In a strict sense you of course are correct, but the number of Infantry Battalions is not really out of line from what the Government says it expects from the Army. Strong, Secure, Engaged states that:
THE BRIGADE GROUP The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner
I find it a contradiction when SSE, in a sidebar, recognizes that a brigade group "is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns" and then sets task that do not go above BG levels - I guess technically they aren't all that joint ... but still.
If you expect the Brigade to consist of 3 x Infantry Battalions and you expect to be able to deploy your Brigade within a reasonable time frame in a crisis (i.e. keeping a portion of your force at heightened readiness) and if you expect to have enough depth in the Army to sustain that Brigade in combat then an Army consisting of 3 x Brigades (9 x Infantry Battalions) is not out of line for that expectation.
I think what
@KevinB is pointing out is that a brigade doesn't call for three infantry battalions but three manoeuvre units. That's eventually how 4 CMBG ended up with one tank regiment and two infantry battalions.
I'm really not so sure that you need 3 brigades (9 battalions) to deploy 1 brigade. What you really need is one full brigade group to deploy and then a force generation structure behind that to generate rotos, replacements and lost equipment to keep it up to strength. You do not need a two supporting one structure nor a managed readiness cycle.
If you recall, 1st Canadian Army in Europe had three infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, two armoured brigades and a hockey sock of Army and Corps troops in Europe but back in Canada there were only three other divisions and an armoured brigade but there was a force generation structure to replace losses.
I think that the Army has lost the plot. It settled on a RegF army structure several decades ago and have fought ever since to maintain its status quo by finding roles and processes to justify its existence and every PY. We would never have been able to deploy 4 CMBG to Europe if we had sent them on 6 month rotos with a managed readiness program. It would have required 6 brigades to do that. As it stands each corps fights tooth and nail for every PY and every capability in order to maintain its relevance. It needs a review and reality check.
Of course you can adjust the structure of the Brigade which will affect the number of component units you'd need and you can adjust the portion of the Brigade you expect to be available at high readiness for deployment and how quickly you expect to be able to put together the balance of the Brigade (as well as how long you plan to be able to sustain it in combat) which will all affect what portion of the Brigade should be Reg Force and what portion should be Reserves, but overall the basic current structure of the Army broadly reflects the structure you'd need in order to be able to fight a Brigade.
In very broad and general terms I agree with that. The problem is that the devil is in the details - artillery batteries are at 4 guns because M777s require a crew of 10 vice 7 and because each battery had to shift extra people into an expanded FSCC and extra FOO parties. There are now 2 gun batteries in a regiment vice 3 because the Army recognized that Surveillance and Target Acquisition was important. BUT - it wouldn't give one additional PYs to the artillery for those FSCCs or FOOs or STA or gun det members - hence we have a 8 gun regiments rather than an 18 gun one. The Army is trying to squeeze ten pounds of s**t into five pound bags. It will pay for that one day.
You could equally say that Canada's Army is significantly armour/artillery light compared to the US Army.
Interestingly a Canadian brigade seems to be established at 4,800 (as per SSE - I actually think its lighter at around 4,400 established positions but don't have access to the actual numbers these days) and that's considering shortfalls in critical areas that need ResF augmentation. In the US, on the other hand, an ABCT is fully manned at 4,200; an SBCT at 4,440 and an IBCT at 4,230. And they do have 18 gun artillery battalions. So we're already equal to, if not heavier, than a BCT as far as personnel are concerned. Surprisingly though, an SBCT rifle battalion is larger than ours at 780 (inclusive of its Forward Support Company) while Canada's RegF battalions are allocated roughly 600 PYs.
I'm certainly not saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option that Canada COULD go with, but I guess I'm saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option Canada CAN go with based on the equipment we have currently. And I don't see any programs on the books to increase the number of tanks we have, so....
I think the fallacy is that we look at equipment as the big ticket item when what really cost the big cash is the annual paycheck for the folks manning it. An M777 and a LAV has 10 folks running it. A tank has 4. An ABCT tank company has an establishment of 62 while a rifle company has 135. That's less than half on the recurring paychecks albeit gas is more expensive. Not sure about ammo considering infantry now shoot pretty pricey missiles in training too.
If you go to an SP gun that has a crew of 5 including ammo handlers then you cut the annual recurring personnel costs in half. Even better if 50% of those are properly trained ResF members on a standby status until needed.
There are many places where one can cut personnel costs. Infantry dismounts within a battalion isn't one of those. But does Canada really need nine RegF battalions of infantry and a SOR when our current recurring deployed needs are a half battalion for Latvia and another half battalion of smaller taskings? Or can Canada do it with three or four such battalions and force generate rotations for peacetime missions as required from less expensive ResF or short term contracts soldiers on an as required basis?
Would we be better served by one RegF brigade group which is fully organized, trained and equipped as a deployable combat entity for NATO backed up by two to four primarily ResF brigades (but RegF led) and a second RegF brigade whose role is simply to hold a varying number of unit HQs and RegF personnel whose role is to force generate contingents for specific "peacetime" missions by way of recruiting and ResF mobilization?
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