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Iraq, Afstan and a stretched British Army

MarkOttawa

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What the Army must learn from Iraq
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/04/06/do0602.xml

In Iraq, the "bomb" is no longer simply a quantity of explosives and a detonator: the insurgents have progressed to an "explosively formed projectile". The effect is of an anti-tank gun firing. The Army will be putting counter-measures in hand, but this is a business of challenge, response and counter-challenge: a deadly game of cat and mouse.

The effect on the Army of casualties such as yesterday's is twofold. In the short term, there will be a grim determination to soldier on. In the longer term - and the question is how long that will be in Iraq - casualties can be corrosive, with an erosion of resolve to do things properly and to see things through. Indeed there may already be signs of corrosion: anecdotal evidence of increased absence without leave, and of experienced officers and soldiers signing off in greater numbers. Perhaps, too, but more subtly, the conduct of the captive sailors and Marines before Iranian television cameras may tell us something.

At bottom is an increasing feeling that, to adapt Bismarck's opinion of the Balkans, Iraq is not worth the bones of another infanteer. Last month, the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies spoke of "British political and military failure in Basra and Maysan province". This was an awfully big spoonful of criticism to have to swallow, but Tony Blair's recent announcement of troop withdrawals is desperately needed good news for the Army.

Mr Blair had no choice. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Dannatt, warned last year that we needed to keep focused on the goal of pulling out of Iraq. If the CGS's words have influenced policy, we should be grateful. The Army was in large part holding the ring, but civil reconstruction was not happening in the way it had been promised. Even the recent tactical successes of Operation Sinbad, to clean up the Basra police, cannot make up for the planning failures at the strategic and operational (theatre) levels.

The CGS urgently needs to rebalance the Army's commitments because the growing demands of Afghanistan, with the Taliban spring offensive under way [seems rather the reverse - MC], otherwise threaten catastrophic overheating. The worrying thing is that, just as in Iraq, the reason more troops are needed in Helmand is to try to recover the situation tactically following miscalculations at the strategic and operational levels. Unless, however, the civil reconstruction effort, which is stalling there too, is revitalised, strategic failure will again be staring us in the face by the end of the year.

Then it will be a choice of another withdrawal that smacks of defeat, or committing even more troops to hold the ring while the policy is "revisited". Except that there are not the troops to commit without further erosion of the 18-month tour interval that the Army Board judges necessary for proper recuperation and retraining.

Of principal concern, though, is that the Government seems not to acknowledge that military force can only achieve so much. Quite simply, there is a lack of focus, intellectual honesty and rigour. Neither do ministers recognise that, without patience and the concomitant manpower and matériel, any strategy of forward engagement with al-Qa'eda will ultimately fail. No insurgency in which Britain has been involved has been won without patience. So if the Government wills these ends it must will the means. Or as Sir Mike Jackson, the previous CGS, said in his Dimbleby lecture last December: "If it expects its soldiers to pay in blood, the nation must pay in gold. [emphasis added]"..

Allan Mallinson was a soldier for 35 years, and commanded the 13th/18th Royal Hussars.

Mark
Ottawa
 
"Appalling though yesterday's deaths in Basra are, they come as no surprise, therefore: a counter-insurgency force must dominate its tactical area of responsibility, and it can do so only by getting among the people. Troops take every measure to protect themselves, consistent with achieving the mission, but the insurgent often has both the tactical and technological initiative."

There is no alternative to Petraeus and Briggs - nor to the steady drip of casualties.  Therefore it only remains to ask if the task is worth the effort and the sacrifice.  I believe that it should be. 

I also believe that Mallinson has it right here.

.... The worrying thing is that, just as in Iraq, the reason more troops are needed in Helmand is to try to recover the situation tactically following miscalculations at the strategic and operational levels. Unless, however, the civil reconstruction effort, which is stalling there too, is revitalised, strategic failure will again be staring us in the face by the end of the year.

.....


Of principal concern, though, is that the Government seems not to acknowledge that military force can only achieve so much. Quite simply, there is a lack of focus, intellectual honesty and rigour. Neither do ministers recognise that, without patience and the concomitant manpower and matériel, any strategy of forward engagement with al-Qa'eda (or any other enemy) will ultimately fail. No insurgency in which Britain has been involved has been won without patience. So if the Government wills these ends it must will the means. Or as Sir Mike Jackson, the previous CGS, said in his Dimbleby lecture last December: "If it expects its soldiers to pay in blood, the nation must pay in gold."


In the current situation what both the leftists and right wingers around the world are missing is the key element of European Colonialism, the central tool in establishing a rude stability, was the District Commissioner - the civilian bureaucrat and his staff from the Colonial Office.  He was the one that was responsible for keeping the population in line by dispensing patronage and employing coercion.  All the talk about CIMIC and Peace Corps and the Limits of Military Force all still dance around this issue.  The lefties have made such a bete-noire of colonialism over the years that they cannot bring themselves to accept that ultimately colonialism was about the establishment of Peace and Order.  The quality of the Governance, Good or otherwise, and to whom the benefits accrued and at whose cost are other, legitimate, matters of discussion.  The fact remains that the TTPs for establishing Peace and Order, and implicitly security, and for supplying the opportunity for Government to prove its quality, are well known and have been well known for centuries, if not millenia.

The District Commissioner is still critical to the establishment of stability.  If the locals can't supply an acceptable candidate then someone else must.  It would be nice if the UN could supply such people but, thankfully IMHO,  they are not so disposed.  So it must fall to individual, sovereign nations like Canada to take a chance and pick a side in conflicts and then supply the necessary support and mentoring to ensure a suitable outcome.  I think that Canada is heading the right way in Afghanistan in that regards with the liaison teams but I think we are at the beginning of a long learning curve ourselves as we learn TTPs, what resources are necessary and how best to employ the resources available - and that includes CIDA aid and business investment.

Colonial Office staff were all selected personnel that had to pass a civil service exam to gain entrance to a service that was has highly prized.  It supplied many men, and today it would include women, with brilliant and rewarding careers. 

If we want to cure the world's ills that is the path we need to pursue.

The Army can't be District Commissioner, Chief of Police and Senior Military Officer everywhere, all the time.  As Mallinson states, they can only supply tactical solutions to hold the line and buy time for others to sort out the real problems.

The Army needs to be in Afghanistan, (and Iraq and Darfur and countless other places) as does the RCMP, but there also needs to be a more "vigorous" Foreign Service populated by more people of the ilk of Glyn Berry and a government willing to employ those types of risk-takers in risky situations.

 
Kirkhill: A book for you:

The Ruling Caste: Imperial Lives in the Victorian Raj
http://www.amazon.ca/Ruling-Caste-Imperial-Lives-Victorian/dp/0374283540/ref=sr_1_1/701-9840826-9598762?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1175886303&sr=1-1
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/features/booklun.php

Niall Ferguson, in Colossus, makes (as you probably know) an argument with overtones of yours:
http://www.amazon.ca/Colossus-Niall-Ferguson/dp/0143034790/ref=sr_1_7/701-9840826-9598762?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1175886867&sr=1-7
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE6D7173AF936A15754C0A9629C8B63

That Americans have the power to run such a ''liberal empire'' Ferguson does not doubt: they have been doing something like this for decades. They have, however, been ''surprisingly inept'' in their interventions, which are ''often short-lived and their results ephemeral.'' This has happened, he complains, because they ''lack the imperial cast of mind.'' Americans fail to train their youth to manage their empire. They resist annexation, preferring ''that foreigners . . . Americanize themselves without the need for formal rule.''..

...the dismantling of formal empires and the near-universal practice of self-determination have so far failed to produce the orderly, prosperous and equitable world for which liberals since Woodrow Wilson have hoped. Another is that ''for some countries some form of imperial governance, meaning a partial or complete suspension of their national sovereignty, might be better than full independence,'' and that only the United States is in a position to supply, and secure international support for, such tutelage...

I find it hard to believe that any Western country would be willing to take on these days the District Commissioner role, which has to be fairly long run--or that the "international community" would accept it.  Just maybe, however, some simalcrum of the League of Nation's mandate system might be recreated under the UN.  Even that though I suspect would be impossible in today's world, both western and other.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Sometimes I end up agreeing with Ferguson - at least in so far as his view on the past and the role of the empire.  I'm not so inclined as him to be harsh on America though - for as you suggest modern times are not ancient times.  Still if we don't supply colonies and District Commissioners I don't doubt that someone else will - and right now my money is betting on China (by colonies I am not suggesting 19th century constructs - I am talking about Greek, Phoenician and Carthaginian colonies - in line with Portuguese and early British practice.  Think York Factory and Calcutta, not Rhodesia.  I think we call them tax free zones and free trade zones these days.

As to the quality of the DCs and their personal motives - no doubt some were better than others and some prospered exceedingly - but that could be said for many of the foreign subjects.  Especially those that ended up moving to Britain or elsewhere in the English speaking world.  :)

 
Sudan as a Chinese factory? ;)
http://www.damianpenny.com/archived/009205.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Kirkhill:  :-*

As for the Chinese government:  >:D :rage:

Mark
Ottawa
 
The British Army would be in better shape if Blair had not axed 4 infantry battalions/regiments last year. The US has been increasing the number of brigades during the war, not decreasing them - sort of.

The surge is going quite well. The bad guys are being pushed out of Baghdad into outlying provinces. We are pursuing them. So far the entire force isnt in place. Two brigades are working up. A third brigade was in Kuwait readying to go into Iraq, I think they may go into Diyala. At some point we will have to go through Basra as well, but that can wait until the rest of the country has been tamped down. Casualties have been alot less than what we expected for the surge so far.

I am afraid the Brits continue to pay a price in Basra for letting the Mahdi Army operate. The two large EFP's were one on either side of the patrol route near an IA checkpoint in Hayaniya. Evidently some IA soldiers have been arrested.
 
tomahawk6 said:
The British Army would be in better shape if Blair had not axed 4 infantry battalions/regiments last year. The US has been increasing the number of brigades during the war, not decreasing them - sort of.

The surge is going quite well. The bad guys are being pushed out of Baghdad into outlying provinces. We are pursuing them. So far the entire force isnt in place. Two brigades are working up. A third brigade was in Kuwait readying to go into Iraq, I think they may go into Diyala. At some point we will have to go through Basra as well, but that can wait until the rest of the country has been tamped down. Casualties have been alot less than what we expected for the surge so far.

I am afraid the Brits continue to pay a price in Basra for letting the Mahdi Army operate. The two large EFP's were one on either side of the patrol route near an IA checkpoint in Hayaniya. Evidently some IA soldiers have been arrested.

No argument on the 4 Battalions T6 - the only trouble is that my erstwhile countrymen don't seem to have been beating the doors down to keep even the units they have up to strength.

I understand your feelings about working with local militias but with respect what exactly is happening in Al Anbar when the Sheikhs are sending their youngsters to be trained by the IA/IP with the understanding that they will be returned to Al Anbar for duty.  At bottom you are talking about the primacy of local loyalties - an issue common to British Regiments and your own National Guard units.  Didn't you have some trouble a few years back with a State National Guard not responding to a Federal Government order resulting in Federal troops being used to escort kids to school?

It is relatively easy to get people organized to defend their own turf.  It is harder to get them to protect others equally.

Agreed that the Brit handling of Basra appears to have been "uneven" at best - and I am being charitable - and they haven't managed the militias they permitted - but I am still a supporter of local forces.  I am also a supporter of actively confronting local criminals whether they are operating individually, in gangs or as a miltia.  Just as in Baghdad the Brits have had to put up with not just Sadr's Mahdi army but also the Badr Brigade and a whole bunch of tribes and other free-agents.
 
Still getting even a local state run defense force run by the local government is an improvement over the current situation, just ensure they will not be strong enough to take on the national army.
 
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