Bert
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 4
- Points
- 230
This is another Stratfor special and provides their opinion of the current and
near future situation in Iraq from a US perspective. It certainly makes
one think of what may happen next and points out the challenges
facing the Bush Administration.
THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Facing Realities in Iraq
December 30, 2004 1840 GMT
By George Friedman
On May 17, 2004, Stratfor published a piece entitled "Iraq: New Strategies."
In a rare moment of advocacy ( http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=232011 ),
we argued that the war in Iraq had evolved to a point where the United States
was unlikely to be able to suppress the insurgency.
We argued then that, "The United States must begin by recognizing that it
cannot possibly pacify Iraq with the force available or, for that matter,
with a larger military force. It can continue to patrol, it can continue to
question people, it can continue to take casualties. However, it can never
permanently defeat the guerrilla forces in the Sunni triangle using this
strategy. It certainly cannot displace the power and authority of the Shiite
leadership in the south. Urban warfare and counterinsurgency in the Iraqi
environment cannot be successful."
We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a
mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the
behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped
disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount
follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the
Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened
without the invasion of Iraq.
As frequently happens in warfare, the primary strategic purpose of the war
has been forgotten by the Bush administration. Mission creep, the nightmare
of all military planners, has taken place. The United States has shifted its
focus from coercing neighboring countries into collaborating with the United
States against al Qaeda, to building democracy in Iraq. As we put it in May:
"The United States must recall its original mission, which was to occupy Iraq
in order to prosecute the war against al Qaeda. If that mission is
remembered, and the mission creep of reshaping Iraq forgotten, some obvious
strategic solutions re-emerge. The first, and most important, is that the
United States has no national interest in the nature of Iraqi government or
society. Except for not supporting al Qaeda, Iraq's government does not
matter."
Most comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam are superficial and some are absurd, but
one lesson is entirely relevant to Iraq. In Vietnam, the United States
attempted to simultaneously re-engineer Vietnamese society and wage a
counterinsurgency campaign. That proved impossible. The United States is
attempting to do precisely that again in Iraq. It will fail again for the
same reason: The goals are inherently contradictory.
Creating democracy in Iraq requires that democratic institutions be created.
That is an abstract, bloodless way of putting it. The reality is that Iraqis
must be recruited to serve in these institutions, from the army and police to
social services. Obviously, these people become targets for the guerrillas
and the level of intimidation is massive. These officials -- caught between
the power of U.S. forces and the guerrillas -- are hardly in a position to
engage in nation building. They are happy to survive, if they choose to
remain at their posts.
Even this is not the central problem. In order to build these institutions,
Iraqis will have to be recruited. It is impossible to distinguish between
Iraqis committed to the American project, Iraqis who are opportunists and
Iraqis who are jihadists sent by guerrilla intelligence services to penetrate
the new institutions. Corruption aside, every one of the institutions is full
of jihadist agents, who are there to spy and disrupt.
This has a direct military consequence. The goal of the Untied States in
Vietnam was, and now in Iraq is, to shift the war-fighting burden -- in this
case from U.S. forces to the Iraqis. This can never happen. The Iraqi army,
like the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, is filled with guerrilla
operatives. If the United States mounts joint operations with the Iraqis, the
guerrillas will know about it during the planning stages. If the United
States fights alone, it will be more effective, but the Iraqi army will never
develop. For the United States, it is a question of heads you win, tails I
lose.
The United States cannot win the intelligence war on the ground level. Its
operations to penetrate the guerrillas depend on Iraqis working with the
United States and these operations will be quickly compromised. The
guerrillas on the other hand cannot be rooted out of the Iraqi military and
intelligence organs because they cannot be distinguished from other Iraqis.
Some will be captured. Many might be captured. But all of them cannot be
captured and therefore no effective allied force can be created in Iraq. This
was the center of gravity of the problem in Vietnam, the problem that
destroyed Vietnamization. It is the center of gravity of the problem in Iraq.
Missed Opportunities
There were two points where the problem could have been solved. Had the
United States acted vigorously in May and June 2003, there is a chance that
the guerrilla force would have been so disrupted it could never have been
born. U.S. intelligence, however, failed to recognize the guerrilla threat
and Donald Rumsfeld in particular was slow to react. By the summer of 2003,
the situation was out of hand.
There was a second point where effective action might have been fruitful,
which was in the period after the Ramadan offensive of October-November 2003,
when Saddam Hussein was captured, and the beginning of the April 2004
offensives in Al Fallujah and the Muqtada al-Sadr rising. Those four months
were wasted in diffused action in several areas, rather than in a concerted
effort to turn Sunni elders against the guerrillas.
It is interesting to note that the attempt to break the Sunni guerrillas in a
systematic way did not begin until November 2004, with the attack against Al
Fallujah and an attempt to co-opt the Sunni elders. For a while it looked
like it might just work. It didn't. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's jihadists had
become too strong and too well organized. Whatever inroads were made among
the Sunni elders was blocked by al-Zarqawi's ability to carry out reprisals.
The Sunnis were locked into place.
The U.S. military is now carrying out an impossible mission. It is trying to
suppress a well-organized guerrilla force using primarily U.S. troops whose
intelligence about the enemy is severely limited by language and cultural
barriers that cannot be solved by recruiting Iraqis to serve as intelligence
aides. The United States either operates blind or compromises its security.
Unless the Iraqi guerrillas are not only throwing all of their strength into
this offensive, but also using up their strength in a non-renewable fashion,
the Jan. 30 elections will not be the end of the guerrilla war. There will be
a lull in guerrilla operations -- guerrillas have to rest, recruit and
resupply like anyone else -- but after a few months, another offensive will
be launched. There is, therefore, no possibility that the Sunni guerrilla
movement will be suppressed unless there is a dramatic change in the
political landscape of the Sunni community.
There is one bit of good fortune that arises out of another of Rumsfeld's
failures. His failure to listen to Gen. Erik Shinseki's warnings about the
size of the force that would be needed in Iraq after the war meant that the
U.S. force structure was never expanded appropriately. In most instances,
this is a terrible failing. However, in this case, it has an unexpectedly
positive consequence. We do not doubt for a moment that Rumsfeld would throw
in more forces if he had them. They would not solve the problem in any way
and would add additional targets for the guerrillas. But Rumsfeld doesn't
have the needed forces, so he can't send them in.
Facing the Facts
The issue facing the Bush administration is simple. It can continue to fight
the war as it has, hoping that a miracle will bring successes in 2005 that
didn't happen in 2004. Alternatively, it can accept the reality that the
guerrilla force is now self-sustaining and sufficiently large not to flicker
out and face the fact that a U.S. conventional force of less than 150,000 is
not likely to suppress the guerrillas. More to the point, it can recognize
these facts:
1. The United States cannot re-engineer Iraq because the guerrillas will
infiltrate every institution it creates.
2. That the United States by itself lacks the intelligence capabilities to
fight an effective counterinsurgency.
3. That exposing U.S. forces to security responsibilities in this environment
generates casualties without bringing the United States closer to the goal.
4. That the strain on the U.S. force is undermining its ability to react to
opportunities and threats in the rest of the region.
And that, therefore, this phase of the Iraq campaign must be halted as soon
as possible.
This does not mean strategic defeat -- unless the strategic goal is the
current inflated one of creating a democratic Iraq. Under the original
strategic goal of changing the behavior of other countries in the region, the
United States has already obtained strategic success. Indeed, to the extent
that the United States is being drained and exhausted in Iraq, the strategic
goal is actually being undermined.
We assert two principles:
1. The internal governance -- or non-governance -- of Iraq is neither a
fundamental American national interest nor is it something that can be shaped
by the United States even if it were a national interest.
2. The United States does require a major presence in Iraq because of that
country's strategic position in the region.
It is altogether possible for the United States to accept the first principle
yet pursue the second. The geography of Iraq -- the distribution of the
population -- is such that the United States can maintain a major presence in
Iraq without, for the most part, being based in the populated regions and
therefore without being responsible for the security of Iraq -- let alone
responsible its form of government.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces west and south of the Euphrates and in an arc
north to the Turkish border and into Kurdistan would provide the United
States with the same leverage in the region, without the unsustainable cost
of the guerrilla war. The Saudis, Syrians and Iranians would still have U.S.
forces on their borders, this time not diluted by a hopeless pacification
program.
Something like this will have to happen. After the January elections, there
will be a Shiite government in Baghdad. There will be, in all likelihood,
civil war between Sunnis and Shia. The United States cannot stop it and
cannot be trapped in the middle of it. It needs to withdraw.
Certainly, it would have been nice for the United States if it had been able
to dominate Iraq thoroughly. Somewhere between "the U.S. blew it" and "there
was never a chance" that possibility is gone. It would have been nice if the
United States had never tried to control the situation, because now the U.S.
is going to have to accept a defeat, which will destabilize the region
psychologically for a while. But what is is, and the facts speak for
themselves.
We are not Walter Cronkite, and we are not saying that the war is lost. The
war is with the jihadists around the world; Iraq was just one campaign, and
the occupation of the Sunnis was just one phase of that campaign. That phase
has been lost. The administration has allowed that phase to become the war as
a whole in the public mind. That was a very bad move, but the administration
is just going to have to bite the bullet and do the hard, painful and
embarrassing work of cutting losses and getting on with the war.
If Bush has trouble doing this, he should conjure up Lyndon Johnson's ghost,
wandering restlessly in the White House, and imagine how Johnson would have
been remembered if he had told Robert McNamara to get lost in 1966.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
http://www.stratfor.com
near future situation in Iraq from a US perspective. It certainly makes
one think of what may happen next and points out the challenges
facing the Bush Administration.
THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Facing Realities in Iraq
December 30, 2004 1840 GMT
By George Friedman
On May 17, 2004, Stratfor published a piece entitled "Iraq: New Strategies."
In a rare moment of advocacy ( http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=232011 ),
we argued that the war in Iraq had evolved to a point where the United States
was unlikely to be able to suppress the insurgency.
We argued then that, "The United States must begin by recognizing that it
cannot possibly pacify Iraq with the force available or, for that matter,
with a larger military force. It can continue to patrol, it can continue to
question people, it can continue to take casualties. However, it can never
permanently defeat the guerrilla forces in the Sunni triangle using this
strategy. It certainly cannot displace the power and authority of the Shiite
leadership in the south. Urban warfare and counterinsurgency in the Iraqi
environment cannot be successful."
We did not and do not agree with the view that the invasion of Iraq was a
mistake. It had a clear strategic purpose that it achieved: reshaping the
behavior of surrounding regimes, particularly of the Saudis. This helped
disrupt the al Qaeda network sufficiently that it has been unable to mount
follow-on attacks in the United States and has shifted its attention to the
Islamic world, primarily to the Saudis. None of this would have happened
without the invasion of Iraq.
As frequently happens in warfare, the primary strategic purpose of the war
has been forgotten by the Bush administration. Mission creep, the nightmare
of all military planners, has taken place. The United States has shifted its
focus from coercing neighboring countries into collaborating with the United
States against al Qaeda, to building democracy in Iraq. As we put it in May:
"The United States must recall its original mission, which was to occupy Iraq
in order to prosecute the war against al Qaeda. If that mission is
remembered, and the mission creep of reshaping Iraq forgotten, some obvious
strategic solutions re-emerge. The first, and most important, is that the
United States has no national interest in the nature of Iraqi government or
society. Except for not supporting al Qaeda, Iraq's government does not
matter."
Most comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam are superficial and some are absurd, but
one lesson is entirely relevant to Iraq. In Vietnam, the United States
attempted to simultaneously re-engineer Vietnamese society and wage a
counterinsurgency campaign. That proved impossible. The United States is
attempting to do precisely that again in Iraq. It will fail again for the
same reason: The goals are inherently contradictory.
Creating democracy in Iraq requires that democratic institutions be created.
That is an abstract, bloodless way of putting it. The reality is that Iraqis
must be recruited to serve in these institutions, from the army and police to
social services. Obviously, these people become targets for the guerrillas
and the level of intimidation is massive. These officials -- caught between
the power of U.S. forces and the guerrillas -- are hardly in a position to
engage in nation building. They are happy to survive, if they choose to
remain at their posts.
Even this is not the central problem. In order to build these institutions,
Iraqis will have to be recruited. It is impossible to distinguish between
Iraqis committed to the American project, Iraqis who are opportunists and
Iraqis who are jihadists sent by guerrilla intelligence services to penetrate
the new institutions. Corruption aside, every one of the institutions is full
of jihadist agents, who are there to spy and disrupt.
This has a direct military consequence. The goal of the Untied States in
Vietnam was, and now in Iraq is, to shift the war-fighting burden -- in this
case from U.S. forces to the Iraqis. This can never happen. The Iraqi army,
like the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, is filled with guerrilla
operatives. If the United States mounts joint operations with the Iraqis, the
guerrillas will know about it during the planning stages. If the United
States fights alone, it will be more effective, but the Iraqi army will never
develop. For the United States, it is a question of heads you win, tails I
lose.
The United States cannot win the intelligence war on the ground level. Its
operations to penetrate the guerrillas depend on Iraqis working with the
United States and these operations will be quickly compromised. The
guerrillas on the other hand cannot be rooted out of the Iraqi military and
intelligence organs because they cannot be distinguished from other Iraqis.
Some will be captured. Many might be captured. But all of them cannot be
captured and therefore no effective allied force can be created in Iraq. This
was the center of gravity of the problem in Vietnam, the problem that
destroyed Vietnamization. It is the center of gravity of the problem in Iraq.
Missed Opportunities
There were two points where the problem could have been solved. Had the
United States acted vigorously in May and June 2003, there is a chance that
the guerrilla force would have been so disrupted it could never have been
born. U.S. intelligence, however, failed to recognize the guerrilla threat
and Donald Rumsfeld in particular was slow to react. By the summer of 2003,
the situation was out of hand.
There was a second point where effective action might have been fruitful,
which was in the period after the Ramadan offensive of October-November 2003,
when Saddam Hussein was captured, and the beginning of the April 2004
offensives in Al Fallujah and the Muqtada al-Sadr rising. Those four months
were wasted in diffused action in several areas, rather than in a concerted
effort to turn Sunni elders against the guerrillas.
It is interesting to note that the attempt to break the Sunni guerrillas in a
systematic way did not begin until November 2004, with the attack against Al
Fallujah and an attempt to co-opt the Sunni elders. For a while it looked
like it might just work. It didn't. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's jihadists had
become too strong and too well organized. Whatever inroads were made among
the Sunni elders was blocked by al-Zarqawi's ability to carry out reprisals.
The Sunnis were locked into place.
The U.S. military is now carrying out an impossible mission. It is trying to
suppress a well-organized guerrilla force using primarily U.S. troops whose
intelligence about the enemy is severely limited by language and cultural
barriers that cannot be solved by recruiting Iraqis to serve as intelligence
aides. The United States either operates blind or compromises its security.
Unless the Iraqi guerrillas are not only throwing all of their strength into
this offensive, but also using up their strength in a non-renewable fashion,
the Jan. 30 elections will not be the end of the guerrilla war. There will be
a lull in guerrilla operations -- guerrillas have to rest, recruit and
resupply like anyone else -- but after a few months, another offensive will
be launched. There is, therefore, no possibility that the Sunni guerrilla
movement will be suppressed unless there is a dramatic change in the
political landscape of the Sunni community.
There is one bit of good fortune that arises out of another of Rumsfeld's
failures. His failure to listen to Gen. Erik Shinseki's warnings about the
size of the force that would be needed in Iraq after the war meant that the
U.S. force structure was never expanded appropriately. In most instances,
this is a terrible failing. However, in this case, it has an unexpectedly
positive consequence. We do not doubt for a moment that Rumsfeld would throw
in more forces if he had them. They would not solve the problem in any way
and would add additional targets for the guerrillas. But Rumsfeld doesn't
have the needed forces, so he can't send them in.
Facing the Facts
The issue facing the Bush administration is simple. It can continue to fight
the war as it has, hoping that a miracle will bring successes in 2005 that
didn't happen in 2004. Alternatively, it can accept the reality that the
guerrilla force is now self-sustaining and sufficiently large not to flicker
out and face the fact that a U.S. conventional force of less than 150,000 is
not likely to suppress the guerrillas. More to the point, it can recognize
these facts:
1. The United States cannot re-engineer Iraq because the guerrillas will
infiltrate every institution it creates.
2. That the United States by itself lacks the intelligence capabilities to
fight an effective counterinsurgency.
3. That exposing U.S. forces to security responsibilities in this environment
generates casualties without bringing the United States closer to the goal.
4. That the strain on the U.S. force is undermining its ability to react to
opportunities and threats in the rest of the region.
And that, therefore, this phase of the Iraq campaign must be halted as soon
as possible.
This does not mean strategic defeat -- unless the strategic goal is the
current inflated one of creating a democratic Iraq. Under the original
strategic goal of changing the behavior of other countries in the region, the
United States has already obtained strategic success. Indeed, to the extent
that the United States is being drained and exhausted in Iraq, the strategic
goal is actually being undermined.
We assert two principles:
1. The internal governance -- or non-governance -- of Iraq is neither a
fundamental American national interest nor is it something that can be shaped
by the United States even if it were a national interest.
2. The United States does require a major presence in Iraq because of that
country's strategic position in the region.
It is altogether possible for the United States to accept the first principle
yet pursue the second. The geography of Iraq -- the distribution of the
population -- is such that the United States can maintain a major presence in
Iraq without, for the most part, being based in the populated regions and
therefore without being responsible for the security of Iraq -- let alone
responsible its form of government.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces west and south of the Euphrates and in an arc
north to the Turkish border and into Kurdistan would provide the United
States with the same leverage in the region, without the unsustainable cost
of the guerrilla war. The Saudis, Syrians and Iranians would still have U.S.
forces on their borders, this time not diluted by a hopeless pacification
program.
Something like this will have to happen. After the January elections, there
will be a Shiite government in Baghdad. There will be, in all likelihood,
civil war between Sunnis and Shia. The United States cannot stop it and
cannot be trapped in the middle of it. It needs to withdraw.
Certainly, it would have been nice for the United States if it had been able
to dominate Iraq thoroughly. Somewhere between "the U.S. blew it" and "there
was never a chance" that possibility is gone. It would have been nice if the
United States had never tried to control the situation, because now the U.S.
is going to have to accept a defeat, which will destabilize the region
psychologically for a while. But what is is, and the facts speak for
themselves.
We are not Walter Cronkite, and we are not saying that the war is lost. The
war is with the jihadists around the world; Iraq was just one campaign, and
the occupation of the Sunnis was just one phase of that campaign. That phase
has been lost. The administration has allowed that phase to become the war as
a whole in the public mind. That was a very bad move, but the administration
is just going to have to bite the bullet and do the hard, painful and
embarrassing work of cutting losses and getting on with the war.
If Bush has trouble doing this, he should conjure up Lyndon Johnson's ghost,
wandering restlessly in the White House, and imagine how Johnson would have
been remembered if he had told Robert McNamara to get lost in 1966.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
http://www.stratfor.com