Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.

So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.

Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.

A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.

The difference between what you are suggesting is that you look at the Canada Army for what it is and I look at it for what it should be.

The vision I have is for one of transformation to a greater potential but at similar cost.

Right now we have a large number of full-time soldiers based the cold war concept of an Army in being (much of our strength being wasted in an overly large bureaucracy in Ottawa). The full-time salaries and benefits involved have eroded our ability to buy new equipment and maintain it and train properly, hence the mind-numbing concept of managed fleets and readiness. Pretty much every nation has devolved it's basic organizational concept to the brigade group level which is the lowest organization capable of supporting itself during operations. We are currently incapable of expanding our footprint beyond three marginally equipped brigade groups.

Those brigade groups have two major capabilities: both our LAV fleet and our support fleet of vehicles are relatively new and do not require much upgrading. While I have issues with the LAV 6.0, they are perfectly useable and could be greatly improved if we could integrate anti-armour missiles on the turrets over and above providing dismounted anti-armour weapons to the infantry.

The point is that in order to be a viable fighting force we need to develop ways to fill out the ranks, augment the equipment and train as formations. That costs money but the issue here is very simple. We either find the money to make our Army a capable force, or we simply decide never to go into a full spectrum conflict.

The former requires an entirely new Army which makes the best use of what we have but changes in a very significant way how we are organized and manned. To generate more money for the essential equipment we need to cut full-time salaries significantly - firstly by reducing all headquarters positions (not just the Army ones), both military and civilian and secondly we need to develop a much more stable and sustainable trained and equipped reserve force.

We simply cannot continue with the manning of the Army (and the Forces as a whole) the way it is. It is mathematically unsustainable. It depends on significantly more funding from the government every year as salaries and benefits become more and more expensive. We will continue with the spiral of rusted out equipment and lowered training standards to compensate. Even worse, we will continue to suffer forced cuts in manning to hold the line. It is far better to have a planned force restructure based on a given budgets than unplanned reactive ones.

The only other option if we continue with our bloated administrative elements and if we fail to properly equip our Army is to continue to lose capabilities to the point where it is ineffective and non deployable. That condition is almost guaranteed to bring about a political decision to abandon the Army except as a minor constabulary force which will only deploy in very limited circumstances in favour of sustaining the Navy and Air Force.

If there's one thing that studying about the Army for the last thirty years has taught me it's that politicians do want to make an impact on the world stage and that the Army is the most effective way of doing that. Our move into the Balkans, our move into Kabul, our move into Kandahar and our move into Latvia were all decisions made at the political level to enhance Canada's standing in the international community. And yes, while the RCAF and the RCN contributed to those operations, it was the Army that made the most impact on the political scene.

The problem isn't so much that the politicians short change the Army. It's National Defence and the CAF that does so. Let's face it, by the time that the MND is given options, the services have already made their deals and compromises for how the money is to be spent. First and foremost is the maintenance (and expansion) of DND/CAF's bureaucracy. Thereafter its a grab bag of whose turn is it and whose equipment is the most rusted out. And again, that rust out is entirely as a result of the fact that DND/CAF prioritizes keeping tens of thousands of full-time personnel on the payroll year after year even when they are not needed under current peacetime conditions. They refuse to consider any improvement to the reserve system that would allow the reserve force to be a meaningful and viable equipped and trained force capable of being used in an emergency. As I've said numerous times: a Class A reservist costs 1/6th of a full-time equivalent. For the reduction of every full-time member, you can hire and train three reservists and put the other fifty percent of the saving to equipment and O&M. The thing is it's impossible to do with our present "come when you feel like" it reserve service. It needs major reform; reform that NDHQ/CAF refuses to undertake.

By all means, plan on deploying no more than a BG during peacetime if that's what you want but for the sake of the country plan on creating a system that has a viable plan and methodology to expand that force rapidly in size when the unthinkable happens.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

When you see SP Artillery does is need to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?

I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.

I think a 120mm SP mortar for a BG would be awesome. Not sure it would have the range, though, to be a Bde-level artillery replacement. Others would know more on that!

Fair point that equipping the infantry with a Javelin-equivalent would need more than "Here you go, carry this around with you!" It would need incorporation into collective training in addition to whatever individual training would be required. I think, though, it would be an order of magnitude less than some other systems that would require dedicated organizational structures. Staff College has Javelin in the units, so its not like we have nothing to go on in terms of employment. Not necessarily helpful for the platoon issued with one, but its a start.

 

[markppcli]

When you see SP Artillery does is need to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?

I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.

As Col Ritchie told us during a town hall a couple years ago " I'd love TOW and Mortar platoons but we just tried to take Rocky Ford and I had to call in 1 CER to act s infantry, I can't afford to loose more bayonets and I'm not getting any more." So it is on some level a structural problem when we can't adjust the LAV Bn we train and employ, which seems to the consensus core of what the CA is going to produce for missions, to reflect new realities and equipment. It would be ideal, well acceptable, if we gave ATGM capability to the reserves to produce deployable platoons to support deploying forces, but as we've discussed on here it's not a reliable force generator.

As an aside to the towed Mortars, I would be curious to see if we could hook up a trailer hitch to the TAPV and get something rigged up for an 81mm. While far from "SP Artillery" at least it would be some kind of mobile indirect capability.

 

[FJAG]

When you see SP Artillery does is need to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?

I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.

You raise two good points both of which are these days rarely understood well.

With respect to the Howitzer v mortar issue, the question is are you looking simply at the battle group level or something more.

Our abandonment of the "Cold War" Army in the late 1990s and a transformation into a medium force had many knock on effects. The desire to create a force more capable of deploying rapidly into a theatre against a lightly armed foe made the elimination of tracked heavy elements such as tanks and SPs which were at the time "rusting out" and expensive to maintain and, difficult to deploy. Up until 2006 we had little use for either mortars or artillery (or tanks for that matter) and allowed both systems to atrophy.

Mortars, especially battalion mortars, have one key characteristic: they provide immediate, guaranteed, all-weather indirect fire support to the battalion. Artillery has its own characteristic which is the ability to reach out further than mortars and through its fire support network has the ability to mass indirect fires from many different sources and calibres in all weather. Some of that fire is immediate and guaranteed (the close support batteries) while others are more of an "as available" situation. In any event, when a given battalion or brigade is in extreme circumstances, fire can be massed from many sources.

Artillery also provides a heavier projectile and a more precise projectile than a mortar although developing munitions make individual, guided projectile capabilities from mortars more viable every day. If close-in guided fire is needed mortars are already quite effective. If range and massed fires are required artillery is still, and will remain, the answer especially as the deep battle becomes more important and as forces are more mobile and dispersed.

I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.

 

[FJAG]

As Col Ritchie told us during a town hall a couple years ago " I'd love TOW and Mortar platoons but we just tried to take Rocky Ford and I had to call in 1 CER to act s infantry, I can't afford to loose more bayonets and I'm not getting any more." So it is on some level a structural problem when we can't adjust the LAV Bn we train and employ, which seems to the consensus core of what the CA is going to produce for missions, to reflect new realities and equipment. It would be ideal, well acceptable, if we gave ATGM capability to the reserves to produce deployable platoons to support deploying forces, but as we've discussed on here it's not a reliable force generator.

As an aside to the towed Mortars, I would be curious to see if we could hook up a trailer hitch to the TAPV and get something rigged up for an 81mm. While far from "SP Artillery" at least it would be some kind of mobile indirect capability.

I'm glad to see the realization that there aren't enough folks in the Reg F to go around. Saying that the reserves are not a reliable force generator is true but is nobody's fault but our own for not making them such. We've seen just how good a force generator the reserves can be if given half a chance during Afghanistan where up to 20% of each deployed battle group or more were reservists. The problem isn't the materiel itself, it's the system that makes them unreliable for anything but deployments with a long lead time to integrate and train them.

Just another aside. Giving reservists a "specialty" that only they do will lead to problems. Not because they can't be relied on to show up--legislation allows them to be called into service--but because their absence from much of the routine training impedes the development of essential experience to allow the development of the more senior leadership within both the platoon and the battalion. You need a small core of Reg F people of all specialties within a battalion at all times to keep the skill levels alive and to allow the more senior leaders to properly understand how such specialties are employed. It is all to easy to ignore the ATGM platoon or the mortar platoon if it is not with you on a battalion exercise and therefore to allow the combined arms skills to fade. The absence of artillery and engineers and even armour on much of the infantry's training results in the infantry not having as good a grasp of their employment as they should. Unfortunately even where such a core exists it is frequently shuffled into the rifle companies to add missing bayonets rather than in playing their proper role.

 

[markppcli]

You raise two good points both of which are these days rarely understood well.

With respect to the Howitzer v mortar issue, the question is are you looking simply at the battle group level or something more.

Our abandonment of the "Cold War" Army in the late 1990s and a transformation into a medium force had many knock on effects. The desire to create a force more capable of deploying rapidly into a theatre against a lightly armed foe made the elimination of tracked heavy elements such as tanks and SPs which were at the time "rusting out" and expensive to maintain and, difficult to deploy. Up until 2006 we had little use for either mortars or artillery (or tanks for that matter) and allowed both systems to atrophy.

Mortars, especially battalion mortars, have one key characteristic: they provide immediate, guaranteed, all-weather indirect fire support to the battalion. Artillery has its own characteristic which is the ability to reach out further than mortars and through its fire support network has the ability to mass indirect fires from many different sources and calibres in all weather. Some of that fire is immediate and guaranteed (the close support batteries) while others are more of an "as available" situation. In any event, when a given battalion or brigade is in extreme circumstances, fire can be massed from many sources.

Artillery also provides a heavier projectile and a more precise projectile than a mortar although developing munitions make individual, guided projectile capabilities from mortars more viable every day. If close-in guided fire is needed mortars are already quite effective. If range and massed fires are required artillery is still, and will remain, the answer especially as the deep battle becomes more important and as forces are more mobile and dispersed.

I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.

Thank you for the education!

WRT your previous points about the reserves I tend to agree they need to be better integrated, and should be the holders of our real niche capabilities (Jungle Warfare, Mountain Warfare, ect). My previous suggestion of ten (ish) Bns of Mounted Rifles and two or three Tank Crew Replacement Regiments was aimed at better integration, and a real role. I would wonder if we could force generate the third infantry BN in each CMBG from a "ready reserve" made up of a company from each of the existing CBGS (which would become the CMR Bns in my fever dreams) mounted in their own TAPVs. Held at their home units and massed for formation exercises. In the discussion of artillery, could we assign the roles of divisional artillery regiments to the Reserves, in a break glass in case of war scenario?

My final question on the reserve roles you envision; the French Army has a reserve company in each of it's Infantry Regiments and I assume they have similar arrangements in other branches and corps is that be the superior organizational structure, reducing the manning of regular force soldiers and also more closely integrating the reserves? (I suspect I'm veering outside of force 2025 here my apologies)

 

[Brad Sallows]

I do wonder how we get a Battlegroup from Edmonton to "unknown point on the globe" in a timely fashion that allows it to influence events for the government of Canada.

From the altitude of politics, Canada likes to send a ship or some aircraft to influence events (ie. to participate in someone else's events; we can't do very much on our own). Fast in; and when the necessity arises, fast out. Land forces (eg. battle group) makes a stronger political statement of commitment (more at risk). All this for operations short of a major war, for which the CAF always manages to put something together from what is already at hand.

So that leaves a major war, for which nothing less than a brigade (with all the capabilities it needs to look after itself in battle) makes much sense (to me) . I sometimes wonder whether a multinational brigade attached to someone's otherwise national division is a contribution welcomed by the politicians but a bit of a PITA for the division commander.

If we can't send one (a brigade) Right Now without displacing someone else's deploying forces, Canada's is a reinforcing force. And regardless, the force needs replacement pools (people and kit). Status quo, time is needed to put it together and work it up. All the equipment, plus extras, has to already be there irrespective of where it is held; and what is mainly needed from the Res F is coal-face soldiers (those who are ready or near-ready for the initial go; those who are not for the replacement stream).

 

[FJAG]

Thank you for the education!

WRT your previous points about the reserves I tend to agree they need to be better integrated, and should be the holders of our real niche capabilities (Jungle Warfare, Mountain Warfare, ect). My previous suggestion of ten (ish) Bns of Mounted Rifles and two or three Tank Crew Replacement Regiments was aimed at better integration, and a real role. I would wonder if we could force generate the third infantry BN in each CMBG from a "ready reserve" made up of a company from each of the existing CBGS (which would become the CMR Bns in my fever dreams) mounted in their own TAPVs. Held at their home units and massed for formation exercises. In the discussion of artillery, could we assign the roles of divisional artillery regiments to the Reserves, in a break glass in case of war scenario?

My final question on the reserve roles you envision; the French Army has a reserve company in each of it's Infantry Regiments and I assume they have similar arrangements in other branches and corps is that be the superior organizational structure, reducing the manning of regular force soldiers and also more closely integrating the reserves? (I suspect I'm veering outside of force 2025 here my apologies)

Around two years ago I spent quite some time reviewing what our Army reserve should look like and how to get it to the point where it can be dependable. I wrote a short book and an article on the subject.

I basically see a regular force and a reserve force made up of one of three types of units. The units are:

• Type 1) a unit made up exclusively of regular force or predominantly regular force members (for units that require a quick reaction operational deployment or are highly skilled operators such as special forces);
• Type 2) a unit made up of primarily reserve personnel with some regular force leadership and admin staff (for units that will only deploy in extreme cases of national emergency but which could also supply volunteers to round out Type 1) units; and
• Type 3) hybrid units which have varying numbers of regular force and reserve force personnel (where a portion of the unit needs to be highly skilled or ready to deploy but the bulk only is needed in extreme circumstances)

These varying units would have a roles as follows:

• a special operations force made up of Type 1) elements;
• a light quick reaction and northern operations brigade group made up of Type 1) units;
• a medium mechanized brigade group (LAVs but no tanks) for follow up purposes and peacekeeping operations made up predominantly of Type 1) units;
• a heavy armoured brigade (LAVs, tanks, SPs) for standing operations in Europe made up predominantly of Type 1) units;
• two heavy armoured brigade groups of predominantly Type 2 units which would be fully equipped and trained to deploy only in a major emergency. They would have a full scale of equipment and be trained in combined arms operations and to reinforce in Europe or any theatre requiring a heavy force. For an example consider one of the several National Guard Armored Brigade Combat Teams in existence;
• one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade each of which would be fully equipped and trained and made up of Type 3) units and provide both support to ongoing operations in peacetime and a capability to provide significantly expanded support capabilities to deployed manoeuvre forces in an emergency. Again think of the National Guard artillery, sustainment and manoeuvre enhancement brigades;
• A number of Type 2) infantry battalions and reconnaissance regiments equipped only with light scales of equipment for training whose primary purpose is to fill vacancies in Type 1) units or to provide individual reinforcements or casualty replacements; and
• An integrated recruiting and training establishment of four regional Type 3) depot battalions to train all Reg F and Res F personnel to an identical DP1 standard in addition to the existing Combat Arms school and trade school establishments

Running the numbers, these units could be built using the existing Army's PYs and Army reserve positions. The main issues with building such a force is:

• equipping the force and equipment maintenance;
• legislation to introduce a set number of "mandatory training days" for reservists and significant employer/family support legislation;
• operational plans (with impact on both the RCAF and the RCN) to project the force into a foreign theatre in times of an emergency;
• potentially, prepositioning assets in high-risk theatres to allow "fly-over" deployments in emergencies and for exercises with the increased equipment and maintenance issues;
• the inevitable opposition by the Res F to the inevitable and necessary and long overdue reduction in the number of small undermanned reserve units and a similar opposition by the Reg F to the necessary and long overdue reduction in PYs (especially at headquarters above brigade level) to generate the funds needed for equipment and O&M

I'm particulalry agnostic when it comes to how these organizations are equipped as I see these "brigades" as not necessarily being organized and equipped as we see them now. My view is based on what basic structures should be possible within existing numbers and what general functions they should have.

The question of the French force structure is one I also tend to leave vague under the general rubric of "hybrid" unit as this will vary with the need for such unit to potentially deploy a rapid reaction element versus a major emergency element. For example, an artillery multi-launch rocket regiment in the arty brigade might be 95% reservist while an air defence regiment within the same brigade may be 50% reservist; a heavy engineer support regiment in the manoeuvre enhancement brigade might have a headquarters and one full squadron Reg F and two squadrons in different parts of the country that are 95% reservist. The whole thing depends on a careful analysis of what is actually needed in each force on a day-to-day basis during peacetime and what necessary elements (individuals to full formations) are needed only in the event of a major emergency (and by definition under the NDA, "emergency" includes full-out war)

 

[Kirkhill]

Going back to stale dated numbers:

In 2008 the RCA claimed 1805 Reg PYs and felt the need to expand those PYs to 2228.

This was predicated on the need to generate

3 Fmn FSCC
3 Fmn ASCC
3 Fmn STA FSC

9 BC Parties
9 BG FSCC
9 BG ASCC

33 FOO/FAC Parties (4 PY per party total of 132 PY of 1805-2228)

An Unknown Number of AD Radar Tps (10x MRR purchased in 2018?)
5x SUAV Tps (Blackjack)
5x AWL Tps (HALO)
5x WLR Tps (LCMR)

In terms of being able to engage the enemy the RCA proposed

6x M777 Gun Batteries of 6 Guns each (36 Guns with 7 PY / Gun for a total of 252 Gun Numbers)
The 7 PY Gun Det was felt to be marginal and required upsizing to 10 PY / Gun for a total of 360 Gun Numbers on the 36 Guns.

In Addition the RCA wanted 16 Long Range Precision Fires Systems

And 3x GBAD Tps (Btys preferred)

LRPRS and GBAD were constrained, in part, by the number of gunners available.



Consider.

1. In 2008 the RCA had managed to convince the government to buy Archer 155s

Each Archer carries 4 crew, but only requires 2. 2x Techs, 1x Cmd, 1x Gnr/Dr.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2 and assume that the Techs come from the existing supply of Gun Techs in each battery.

36x Archer 155s requires 72 Gunners instead of 252 to 360 Gunners anticipated if employing M777s.
180 to 288 PYs saved for the same number of tubes

2. With the saved PYs the RCA acquired 16 HIMARs to fulfill the LRPRS requirement

16 HIMARS can be operated by 2 Gunners but usually carries 3. The third PY is part of the command team and we will assume that, like the Techs, they come from the existing command team in each battery.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2, like the Archers.

16x LRPRS HIMARS requires 16x 2 Gunners for a total of 32.

The unemployed 180 to 288 M777 Gunners, if they were tasked to man the 16 HIMARs, would be reduced to 148 to 256.

3. With the residual PYs the RCA acquired 10 GBAD Tps based on the purchase of 10x MRR and the NASAMS organization of

1x Radar (2x Ops)
1x EO/IR (2x Ops)
1x FDC (3x Ops)
1x Firing Det (4x Ops)
Number of Weapons (Guns and Missiles) assigned to each Tp variable depending on Threat Management.

Total of 11x Gunner PYs per Tp for a total of 110 PYs from the remaining 148 to 256 PYs. 38 to 146 PYs left for reassignment.


4. Summary - within the 2008 RCA Regular Force PY Envelope, had the RCA been able to acquire Archers rather than M777s it would have been able to field

36x 155mm (capable of launching current NATO projectiles as well as Excaliburs, Vulcano and HVM out to 100 km)
16x MLRS/GMLRS/PrSM munitions out to 500 km with the prospect of 1500 km in sight)
10x NASAMs GBAD Tps

And spares to man FOO/FAC tms, sensors and co-ord centres.

Motors not muscles.

 

[Kirkhill]

....

I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.

Going back that Swedish drum I have banging of late - That 6 man "Section" they use - I get the sense that it is more an AT Tm of 2, armed with CG-84 or other ATGMs depending on mission, defended by a team of 4.

And the CG-84, and the M203/320 40mm, both of them have the ability to launch Laser Guided Projectiles. That means somebody in the team needs to carry a designator to illuminate targets. Shouldn't one designator suffice to direct grenades, bombs and missiles?

 

[FJAG]

Going back to stale dated numbers:

In 2008 the RCA claimed 1805 Reg PYs and felt the need to expand those PYs to 2228.

This was predicated on the need to generate

3 Fmn FSCC
3 Fmn ASCC
3 Fmn STA FSC

9 BC Parties
9 BG FSCC
9 BG ASCC

33 FOO/FAC Parties (4 PY per party total of 132 PY of 1805-2228)

An Unknown Number of AD Radar Tps (10x MRR purchased in 2018?)
5x SUAV Tps (Blackjack)
5x AWL Tps (HALO)
5x WLR Tps (LCMR)

In terms of being able to engage the enemy the RCA proposed

6x M777 Gun Batteries of 6 Guns each (36 Guns with 7 PY / Gun for a total of 252 Gun Numbers)
The 7 PY Gun Det was felt to be marginal and required upsizing to 10 PY / Gun for a total of 360 Gun Numbers on the 36 Guns.

In Addition the RCA wanted 16 Long Range Precision Fires Systems

And 3x GBAD Tps (Btys preferred)

LRPRS and GBAD were constrained, in part, by the number of gunners available.



Consider.

1. In 2008 the RCA had managed to convince the government to buy Archer 155s

Each Archer carries 4 crew, but only requires 2. 2x Techs, 1x Cmd, 1x Gnr/Dr.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2 and assume that the Techs come from the existing supply of Gun Techs in each battery.

36x Archer 155s requires 72 Gunners instead of 252 to 360 Gunners anticipated if employing M777s.
180 to 288 PYs saved for the same number of tubes

2. With the saved PYs the RCA acquired 16 HIMARs to fulfill the LRPRS requirement

16 HIMARS can be operated by 2 Gunners but usually carries 3. The third PY is part of the command team and we will assume that, like the Techs, they come from the existing command team in each battery.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2, like the Archers.

16x LRPRS HIMARS requires 16x 2 Gunners for a total of 32.

The unemployed 180 to 288 M777 Gunners, if they were tasked to man the 16 HIMARs, would be reduced to 148 to 256.

3. With the residual PYs the RCA acquired 10 GBAD Tps based on the purchase of 10x MRR and the NASAMS organization of

1x Radar (2x Ops)
1x EO/IR (2x Ops)
1x FDC (3x Ops)
1x Firing Det (4x Ops)
Number of Weapons (Guns and Missiles) assigned to each Tp variable depending on Threat Management.

Total of 11x Gunner PYs per Tp for a total of 110 PYs from the remaining 148 to 256 PYs. 38 to 146 PYs left for reassignment.


4. Summary - within the 2008 RCA Regular Force PY Envelope, had the RCA been able to acquire Archers rather than M777s it would have been able to field

36x 155mm (capable of launching current NATO projectiles as well as Excaliburs, Vulcano and HVM out to 100 km)
16x MLRS/GMLRS/PrSM munitions out to 500 km with the prospect of 1500 km in sight)
10x NASAMs GBAD Tps

And spares to man FOO/FAC tms, sensors and co-ord centres.

Motors not muscles.

Not arguing with the facts and figures but to note the following.

1. Fmn FSCC and STACCs were not new. There was always a bde FSCC based on the CO and Ops O of the close support regiment and the BAIO (although that role was rarely played). The ASCC was a long time asset of 4th AD (later 4th RCA (GS)) so there was only a marginal change in PYs;

2. The BG FSCC always existed as a combination of the BG's Mor Pl and the close support regiment's BC party. The foolish elimination of the Mor Pl necessitated an increase in the close support regiment's BC party to form the entirety of the BG FSCC;

3. There is no need for a BG ASCC as long as a Bde ASCC exists. In the unique circumstances in Afghanistan there were occasions when the ASCC had elements at both the BG and the Bde but the BG ASCC is not a separate entity;

4. prior to the 2005 restructuring, each close support regiment already had 3 BC parties and 6 FOO parties (with a planned wartime augmentation of a third FOO party for each deployed BG) for a total of 18 (27) Note as well that each BG had a minimum of two mortar FCs for a total of 18. Accordingly the need to increase FOO party PYs came very much from the mortar party reduction (albeit not purely one-to-one);

5. M777 manning requires 10 people. 7 is not only marginal, it's near impossible for sustained operations in a dispersed highly mobile environment) It takes a lot of grunt work to emplace and deplace the gun and to handle the ammo especially with the sub optimal gun tractors and bulk ammo handling capabilities;

6. Archer is leaps and bounds superior to this in all respects although one should not underestimate the off-position ammo handling needed. In addition, while Archer crews need to be skilled, there is more room for semi-skilled reserve ammo handling teams thereby reducing the number of PY needed in a hybrid reg/res bty. They do, however, require more skilled maintenance staff than an M777 battery;

7. A HIMARS battery could be run primarily by reservists. The establishment for a complete battery runs around 100-118 depending on configuration which is not dissimilar from a gun battery. Again, while there are fewer operators of each weapon system, there is a need for a more robust ammo handling element and maintenance det.

I have maintained for years and years (even when I served in the Reg F artillery) that artillery was one of the primary elements in the Army that was absolutely rife for becoming a hybrid force with a large reserve component because generally it was only needed in times of very high tensions. What was needed on a full-time basis was a sufficiently large enough Reg F component to provide full-time FSCC, FOO, ASCC, STACC support to the infantry and armoured units and formations, a full-time command and control structure and sufficient gunners to provide an emergency rapid reaction deployment force (whether guns or radars or UAVs or GBAD) and to provide sufficient personnel for skill retention and development, career advancement, equipment maintenance and training of the reserve force. The vast bulk of the manpower up to and including junior officer should be reservist. What's critical as well is that the equipment for the entire force be held in hand a nd the doctrine fully developed and applied.

 

[Kirkhill]

Any clue as to whether or not Commander 2 Wing RCAF and Commander 4 RCA GSR have exchanged phone numbers?

 

[FJAG]

Going back that Swedish drum I have banging of late - That 6 man "Section" they use - I get the sense that it is more an AT Tm of 2, armed with CG-84 or other ATGMs depending on mission, defended by a team of 4.

And the CG-84, and the M203/320 40mm, both of them have the ability to launch Laser Guided Projectiles. That means somebody in the team needs to carry a designator to illuminate targets. Shouldn't one designator suffice to direct grenades, bombs and missiles?

It gets us back to that old WW2 dichotomy where the brits generally used the machine guns to support the rifle sections while the Germans tended to use the rifles to augment and protect the machine guns which were the main element.

Over my career I've seen 11 man sections with one or two Brens or C2s with the odd 3.5 inch rocket launcher mounted in 3/4 ton trucks to ever reducing sections with a variety of rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns and anti-armour weapons. Not all of those changes had been put into place as a result of firm doctrinal changes. I frankly would be hard pressed to talk intelligently about how a section, platoon or company should be organized for the fight considering the many changes in weapon systems going on. Quite frankly I'm not so sure if its something that needs to be studied to death or whether someone should just pick something and get on with it.

 

[markppcli]

I think the thing to take away from a Swedish Section is the weapons locker model they follow. The 84 is available, so's an LMG, so's a GPMG. What they dismount with depends on the task at hand.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am going to change gears for a second and look at some other mission sets.

Let's say that the GOC turns to the CA and says "we need to you to provide a Battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission in xxxxx. Maybe a Sector HQ as well?" Having served in Southern Lebanon alongside UNIFIL, a divisional level UN force I think that we could. Our LAVs and TAPVs would give us some options for a force to patrol a battalion sector. Depending on the mine/UXO/IED threat we have some muscle memory from Afghanistan that would prove useful. I am sure we could provide plenty of CIMIC/IA guys to go to meetings. Our CMBG HQs could form the nucleus of a Sector HQ (in UNIFIL there is a lead nation for each Bde HQ, but the other nation in the Sector provide people as well).

Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?

 

[markppcli]

No I think we have the capacity to do this. Probably in a mission like this, we'd like to have some more UAVs though?

 

[FJAG]

I am going to change gears for a second and look at some other mission sets.

Let's say that the GOC turns to the CA and says "we need to you to provide a Battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission in xxxxx. Maybe a Sector HQ as well?" Having served in Southern Lebanon alongside UNIFIL, a divisional level UN force I think that we could. Our LAVs and TAPVs would give us some options for a force to patrol a battalion sector. Depending on the mine/UXO/IED threat we have some muscle memory from Afghanistan that would prove useful. I am sure we could provide plenty of CIMIC/IA guys to go to meetings. Our CMBG HQs could form the nucleus of a Sector HQ (in UNIFIL there is a lead nation for each Bde HQ, but the other nation in the Sector provide people as well).

Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?

Nope. You could even add an EW cell, an ASCC element and a helicopter squadron, an engineer troop and a few other capabilities as well if desired.

And if some morons started using us for target practice we could follow that up with some UAVs, an LCMR, a half squadron of tanks, and a troop of guns and or mortars to shoot back with as well. We would be in trouble if they used suicide Cessnas or drones.

But then there's this from the SSE:

The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. At its core, deterrence is about discouraging a potential adversary from doing something harmful before they do it. A credible military deterrent serves as a diplomatic tool to help prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO Allies and other like-minded states have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.” Deterrence has traditionally focused on conventional and nuclear capabilities, but the concept is also increasingly relevant to the space and cyber domains.

and:

The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner. The brigade group consists of approximately 4,800 soldiers, organized in eight major units generally including Artillery, Armour, Infantry, Engineer, and Combat Service Support organizations. Combinations of these units operate together in “battle groups” to provide the joint force with the requisite firepower, mobility, protection, sustainment, and command and control functions to effectively coordinate their employment.

and:

Fundamental to future effectiveness as a combat-ready force, the Canadian Army will recapitalize many core capabilities, such as command, control and communications systems, weapons and soldier night vision systems, and logistic vehicle fleets. The Canadian Army will continue to pursue investment in war-fighting capabilities such as ground-based air defence, bridge and gap crossing equipment, anti-tank guided missile systems, and vehicles to better operate in Canada’s north.

By all means, have an ability to deploy a BG when and where desired in low intensity operations but develop a doctrine and equip and train the force to fight as a brigade or higher in high intensity ones. "Walk softly but carry a big stick" Teddy R.

 

[Ostrozac]

Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?

Only two. First, the Canadian Army’s continuing inability to force generate significant quantities of women for such deployments, as has been requested by the UN. Second, we have a deep institutional mistrust of the United Nations that was born out of experiences in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (but does not seem to be shared by either the Canadian population or government).

In both cases, these are a result of senior leadership that never really got over the 1990’s — cultural change is difficult, but certain senior leaders that appear to view life as some kind of fraternity party movie and view white vehicles as shameful means that change won’t even start.

Aside from that, we are well postured to provide UN peacekeeping forces, both in terms of structure and equipment.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Nope. You could even add an EW cell, an ASCC element and a helicopter squadron, an engineer troop and a few other capabilities as well if desired.

And if some morons started using us for target practice we could follow that up with some UAVs, an LCMR, a half squadron of tanks, and a troop of guns and or mortars to shoot back with as well. We would be in trouble if they used suicide Cessnas or drones.

But then there's this from the SSE:

and:

and:


By all means, have an ability to deploy a BG when and where desired in low intensity operations but develop a doctrine and equip and train the force to fight as a brigade or higher in high intensity ones. "Walk softly but carry a big stick" Teddy R.

Trust me, I have read SSE. Worked at Div and CMBG level. Was happy to see the CMBG included in SSE, but I also see things as they are and not how I wish they were to be.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Looking at a COIN scenario, what do we need? I think the army that we have now is the result of our Kandahar experience. Some things have been put aside and others added on, but at the end of the day I think we would recognize the situation and would know roughly what to do. Acknowledging that we would would need to know some rust off, is there a structure or capability that we are missing?