How the US will fight - if it is able.

[Kirkhill]

Foregoing all reference to strategy, operations and tactics this article caught my interest because it suggests to me that the US shortage of funds is driving its sense of how it will fight into a vision that is closer to the capabilities and needs of its allies.  And, I believe, has the potential for making the US a more effective force. 

From WW2 the US has had the luxury of buying its victories with treasure.  Buy what you need.  Take your time. Build up overwhelming force.  Engage the enemy's centre of gravity.  Crush the little buggers like ants.

Problem.  Ants' nest easily destroyed.  Ants? Not so much.  Hang around too long and the ants will take you apart in an exceedingly painful manner.


Good news.

The US can now no longer afford to buy their way into trouble nor can they afford to hang around for very long.  If they are going to exploit the military avenue of approach to diplomacy they will have to deal with the realities overcome by the other great commanders of the past.    My two modern heroes are Slim and Sherwood Forrest.

The US Army now hopes to establish FUPs where the enemy is not and then act before the enemy knows it is there.  This demands taking a gamble and acting with what you can make available (Slim) in the shortest possible time (fustest mostest).

Canada's army has excelled in working with what it has.  If their politicians and diplomats don't over-reach.  Now the US will be facing the same challenge.

Defense-Aerospace

The Army Is Ready to Fight But Can DoD Get It There?


(Source: Lexington Institute; issued September 20, 2012)


(© Lexington Institute; reproduced by permission)



Responding to growing questions regarding the relevance of ground forces to future national security requirements, the Army is beginning to make the case for a new operational concept, one tailored to emerging challenges such as anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) threats and the loss of forward operating bases.

In prior conflicts -- including Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom -- the Army deployed into fixed ports and airfields, conducted a deliberate build-up of forces and then struck with overwhelming force. The new concept is to avoid known and targetable locations, deploy into austere places and use agility, mobility, superior situational awareness and surprise to defeat adversaries who may have a quantitative advantage.

The key is to use an indirect approach in the conduct of initial entry operations, essentially landing where the enemy doesn't expect you to be and isn't prepared to defend and then conducting fast-paced land operations to destroy the enemy's A2/AD capabilities, defenses, fracture his command and control and seize key objectives. Think Ariel Sharon and the crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973.

For this approach to work, the Army needs two things. The first is highly capable joint logistics that can support the landing of major formations over the beach. The second is sufficient logistics capabilities to sustain such a force without reliance on major ports and airfields.

These requirements necessitate both a lot of air and sea lift but also different kinds of capabilities. If you are deploying over the beach you have to have the right kind of ships and connectors between those ships and the shore. Airlifters have to be able to operate from smaller, austere airfields rather than large, well-equipped international airports.

In its recent massive annual wargame, Unified Quest 2012, the Army discovered that the Pentagon lacks both sufficient air and sealift assets as well as the right kind. For example, there are not enough high speed vessels to allow rapid closure to the beach. There are not enough roll-on/roll-off ships that can offload equipment and vehicles without requiring cranes. The Navy lacks the kind of ships, called mobile landing platforms, that can serve as expedient ports. There are few ships able to carry large numbers of soldiers because we have gotten used to flying personnel into theater. The Air Force doesn't have enough C-17s to provide a sufficient flow of material in the absence of a very robust sealift capability which, in turn, relies on large port facilities.

The irony here is that the Army is prepared to take the risk to fight in a new way without some of its traditional advantages, but is going to be hamstrung if greater investment isn’t made in air and sealift. For want of a nail, etc., etc.

-ends-

As a side note one of the more noteworthy aspects of this is the need for exactly those assets that the Air Force (C-17s) and the Navy (MLPs, RoRos and JHSVs) have side tracked.

Perhaps the case needs to be made for a NEW (yes more bureaucrats squabbling for dollars) NEW COS co-equal with the Navy, Army, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard  (and SOF?) responsible for long range mobility.  The existing squabblers don't seem to be quite getting the job done.  Maybe one more will do the trick?

 

[a_majoor]

Putting more people in the Chain of Command and creating more bureaucratic empires would have quite the opposite effect, Kirkhill.

The military and their political masters need to focus their energy and resources, and I suspect the coming cutbacks will do so far more than anything else to date. Like our Armed Forces, the US military has a inordinate "tooth to tail" ratio and a standing army of military headquarters, bureaucrats and civilian employees where the cuts could come from, without affecting the fighting power all that much. (You could make the argument that eliminating a lot of the overhead and streamlining operations would actually increase the utility and effectiveness of the fighting elements...)

Actual capabilities would need to be defined via doctrinal analysis, but much of the technological thrust seems to be driven more by contractors and a heavy element of "gee whiz" techno-magical thinking (something we all seem to have a tendency to fall into from time to time). The disconnect is quite strong in the US; in the recent past they identified the need to be able to move brigades and divisions across oceans in a short time frame, but then blew billions on things like the FCS program, and are now back to where they started.

As for long range mobility and the ability to do the things suggested in the article, strengthen the hand of the USMC, since going in and door crashing is what they are about anyway.

 

[Kirkhill]

.....
As for long range mobility and the ability to do the things suggested in the article, strengthen the hand of the USMC, since going in and door crashing is what they are about anyway.

The Marines, Thuc? But then what would the Army DO?  The angst is actually over finding a role for the Army - Apparently a future as 2nd Echelon Marines doesn't turn their cranks.  And the really Special guys (all 71,000 of them or 5 Divisions worth?) have got all the other stuff covered.

And I get the antipathy to extra bureaucracy but it seems the kids in the sandbox have difficulty getting along as it is.  Maybe a new kid would change the game?

 

[Eaglelord17]

Even better idea, amalgamate them, then they will HAVE to work together  >

 

[a_majoor]

There is a school of thought which states that a Navy and Marine force is all a proper Republic needs; the Navy to patrol the sea lanes and protect oceanic trade, and Marines to invade, punch the right people in the face, then leave with a warning not to do that again or they will be back. (both the USN and USMC provide their own air cover).

A standing army is more of a tool for an Imperial power, which needs to occupy territory for long periods of time. In the old days, this was to ensure the occupied payed taxes to the Imperial metropole, today we see this as a tool of "nation building" (although arguably the military shoudl just be part of a suite of tools needed to do the building, and historically the USMC did a pretty good job of directly running small nations during the "bannana war" period, but not so well on the handover).

As for the "really special guys", one could argue that they are, in fact, the future of the military. Units like Force Recon, the SEALS and SOAR represent the new and imprved way of doing things, and given the numbers, they would actually be a pretty impressive Army in their own right.

 

[Breezybree2002]

I think the U.S. "special guys" needs to take an example from Canadian forces and not talk about their missions or write books. That would go a long way in keeping with their national security. Also, they need to spend more time not trying to be the big brother in the world and getting their own country and finances back on track.
  Just a thought

 

[Jarnhamar]

I think the U.S. "special guys" needs to take an example from Canadian forces and not talk about their missions or write books. That would go a long way in keeping with their national security. Also, they need to spend more time not trying to be the big brother in the world and getting their own country and finances back on track.
  Just a thought

The world is a messed up place and needs us to clean it up.

 

[Breezybree2002]

Zellum sir...the Canadian forces don't write books intoning the operation or planning. They know the enemy will read it...I think some things just need to be hush hush for safety of the men and women involved..
  Again just a thought

 

[MikeL]

Books that are written by USSOCOM members are vetted to ensure there's no OPSEC/PERSEC violations, etc.  Some members have skipped this step though, example "Killing Bin Laden"

There are also a few books written by Canadian Forces members about operations in Afghanistan,  none written by the SOF community(AFAIK) - there are a couple books about JTF2 though.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It's clear that now, like many other countries, the US and allies like Canada will have to formally acknowledge a state of ongoing conflict - or permanent war - and organize themselves for the long haul.

For example, the only year that the UK did not have some poor sap KIA was 1948, I think.

 

[UnwiseCritic]

"The world is a messed up place and needs us to clean it up."

Sometimes you have to tidy up your own house, before going next door to help the neighboor.

 

[AmmoTech90]

And when you have yards that are very close together (which is everywhere in the world today), sometimes you have to clean out the neighbour's yard so you can put up the scaffolding to fix your own house.

 

[Jarnhamar]

And when you have yards that are very close together (which is everywhere in the world today), sometimes you have to clean out the neighbour's yard so you can put up the scaffolding to fix your own house.

Right. I was going to suggest too that worrying about doing the dishes while the neighbor is about to throw a rock through your window is going to leave you a bigger mess to clean up.

 

[UnwiseCritic]

Point taken, but the only thing that is going to destroy America is America. Not a guy with an AK 15000km away. Yes I know a guy with an AK attacked and killed thousands of Americans but it didn't destroy America. It did give them a right too attack them, but continuing to hurl themselves into trillions of debt... To get the guy with the rock, they won't be able to afford to get the guy coming with the bulldozer.

 

[Sythen]

Point taken, but the only thing that is going to destroy America is America. Not a guy with an AK 15000km away. Yes I know a guy with an AK attacked and killed thousands of Americans but it didn't destroy America. It did give them a right too attack them, but continuing to hurl themselves into trillions of debt... To get the guy with the rock, they won't be able to afford to get the guy coming with the bulldozer.

So you think they should just sit back and soak up hundreds or thousands of casualties every decade or so?

 

[UnwiseCritic]

No, but they should focus on their budget and just use SF that won't write a book about it to fight there enemies. I am not even sure if there was ever an unconventional war won by conventional troops in the history of war. So you spend more and put more at risk too lose the war.

 

[SeR]

Just use SF that won't write a book about it to fight there enemies.

So if they don't write books they win the war?

 

[UnwiseCritic]

No they win the war becuase they put an indigenous face on the war and use indigenous forces as a front so people will believe that they won the war and not America. Becuase if they believe that they might trust and support their army and choose sides and not just play like italians. Also if nobody knows what SF are up to the journalists aren't going to go there and write about it themselves and spin it to make us look like the bad guys. Which we sometimes are.

 

[SeR]

No they win the war becuase they put an indigenous face on the war and use indigenous forces as a front so people will believe that they won the war and not America. Becuase if they believe that they might trust and support their army and choose sides and not just play like italians. Also if nobody knows what SF are up to the journalists aren't going to go there and write about it themselves and spin it to make us look like the bad guys. Which we sometimes are.

I can honestly say that I have no idea what you are trying to get across. That makes no sense whatsoever.

 

[Jarnhamar]

No, but they should focus on their budget and just use SF that won't write a book about it to fight there enemies. I am not even sure if there was ever an unconventional war won by conventional troops in the history of war. So you spend more and put more at risk too lose the war.

I'm sure the US war machine spends way too much money on weirdo DARPA projects.