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Infantry Vehicles

FJAG

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Since 1946 the accepted standard unit of force for the defence of Canada has been the Company. And the target has been "SOF" types and small arms.
How much of this was ever a real scenario in defence of Canada? Or was it a problem we invented so that we could exercise stand alone companies and say we were doing something under the "securing the homeland" mandate of our defence policy?

I have a hard time conceiving of such an attack that wouldn't have met its objectives long before our reaction forces could be brought to bear.

Let's face it. If this were a true threat, we would have long ago adopted the local territorial defence structures that you keep suggesting. But we haven't.

🍻
 

markppcli

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I think the weight limit is an issue. We have much better, more efficient engines now than when the AVGP came out so you can get more performance out with a smaller engine and power train, but armour is still armour at that scale.

We've been on a trend now for several years to uparmour everything so as to provide more protection and each time we do we find yet another offensive weapon that can take on the new armour so, once again, we push up the protection. Here's an article reaching back to 2018 which considers the trend unsustainable.

I really don't care about whether a vehicle looks like an armoured pickup truck or a Piranha, if weight (7 tons) and size (fits in a Chinook) is the issue, then there is only so much you can do with a vehicle as to its pax carrying capacity and level of armour protection.

I still prefer a VBL to a TAPV as a scout car any day of the week. It's a third of a TAPV's weight (4 v 14-18 tons) and slightly more than one half its height (1.7 to 3.2 metres). Does one really need those three extra people for a "patrol" vehicle?

View attachment 70942

When it comes to the question of carrying an infantry section, then weight and size for Heli lift become mute. We really do have to face the issue of whether the section fights the vehicle or not. Something like the Italian Puma is not a section carrier. It is closer to TAPV in its passenger configuration which begs the question of what is it used for? As far as I know the Puma is being phased out for the armoured truck-like VTLM Lince which is classified as an infantry mobility vehicle for patrolling, reconnaissance and security duties and it looks like the Italians confine them to the Alpini and Paratroop regiments. I would want to know a whole lot more about how those units use these vehicles on a regular basis before making any value judgement about a vehicle with such a limited. Personally I see a very limited use for a vehicle that carries only three or four dismounts.

🍻
The Alpini we worked with used the Linces for the AT section, Snipers, and their recce giys. The rifle platoons were in BV 206s which they fought like IFVs, but that might have just been for range purposes. They were usually cut away from us for other tasks on exercise.
 

FJAG

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The Alpini we worked with used the Linces for the AT section, Snipers, and their recce giys. The rifle platoons were in BV 206s which they fought like IFVs, but that might have just been for range purposes. They were usually cut away from us for other tasks on exercise.
Actually I just read an article from folks with the US 173 Airborne Brigade in Vicenza integrated into an Alpini battalion for an exercise and they too mention using the BV 206s as section carriers. That confirms my suspicion that Linces don't fulfil a role in their rifle platoons.

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Kirkhill

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How much of this was ever a real scenario in defence of Canada? Or was it a problem we invented so that we could exercise stand alone companies and say we were doing something under the "securing the homeland" mandate of our defence policy?

I have a hard time conceiving of such an attack that wouldn't have met its objectives long before our reaction forces could be brought to bear.

Let's face it. If this were a true threat, we would have long ago adopted the local territorial defence structures that you keep suggesting. But we haven't.

🍻


We did adopt the Territorial Defence Structure I keep talking about. We called them Rangers. Their primary job is to observe and report. We don't have the population density in most of the country to mount a QRF from local resources. The QRF has to come from some distance away.

My sales territory, once upon a time extended from Vancouver Island to the Lakehead (roughly a 3 to 4 hour flight if you could get a direct flight like in the old days). In Europe the equivalent flight would see me taking off from London, overflying the Channel, Brussels, Luxembourg, Berlin, Warsaw, the Baltics, Belarus and landing in Russia somewhere around Belhorod east of the Ukrainian border. In other words half way across Canada is all the way across Europe. If you fly that distance north from Winnipeg you end up somewhere in the Resolute area. You are still a thousand kilometers short of Alert. But you know all this...

The best we could do, with aircraft parked on the runway and ready to scramble, and troops packed, co-located and ready to load would be ....
Wait we couldn't do that...
But the RCAF do do that

Only when they launch they carry missiles, not troops.

Maloney 1993

Abstract

The need to project land force power within the confines of the northern portion of the North American continent may appear, at first glance, ridiculous in today’s world. In the early years of the Cold War, both Canada and the United States gave credibility to a land supported air threat to North America and took steps to meet such a contingency. The Canadian response was to configure the small, almost token, active Canadian Army into an airtransportable formation called the Mobile Striking Force (MSF). Some have suggested that the creation of the MSF and its operations in the 1948–1955 period was not only a waste of resources but distracted the Canadian Army from training for other, more important tasks

The Need

In September 1946, the MCC (of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence) developed a joint
appreciation for defence requirements in North
America with the intention of revising the
wartime defence plan, known as ABC-22.
Developed from a U.S. strategic study called
PINCHER,6 the MCC's appreciation was based
on the premise that, by 1950, the Soviets
would be able to hinder Canadian and U.S.
industrial capacity in a global war through the
use of guided missiles, conventional and atomic
long range bombers, airborne and amphibious

attack and internal subversion. The MCC
appreciation emphasized the interdependency
of Canada and the U.S. in continental defence;
the U.S. was dependent on bases in Canada to
project power from its bases in Alaska,
Greenland and Iceland, while Canadian security
was dependent upon the need to protect U.S.
industrial potential that would be applied
overseas against the Soviet Union and in the
defence of Europe.

By October 1946, the U. S. JCS had
developed a more complete threat estimate
and response within the context of PINCHER.
Known as BROADVIEW, the objective of
defending North America was to "safeguard
our military capability by protecting the vital
elements of our war potential."8 Since
BROADVIEW provided the context of the
Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan (BSP), that
is, the ABC-22 revision, its discussion of
possible threats to North American security
was notable. BROADVIEW anticipated that,
up to 1950, the Soviets could use subversion
and sabotage by internal groups; covert
biological and chemical attacks; air attacks
against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the
use of airborne irregular forces ranging

throughout the continent. By 1952,
BROADVIEW planners projected the use of
the atomic bomb delivered by long range
aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland,
Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of
Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces.9

The Plan with no Force

The 1946 Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan
discussed previously required Canada to
provide one airborne or airtransportable brigade
group and its attendant airlift as part of the
overall continental defence scheme. Initially,
the Cabinet Defence Committee referred to this
commitment as the Mobile Reserve, to be
supplied from units of the Active Force to
prevent the Soviets from gaining a lodgement
in North America. However, no plans for its
creation or composition were implemented
before 1948.

The Force with no Plan

It should be emphasized that in 1948 the
MSF was a very rudimentary organization. The
MSF did not exist as a formation in the same
sense that a brigade group of three battalions
does; the Active Force infantry battalions,
engineers, artillery and services were located
in many different locations across Canada.
The Active Force itself did constitute a brigade
group with armoured support and it did train
for conventional combined arms operations on
a limited basis. There was no MSF headquarters
in 1948, no training higher than company level
in parachute or arctic operations, no
airtransportable oversnow vehicles nor was
there any mechanism for coordinating with the
RCAF, which was supposed to provide transport
aircraft for the MSF.21 The Army Plans
Committee had drawn up a brief in which the
three infantry battalions, an engineer squadron
and some service support could be formed into
an MSF brigade group but there were too many
of the above factors militating against its
creation. Additionally, under the terms of the
BSP, the MSF could be airborne or
airtransportable but the method of delivery
had not been decided upon in 1948.22

The 60 Day NTM Quick Reaction Parachute Battle Group.

...prior to May 1949,
Canada was required to provide one parachute
infantry battalion group on day 60 of a war,
followed by one within 130 days and another in
180 days. After May 1949, Canada was expected
to have one battalion group available
immediately, followed by two battalions in the
field within 60 and 120 days respectively.23

Forward Deployed Company Groups

Some thought was given to
eliminating the MSF brigade headquarters,
allocating one battalion each to the Western
Command and the Eastern Command and
calling the organization the Northern Combat
Force. This idea was dropped since it included
a proposal to forward base the company groups
in the northern regions; this would have had
severe morale repercussions and would have
limited the ability of the MSF to react to a larger
threat.3

The End

the MSF waxed and waned in the late 1950s. By 1957,
airborne continental defence had come full
circle as one company group from each of three
infantry battalions based in Canada were
assigned to the ambiguous "Defence of Canada
Force" which possessed no brigade
headquarters or joint liaison with the RCAF.
By the early 1960s, the DCF was whittled down
to a token company group.

For a short period of time, before the advent of the ICBM there was considered to be a threat of a Division of Russian VDV descending on Thule or Churchill to create a FOL for launching Russian Bombers. That threat came and went.

But the pre-existing threat of "subversion and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland (And Canada and CONUS) and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent" have not completely disappeared - although the airborne irregulars are now likely to fly Air Canada or a company charter.


Quick observation on the Morale front. The CAF seems to struggle with posting people remote from Starbucks. And yet the Mounties have detachments of 2 or 3 all over everywhere.
 

Kirkhill

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Actually I just read an article from folks with the US 173 Airborne Brigade in Vicenza integrated into an Alpini battalion for an exercise and they too mention using the BV 206s as section carriers. That confirms my suspicion that Linces don't fulfil a role in their rifle platoons.

🍻

So do the sections own the Bvs or does the Battalion Transport Pl own them or does, as in the case of the Royal Marines, the Brigade own them?
 

markppcli

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Unsure, I’d assume they aren’t dissimilar from other Italian units and the vehicles belong to their sections.
 

Good2Golf

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We did adopt the Territorial Defence Structure I keep talking about. We called them Rangers. Their primary job is to observe and report. We don't have the population density in most of the country to mount a QRF from local resources. The QRF has to come from some distance away.

My sales territory, once upon a time extended from Vancouver Island to the Lakehead (roughly a 3 to 4 hour flight if you could get a direct flight like in the old days). In Europe the equivalent flight would see me taking off from London, overflying the Channel, Brussels, Luxembourg, Berlin, Warsaw, the Baltics, Belarus and landing in Russia somewhere around Belhorod east of the Ukrainian border. In other words half way across Canada is all the way across Europe. If you fly that distance north from Winnipeg you end up somewhere in the Resolute area. You are still a thousand kilometers short of Alert. But you know all this...

The best we could do, with aircraft parked on the runway and ready to scramble, and troops packed, co-located and ready to load would be ....
Wait we couldn't do that...
But the RCAF do do that

Only when they launch they carry missiles, not troops.

Maloney 1993



The Need





The Plan with no Force



The Force with no Plan



The 60 Day NTM Quick Reaction Parachute Battle Group.



Forward Deployed Company Groups



The End




For a short period of time, before the advent of the ICBM there was considered to be a threat of a Division of Russian VDV descending on Thule or Churchill to create a FOL for launching Russian Bombers. That threat came and went.

But the pre-existing threat of "subversion and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland (And Canada and CONUS) and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent" have not completely disappeared - although the airborne irregulars are now likely to fly Air Canada or a company charter.


Quick observation on the Morale front. The CAF seems to struggle with posting people remote from Starbucks. And yet the Mounties have detachments of 2 or 3 all over everywhere.
Kirkhill, unless I misread FJAG’s post, I believe he was making a point about there being a logical limit to element size domestically, re: Coy/sub-unit not being truly representative of practical sub-sub/sub-sub-sub-unit level employment territorially. This piece above of yours is travelling to another Universe, not developing ArmyRick’s Sect/PL infantry thoughts/dialogue. There more than enough grist in PRes and other threads for you - I think, as a semi-objective blue(ish) guy, that we should stick closer to ArmyRick’s theme, and venture elsewhere to scale up…
 

Kirkhill

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Kirkhill, unless I misread FJAG’s post, I believe he was making a point about there being a logical limit to element size domestically, re: Coy/sub-unit not being truly representative of practical sub-sub/sub-sub-sub-unit level employment territorially. This piece above of yours is travelling to another Universe, not developing ArmyRick’s Sect/PL infantry thoughts/dialogue. There more than enough grist in PRes and other threads for you - I think, as a semi-objective blue(ish) guy, that we should stick closer to ArmyRick’s theme, and venture elsewhere to scale up…

I wander. Sorry.


How much of this was ever a real scenario in defence of Canada? Or was it a problem we invented so that we could exercise stand alone companies and say we were doing something under the "securing the homeland" mandate of our defence policy?

I have a hard time conceiving of such an attack that wouldn't have met its objectives long before our reaction forces could be brought to bear.

Let's face it. If this were a true threat, we would have long ago adopted the local territorial defence structures that you keep suggesting. But we haven't.

This is what I was responding to.

Which in turn was related to this

Other than SOF I wouldn’t consider Hook lift for a vehicle in Canada, you don’t have enough to move a Light BN let alone any vehicles.


The discussion was about sections and platoons (sub-sub-sub units and sub-sub-units - do you guys really talk like that? - anyway) We got off on a vehicular tangent.

The first questions in organizing the SSSU and the SSU (if I may?) is what do you want them to do and where do you want them to do it?
Next is what do they need to get the job done.
How will they carry it?


An SSSU operating within a well resourced Formation will operate one way. An SSSU working with more autonomy in an independent company combat team will face different challenges.

My bias is that the European context demands the Heavy Armoured Formation. I am of the opinion that the LAV is neither fish nor fowl, especially the way that it and its section are equipped. That Formation should be properly resourced for that task.

But.

I am also of the opinion that there is an inadequate amount of attention paid to the defence of North America - something that the our neighbours and occasional protectors have been bringing to our attention since 1946. And they are re-emphasising that again today with their Continental Defence initiatives.

I am of the belief that the Continental Defence force, whatever it looks like, would benefit from being air and heli-portable. To that end I think that the upper end of the range of vehicles has been set by the US - specifically the assessed limit of 7 tonnes to be compatible with a CH-47 sling load. Which gives the JLTV. I think that there are other, better, lighter platforms that could be produced in Canada. GDLS has an interesting base of designs from which to start.

Kevin suggested that Canada doesn't have the lift to move a battalion. I countered that I didn't think a battalion was the requirement. That the Company Tm (or I could say the Commando) was the standard for much of the period post 1946 for both the US and Canada. I still think that.

FJAG countered that he was not convinced that the Company Team was anything more than an administrative fiction dreamed up at NDHQ.

I sougth to offer a divergent opinion by citing references to Permanent Joint Board of Defence advice.

Which brings me back to the point that there is, in my opinion, a need for two very different types of platoons in the Canadian Army, one for the Heavy fight in Europe and one for the Domestic front that can be a Light Force.

I do not think that one, all singing, all dancing Platoon will get both jobs done. Especially if we try to pretend that a Medium Force is both an adequate replacement for a Heavy Force and a Light Force. In my opinion it is neither.

I would as soon stick one foot in boiling water and the other in a bucket of ice and declare myself to be comfortable because it all averages out.


So

Sections and Platoons for Europe - Panzergrenadiers in CV90s
Sections and Platoons for North America - USMC in whatever is availlable

LAVS? - great rear area transport for Europe - but it doesn't need a Bushmaster in that role.
 

KevinB

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I’m big on the CV90 or bigger concept for Europe.
I’m not against the LAV as a major component of a medium force, I’d still like it to have a larger cannon and turret integrated ATGM, so it can fight a tank if need be.

Canada should be able to field 6 Bde of troops if a workable PRes is created.

2 Heavy facing Europe (maybe 1 pre deployed) tracked CS and CSS.
2 Medium LAV based, wheeled SPA etc
2 Light (1 Airborne, 1 Airmobile, both with secondary roles of Arctic, Mountain and maybe even Amphibious if the RCN is interested.
 

FJAG

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FJAG countered that he was not convinced that the Company Team was anything more than an administrative fiction dreamed up at NDHQ.
Not quite what I said or meant. My point was the training concept we've had during the seventies and into the eighties where we constantly had platoons attacking isolated section positions and companies attacking isolated platoon positions were a training fiction to facilitate platoon and company training. Company teams or, more properly, "combat teams" as tactical groupings, I have absolutely no problems with.

I always thought that the concept of an isolated enemy section or platoon sitting in the middle of nowhere had no air of reality about it.
I sougth to offer a divergent opinion by citing references to Permanent Joint Board of Defence advice.
The 1940s bomber threat was long gone by the seventies. That's why we cashiered the Voodoo and its Genie rockets.

Which brings me back to the point that there is, in my opinion, a need for two very different types of platoons in the Canadian Army, one for the Heavy fight in Europe and one for the Domestic front that can be a Light Force.
I think - three - but see below.

I do not think that one, all singing, all dancing Platoon will get both jobs done. Especially if we try to pretend that a Medium Force is both an adequate replacement for a Heavy Force and a Light Force. In my opinion it is neither.
There needs to be standard "dismounted element" TTPs as much as possible with minor deviations to allow for the differing vehicles and their weapons systems.

I’m big on the CV90 or bigger concept for Europe.
I’m not against the LAV as a major component of a medium force, I’d still like it to have a larger cannon and turret integrated ATGM, so it can fight a tank if need be.
Agreed

Canada should be able to field 6 Bde of troops if a workable PRes is created.

2 Heavy facing Europe (maybe 1 pre deployed) tracked CS and CSS.
2 Medium LAV based, wheeled SPA etc
2 Light (1 Airborne, 1 Airmobile, both with secondary roles of Arctic, Mountain and maybe even Amphibious if the RCN is interested.
Like you, I still see a role for the LAV (if upgraded the way that you suggest) As a country we still have other tasks besides Europe and North America. The most obvious is peacekeeping missions amongst shabbily armed parties in Third World countries.

I disagree about six manoeuvre brigades. I think with our current establishments we can only field 5 because we need to also dedicate roughly 8 - 10,000 PYs and Class A positions to combat support and combat service support brigades.

Of your six manoeuvre brigades I would give up one of the two light brigades, in part, because we already have enough LAVs to equip two medium brigades. In my own napkin force I did squeeze in two extra 10/90 ResF light battalions - so 1 x light brigade but five light rifle battalions, three RegF heavy and two ResF heavy (1 x west coast mountain and 1 x east coast amphibious). I just couldn't squeeze out the bulk of the 6th manoeuvre brigade.

That "if a workable PRes is created" is a sine qua non. Personally, If I was MND I would fire any CDS/CLS who doesn't make that his top priority.

🍻
 

FJAG

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To get back to the vehicle portion of this thread, I see a clear need for three types of section vehicles:

a. for the heavy force, a proper tracked IFV with a 35 to 40mm gun and an ATGM capability. My preference is for a RWS structure;

b. for the medium force, a reconfigured LAV 6.0. As a minimum there needs to be an add on ATGM. My preference would be for the same turret/RWS as for the IFV so that there is a common training standard as between the heavy and medium force crews;

c for the light force, in general, something very light for transport only and with absolutely no pretense of being a fighting vehicle (thinking something like the ISV). But yes, I would agree to special mobility vehicles (such as BVs) for specific terrain. My thought is to hold these in a special mobility company(ies) at brigade (possibly at battalion) where they, their drivers and LMTs would be assigned on an as required basis.

I'm having some trouble in seeing an army as small as ours having specialty section vehicles for the light brigade for patrolling (such as Foxhound or Mastiff or any of the other animals used by the Brits) if we also want to fill Arctic, amphibious, mountain, airmobile and airborne roles. My view is the light infantry goes really light and the heavy infantry goes really heavy. Anything else is a medium brigade job with the LAV 6.

🍻
 

KevinB

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I'm having some trouble in seeing an army as small as ours having specialty section vehicles for the light brigade for patrolling (such as Foxhound or Mastiff or any of the other animals used by the Brits) if we also want to fill Arctic, amphibious, mountain, airmobile and airborne roles. My view is the light infantry goes really light and the heavy infantry goes really heavy. Anything else is a medium brigade job with the LAV 6.

🍻
I see ATV’s, some Argo type vehicles, Snowmobiles and Bv206 are all that are required for Canadian territory patrolling for the Light Forces.
An ISV type mobility vehicle for the sections (and I’m frankly a big fan of the GMVW Hummer) or the new Army GMV
8C80AAE0-2AE3-40B7-B0F6-859F85B71615.jpeg
The new A-GMV is slingable under a Blackhawk or internally by a Hook or Herc, and can be jumped out of a Herc etc.

I’m of the opinion that light vehicles need to be viewed more as admin vehicles to provide mobility and logistics support to Light Forces - one needs to accept they aren’t A vehicles and aren’t designed for combat - but can be used for Firebase roles in some conflicts.
 

IKnowNothing

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To get back to the vehicle portion of this thread, I see a clear need for three types of section vehicles:

a. for the heavy force, a proper tracked IFV with a 35 to 40mm gun and an ATGM capability. My preference is for a RWS structure;
Future- that word for word, Lynx with the remote Lance fits the bill
Current- Lav 6 as it stands, with a small number (CS direct fire platoon) returreted with RT60 or Cockerill C3035/40
b. for the medium force, a reconfigured LAV 6.0. As a minimum there needs to be an add on ATGM. My preference would be for the same turret/RWS as for the IFV so that there is a common training standard as between the heavy and medium force crews;
Future- Modernized Stryker with suite of RWS/Remote Turrets. In my opinion that medium force should be in the 20 tonne range and have a lot more strategic mobility

Current- TAPV, some with upgraded weapons. Not ideal, but the start of a fundamental shift in how we see and use the "Medium" in a full spectrum force (more below)
c for the light force, in general, something very light for transport only and with absolutely no pretense of being a fighting vehicle (thinking something like the ISV). But yes, I would agree to special mobility vehicles (such as BVs) for specific terrain. My thought is to hold these in a special mobility company(ies) at brigade (possibly at battalion) where they, their drivers and LMTs would be assigned on an as required basis.
Yup
I'm having some trouble in seeing an army as small as ours having specialty section vehicles for the light brigade for patrolling (such as Foxhound or Mastiff or any of the other animals used by the Brits) if we also want to fill Arctic, amphibious, mountain, airmobile and airborne roles. My view is the light infantry goes really light and the heavy infantry goes really heavy. Anything else is a medium brigade job with the LAV 6.

🍻
Going back to changing the way we see Medium. The Mastiff tops out at 22 tonnes- that doesn't belong anywhere near the discussion of a light brigade. The British use them transport for "Heavy Protect Mobility" Units, which seem like their version of the Styker teams, which seems like exactly the niche / chasm that the future medium Bde should be filling out.

Edit: I think the attempt to justify the entire force going medium required going medium+, which has evolved into heavy-. If we have a real heavy component the need for the all singing all dancing 28 tonne turreted "L"AV goes away.
 
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FJAG

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I see ATV’s, some Argo type vehicles, Snowmobiles and Bv206 are all that are required for Canadian territory patrolling for the Light Forces.
An ISV type mobility vehicle for the sections (and I’m frankly a big fan of the GMVW Hummer) or the new Army GMV
View attachment 70951
The new A-GMV is slingable under a Blackhawk or internally by a Hook or Herc, and can be jumped out of a Herc etc.

I’m of the opinion that light vehicles need to be viewed more as admin vehicles to provide mobility and logistics support to Light Forces - one needs to accept they aren’t A vehicles and aren’t designed for combat - but can be used for Firebase roles in some conflicts.
Not sure why this one hasn't popped up on my radar before.

It holds a section, is light, can be armed and armoured if required or desired, and recently came in at 118 copies for US$33.8 million. That's comparable to (even a touch cheaper than) the ISV. It doesn't quite have the COTS automotives that would make the ISV maintainable at the local GM dealer but otherwise it checks all the boxes and then some. At 70 or so to a battalion you could fit one out for US$20 million.

🍻
 

KevinB

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Future- that word for word, Lynx with the remote Lance fits the bill
Current- Lav 6 as it stands, with a small number (CS direct fire platoon) returreted with RT60 or Cockerill C3035/40
Lynx KF41 IFV looks fairly promising - the one issue I have with the Lance 2.0 turret is the ATGM setup is "pod" based = so no under armor reload .
One thing everyone should be making a take away is ALL forces - be it Heavy, Medium, or Light need to be able to dig in - the Kodiak AEV makes a lot of sense for a Leo2 based army to work with.

Future- Modernized Stryker with suite of RWS/Remote Turrets. In my opinion that medium force should be in the 20 tonne range and have a lot more strategic mobility

Current- TAPV, some with upgraded weapons. Not ideal, but the start of a fundamental shift in how we see and use the "Medium" in a full spectrum force (more below)
Honestly the LAV 6.0 isn't a bad Medium system to base around, the CA has the platforms, and quite frankly I don't via able truly viable 20t IFV systems available - sure it's heavier than one may want - but protected mobility comms with a weight penalty.
I suspect the 6.0 will morph into the LAV-700
Yup

Going back to changing the way we see Medium. The Mastiff tops out at 22 tonnes- that doesn't belong anywhere near the discussion of a light brigade. The British use them transport for "Heavy Protect Mobility" Units, which seem like their version of the Styker teams, which seems like exactly the niche / chasm that the future medium Bde should be filling out.

Edit: I think the attempt to justify the entire force going medium required going medium+, which has evolved into heavy-. If we have a real heavy component the need for the all singing all dancing 28 tonne turreted "L"AV goes away.
The issue I see with Medium Bde's is what does one expect of them.
If you also expect to be able to use them in high intensity conflicts - even if only as rear area security, convoy escort etc = they still need weapons and protection.
Thus weight of the medium force expands.
 

GR66

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Not sure why this one hasn't popped up on my radar before.

It holds a section, is light, can be armed and armoured if required or desired, and recently came in at 118 copies for US$33.8 million. That's comparable to (even a touch cheaper than) the ISV. It doesn't quite have the COTS automotives that would make the ISV maintainable at the local GM dealer but otherwise it checks all the boxes and then some. At 70 or so to a battalion you could fit one out for US$20 million.

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Isn't the A-GMV basically the failed Oshkosh/Flyer entry in the ISV program? Do we know what led to the GM entry beating out the A-GMV?

The Polaris Dagor was the other entry in the ISV competition. CANSOFCOM is already using this vehicle so it would not be a completely new vehicle for the CAF, but again I'd be curious as to why it lost out to the GM entry.
 

Brad Sallows

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Up-armouring to meet a threat is a losing proposition (there is always a bigger fish). For vehicles not intended to fight mounted in the mix against anything short of tanks, settle for wheels (optimize for non-tactical mobility), ballistic protection up to .50 inclusive, hull design to mitigate mines/IEDs, RWS plugin or mounting point, and either go large (minimum 10 pax + 2 crew with a view to 3 per platoon) or go small (5 pax + driver with a view to 6 per platoon). I suspect going small would produce a more versatile force.
 

FJAG

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Isn't the A-GMV basically the failed Oshkosh/Flyer entry in the ISV program? Do we know what led to the GM entry beating out the A-GMV?

The Polaris Dagor was the other entry in the ISV competition. CANSOFCOM is already using this vehicle so it would not be a completely new vehicle for the CAF, but again I'd be curious as to why it lost out to the GM entry.
I like the Dagor very much as a patrol vehicle, mortar carrier (with trailer) or ATGM team, in fact anything that employs a small detachment.

I'm somewhat stuck on the concept that I want my rifle sections transportable in one vehicle. In large part this is a command and control issue, in another its the additional burden of double the number of vehicles and people lost to driver/maintainer duties rather than rifles on the ground. I know that's arguable as there are some benefits to smaller and more vehicles as well, but that's the side of the argument I've settled into and I'm at the stage where I'm more swayed by confirmation bias rather than opposing viewpoints. Sometimes you just don't need to reinvent the wheel.

😁
 

IRepoCans

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The Dagor (and it's smaller MRZR cousin) is plagued with issues in actual execution and logistics, a lot of highly spec'd Toyotas are the actual ULCV for the command or they continue to use the armoured GMVs. 3RCR and the DFS cell in CTC have written up some decent literature on what kind of vehicle you need for the LIB (that can also mount the complete ensemble of DFS weapons: HMG, GMG and TOW / ATGM-R), and it resembles something akin to a Flyer-72.
 

Kirkhill

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Not quite what I said or meant. My point was the training concept we've had during the seventies and into the eighties where we constantly had platoons attacking isolated section positions and companies attacking isolated platoon positions were a training fiction to facilitate platoon and company training. Company teams or, more properly, "combat teams" as tactical groupings, I have absolutely no problems with.

I always thought that the concept of an isolated enemy section or platoon sitting in the middle of nowhere had no air of reality about it.

Sorry for the misunderstanding.

In terms of the Lawfield run I agree entirely. It should be made clearer that that particular exercise is simply a beginners level training exercise that is speedily followed by the next level once the basics of how to command manouevre have been grasped.

The 1940s bomber threat was long gone by the seventies. That's why we cashiered the Voodoo and its Genie rockets.

Agreed. But many of he other, more likely threats identified in 1946 are still possibilities, if not necessarily probabilities. The most common factor, in my opinion, is that they will likely take the form of scattered, small units, probably of section size or smaller and most likely be in civilian clothes and not equipped with heavy weapons. The counter force would be, first of all, the RCMP. But if the demand for their services overwhelmed them then the Army would need to supply platoon sized elements armed with small arms and light support weapons.

I think - three - but see below.

The debate continues :giggle:



There needs to be standard "dismounted element" TTPs as much as possible with minor deviations to allow for the differing vehicles and their weapons systems.

More debate. I am comfortable with ditching the whole army rotation plan and creating a specialist Panzergrenadier corps. Currently the Light Armoured Vehicle / Medium Armoured Vehicle is a stand in for an IFV which I would prefer to see as something like the CV90 or Puma or Bradley. The Heavy end of the spectrum

The other end of the spectrum is the General Duty Infantry - AKA the Light Infantry - people that get to the worksite by whatever means are available - Army Service Corps, RCAF or RCN. They take with them whatever equipment they can, including ground transport. The Light end of the spectrum.

In between, by definition is the Medium Force. One way to define a Medium Force is a Light Force with Heavy Elements. Another way, the Canadian/Shinsecki way is to make a lighter weight Heavy Force.

My inclination is to start from the Light Force end of the spectrum and add compatible heavier weight elements. To my way of thinking that starts with the Infantry Transport Platoon and the Recce Platoon and their needs ase well as the Service Bn Transport Coy and the Recce/ISR Sqn. Those are the minimal requirements for converting a Lt Infantry Battle Group into a Motorized Battle Group capable of some degree of manoeuvre.

Where I think Canada lost the plot was with the introduction of the 20 tonne LAV III and then the growth through the LORIT and LAV-UP programs to the 30 Tonne LAV 6.0. To my way of thinking we could have stopped at the 13 tonne LAV II Bison-Coyote level as an adjunct vehicle for the Light Force, employed as a Battalion/Brigade resource while clearly opting for the Close Combat Vehicle for the Panzergrenadiers and buying them the 40 tonne CV90 along with additional Leos.

Heavy Force would be intimately associated with their vehicles.
The Light Force would use vehicles as adjuncts, tools.

The government would make the Maintenance departments life miserable but it needs to buy multiple small fleets to accommodate Canada's multiple environments. The fleets would be best centrally managed, stored, maintained and driven and allocated to the force employed according to requirements of the mission. Army Service Corps as it was.


We agree on the CV90


Like you, I still see a role for the LAV (if upgraded the way that you suggest) As a country we still have other tasks besides Europe and North America. The most obvious is peacekeeping missions amongst shabbily armed parties in Third World countries.

I agree on there being a role for the LAV but I would be down-grading it to the 13 tonne LAV II model so that it could be transported easily by C130 and C17 in useful packets as an alternative to the Bv206/210 and an adjunct to the Argos and Sherps.


I disagree about six manoeuvre brigades. I think with our current establishments we can only field 5 because we need to also dedicate roughly 8 - 10,000 PYs and Class A positions to combat support and combat service support brigades.

Of your six manoeuvre brigades I would give up one of the two light brigades, in part, because we already have enough LAVs to equip two medium brigades. In my own napkin force I did squeeze in two extra 10/90 ResF light battalions - so 1 x light brigade but five light rifle battalions, three RegF heavy and two ResF heavy (1 x west coast mountain and 1 x east coast amphibious). I just couldn't squeeze out the bulk of the 6th manoeuvre brigade.

That "if a workable PRes is created" is a sine qua non. Personally, If I was MND I would fire any CDS/CLS who doesn't make that his top priority.

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If we are doing 6 Brigades then I would be doing this

A Panzer Brigade Forwards with a caretaker/security cadre
A Panzer Brigade Rear with the formed body of troops dedicated to training

The other 4 Brigades I would make them all Infantry Brigades, a mix of Reg and Reserve elements, with Regular Force Irmmediate Reaction Units.

The Infantry Brigades would have ready access to a variety of transport including some deployable armoured assets that could heavy up the lights and move them into the medium category if the mission demanded it.

And lots of emphasis on Fire Support, UAVs and EW.
 
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