value in the Black Swan approach? 

I'll stick my hand up.  This comes from an Army Officer, so take it for what it's worth.

I like the Black Swan proposal for its general intent; something akin to the U.S. LCS that delivers joint force capability to project power abroad.  The paper correctly identifies the primary problem that we'll face, even when we have the Future Surface Combatant/SSC/whatever it is called this week.

However, these large combatants will be too few, too costly, too mission essential and most importantly too vulnerable to be risked in a contested littoral – although without an alternative they will have to be risked with the knowledge that they will probably take losses. Defence needs to escape its current predicament of escalating platform and personnel costs causing ever decreasing numbers,
which also lack the quality required to make them fit for task.

Our frigates will never be available in sufficient numbers to conduct the dirty tasks, like counter-mine warfare, that are essential for force projection.  I did some research in amphibious operations and it is apparent, despite big platforms costing so much in terms of manpower and resources, that navies often shed lesser platforms to sustain these capital ships.

To me, a primary problem is that joint force development rests (appropriately) in the hands of the Chief of Force Development is in the VCDS branch but that anything done here is diluted by the fact that the Army, Navy and Air Force all have their own force development organizations that, generally, follow single-service development.  This is, ironically, one of the reasons that spurred Unification in the 1960s.  Although a tank, a frigate or an F-35 produces some form of combat power or capability for Canada, I wonder how much more capability is gained through creating systems capable of joint force synergy.  A tank in Suffield, a Fighter in Bagotville or a Frigate in the middle of the blue ocean may not be as strategically useful as a small "Black Swan" with some UAVs and a company of soldiers on board.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Just a minor bicker about nautical terminology - 'sloop' is a term I've not heard applied navally recently, so I assume you're reaching for the right word. In sailing days, sloops-of-war were vessels smaller even than corvettes, so while we're coining terms this one may not be the right one. If what you want is a ship about the same size as a Kingston-class with more line-of-sight weapons, a bit more speed and a slightly larger crew to support continuous operations, 'corvette' is probably the right word.

In WWII a "sloop" was an ocean-going escort with 2 shafts, warship machinery and oriented towards AAW.

 

[kratz]

So, three pages on, are we agreed that:

    1. The MCDVs are anything but dead ~ they have useful roles, some of which they perform in an very efficient and effective manner, relative to the "heavies." Maybe they will have new kit and new roles, too;

    2. A wholly "reserve fleet" is on the way out. All ships will be crewed by whoever is available and qualified;

    3. NAVRES will need more and better training to do meet its full and fair share of the new role co-crewing the fleet;

    [snip]

FTFY

 

[Ostrozac]

Do members think one of the two (army or Navy) is a more "correct" model or reserve forces?

An equivalent army structure to the Navy Reserves would be if the battle group on high-readiness were to actually receive its full complement of reserve augmentation, posted, cost-moved and on Class B or Class C service for the two year period of high readiness. The problem in a peacetime army is that being posted to Petawawa or Shilo for two years with the prospect of probably not actually deploying overseas is not too attractive a job to a reservist, and even if we were to develop "career reservists" the way the navy has, we have five force generation bases that we would have to keep moving guys between.

The navy seems to have a good thing going with their naval reservists -- it seems to work for them. But a peacetime navy based out of Halifax and Esquimalt still sails around and does interesting things. A peacetime army is training and waiting for the next mission.

 

[Navy_Pete]

To me, a primary problem is that joint force development rests (appropriately) in the hands of the Chief of Force Development is in the VCDS branch but that anything done here is diluted by the fact that the Army, Navy and Air Force all have their own force development organizations that, generally, follow single-service development.  This is, ironically, one of the reasons that spurred Unification in the 1960s.  Although a tank, a frigate or an F-35 produces some form of combat power or capability for Canada, I wonder how much more capability is gained through creating systems capable of joint force synergy.  A tank in Suffield, a Fighter in Bagotville or a Frigate in the middle of the blue ocean may not be as strategically useful as a small "Black Swan" with some UAVs and a company of soldiers on board.

Personally, I would prefer greater integration with the army for operations.  OP HESTIA in Haiti was a good example; I know ATH and maybe HAL as well picked up a platoon in Jamaica and shuttled them in, then provided some logistic support (like water).  They weren't designed for it though, but something similar to the Black Swan concept would be perfectly suited for that.  Also then we'd be less likely to be toting around a 'Land Forces Support Radio' that uses a frequency range the army abandoned in the 90s.

If they had gone down with a supply ship as well (PRE was in refit), they could have easily deployed a fair bit of manpower and had a good sized mobile supply depot on hand, and a half dozen helos, plus the RIBs/landing crafts would have been available for movement.

Adapting that to a warzone doesn't really involve much more.  You'd want one or two ships capable of air defence to protect the tanker.  If the Black Swan were fitted with a reasonable sized gun, they could also provide fire support.  Of course, if there was a USN Arleigh Burke ship along with you they'd have a ridiculous number of missiles onboard as well.

The one big thing changing in the newer ships is that they are modular.  So aside from your core crew, each different load out would come with it's own operators, so you could have two ships in the same class doing different jobs, but keeping some similar core capabilities.

If nothing else, it'd be nice to be able to better support the army when they are fighting a ground war or otherwise off somewhere miserable.  Joined the mob because I wanted to do something more meaningful then improving someone's widget factory.  While it's been a lot of fun, sailing around with stops in Boston, NY, Edinburgh etc while friends are getting shot at doesn't really fill me with a sense of accomplishment.

 

[Underway]

So, three pages on, are we agreed that:

        3. NAVRES will need more and better training to do its full and fair share of co-crewing the fleet;

   

I would disagree with #3.  Due to this sailing time and the "total force" training concept the NAVRES is pretty far along to meeting platform augmentation.  Its more a platform famil that needs to happen.  MARS for example have nearly identical training for through the Naval Officer Training Centre.  Its the platform experience and sailing time that creates the division, (and eventually the class A vs Class C division).  But at the SLt level going to their first ship all MARS officers are essentially equal.  The same could be said to varying degree's for Bosn, Navcom, and probably NCIOp at the AB-LS level.  MESO is the problem child most definitely but I do believe that the focus will be on making them roundsmen qualified to start. 

As a matter of fact I know plenty of PRes MARS who operated as 2OOW or NAVO for a heavy, and the same for LS Bosn, and Navcom who backfilled on the Protector or the Algonquin.  I think its the positions and pers management as well as promotion requirements beyond LS that will have to change more so than the initial trades training.

5. Question: Is there a "master plan" for a complete, mixed fleet of "heavies" with support ships, subamrines, tenders, training vessels and small combatants (1,000± tons) and even an
        "intermediate" class of ships like the UK proposal for the Black Swan class of ships?

Yes there is a master plan.  Canada First Defence Strategy, Leadmark 2020 , and Horizon 2050 (and associated documents relating to the three).The Canadian Navy maritime strategy doesn't have a place for a 3000 tonne or below ship aside from MCDV's which have a very specific role.  The Navy believes that to be an effective warship in the Northern latitudes the minimum floor for tonnage is 3500+ tonnes, preferably. 

The core of the navy is the task group 1 AAD destroyer, 1 AOR, frigates, subs and attached air as required.  Building lighter escorts will do things the navy doesn't want IMHO.

1.  Create more ships that we can't crew properly.
2.  Cause us to loose out on proper (read 5000+ tonnes) warships because we are spending limited funds on smaller less effective platforms.
3.  Similar to above - maintenance on more ships - limited funds again.
4.  It follows that if we make less capable ships then we loose certain abilities to implement gov't policy - make us more of a Rank 4-5 navy vice the Rank 3 navy we are now.
5.  Canadian military procurement politics - ask for what you really need, because if the gov't sees smaller cheaper ships guess what they will build instead (read losing out on 6-12 frigates because of the Mulroney nuclear submarine discussion)

Essentially being that North America is an island continent would a 3000 tonne frigate be able to sail around to worldly hotspots and do what it needs to do?  This is the same question that killed the Black Swan project, and the Global Corvette project for the UK.  They would rather place their money on the 5400 tonne Type 26 frigate.

What the Navy needs to do its job it's already requesting and almost everything will be built.  What the navy believes it needs to do its job as the gov't has directed and previous operational experience has shown is the following.

3 Area Air Defence and C2 ships (aka destroyer replacements) 5000-7000 tonnnes
12 General purpose combat ships (aka frigates) 5000-7000 tonnes
2-3 AOR's (going to get two most likely)
6-8 AOPS
6-12 MCDV's
2 Dive units
organic air (cyclone, UAV's)
4-6 submarines
Maritime patrol aircraft of some sort
and
1-2 amphibious troop carrying ship (never going to happen but its what we need)

*edit to fix grammar/format*

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
Essentially being that North America is an island continent would a 3000 tonne frigate be able to sail around to worldly hotspots and do what it needs to do?  This is the same question that killed the Black Swan project, and the Global Corvette project for the UK.  They would rather place their money on the 5400 tonne Type 26 frigate.
...

Thanks for that informative response, Underway; the quoted bit makes very good sense to me.

Am I correct in saying that you see an ongoing requirement for a 1,000± ton vessel ~ a requirement that sees a need for 6 to twelve replacements twenty or so years from now?

 

[Kirkhill]

Does your General Purpose Frigate (5000 to 7000 tonnes) include space and displacement for an 1000 m2 mission bay from which boats can be launched, accomodation for 40 (140 overload) PAX and a flight deck big enough to land a Chinook? 

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/global-combat-ship-gcs-programme/

 

[Underway]

Does your General Purpose Frigate (5000 to 7000 tonnes) include space and displacement for an 1000 m2 mission bay from which boats can be launched, accomodation for 40 (140 overload) PAX and a flight deck big enough to land a Chinook? 

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/global-combat-ship-gcs-programme/

I don't know.  The design is 3-7 years away, planning is ongoing for the AAD version.  As they will have the same hull and probably the same sensor package (APAR and SMART-L) the tonnage will be similar.  Judging by the way the wind is blowing I'm thinking 6000 or so. That's more tonnage than both the current destroyers and frigates by a significant margin.  With the Halifax design add in 1000 tonnes and you have a bucket load of space relatively speaking. If you can do it with the GCS at only an extra 400 tonnes over the current platforms then why not with an even heavier platform?  I suppose its all about what you want to do with the platform?  Though this is a discussion for another thread.  I think you should start one Kirkhill, we can bash away at each other with ideal ship design and fleet mixes all day.  ;D

Thanks for that informative response, Underway; the quoted bit makes very good sense to me.

Am I correct in saying that you see an ongoing requirement for a 1,000± ton vessel ~ a requirement that sees a need for 6 to twelve replacements twenty or so years from now?

I'm assuming you are referring to MCDV replacements and that is an interesting question.  I see a requirement, depending on current tech.  What have the MCDV's been used for operationally and what is their future role?
a. Officer/navigation training, Reserve training
b. support whole of navy training operations (aka help other ships with their workups by pretending to be a bad guy etc....)
c. OGD support operations -  fishpats, SAR zone coverage, security, Olympics etc...
d.  mine counter measures
e.  advanced route survey
f.  command development platforms
g. inshore support for continental operations - OP CARIBBE, Swissair,
h.  trialing new equipment (Scaneagle, remote .50 cal gun system etc...)

Lots of these roles are already being surplanted by new platforms, or can be done better by other organizations.  Everything but "d", "e" and "g" can be done by the AOPS or ORCA's effectively.  "c" can be done better by the Coast Guard for the most part. The Hero Class for example might be excellent for this.  MCM can be done off of just about any ship as the Fleet Dive Units use UUV's and their staff to hunt and destroy mines.  You can do it off a barge,  a dive tender or a frigate if you want fairly easily (depending of course on sea state).  In 15 years will route survey UUV's be advanced enough that we don't need to tow behind a ship?  What kind of "continental operations" are required?  Whats the threat environment like?  Will the gov't have different requirements?

The main argument in support of the MCDV's and their potential replacements is that they are CHEAP TO OPERATE in crew, fuel and maintenance.  They give the navy a cost effective answer to many questions and problems, allowing them to meet their domestic and continental requirements without sending a big expensive heavy.  If new ships are built to replace the MCDV's they will be built to slightly modified civilian standards, they will go faster with better seakeeping than the MCDV's, and will have a modern naval gun (prob similar to the AOPS).  If they can keep position statically (azimuth and bow thrusters) and hold a few ISO containers then we have a winner of a design.  But I certainly don't see a much more capable replacement combat power wise.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't know.  The design is 3-7 years away, planning is ongoing for the AAD version.  As they will have the same hull and probably the same sensor package (APAR and SMART-L) the tonnage will be similar.  Judging by the way the wind is blowing I'm thinking 6000 or so. That's more tonnage than both the current destroyers and frigates by a significant margin.  With the Halifax design add in 1000 tonnes and you have a bucket load of space relatively speaking. If you can do it with the GCS at only an extra 400 tonnes over the current platforms then why not with an even heavier platform?  I suppose its all about what you want to do with the platform?  Though this is a discussion for another thread.  I think you should start one Kirkhill, we can bash away at each other with ideal ship design and fleet mixes all day.  ;D

Ample opportunity for the mutual bashing on a multitude of other threads Underway.  ;D

I'm just figuring that in the absence of a decent supply of BHSs (1 ain't the number I'm thinking of) then the least we can do is make sure that we supply an array of lily pads, or step stones, across which muddy boots can bounce.  Instead of trying to get a whole Med/Hvy Battle Group on the ground in a month what could be done with Light Forces in the meantime?

They may not be able to skip Leos across decks but there is a pile of other gear that would come in useful that would fit in the same space you guys might carry UUVs, Boats and UAVs - or sweeping gear or hunting gear etc.

And with a big enough flight deck - well at least you could get your Timmies delilvered by the bucket load. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
The main argument in support of the MCDV's and their potential replacements is that they are CHEAP TO OPERATE in crew, fuel and maintenance.  They give the navy a cost effective answer to many questions and problems, allowing them to meet their domestic and continental requirements without sending a big expensive heavy.  If new ships are built to replace the MCDV's they will be built to slightly modified civilian standards, they will go faster with better seakeeping than the MCDV's, and will have a modern naval gun (prob similar to the AOPS).  If they can keep position statically (azimuth and bow thrusters) and hold a few ISO containers then we have a winner of a design.  But I certainly don't see a much more capable replacement combat power wise.

Which, it seems to me, is a very good argument for replacing them circa 2030. And given the sorts of tasks you outlined, do they need to be "more capable, combat power wise?"

 

[Underway]

do they need to be "more capable, combat power wise?"

Giving them a modern naval gun of the 25-30mm variety and a modern EO/IR targeting capability would be a massive leap in combat power over the current 40mm WWII Bofors.  Combat equipment is as we know is the most expensive addition to a ship.  If you upgrade the weapons then you have to upgrade the sensors as well and then you start running up costs.  Then crewing gets bigger, etc... and before you know it you have a ship that isn't cheap anymore.  That being said is still might be cheap-ER and that would be ok. 

 

[Bearpaw]

Would the Oerlikon Millennium 35 mm Naval Revolver Gun System be considered?

Bearpaw

 

[Navy_Pete]

Pretty sure the 40mm is on the way out and to be replaced with a few .50 cal mounts.  Makes more sense given their actual use and they are common equipment so it's cost effective in the age of bring your own stationary.

I guess one thing to make a distinction about is draught; large or small ships can both be relatively deep or shallow and that has a much greater impact or AoO then displacement.  Both of the USN littoral ships are listed as being less then 15', so they can get a lot closer to shore then most general purpose ships.  Really depends what you want to do with it; they new RN type 45s are around 8000 tonnes, primarily because of the top heavy Gizmo like radar on top of the mast.

They may want to get around to updating their ConOps for the existing fleet though before they look at the future fleet; the ORCAs for example are designed for a crew doing day sails and alongside every night, were they are actually out for a week at a time.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Another question: what about the M242 Bushmaster/Mk 38 as "a modern naval gun of the 25-30mm variety?" My google search says it is used on ships by many navies.

Mk 38 25mm Machine Gun System

US Navy 111231-N-KS651-967 A Mk 38 MOD 2 25mm machine gun system aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor

We already know the Bushmaster in the Canadian Army, and it is in fairly common naval use, including as "main armament" for the Republic of Singapore's minesweepers and on their coast guard's new patrol vessels.

Singapore's Bedok mine countermeasures vessels, mounting a Mk 38 Typhoon 25mm Bushmaster based gun system

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I roughly calculated $50,000 to arm a CCG ship with 2 .50cals, mounts, spare bits, lockers, comms and crew gear. The bushmaster would likely be 3x that for 1 mount.


The nice thing about the .50 is that all the training could be done through the normal crew cycle and pay for a Navy guy to come and teach onboard, with meals and quarters onboard.

 

[Kirkhill]

How about adding something like the Mirador to the MCDV?

Wouldn't it serve for general situational awareness, navigation, low visibility conditions and fire direction (especially if weapons (12.7 or 25 mm) were mounted on remote weapons mounts)?

 

[AlexanderM]

They should be well armed.  Look at the Rasmussen design, which I expect would fit into our budget, it's armed with a 76mm main gun and can carry modules for ESSM's and ASW.  Just my opinion, but this is the minimum we should be looking at.  I'd like to stretch that design a bit and add a hanger, so it could carry a small to medium sized helicopter, doesn't have to carry a Cyclone.

 

[Edward Campbell]

They should be well armed.  Look at the Rasmussen design, which I expect would fit into our budget, it's armed with a 76mm main gun and can carry modules for ESSM's and ASW.  Just my opinion, but this is the minimum we should be looking at.  I'd like to stretch that design a bit and add a hanger, so it could carry a small to medium sized helicopter, doesn't have to carry a Cyclone.

I'm leaning towards the two platform solution: n "heavies" and n1 small combatants, plus AORs, submarines, tenders and training vessels, for the reasons Underway gave. The justification for the small combatants is, as he said, "they are CHEAP TO OPERATE in crew, fuel and maintenance.  They give the navy a cost effective answer to many questions and problems, allowing them to meet their domestic and continental requirements without sending a big expensive heavy."

It seems to me that if you arm them too well and make them big enough to carry a helicopter that we are:

    1. At the point of buying a 3,500 ton ships which we don't really need; and

    2. Devoid of CHEAP alternatives to the "heavies."

I would, I think, prefer to see the MCDV upgraded, just enough, and a replacement designed that is:

    1. In the 1,000± ton range, say less than 1,500 tons;

    2. Is stabilized so that it can "fly" UAVs;

    3. Is lightly armed with a modern 25-30mm main gun and some machine guns;

    4. Is built to mine counter measure standards - whatever that means in hull material, etc; but

    5. Is also built to "slightly modified civilian standards;"

    6. Has a crew of about 30 to 50 all ranks, which, I think, limits how many sophisticated systems the vessel can carry; and

    7. Can be reconfigured (using ISO containers) for different missions.

Re: the "heavies." Can we not have the same hull and engine with several different configurations: general purpose frigate, AAW frigate, C2 ship, and, even, a few of Kirkhill's "lily pads," ships able to deploy with, say, a company of light infantry on board?

In my perfect world we have three or four AORs, with helicopters, several submarines (several is more than three), 16 to 20 "heavies," all with helicopters, six to ten small combatants, flying UAVs, and several tenders, training vessels and so on. That sort of mix is, I believe, affordable - but not, I think, possible within the budgetary constraints imposed by the Canada First Defence Stratgey - and would be strategically effective, too, giving our government a global reach and a mix of options.