Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones

[PanaEng]

....so to alleviate any confusion, henceforth and from this day forward the term "drone" will be replaced by the term "worker bee"... ;D

I'll have a hive of the killer type...

:christmas happy:
couldn't resist...

good morning everyone

and I don't care if the video feed is encrypted or not:
Abdul: "Muhamad, Ali, Ahmed come here and look at this."
Ali: "Hey! it looks like our house. Ahmed, go outside and wave your arms"
Muhamad: "Crap! that's him - its getting closer - Shit - Allahu akbar!..... EOT

cheers,
Frank

 

[KingofKeys]

Not sure what you mean by that. That Iran is involved ?

Yup. That is exactly what I meant. Not that I was surprised but I wasn't expecting it either. :camo:

 

[Jammer]

Do you have another source that can lend some consistancy to your analysis?

 

[rampage800]

Flawed Design

To answer your question, in my opinion its nothing really more than an early warning receiver and for the most part I would think that the average INS or even MVT for that matter, doesn't have this cape. Its also highly unlikely that the HVTs have the corresponding maps to know where the UAV is actually looking, I would think that it more that they have a guy watching the screen and when all of a sudden a picture appears they know that an airframe of some sort is fairly close (because I doubt this device has an external antenna so has very limited range and also has to be outside to view).

There already is a way to defeat this so the INS seeing this might just lull them into a false sense of security as well...........a few of the reports I've read have mentioned the US capturing laptops from raids in Iraq over a year ago with footage yet they still seem to be dropping GBU-12s and AGM-114s so that in itself I would think speak volumes towards the effectiveness of this "device".

For the pers who are saying that it can be done, you're absolutely right, it can, but if you read the article Journeyman posted you'll see the problems it would create. There are thousands of receivers in theatre right now, not all of them are made by L-3, as well not all the footage is coming off of UAVs, I'd bet theres over a dozen different pods being used right now over there...........it'll get fixed or rectified but trying to do it in the middle of a war might be the wrong time and you certainly don't want to isolate any of your allies who decide not to encrypt because I dunno, maybe they don't want to spend the money because they're pulling out soon or maybe the software they are using isn't compatible with everyone elses. Just a couple of I'm sure many problems that come to mind.

Anyhow a few assumptions on my part and kind of long winded but you can draw your own conclusions, mostly just my opinion.

Happy Holidays  :christmas happy:

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Here is a report from security expert on the UAV video feeds. As he points out the problem is not encrypting the video feed, but managing all the encryption keys. Having worked with crypto material I know how much of a pain it can be making sure you have all the proper keys, they are keyed at the proper time, properly stored, etc, and what to do if problems happen, and they will.  Then imaging you have dozens of different units spread all over Afghanistan, and of different nationalities who may or may not be very fluent in English.

Here is his report in whole (under the usual caveats about Fair Dealings, etc).

Schneier on Security

December 24, 2009
Intercepting Predator Video

Sometimes mediocre encryption is better than strong encryption, and sometimes no encryption is better still.

The Wall Street Journal reported this week that Iraqi, and possibly also Afghan, militants are using commercial software to eavesdrop on U.S. Predators, other unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, and even piloted planes. The systems weren't "hacked" -- the insurgents can’t control them -- but because the downlink is unencrypted, they can watch the same video stream as the coalition troops on the ground.

The naive reaction is to ridicule the military. Encryption is so easy that HDTVs do it -- just a software routine and you're done -- and the Pentagon has known about this flaw since Bosnia in the 1990s. But encrypting the data is the easiest part; key management is the hard part. Each UAV needs to share a key with the ground station. These keys have to be produced, guarded, transported, used and then destroyed. And the equipment, both the Predators and the ground terminals, needs to be classified and controlled, and all the users need security clearance.

The command and control channel is, and always has been, encrypted -- because that's both more important and easier to manage. UAVs are flown by airmen sitting at comfortable desks on U.S. military bases, where key management is simpler. But the video feed is different. It needs to be available to all sorts of people, of varying nationalities and security clearances, on a variety of field terminals, in a variety of geographical areas, in all sorts of conditions -- with everything constantly changing. Key management in this environment would be a nightmare.

Additionally, how valuable is this video downlink is to the enemy? The primary fear seems to be that the militants watch the video, notice their compound being surveilled and flee before the missiles hit. Or notice a bunch of Marines walking through a recognizable area and attack them. This might make a great movie scene, but it's not very realistic. Without context, and just by peeking at random video streams, the risk caused by eavesdropping is low.

Contrast this with the additional risks if you encrypt: A soldier in the field doesn't have access to the real-time video because of a key management failure; a UAV can't be quickly deployed to a new area because the keys aren't in place; we can't share the video information with our allies because we can't give them the keys; most soldiers can't use this technology because they don't have the right clearances. Given this risk analysis, not encrypting the video is almost certainly the right decision.

There is another option, though. During the Cold War, the NSA's primary adversary was Soviet intelligence, and it developed its crypto solutions accordingly. Even though that level of security makes no sense in Bosnia, and certainly not in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is what the NSA had to offer. If you encrypt, they said, you have to do it "right."

The problem is, the world has changed. Today's insurgent adversaries don't have KGB-level intelligence gathering or cryptanalytic capabilities. At the same time, computer and network data gathering has become much cheaper and easier, so they have technical capabilities the Soviets could only dream of. Defending against these sorts of adversaries doesn't require military-grade encryption only where it counts; it requires commercial-grade encryption everywhere possible.

This sort of solution would require the NSA to develop a whole new level of lightweight commercial-grade security systems for military applications — not just office-data "Sensitive but Unclassified" or "For Official Use Only" classifications. It would require the NSA to allow keys to be handed to uncleared UAV operators, and perhaps read over insecure phone lines and stored in people's back pockets. It would require the sort of ad hoc key management systems you find in internet protocols, or in DRM systems. It wouldn't be anywhere near perfect, but it would be more commensurate with the actual threats.

And it would help defend against a completely different threat facing the Pentagon: The PR threat. Regardless of whether the people responsible made the right security decision when they rushed the Predator into production, or when they convinced themselves that local adversaries wouldn't know how to exploit it, or when they forgot to update their Bosnia-era threat analysis to account for advances in technology, the story is now being played out in the press. The Pentagon is getting beaten up because it's not protecting against the threat — because it's easy to make a sound bite where the threat sounds really dire. And now it has to defend against the perceived threat to the troops, regardless of whether the defense actually protects the troops or not. Reminds me of the TSA, actually.

So the military is now committed to encrypting the video ... eventually. The next generation Predators, called Reapers -- Who names this stuff? Second-grade boys? -- will have the same weakness. Maybe we’ll have encrypted video by 2010, or 2014, but I don't think that's even remotely possible unless the NSA relaxes its key management and classification requirements and embraces a lightweight, less secure encryption solution for these sorts of situations. The real failure here is the failure of the Cold War security model to deal with today's threats. [My emphasis]

 

[PanaEng]

I think this sentence sums up the POV on the article:

There is another option, though. During the Cold War, the NSA's primary adversary was Soviet intelligence, and it developed its crypto solutions accordingly. Even though that level of security makes no sense in Bosnia, and certainly not in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is what the NSA had to offer. If you encrypt, they said, you have to do it "right."

i.e. stuck in cold war process and controls.

Today encryption is a commodity technology. You don't need special clearance or technology to handle it, produce keys, distribute them. Anyone can use encryption and anyone can attempt to break it with free or commercial sw.  You use encryption every day you log in to your bank from your pc; when you use your BB; when you video chat using skype.

The issue here is that the video feed is not considered important enough to encrypt and tedious to do so due to the impositions of the respective MIL-SPEC (see quote above) and the Key handling problems when the information is required by many parties. ( Re MIL-SPEC: In the 80's there was this push to have all SW written in Ada - where is that today? still around but very rare)

What I say is that it does not have to be black or white (open or TS). Encryption keys can be negotiated on the fly - per session. It does not have to be "secret" or "top secret" grade - just like in the web browsers we use every day and just hard enough to make it a pain to hack into.  A receiver from a third party would need to authenticate itself with the owner of the feed and obtain the appropriate key. There is enough bandwidth in the current systems/channels/bands so there is no need to alter any other component - theoretically speaking since a plug in module will still need a receptacle created  ;D  - and it could all fit in nothing more than the "Enter" key on your keyboard.

However, that's all theoretical. We can list all kinds of examples of how it is available but the bottom line is that some company(s) ha(s/ve) a contract for systems and support, including inter-working with other systems and unless the specs are changed and new projects/contracts awarded, it is not going to change.

cheers,
Frank

 

[rampage800]

Frank

I guess you missed the part of the article in bold stating that encrypting would be the easy part.

If you could show me an 'Enter' key on some of the receivers it might work but guess what......

 

[PanaEng]

Frank

I guess you missed the part of the article in bold stating that encrypting would be the easy part.

If you could show me an 'Enter' key on some of the receivers it might work but guess what......

True enough.
I think I did allude to that but did not make it clear that I understand that. Anyway, with todays technology it is easy and cheap - but compatibility, standards and ongoing contracts makes it very hard to implement and the value of the data does not justify it at the moment.

;D on my Mac it is exactly 2 keys to the right of my right pinky (i was just comparing the size of an equivalent component)

cheers,
Frank