Making “3D” Work

[ruxted]

Link to original article on ruxted.ca

Making “3D” Work

By now most Canadians have heard that Canada is pursuing a 3D – Defence, Diplomacy and Development – strategy in Afghanistan. In an April 2004 speech at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, NB, Prime Minister Paul Martin explained Canada’s 3D strategy in Afghanistan as:

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“Canada’s role in Afghanistan has all the hallmarks of the new type of operation the Canadian Forces will be expected to lead: it’s a multilateral mission authorized by the United Nations and led by NATO; undertaken at the invitation of the Afghan government, and aimed at reviving a failing state, for humanitarian reasons and at the same time ensuring that it cannot be used as a base of operations for terrorists.

Elements of defence, diplomacy and development are woven tightly together as part of the mission. The Canadian Forces, for example, provide the security that, in turn, allows organizations like Canada’s International Development Agency to support Afghanistan’s election process and democratic development.

This ‘3-D’ approach – the integration of diplomacy, defence and development – will serve as the model for Canada’s involvement in international crises in the future – crises that will take many forms. For instance, multilateralism is clearly our preferred approach to resolving international crises. But the absence of international consensus must never condemn us to inaction.”
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In The Ruxted Group’s view only one D, Defence, is working; and we are not convinced it’s working as well as it could.

We are believers in the 3D strategy. Our studies and personal experiences tell us that this is the way to go.

3D is not new. In some respects it is a logical Canadian response to another “three”: The Three Block War, conceived by USMC General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s. The Three Block War concept says we have to: “...  deliver humanitarian aid or assist others in doing that ... conduct stabilization or peace support operations ... [and] we will be engaged in a high-intensity fight.” The link is not exact, but the transformation process, in which many military forces, including Canada’s, are engaged, accepts many of The Three Block War premises.

But many Canadians sought something akin to 3D long before General Krulak offered his theory. Many a frustrated peacekeeper, going all the way back to the 1950s, saw the need for more and better coordination of military force, political action and development assistance or nation building. In the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s Canada was inching towards something like 3D in its engagements in the Middle East and Africa. However, 3D requires a set of commitments, in foreign policy and in politics, which fell by the wayside in the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s as we turned away from the world and focused our political energies on our internal problems.

We are back on the world’s stage in a situation ideally suited for our 3D strategy.

A good 3D strategy requires commitment from all partners: the military, the foreign affairs team, including international aid and trade staffs, and other agencies like the police and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To date, it appears to Ruxted that while the various commitments, per se, may be there they are, at best, poorly applied.

This is a counterinsurgency campaign and must be fought as such. Winning “hearts and minds” rather than eliminating “bad guys” is the key to victory. Victory for Canada is, as we told the Manley Commission achieved when “the people of Afghanistan can make their own decisions in their own way, even when they decide on policies with which we disagree – always bearing in mind that Canada, and the world, cannot accept a country's decision to turn itself into a base for aggressive war. The victory conditions will be achieved when the Afghans can elect a government – even if it is a government which we do not much like. The victory conditions will be achieved when the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police(ANP) are able to contain insurgencies – home-grown and foreign.”

Canada need not defeat the Taliban and their fellow travellers. We must prevent them from defeating the Afghan National Army so that the people of Afghanistan can make their own choices without duress. We want the Afghan people to choose “our” solution, which we believe leads towards peace, prosperity, equality and justice for all. We need the Afghan people to buy into our solution – we need to ensure that what we offer is more appealing than what the Taliban offers. We must help the lawful Government of Afghanistan and the ANA provide security, safety and some measures of prosperity and hope for a better future.

Militarily, we must teach the ANA how to win a counterinsurgency campaign and then stand, shoulder to shoulder, with them while they do it. Then we need to help the ANP learn to maintain the peace in communities. We, ourselves, may need to revisit the principles of counterinsurgency warfare.

There is, as there ought to be, a debate within military circles about objectives and methods. Canada’s generals know what needs doing; they will figure out how to do it, too.

Diplomatically, we need to get at the illegal drug trade – it appears to us, as it does to others, that the American led “war on drugs” is failing in Afghanistan, too. We have to find alternatives to allow Afghan farmers to put food on their tables from their poor, dry farms. Equally, we need to get at our enemies’ money – in banks in Tehran, Tokyo and Toronto – by fair means and foul.

There is need and room for improvement in the first two “Ds,” Defence and Diplomacy, but nowhere, in our view, is the poor application of 3D more evident than in Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which is responsible for Development.

By way of examples: Early in 2007 the Senate of Canada recommended that:

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“Given the failure of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Africa over the past 38 years to make an effective foreign aid difference, the Government of Canada should conduct an immediate review of whether or not this organization should continue to exist in its present non-statutory form. If it is to be abolished, necessary Canadian development staff and decision-making authority should be transferred to Department of Foreign Affairs and Internal Trade.”1
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And: In a recent report the Senlis Council, in response to a CIDA invitation to review it work, explained how CIDA failed at one of the most basic ‘development’ tasks:

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“CIDA distinguishes between several types of internally displaced persons including: ‘battle-affected displaced persons’, ‘drought-affected displaced persons’, and ‘security affected displaced persons’ to name some examples.

‘Displaced people’ and ‘refugees’ have several things in common: They are Afghan citizens who live in camps away from the villages that were home for many generations, they have few or no belongings and cobble together shelter from garbage, discarded sheet metal, vinyl tarps etc., they are generally unemployed and have no prospects for work, and virtually none of them know where their next meal will come from or when.

CIDA says it has funded food for work programs that have proven effective means for providing meaningful work and sustenance to some families in some camps. However the locations and other details of these programs remain unavailable. Also, many camps have yet to receive aid and will not because of their category of displacement or homelessness. If a camp is forced to exist long enough through lack of development initiative (and some camps have endured since the invasion following September 11, 2001) there is a tendency to rename them ‘settlements’. Such a move then places these people camping in the desert outside of the responsibility of CIDA-funded partners such as the UN’s World Food Program (WFP); in this way these people are placed by WFP under the auspices of the local government.

This is disastrous in contemporary Kandahar because the local government is not developed enough to accept responsibility and doesn’t necessarily agree with foreigners’ interpretations of ‘settlement’ vs. ‘camp’.

The bottom line: this group of Afghan people who are unemployed, homeless, hungry or starving, sick and injured, etc., are not eligible to receive aid – they fall through the very large CIDA bureaucratic cracks.”2
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Regardless of defining who are displaced persons and refugees, these examples provide ample evidence, in Ruxted’s view, that CIDA is not doing what it must to make 3D work. CIDA’s problems appear to be consistent institutional ineptitude across the years, even decades, regardless of the political affiliation of the minister concerned. That failure threatens the entire 3D strategy.

We believe that an effective 3D strategy will work, indeed must work in Afghanistan and we agree with former Prime Minister Martin that it should be how we plan to operate in the future. But we must reform the Development arm.

To begin: CIDA should be folded back into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) as the development aid funding arm, not a programme delivery organization. CIDA’s staff should be Ottawa based; a few may need to travel, now and again, to audit projects, etc.

Next: DFAIT, mainly, but DND, frequently, and other government departments, occasionally, should receive development aid funds (from CIDA) for specific projects (perhaps a telecom renewal project in one country) or programmes (an interlinked series of projects in another, à la Afghanistan).

Then: DND, specifically, should then hire private sector groups (Canadian and foreign – some humanitarian service agencies, some engineering/logistical firms) to deliver the projects or (perhaps using a prime contractor and sub-contractors) complete programmes.

Finally: DFAIT/CIDA and the Auditor General of Canada should audit projects and programmes for both appropriate (authorized, etc) spending and performance.

The Ruxted Group does NOT want the Canadian Forces turned into some sort of development aid organization. In our view the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept is too military now – although, given the security situation in Kandahar, that’s understandable. We would prefer to see those military personnel who are not providing security in a handful of management and contract award/payment functions rather than doing the work themselves. We recognize that until it is safe enough for civilian contractors and NGO workers to do much, the soldiers will have to do almost everything which is to be done.

In a counterinsurgency campaign the management team (a very senior civil servant and an equally senior military officer) need to direct military operations, development and aid money towards projects which enhance their overall goal: winning hearts and minds.

It is time for the Government of Canada to get back on board – back to something like Prime Minister Martin’s vision and make all three Ds work.

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1. Smith, The Utility of Force, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007
2. Report - http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fore-e/rep-e/repafrifeb07-e.pdf - page, 97
3. Report - http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/publications/025_publication/documents/CIDA_Unanswered_questions - pages 9/10

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, are two pieces – an article by award winning journalist/war correspondent and author Christie Blatchford and an editorial - from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080114.wblatchford14/BNStory/specialComment

'Bureaucratic jealousy' threatens military team

CHRISTIE BLATCHFORD

From Monday's Globe and Mail
January 14, 2008 at 4:00 AM EST

Canada's smallest and arguably most influential group in Afghanistan is under the gun and may be at risk of being disbanded.

The Strategic Advisory Team or SAT, now in its third iteration, is a group of about 20 high-level military planners who are embedded in the country's fledgling government in Kabul.

Composed of senior Canadian Forces personnel - they are French and English, male and female and from the navy, air force and army - the SAT members work intimately with Afghans trying to build or rebuild institutions of the frail Afghan state.

But diplomats - reportedly led by Canada's ambassador to Afghanistan, Arif Lalani - have convinced senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and in Prime Minister Stephen Harper's office that the team should be shut down at the end of the year, The Globe and Mail has learned.

Indeed, when Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion and deputy party leader Michael Ignatieff were in Kabul for their surprise weekend visit to Afghanistan, they spent time at the Canadian embassy but were not taken the few steps to the SAT headquarters right next door.

Ironically, while in Afghanistan the two senior Liberals called for an end to Canada's combat role in violent Kandahar province and for more non-combat efforts, yet didn't meet the one group that has for three years led the way in some of those very areas.

Indeed, Globe sources say diplomats are urging Mr. Harper's government to act swiftly, pre-empting the release of the report of the Manley commission, the panel headed by former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley that is to advise Mr. Harper on the shape of Canadian efforts in Afghanistan once the current mandate expires in February, 2009.

The panel is to report to Mr. Harper by the end of this month, and military insiders say they expect that the report likely will refer favourably to the SAT.

Mr. Manley's panel was in Afghanistan late last fall, and sources say its members found the SAT briefing they received much more useful and informed than the one they got from Canadian diplomats.

"At bottom, at the crassest level, this is about bureaucratic jealousy between departments," retired army colonel Mike Capstick, the head of the first SAT, told The Globe yesterday in a telephone interview from his Calgary home.

Mr. Capstick said the efforts to do in the SAT are the culmination of long-standing bitterness from senior officials at Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency.

When the SAT was first formally set up by Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier in August of 2005, Canada's then-ambassador to Afghanistan Chris Alexander and Nipa Banerjee, then CIDA's head of aid for Afghanistan, were instrumental in helping him determine where the military planners should focus their efforts, Mr. Capstick said, and were enormously helpful.

But Mr. Alexander moved on to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, where he now works as a UN deputy special representative, and Ms. Banerjee left CIDA in 2006 after three years in Afghanistan.

The SAT concept had its roots in a small group of senior Canadian officers Gen. Hillier, then commander of the International Security Assistance Force to Afghanistan, had lent Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2004. When Gen. Hillier returned as the chief of staff of the Canadian Forces the next year, Mr. Karzai famously asked him, "Whatever happened to those guys who were always around?"

Gen. Hillier asked if the President wanted more of them, and when he said he did, the first formal SAT team was born. It included a CIDA contract officer, Andy Tamas, who was initially skeptical about how soldiers would manage the collaborative thinking traditional in the development field.

Mr. Tamas, who has more than three decades of development work under his belt, quickly became a convert, once saying, "The impact of their effort is plain as day. There's no doubt at all that it's very, very important. If what's needed to counter the insurgents is a functioning government, this [the SAT team] is probably the best return on investment that Canada or any other military is making."

Ms. Banerjee, now a teacher at the University of Ottawa's graduate school of public and international affairs who returns to Afghanistan four times a year, was similarly dubious at the start.

"I'd never met an army person," she told The Globe yesterday. "In Canada, the army is invisible. I wasn't comfortable at first, but I decided I would try my best. And the army people were so co-operative.

"Civilians say they [soldiers] don't understand development, but I found they understand it better than many of us."

Ms. Banerjee also chalks up the internal efforts to disband the SAT to internecine jealousies, saying that because its members work on a daily basis with Afghans, "the army has access" that diplomats don't.

The Canadians on the small team are embedded in three key areas: with the Afghan National Development Strategy and an 18-member working group of Afghans; in the civil service commission (where they are helping locals to build a public service); and in President Karzai's office.

and​

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080115.weafghanistan15/BNStory/specialComment/home

Globe editorial

Put real civilians in these positions

From Tuesday's Globe and Mail
January 15, 2008 at 7:38 AM EST

By all accounts, the Canadian military's Strategic Advisory Team has played a productive role in Afghanistan. Members of the SAT, a group of about 20 military planners, have been embedded with the Afghan bureaucracy and leadership since 2005. The team, established by Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, has been assisting government departments, cabinet ministers and even the office of President Hamid Karzai. Dressed as civilians, and doing the work of civilians, these military officers have distinguished themselves in helping to build civil institutions in the war-ravaged country. To fulfill their mission, however, they should pass the job on to real civilians.

If there is a lesson Canada should be providing to Afghanistan's fledgling democracy, it is that the senior public service advisers to the government should not be military officers. More than that, they should not be foreign military officers. That seems to be understood by the team, insofar as they seek to mix in with local officials not only by wearing civvies but, at least one report says, by growing beards and allowing their hair to exceed the military's usual hair guidelines. But it is not enough that such advisers look like civilians. They need to be civilians.

By any standard, the SAT's mission is an unusual one for the military. Justified during the chaotic and transitional early days of the efforts to build democratic governmental institutions, the persistence of military officers in high-level advisory jobs several years on has the potential to harm the legitimacy of the Karzai government by casting them as toadies of an occupying army. There are also considerations with respect to the nature of the advice being given; witness the military's advice on detainee policy when it got a chance to perform the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

The Globe's Christie Blatchford reported on Monday that Canadian diplomats have convinced officials at DFAIT and in the Prime Minister's Office to end the SAT's mission by the end of the year. There are suspicions that the push is intended to pre-empt the results of John Manley's report on the future of the Afghan mission. It is also suggested by some defenders of the SAT that internecine battles with other, civilian agencies of the Canadian government are responsible for the moves to shut the team down. Both are likely true. But regardless of the motivation behind any moves to end the mission, the decision is the right one. For all their talents, Canada's soldiers are best equipped to soldier.

I agree with the basic premise of the Good Grey Globe’s editorial: civilian advisory positions should be filled by civilians – just as soon as we have enough high quality volunteers ready and able to do the job. I doubt there are enough in the Public Service of Canada to fill one roto. As has been reported by e.g. Janice Gross-Stein and Eugene Lang in The Unexpected War, the Canadian Foreign Service appears to be far, far better at process than at policy – and it is unlikely that the rest of the public service is markedly better than DFAIT. By all accounts and according to the observers cited by Blatchford the Canadian military people are doing what needs to be done – the right way, the first time.

We (Canada and, by extension all Canadian) are fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan; our mission is (or should be) to allow the legitimate Government of Afghanistan to govern in a way that permits the Afghan people to make their own decisions about their own country (even ones we may not like) in their own ways (which is almost certainly not going to be through any sort of liberal-democratic processes) without undue fear for their lives and property. The SAT is a key element in this mission. We cannot afford, at this juncture, to start ”on the job training” for a bunch of careerist bureaucrats who appear to fear that military success will damage their prospects for promotion.

I’m sure there is an intense political campaign (inside the greenbelt office politics) being waged in Ottawa right now. Prime Minister Harper should be able to see through it and do the right thing and do things right, too, by leaving the military SAT in operation for the next few years.

 

[GAP]

The fate of SAT is probably going to depend on how much support Manley gives it, otherwise the intercine warfare among departments will convince the government to shut it down.

 

[Good2Golf]

Disappointing news at best. 

Unbelieveable that the issue is being polarized into military personnel doing civilians' work.  Wearing civilian attire (jacket and tie) to respect the sensitivities of the Afghan Government while they are assisted, in no way implies that it should be civilians doing the job the SAT does.  The SAT provides comprehensive strategic planning assistance to the Afghan Government, i.e. how to plan and implement robust plans to address the rebuilding and developmental challenges.  Such a capability was badly broken under Soviet administration of the government during the period of Soviet influence and occupation.  Note that military personnel providing generic strategic planning assistance has nothing to do with combat operations -- it is helping the Afghans develop their own strategic planning capability (i.e. beyond planning for getting next weeks food and clothing)  Such advising is not at all the same as conducting Diplomatic work (which the Government of Canada does through DFAIT and the Ambassador) or Developmental work (which CIDA does, with the PRT's assistance in Kandahar province.)

I am sceptical, to say the least, at what a squad of mandarins from DFAIT would achieve...but hey, why not give it a try?  Let's just establish meaningful performance metrics before the changeover so we can see how well/poorly the change affects the continued development of the Afghan government.

G2G

 

[Edward Campbell]

I am of the opinion that DFAIT needs a thorough, major overhaul before it can be trusted to do anything right.

It has been emasculated, over and over again ever since 1967. Trudeau started the process of debasing the human currency upon which that department, especially, depends. Mulroney and Chrétien, for their own reasons continued the process.

CIDA is, in my opinion worse. It was created by the old External Affairs Oxbridge elite to comply, in letter rather than spirit, with Trudeau's order to Frenchify the foreign service. They set up a Québec based, Québec staffed agency with a mandate to use tied aid to benefit Québec companies – for some time (until circa 1975) that satisfied Trudeau and his inner circle. CIDA has never, I think developed an ethos that is, in any way, tied to its purported role.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is more, in the form of a web comment from LCol George Petrolekas, a member of the original SAT:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080116.wcomment0116/BNStory/Afghanistan/home

Web-exclusive comment

In Afghanistan, our rivalries conspire to make a great nation small

GEORGE PETROLEKAS

Special to Globe and Mail Update
January 16, 2008 at 12:54 AM EST

On Monday, the Globe and Mail broke the story of interdepartmental conflict threatening Canada's Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) in Kabul, arguably the most influential contribution that Canada has made to Afghanistan. What a shame that limited vision and bureaucratic pettiness have apparently conspired to jeopardize this contribution.

The Achilles heel to good governance in Afghanistan is the limitations of the Afghan civil service savaged by circumstance from being efficient and incorrupt. Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier saw this in 2004 and dispatched strategic planners to pass on to Afghan officials the best practices that we, in Canada, take for granted. It was hoped that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would rise to the challenge itself, but, if not, President Hamid Karzai requested that Gen. Hillier, whom the President affectionately calls "my general," might help.

Former ambassador Chris Alexander, along with his key staff and high-ranking NATO officials whom I met to confirm Mr. Karzai's request, were unequivocal in endorsing the plan. Yet, even then, they cautioned that this team would become a lightning rod of envy for those who did not comprehend it or felt threatened by it. That warning sadly proved true, as ready access to the President's office, to important ministries and the unprecedented freedom that went with it, challenged the bureaucratic status quo. On one occasion, David Sproule, who succeeded Mr. Alexander as ambassador, had to send one of his staff back to Canada as this person objected to SAT members using the embassy swimming pool, not understanding that we are all Canadians in a foreign land.

Mr. Alexander and Mr. Sproule understood that the SAT did not diminish their position as Canada's chief representative in Kabul — it only enhanced their stature. Other countries could not even hope for such influence. Colonel Mike Capstick, the team's first commander (now retired), went to the landmark Afghanistan Compact discussions in London as an Afghan delegate, and the whole SAT was more of an adjunct to, or seconded to, the Afghan civil service than Canadians working in their government. It is a subtle difference, but that nuance means everything.

But such troubles are not entirely new. Reporting to the chief of the defence staff, instead of to the ambassador, was somehow seen as sinister, ignoring the motivation that sought to preserve this team's independence. Gen. Hillier fervently wished that other government departments would join in to make it, as he calls it, "a true Team Canada affair" — yet only the Canadian International Development Agency took up the offer (albeit reluctantly and beset by doubts). The strongest testament to the SAT's worth is that every CIDA person who has worked with it has become a convincing advocate. It represents the absolute best in Pearsonian diplomacy, which we wistfully memorialize — independent, absent of partisan agenda, with Canada's name heralded in consequence.

As I was present at the birth of this team, I was also privileged to be present in the last days of the first rotation. During a farewell party in Kabul, I was overwhelmed by the outpouring of affection from members of non-governmental organizations that were also working in the capital, from key embassy staff and, most importantly, from Afghan ministers and lower-level civil servants. On his last night in Kabul, I saw Andy Tamas, the CIDA representative on SAT, eyes watering with intense pride as he said farewell, expressing his profound gratitude for having been able to serve Afghans with his military colleagues. I was so intensely proud of the Canadian flag on my shoulder that day.

Critics of Canada's military mission casually label it a combat mission, conveniently ignoring the roads, irrigation ditches, bridges, causeways, schools and orphanages that Canadian soldiers have built, not to mention the strategic advice the SAT has provided. Canadian values of humility and assistance, which are emblematic of the SAT team, might very well be sacrificed on the altar of vanity, envy and perceived competition. It is no wonder that our allies sometimes raise an eyebrow with respect to Canada. It is equally wondrous that we permit such rivalries to make a great nation small.

George Petrolekas, a lieutenant-colonel of the Royal Montreal Regiment presently on unpaid leave, represented Canada to NATO Operational Command of the Afghan mission from 2003 to 2006.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Two letters today, under the title Bringing home the SAT, respond to Globe editorial:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080115.weafghanistan15/BNStory/specialComment/home

1) By MIKE CAPSTICK, Colonel (ret'd)
http://199.246.67.249/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20080116/LETTERS16-3/Letters/commentLetters/commentLetters/3/3/15/

Calgary -- Your editorial on the employment of Canadian military personnel to assist the Afghan government (Put Real Civilians In These Positions - Jan. 15) demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the Strategic Advisory Team's role. As the SAT's first commander, I can assure you it does not pretend to provide expert advice on governance. Instead, it provides Afghan ministers with crucial strategic planning skills and helps Afghan civil servants develop those skills, a task that military professionals are expert at.

In an ideal world, civilians should be included on the team (and there are always one or two). But the reality is that both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency have to scramble to fill their essential posts in Afghanistan. In short, the Canadian Forces is the only government agency that can generate and sustain the requisite number of people willing to deploy to a dangerous environment for a year.

2) By ROGER LUCY:
http://199.246.67.249/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20080116/LETTERS16-4/Letters/commentLetters/commentLetters/7/7/15/

Ottawa -- While, in an ideal world, SAT members should come from the public service rather than the military, it's doubtful if any civilian arm of government could draw on such a large pool of talented personnel, able to be deployed at short notice to dangerous places. But I can't fault your bottom line: By all means, bring the SAT home. But set it up in a discreet cell in the Privy Council Office. Perhaps it can work the same magic in Ottawa rebuilding civic institutions that it has in Kabul.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[dapaterson]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, is more, in the form of a web comment from LCol George Petrolekas, a member of the original SAT:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080116.wcomment0116/BNStory/Afghanistan/home

Just a minor point of clarification - LCol Petrolekas was with NATO and visited the SAT; he was not part of the SAT.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen, is another complaint about CIDA:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/business/envoy+urges+government+abolish+CIDA/2045279/story.html

Ex-envoy urges government to abolish CIDA
Liddar claims agency has created culture of dependence

By Jennifer Campbell, The Ottawa Citizen

September 29, 2009

Bhupinder Liddar says the non-government organizations in Africa, many of which receive CIDA funding, have turned programs into 'make-work projects.'

Diplomat Bhupinder Liddar is fresh off a political appointment in Kenya and, being no longer bound by the Foreign Affairs Department's strict communications policies, he has decided to speak his mind.

The one-time Parliament Hill staffer and journalist was in town briefly, on his way to Goa, India, and held a press conference on Parliament Hill in which he called for the abolition of the Canadian International Development Agency.

"It's not the lack of diplomats, but it's the lack of policy from the government," Liddar said. "There are plenty of diplomats sitting around, but they are looking for direction and one of the areas in which they're looking for direction is overseas development assistance."

In Africa, he said, CIDA has created dependence and has failed to develop the "know-how and capacity-building" that is required.

"What is the solution? I would strongly suggest that CIDA be abolished. Because at this stage, all we are doing is funneling money into countries that is not really seen," he said. "We saw tons of examples of dependencies created."

Liddar said the non-government organizations, many of which receive the CIDA funding through programs they run, have turned the funding into "make-work projects."

As an alternative to CIDA, Liddar suggested dealing with developing countries on a bilateral basis, and selling them Canadian goods.

He also brought up previously discussed suggestion for a Canadian "youth corps" that could work in such countries.

"It's not a question of giving official development assistance. It's to help in good governance.

"The way Canada can help in good governance is to provide healthy institutions, such as the judiciary, police, the RCMP and provincial police forces -- and help them in parliamentary institutions, training -- that's what Canada can do."

CIDA's response was predictably curt.

"The views expressed are those of Mr. Bhupinder Liddar and are not those of CIDA. The government is taking measures to make national assistance more focused, more efficient and more accountable. That's what Canadians expect," said Denise Robichaud, CIDA's director of public affairs and ministerial communications.

Liddar also brought up other issues in Canadian foreign policy, saying the focus is too narrow. He said it was fine to focus on emerging economies and the Americas, but not at the expense of Africa and the Arctic, which he acknowledged now appears to be getting its due.

Liddar also said he was at the High Commission in Nairobi during the detainment of Suaad Hagi Mohamud, the Canadian woman who was jailed in Nairobi as an impostor because Canadian consular officials didn't think her passport photo looked like her.

"I think it was a total disgrace what Canadians did in that case," he said, and called for more sensitive consular officials who give each case due process.

Finally, he took a shot at Canada's immigration system, which he said was flawed, with qualified people waiting six to seven years to come to the country.

"Canadian immigration is a mess. I don't have the solution."

© Copyright (c) The Ottawa Citizen​

First: I think that almost everything Mr. Liddar says needs to be taken with a grain of salt. His relationships with government have been, to be charitable, rocky and he is a man with a great sense of his own importance.

But, that doesn’t make him wrong about CIDA.

His solution, however, perpetuates what Dambisa Moyo call ”Dead Aid”, and I’m not convinced that it will work any better or save any money.

 

[Good2Golf]

Indeed.  His proposal to improves Immigration Canada seems...less then inspired.