Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[MilEME09]

My understanding about the centralization in AB, is it is the tanks that are centralizing not the entire corp. The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.

My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle. Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).

Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low. Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing. Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated. This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.

Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world. Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.

My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division). That force could look something like this:

• Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
• 12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
• 1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
• 2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
• 1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
• 2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
• 1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
• 5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
• 1 CER - Edmonton
• 5 CER - Valcartier
• 1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
• 5 Service Battalion - Valcartier

I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis. This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units. This force could look something like this:

• Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
• 1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
• 2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
• 3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
• 2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
• 2 CER - Petawawa
• 2 Service Battalion - Petawawa

• Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
• 3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
• Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec

• Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
• 3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
• Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
• Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario

Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:

• Atlantic Canada
  • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment
  • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1/2 x Service Battalion
• Quebec
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x SHORAD Battalion
  • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1/2 x Service Battalion
• Ontario
  • 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment
  • 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1 x Service Battalion
• Western Canada
  • 1 x Tank Regiment
  • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment

Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).

I'm going to take the opportunity ....

3x SSFs
1x Pansar Brigade
1x CCSB

Looking at the Abn Infantry Brigade of the 11th Abn Div I realized that it looked a lot like the old Special Service Force before it became 2 CMBG.

So -

HQ & Sigs Sqn
Svc Bn
Eng Sqn/Regt
Arty Regt (Fd & AD)
Recce/RSTA Unit (Previously the RCD - proposed 2nd Bn RCR)
Lt (Abn) Unit based on permanent combat teams with their own, internal, man-portable, heavy weapons (Previously the CAR - proposed 3rd Bn RCR)
LAV Unit (Previously and proposed 1st Bn RCR)

Two more similar brigades based on the PPCLI and the Vandoos and the existing Brigade Groups.
Minimal disruption.

The Pansar Brigade

RCD/LdSH(RC)/12eRBC

Each Pansar Battalion is based on a large Canadian Squadron (22 Swedish tanks vs 19-20 Canadians) operating in two Half-Squadrons and accompanied by 40 to 48 IFVs (12 IFVs per company, 4 IFVs for a recce platoon, 4 AD variants for. an AD platoon and 8 mortar variants for two mortar platoons).

We have the kit to produce three such units and still leave kit, and bodies, for enablers.

CCSB to continue as planned minus the armoured and infantry elements

The key element is to focus on the kit we have and not on the bodies we would like.

Oh ... and the Army needs to stand up its own DIV HQ separate from CJOC.

 

[Kirkhill]

And why do I keep forgetting to add 1 Wing to the Army's ORBAT - the light battalions don't work without integrated rotary wing lift.

 

[Kirkhill]

An alternative would be the Pansar Brigade based on 1 CMBG with 2 SSF Brigades where the RSTA units are based on Cavalry Squadrons.

 

[Kirkhill]

My understanding about the centralization in AB, is it is the tanks that are centralizing not the entire corp. The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.

I think we do have enough tanks. Could we use more tanks? Sure. Maybe. Could we use lighter tanks? Sure. Maybe. Could we use tracked IFVs? Sure. Maybe.

But what can we do with what we have first?

 

[Kirkhill]

On the arty front

SSF Regiments 2x M777s, 1x HIMARS, 1x AD
Pansar Regiment 2x SPH, 2x LRPF, 1x AD
IRSTA and FSCC to suit.

 

[Skysix]

I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.

My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle. Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).

Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low. Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing. Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated. This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.

Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world. Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.

My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division). That force could look something like this:

• Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
• 12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
• 1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
• 2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
• 1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
• 2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
• 1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
• 5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
• 1 CER - Edmonton
• 5 CER - Valcartier
• 1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
• 5 Service Battalion - Valcartier

I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis. This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units. This force could look something like this:

• Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
• 1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
• 2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
• 3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
• 2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
• 2 CER - Petawawa
• 2 Service Battalion - Petawawa

• Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
• 3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
• Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
• Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec

• Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
• 3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
• Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
• Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
• Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
• Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
• Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario

Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:

• Atlantic Canada
  • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment
  • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1/2 x Service Battalion
• Quebec
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x SHORAD Battalion
  • 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1/2 x Service Battalion
• Ontario
  • 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
  • 1 x Cavalry Regiment
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment
  • 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
  • 1 x Service Battalion
• Western Canada
  • 1 x Tank Regiment
  • 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
  • 1 x Artillery Regiment

Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).

Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.

 

[GR66]

Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.

Medical services fall under the Canadian Forces Health Services Group and are responsible for the Field Ambulance units which support the Brigades. They are not integral to the Brigade Groups. Also each Reg Force Brigade is supported by a Reg Force Service Battalion (actually in my structure the Heavy Brigade Group has two Service Battalions for support - 1st and 5th) and each Reserve Brigade has a Reserve Service Battalion so not sure what your point is.

 

[Kirkhill]

Medical services fall under the Canadian Forces Health Services Group and are responsible for the Field Ambulance units which support the Brigades. They are not integral to the Brigade Groups. Also each Reg Force Brigade is supported by a Reg Force Service Battalion (actually in my structure the Heavy Brigade Group has two Service Battalions for support - 1st and 5th) and each Reserve Brigade has a Reserve Service Battalion so not sure what your point is.

Perhaps the point is there is not enough of them and they are NOT integral? Garrison and Field Medics - are they the same thing?

Keeping the force healthy in garrison is one job. Patching it up in the field is another.
Similar situation for Maintenance and Supply.
At least in my opinion.

 

[MilEME09]

Perhaps the point is there is not enough of them and they are NOT integral? Garrison and Field Medics - are they the same thing?

Keeping the force healthy in garrison is one job. Patching it up in the field is another.
Similar situation for Maintenance and Supply.
At least in my opinion.

Issue with supply and maintenance is the line between institutional support and field support has become blured. We are also having field units robbing the institutional support constantly in order to support even reg force exercises. Reserve augmentation is limited because in the words of one warrant I talked to "we don't trust you", not because we are reservists but because the system is broken and we lack actual experience to be independent and have that knowledge.

Force 2025 unfortunately doesn't address this but it hopefully stops robbing Peter to pay Paul in the long term.

 

[Ostrozac]

Issue with supply and maintenance is the line between institutional support and field support has become blured. We are also having field units robbing the institutional support constantly in order to support even reg force exercises. Reserve augmentation is limited because in the words of one warrant I talked to "we don't trust you", not because we are reservists but because the system is broken and we lack actual experience to be independent and have that knowledge.

Force 2025 unfortunately doesn't address this but it hopefully stops robbing Peter to pay Paul in the long term.

All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.

If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.

 

[MilEME09]

All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.

If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.

Part of it is just simple communication, we have gotten requests before with 1 week notice of requests for augmentation for multi week exercises. No reservist can take weeks off on a week notice, and if they do, I bet they won't have a job to come back to.

 

[Kirkhill]

Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.

We seem to know how - if only the government would focus.

Exercise STRIKING BAT 21 hit it out of the park - News Article - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca

Exercise STRIKING BAT 21 recently concluded at United States Marine Corps (USMC) Air Ground Combat Centre Twentynine Palms, California. “These exercises are crucial to ensure we maintain the skills of our world-class aircrews and ground staff,” said LCol Richard Harris, Exercise Director and...

www.canada.ca

 

[FJAG]

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.

I agreed fully with everything you said. I wish, though, that those three highlighted words weren't part of the reality of how the Army does things. IMHO, all the gear we have at present is useful and necessary (even the much maligned TAPV a vehicle I really have no issue with and which I believe could be put to better use than we do and the M777 which definitely has uses).

We basically have half the Army unequipped as part of a deliberate policy. We need to change that policy. Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything. As a second priority we replace older equipment before it is clapped out so that rather than being divested, it can continue to provide service at a reduced usage rate (such as with the reserves or as war stocks). As a third priority should be the purchasing of new equipment capabilities which only have a reserve role function to support a mobilized force.

The overarching policy should be to create an equipment holding that allows for the expansion of the Army beyond its current 3 + 1 brigade limit to its full authorized manpower potential. That obviously requires a new approach to equipment maintenance and usage including a reallocation of funds and people to keeping it serviceable.

Quite frankly, while I love playing with napkin forces to see what can be done within the current manpower allotments for the Army, I really have no idea of what direction the current Army should go (a failing which government and the military seem to share with me). One could reduce the size of the RegF Army dramatically so that the combined RegF and ResF that's left over would fit the current equipment holdings, or one could keep the current manpower footprint and expand the equipment holdings, or do something in between. All of that depends on what the objective for Canada's Army actually is both for day-to-day tasks during peacetime and in the case of an eventual conflict.

I know that for at least 25 years, divestment for replacement has been the economical and necessary solution. In many cases it formed the justification for new equipment purchases (eg MGS to replace tanks). In other cases it had no sense of reality at all (divesting M109s without replacement on the theory we just didn't need anything and they were costly to maintain). IMHO that's a fundamental flaw in thinking which is woven, in part, into our long term belief that the reserves are good for nothing but augmentation after a lengthy predeployment training period (you could probably recruit and train people off the street in that length of time). It protects a broken status quo while failing to look for more practical and more effective solutions.

 

[Kirkhill]

I agreed fully with everything you said. I wish, though, that those three highlighted words weren't part of the reality of how the Army does things. IMHO, all the gear we have at present is useful and necessary (even the much maligned TAPV a vehicle I really have no issue with and which I believe could be put to better use than we do and the M777 which definitely has uses).

We basically have half the Army unequipped as part of a deliberate policy. We need to change that policy. Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything. As a second priority we replace older equipment before it is clapped out so that rather than being divested, it can continue to provide service at a reduced usage rate (such as with the reserves or as war stocks). As a third priority should be the purchasing of new equipment capabilities which only have a reserve role function to support a mobilized force.

The overarching policy should be to create an equipment holding that allows for the expansion of the Army beyond its current 3 + 1 brigade limit to its full authorized manpower potential. That obviously requires a new approach to equipment maintenance and usage including a reallocation of funds and people to keeping it serviceable.

Quite frankly, while I love playing with napkin forces to see what can be done within the current manpower allotments for the Army, I really have no idea of what direction the current Army should go (a failing which government and the military seem to share with me). One could reduce the size of the RegF Army dramatically so that the combined RegF and ResF that's left over would fit the current equipment holdings, or one could keep the current manpower footprint and expand the equipment holdings, or do something in between. All of that depends on what the objective for Canada's Army actually is both for day-to-day tasks during peacetime and in the case of an eventual conflict.

I know that for at least 25 years, divestment for replacement has been the economical and necessary solution. In many cases it formed the justification for new equipment purchases (eg MGS to replace tanks). In other cases it had no sense of reality at all (divesting M109s without replacement on the theory we just didn't need anything and they were costly to maintain). IMHO that's a fundamental flaw in thinking which is woven, in part, into our long term belief that the reserves are good for nothing but augmentation after a lengthy predeployment training period (you could probably recruit and train people off the street in that length of time). It protects a broken status quo while failing to look for more practical and more effective solutions.

Based on observations of the current situation this takes on some interesting overtones

Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything.

According to our allies we are short some 5 to 10 BCAD annually in dues. A problem shared by a number of them granted.

One thing that the current kerfuffle is demonstrating is the value of goods in storage. Any goods. If Canada is not comfortable offering blood then it must offer treasure or else quit its alliance.

The solution then becomes stocking the larder with 5 to 10 BCAD of hardware and consumables annually and then rotating the stock regularly. Part of that rotation programme can be selling it / donating it as foreign aid to allies on an ongoing basis. Become a sugar daddy.

Incidentally, whatever small number of troops Canada has on strength would have a modern arsenal and the Just In Case Militia would have something to draw on.

 

[McG]

The problem with all CAF sustainment is that we made it lean & efficient for peacetime and to support static operations wherein the strategic lines of communication delivered everything to a MOB that the fighting unit’s integral echelon could reach right into. To compound the problem, we started civilianizing tactical level positions that held deployable “support operators” (while simultaneously bloating a few civilian institutional functions with military personnel.

A lean force is fragile; a highly efficient force is brittle. Even before COVID & a war in Europe, our country uniformed sustainment personnel were operating at a peak tempo. There is not enough to sustain a war fighting force and all the domestic institutional demand.

 

[Underway]

The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.

Really? Instead of light tanks perhaps we should just get more MBTs. Adding another vehicle line for something as specialized as light tanks just makes me cringe.

 

[Edward Campbell]

All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.

If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.

“Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.”
– Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant, US Marine Corps) (1980)

 

[quadrapiper]

Really? Instead of light tanks perhaps we should just get more MBTs. Adding another vehicle line for something as specialized as light tanks just makes me cringe.

How much of an improvement does a light "pure" tank offer in comparison to the punchier sorts of IFV? Is it akin to a battlecruiser; all the punch of the heavier sibling, but with other aspects significantly downgraded; or is it more balanced in its capability-drop?

Wondering whether, if you're looking at a need for something to go where a MBT cannot go/be sustained/etc., if you'd be just as well served by buying additional units of a class of vehicles with broader utility (one of the turreted IFVs, e.g.) and just not filing the back with infantry.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Based on observations of the current situation this takes on some interesting overtones



According to our allies we are short some 5 to 10 BCAD annually in dues. A problem shared by a number of them granted.

One thing that the current kerfuffle is demonstrating is the value of goods in storage. Any goods. If Canada is not comfortable offering blood then it must offer treasure or else quit its alliance.

The solution then becomes stocking the larder with 5 to 10 BCAD of hardware and consumables annually and then rotating the stock regularly. Part of that rotation programme can be selling it / donating it as foreign aid to allies on an ongoing basis. Become a sugar daddy.

Incidentally, whatever small number of troops Canada has on strength would have a modern arsenal and the Just In Case Militia would have something to draw on.

The 2% pledge is just that - a pledge.

Canada absolutely meets direct funding obligations for NATO programs. Canada contributes roughly 6% of the NATO direct funding budget - that amount is based on Gross National Income (we are allocated a share to pay based on GNI - adjustments are made). The US contributes 16% of the overall budget while Denmark contributes 1%.

NATO membership is also voluntary. The benefits accrued can vary and are likely unequal. European members are quite happy to have their trans-Atlantic allies contribute to their collective security. Our contributions of forces to NATO certainly increase European collective security - NATO gains nothing by losing Canada.

Don't get me wrong - happy to get more funding. Happy to have the full suite of brigade combat, command support, combat support and combat service support. Larger war stocks are great, but I am not sure we need stockpiles of equipment that need to be maintained beyond our means.