Is the myth of Gen Robert E Lee starting to crumble?

[FJAG]

An interesting article concerning the place in history of Gen Robert E Lee and his worship by white supremacists.

The strangest part about the continued personality cult of Robert E. Lee is how few of the qualities his admirers profess to see in him he actually possessed.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-myth-of-the-kindly-general-lee/529038/

While this article doesn't touch much on Lee's performance as a tactical or strategic leader, it's quite interesting actually when you study Lee's campaigns to see how many of his successes were not so much the result of any brilliant leadership on his part rather than simple fortune or the result of his opponents failures. A simple example is Lee's dispersion of his forces before Gettysburg, his failure to control Stuart's cavalry, his failure to push Ewell to take Cemetery Ridge while they had the advantage on the first day of the battle, his long delay in issuing orders for the battle on the second day and finally his ill-fated orders for Pickett to attack the union's strongest position on the third. But for a timely storm during the fourth day which allowed his army to flee the battlefield he would have been annihilated in Pennsylvania.

:cheers:

 

[Remius]

An interesting article concerning the place in history of Gen Robert E Lee and his worship by white supremacists.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-myth-of-the-kindly-general-lee/529038/

While this article doesn't touch much on Lee's performance as a tactical or strategic leader, it's quite interesting actually when you study Lee's campaigns to see how many of his successes were not so much the result of any brilliant leadership on his part rather than simple fortune or the result of his opponents failures. A simple example is Lee's dispersion of his forces before Gettysburg, his failure to control Stuart's cavalry, his failure to push Ewell to take Cemetery Ridge while they had the advantage on the first day of the battle, his long delay in issuing orders for the battle on the second day and finally his ill-fated orders for Pickett to attack the union's strongest position on the third. But for a timely storm during the fourth day which allowed his army to flee the battlefield he would have been annihilated in Pennsylvania.

:cheers:

I always thought he wasn’t overrated.  Jackson was a far better general.  Lee had some good commanders.  But as you pointed I out he got lucky several times and after Gettysburg he was constantly pushed back by the union army.

 

[mariomike]

Perhaps Gen. Sherman deserves a mention for strategic reasons.

In 1864 it seemed likely that President Lincoln would lose to the Democrats. Lincoln's defeat could have meant victory to the Confederacy, as the Democratic platform called for peace negotiations based on acknowledgement of the Confederacy's independence. Sherman's capture of Atlanta, coming when it did, helped ensure President Lincoln's re-election.

In his "March to the Sea", Sherman demonstrated for the first time in the modern era breaking the enemy's ability and will to wage war,

We are not only fighting armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience.

Letter from Gen. Sherman, December 24, 1864

"Marching through Georgia" will likely always be unpopular in the South.

We saw the full effect of this strategic doctrine during the strategic bombing offensive in World War 2.

 

[daftandbarmy]

An interesting article concerning the place in history of Gen Robert E Lee and his worship by white supremacists.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-myth-of-the-kindly-general-lee/529038/

While this article doesn't touch much on Lee's performance as a tactical or strategic leader, it's quite interesting actually when you study Lee's campaigns to see how many of his successes were not so much the result of any brilliant leadership on his part rather than simple fortune or the result of his opponents failures. A simple example is Lee's dispersion of his forces before Gettysburg, his failure to control Stuart's cavalry, his failure to push Ewell to take Cemetery Ridge while they had the advantage on the first day of the battle, his long delay in issuing orders for the battle on the second day and finally his ill-fated orders for Pickett to attack the union's strongest position on the third. But for a timely storm during the fourth day which allowed his army to flee the battlefield he would have been annihilated in Pennsylvania.

:cheers:

'I know he's a good General, but is he lucky?'

Napoleon Bonaparte

 

[Blackadder1916]

While this article doesn't touch much on Lee's performance as a tactical or strategic leader, it's quite interesting actually when you study Lee's campaigns to see how many of his successes were not so much the result of any brilliant leadership on his part rather than simple fortune or the result of his opponents failures.  . . .

"In war, luck is half in everything".  Napoleon Bonaparte

Perhaps "luck" should be one of the principles of war.  While a close study of Lee's campaigning may reveal that his success (while it lasted) could be attributed to luck, poor generalship of his opponents or a combination of factors outside his control, the same could be said of any number of well regarded commanders.

 

[FJAG]

"In war, luck is half in everything".  Napoleon Bonaparte

Perhaps "luck" should be one of the principles of war.  While a close study of Lee's campaigning may reveal that his success (while it lasted) could be attributed to luck, poor generalship of his opponents or a combination of factors outside his control, the same could be said of any number of well regarded commanders.

That's very true but very few (if any of them) had as many statues raised to them by a defeated nation. Tell me when's the last time you saw a statue of Bernard Montgomery? I think there's just the one at Whitehall. Or Heinz Guderian? Nada.

The point of the article is that Lee was never the kindly, gentleman who he was portrayed to be but a ruthless slave owner and white supremacist. His image was greatly polished after the war by the "Lost Cause" proponents who used him as one of many symbol to to push through widespread Jim Crow laws in the South.

:cheers:

 

[mariomike]

That's very true but very few (if any of them) had as many statues raised to them by a defeated nation. Tell me when's the last time you saw a statue of Bernard Montgomery? I think there's just the one at Whitehall. Or Heinz Guderian? Nada.

The point of the article is that Lee was never the kindly, gentleman who he was portrayed to be but a ruthless slave owner and white supremacist. His image was greatly polished after the war by the "Lost Cause" proponents who used him as one of many symbol to to push through widespread Jim Crow laws in the South.

:cheers:

We've had some interesting discussions about Confederate monuments.

There was nothing like a Directive #30 in 1865, as there was in 1946,

How Did We Treat Monuments to White Supremacists When They Weren’t Our White Supremacists?
https://slate.com/culture/2017/08/read-the-allied-order-to-destroy-nazi-monuments-in-germany.html

 

[Blackadder1916]

That's very true but very few (if any of them) had as many statues raised to them by a defeated nation. Tell me when's the last time you saw a statue of Bernard Montgomery? I think there's just the one at Whitehall. Or Heinz Guderian? Nada.

The point of the article is that Lee was never the kindly, gentleman who he was portrayed to be but a ruthless slave owner and white supremacist. His image was greatly polished after the war by the "Lost Cause" proponents who used him as one of many symbol to to push through widespread Jim Crow laws in the South.

:cheers:

Napoleon (and a few other French generals) probably falls into the statue category?

Maybe, since I quoted only your comment about the relationship of Lee's battlefield successes to good fortune or lacklustre opponents, my response was meant to touch only on that aspect of Lee's career.  As for the more reprehensible characteristics of his personality, the article is probably on point.  But what it likely fails to explain is that Lee was not much different than any of the pre-Civil War Regular Army Colonels, and not just the ones from the South (the majority, by the way stayed in the US Army and fought for the Union).

 

[mariomike]

Nothing new about who had the best generals.

But, it's pretty hard to argue about the end result when looking at photographs of the ruined cities of the South.

The Aesthetics of Ruined Cities and the Lost Cause
https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-313?result=1&rskey=vkiW5v

 

[FSTO]

Napoleon (and a few other French generals) probably falls into the statue category?

Maybe, since I quoted only your comment about the relationship of Lee's battlefield successes to good fortune or lacklustre opponents, my response was meant to touch only on that aspect of Lee's career.  As for the more reprehensible characteristics of his personality, the article is probably on point.  But what it likely fails to explain is that Lee was not much different than any of the pre-Civil War Regular Army Colonels, and not just the ones from the South (the majority, by the way stayed in the US Army and fought for the Union).

I'm sure the aboriginals of the Great Plains had great things to say of the Officers and Men of the US Calvary.

 

[tomahawk6]

Lee lost to Grant's strategy of attrition just as the indians did.

 

[Infanteer]

Grant's strategy actually wasn't one of attrition.  His orders for the Overland Campaign, contained in his memoirs, actually indicate some sophisticated operational manoeuvre between 4 separate armies.  His objective was Lee's Army, and the campaign saw repeated use of manoeuvre to try and lever Lee out of ground where he could be defeated.

 

[FJAG]

Grant's strategy actually wasn't one of attrition.  His orders for the Overland Campaign, contained in his memoirs, actually indicate some sophisticated operational manoeuvre between 4 separate armies.  His objective was Lee's Army, and the campaign saw repeated use of manoeuvre to try and lever Lee out of ground where he could be defeated.

The Overland Campaign is well summarized in Wikipedia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overland_Campaign

It showed a deft handling of continuing offensive turning movements against a determined enemy relying on the strength of defensive positions. Grant probably gained an advantage in this process when early on in the campaign, James Longstreet, Lee's premier expert on active defence, was wounded (like Jackson, by his own men) and had to sit out the remainder of it.

Thereafter Petersburg. Well, what can one say about trench warfare in a Virginia winter? Lee was forced into it and Grant had to besiege it.

Thereafter the Appomattox campaign also ran it's course as a series of turning/flanking movements to cut Lee from his supplies and force Lee into the open where his army could be defeated in detail.

I think the argument respecting attrition comes from the fact that a) Grant was constantly aggressive and kept the pressure on Lee (which was essential) b) Lee mostly fought from defensive positions which limited his casualties while Grant, on the offensive, naturally had more, and c) the "Lost Cause" crowd needed to find an excuse for why their side lost which wasn't predicated on their own bumbling campaigns and inadequacies (like logistics which were for the most part atrocious).

:cheers:

 

[mariomike]

A Canadian connection to Confederate memorials.

In 1957, the United Daughters of the Confederacy had a plaque installed on the outer wall of the Hudson's Bay Company flagship store in downtown Montreal , commemorating Jefferson Davis' brief stay in the city; the plaque was removed following the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally of August, 2017, under pressure from the public.
https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.4248206

 

[a_majoor]

While most of my Civil War library is of an older vintage (Edwin B Coddinton's "The Gettysburg Campaign" and Grants Memoirs taking pride of place), the general impression I got from historiography from that era was Lee was considered an excellent tactician, but few, if any of the authors chose to look at Lee's strategic acumen. or lack thereof.

Grant, on the other hand, is treated far differently in the same period. Outside of his own Memoirs, few people stopped to consider Grant's strategic planning and execution, and rather focused on his tactical encounters with Lee. Oddly, the best summary is in one of Ralph Peter's Civil War novels, where General Meade has the epiphany that "Grant did not know how to fight Lee. He knew how to win the war" (or words to that effect).

Since Lee was focused on just one of the multiple theaters of the Civil War, and was capable of tactically defending the area until eventually overwhelmed by a combination of  greater forces, logistical collapse and being outmaneuvered (not just in Virginia, but strategically as well, with Sherman marching north from Savannah through the Carolina's to squeeze the AoNV between the two Union forces, his story was relatively simple to tell and craft to support narratives like the "Lost Cause". Lee never seemed to have the strategic vision to know how to utilize the forces of the Confederacy (stubbornly refusing to part with any part of the AoNV to support other theaters until the pressure became too great), although the overall lack of strategic vision is rightly in the hands of the CSA's government and Jefferson Davis in particular.

 

[Infanteer]

Read J.F.C. Fuller's Grant and Lee.  Its actually a really good comparison of the two, and argues that Grant had greater skill and Lee had greater publicists.

 

[FJAG]

While most of my Civil War library is of an older vintage (Edwin B Coddinton's "The Gettysburg Campaign" and Grants Memoirs taking pride of place), the general impression I got from historiography from that era was Lee was considered an excellent tactician, but few, if any of the authors chose to look at Lee's strategic acumen. or lack thereof.

Grant, on the other hand, is treated far differently in the same period. Outside of his own Memoirs, few people stopped to consider Grant's strategic planning and execution, and rather focused on his tactical encounters with Lee. Oddly, the best summary is in one of Ralph Peter's Civil War novels, where General Meade has the epiphany that "Grant did not know how to fight Lee. He knew how to win the war" (or words to that effect).

Since Lee was focused on just one of the multiple theaters of the Civil War, and was capable of tactically defending the area until eventually overwhelmed by a combination of  greater forces, logistical collapse and being outmaneuvered (not just in Virginia, but strategically as well, with Sherman marching north from Savannah through the Carolina's to squeeze the AoNV between the two Union forces, his story was relatively simple to tell and craft to support narratives like the "Lost Cause". Lee never seemed to have the strategic vision to know how to utilize the forces of the Confederacy (stubbornly refusing to part with any part of the AoNV to support other theaters until the pressure became too great), although the overall lack of strategic vision is rightly in the hands of the CSA's government and Jefferson Davis in particular.

I was always of the view that after Grant was appointed General of the Army (and thereby had overall supervision of all land theatres) Meade was left to run the Army of the Potomac although closely supervised by Grant who collocated his headquarters with the AoP headquarters for the rest of the war. There was a story that Meade had a terrible relationship with the press as a result of which all the reporters with the Army resolved to mention his name only when there were setbacks and give credit to Grant for all the successes.

As far as the cohesion of the South was concerned, there was little. States treasured their "independent states rights" and as a result gave only limited support to the confederation. This continuously resulted in uncoordinated strategy as well as lack of personnel and supplies being sent to the area of greatest strategic need.

One place where I think Lee did deserve a lot of credit, both for strategy and tactics, was the Seven Days campaign which drove McClellan and his larger army away from Richmond and ended the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and allowed for his repositioning to face Pope's Army of Virginia and 2nd Bull Run.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

One place where I think Lee did deserve a lot of credit, both for strategy and tactics, was the Seven Days campaign which drove McClellan and his larger army away from Richmond and ended the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and allowed for his repositioning to face Pope's Army of Virginia and 2nd Bull Run.

:cheers:

McClellan was a famous ditherer, so there was about as much glory to be had pushing him around as there might be for a school yard bully to kick the littlest kids in the pants...

'If General McClellan isn't going to use his Army I'd like to borrow it for awhile.' Abraham Lincoln

 

[a_majoor]

One of the larger problems with this sort of debate is the lack of nuance. Lee is castigated upthread for "White Supremacy", even though he joined the Confederacy due to his feeling for Virginia as the seat of his allegiance rather than "These United States" (as the nation was actually called at that time). Lee was also morally ambivalent about the issue of slavery, freeing his own slaves when it became possible to do so, but not really speaking out against the institution during the war.

Much of the credit (and blame) for Lee's performance as a Civil War general falls to both his military education and his personality. Lee, like most officers, was educated to believe in the Napoleonic conception of decisive battle, but unlike most, he had both the vision to "read" the tactical battlefield and the personality to force engagements seeking the decisive encounter. Against timid or indecisive commanders, this worked very well, but against men like Meade or Grant, this tended to end up like running straight into a wall. Of course there were other factors outside of Lee's perview as well, such as the strategy of the Confederacy and logistics.

Lee also deserves credit for ending the war outright (many commanders felt that they should melt into the bush and continue an insurgency, until Lee effectively forbade them to do so), and working towards reconciliation and his support of higher education as the President of Washington University (renamed after his death as Washington and Lee University).

So while this is a fascinating topic, I would hope that it is treated in a serious manner, rather than the current trend of "presentism" where Lee is judged according to the standards of our time, and usually only on the basis of one or two factors. While I know that "we" are able to treat the subject in this manner, the sad fact is the outside world is devolving to the point that these sorts of discussions would likely be condemned for some sort of "ism".

 

[Remius]

This article in the Atlantic takes down a lot of the myths of Lee including his attitude after the war.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-myth-of-the-kindly-general-lee/529038/


Sometimes it isn’t presentism.  It’s just recognizing that some people’s hero was really just an a hole back then even by that time’s standard and was that his perceived persona was just a thing of fiction to justify some narrative.