Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[blacktriangle]

Note: “SFA” is a US doctrinal acronym. In Canada we use “SFCB.” In Canada there is a slang use for “SFA” that probably precludes using the acronym in doctrine. I watched a room full of Canadian colonels struggle to contain their giggles as a US colonel briefed that “NATO is in Afghanistan to do SFA, and NATO is making great strides in accomplishing SFA.”

I’d argue we’re pretty good at doing SFA here in Canada…

As for capacity building, perhaps we should start with ourselves. If those same Colonels spent more time sorting real issues out, and less time coming up with our own set of acronyms, perhaps we’d be further ahead in the game.

Fair enough though - thank you for the correction.

 

[daftandbarmy]

What near peer light force do you have in mind? Look at our “rivals” in China and Russia, light forces don’t really exist. Even the Chinese Light Brigades are heavily motorized and the VDV is essentially mechanized infantry.

If we're part of NATO, I assume we'll need to pony up light forces for things like Northern Norway defence.

If we're working with a US coalition, I assume we'd need to be able to work alongside their various Mountain/Littoral-Amphib/Airmobile-portable-borne formations.

But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our light units to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.

 

[Kirkhill]

But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our light units Forces to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.

FTFY.

And just because the government says they want Forces that can do stuff doesn't necessarily mean they actually want them to do it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

FTFY.

And just because the government says they want Forces that can do stuff doesn't necessarily mean they actually want them to do it.

So you've just nicely described the PRes CAF Mission Tasks A.K.A. OP FASCINATOR

Backgrounder | Backgrounder: Strengthening the Army Reserve through Mission Tasks

As part of the Strengthening the Army Reserve (StAR) initiative, Army Reserve units will be focused more closely on specific Mission Tasks. The Army Reserve has expertise that is valued for domestic and international operations. Given the current threat environment and political realities...

www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca

 

[markppcli]

If we're part of NATO, I assume we'll need to pony up light forces for things like Northern Norway defence.

If we're working with a US coalition, I assume we'd need to be able to work alongside their various Mountain/Littoral-Amphib/Airmobile-portable-borne formations.

But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our light units to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.

Norway itself choosing to use mechanized combined arms battalions to defend itself.

10th Moutain is a name, it has not "mountain" role. If we look at other NATO Mountain Forces, Alpini or Chasseur Alpine, we'll find they are actually motorized / light mechanized units.

You're right in the big question thing, what do we need our army to do? Do we need to provide light forces and if so what is their role? The Aussies, not to constantly fall back to that, have done that well in determining they need a light Bn as their lead amphibious force to be supported by their Mechanized forces.

 

[FJAG]

The “just hand out Javelins” is something very easy to say when your total knowledge of ATGM employment comes from TEWTs where can just say “Anti Armour will cover this” and everyone nods sagely. It was similar to my experiance with the just throw the tow in the LAV system, fine sir where do I put the 4 foot long 75lb 80,000 dollar missile with the sensitive RF transmitter?

That's really the point I was making too with my comment much earlier in the thread with "too many blades in the swiss army infantryman".

I know that weapon systems are becoming easier to operate but nonetheless there are only so many diverse skills you can load on someone before they become inefficient with most of them. Whether its recce or mortars or ATGMs or GBAD or loitering munitions etc etc there are skill levels, tactical employment doctrines, interrelated target acquisition and control arrangements, etc etc that apply and its practically impossible to download all of that onto one Mark 1 No 1 Grunt not to mention his already overloaded body and LAV.

Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.

That's why in other threads I keep saying keep the heavier ATGMs and Manpad out of the rifle companies. They don't belong in the company; they deploy more broadly in layers that overlay the company positions and that can be adjusted, controlled and employed to meet the development of the threat. Flexibility and tight command and control are the key for maximizing these systems.

 

[markppcli]

Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.

Shhh every time some one mentions that a platoon gets forced to read that "emma gees" article again.

I completely agree, throwing tools into the tool box takes up time and space in training and support. Adding weapon systems into existng structures doesn't not mean that capability is going to be employed effectively in any way shape or form. Look at the C16 in an infantry Bn: it's held by the CQ and brought out a couple times a year for a defensive exercise or a course, no one is proficient in it, and there's not way for the company to effectively man them without robbing peter.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's really the point I was making too with my comment much earlier in the thread with "too many blades in the swiss army infantryman".

I know that weapon systems are becoming easier to operate but nonetheless there are only so many diverse skills you can load on someone before they become inefficient with most of them. Whether its recce or mortars or ATGMs or GBAD or loitering munitions etc etc there are skill levels, tactical employment doctrines, interrelated target acquisition and control arrangements, etc etc that apply and its practically impossible to download all of that onto one Mark 1 No 1 Grunt not to mention his already overloaded body and LAV.

Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.

That's why in other threads I keep saying keep the heavier ATGMs and Manpad out of the rifle companies. They don't belong in the company; they deploy more broadly in layers that overlay the company positions and that can be adjusted, controlled and employed to meet the development of the threat. Flexibility and tight command and control are the key for maximizing these systems.

Fair points FJAG but if we are content saying that we can rerole LAV to Light to Para and back again I have to ask how much easier it is to rerole an infantry battalion from an anti-personnel direct fire role to an anti-tank direct fire role.

I agree that training is involved but is the difference greater than that of conducting hasty and prepared attacks and defences; in open, close or urban terrain; in boreal, jungle, arctic and desert environments?

I agree that fire discipline is going to be a major issue when, instead of the individual soldier having 300 rounds of 5.56 at his disposal for the anti-personnel battle, in the antii-tank battle it will be a case of the Section Leader having half a dozen 84mms or the Platoon Leader having a dozen ATGMs and some Swingfires. It will require different templates for different kill zones and different call of shots.

But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.


And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band. Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.

I have no problem with the 50 km band being an Arty responsibility. But the 5 km band is no longer strictly a Bn responsibility. That band has moved down to the Coy/Pl level.

 

[markppcli]

For a quick task? No.

For a longer operation, that requires sustainment, and planning gap drills and such yes.

 

[Kirkhill]

The SBCT has three organic systems capable of destroying enemy armor and can employ lethal fires to disrupt and neutralize armored forces. The first organic system is the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Company that is assigned to the SBCT headquarters. This ATGM Company employs tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) systems mounted on Strykers and is highly effective at destroying armor at a range of 3,750 meters.2 Many times this force is held in reserve or placed by the brigade commander to reinforce his main effort operation.

The second organic system, the Mobile Gun System (MGS), may look like a tank to the casual observer, but this vehicle was built as an Infantry support system. The MGS does have a M68A1E4 105mm cannon, but it was built to operate independently and support Infantrymen in the fight. Furthermore, the Infantry battalions within the SBCT are only authorized to have nine of these systems. It is also important to note that only 143 MGS have been produced for the U.S. Army. As a result of this decision, each SBCT will only receive nine of its authorized 27 MGS systems.

The last organic system is the Javelin, which is the primary anti-armor system across the SBCT formation. Each SBCT rifle battalion has M98A2 Javelin Weapon Systems that are employed at the squad level to defeat enemy armor. The Javelin system is a highly effective armor-defeating weapon system that was first employed in military service in 1996 as a replacement for the M47 Dragon anti-tank missile. The Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile that has automatic self-guidance that does not require a Soldier to steer the missile onto the target. This fire-and-forget capability allows the operator to fire the missile and retain cover and concealment. The Javelin provides dismounted Infantrymen a surefire way to effectively kill tanks. The system’s portability makes it the anti-armor weapon of choice for light early entry forces. It has an extremely high probability kill rate against enemy armor and is effective out to 2,500 meters.3

The Javelin now outranges the TOW missile.

Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations. While 50 percent is low, it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects against enemy armor.

The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward. The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.

During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to employ the “push and pull” technique described above. Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted en-route to their objective and only moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established. While this technique took extended time to execute, it enabled our battalion to destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective.

U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine

www.benning.army.mil

And, again, we have the Swedish Pansar Battalion with their Squad Level selection of AT4, CG84, N-LAW and BILL as alternative weapons systems.

 

[Kirkhill]

Interesting that the Javelin CLU also works with the Stinger MANPAD.

Not necessary that the rifle sections have MANPADS but not a bad idea if the entire battalion has the same CLU. The AD platoon can then add to the AT battle if the situation calls for it. You could even call it the ADATs Platoon.

Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher

Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a Raytheon Technologies business, announced last week that it successfully completed the first-ever demonstration of a Stinger missile fired from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit, or LWCLU, for the U.S. Army. The missile engaged and defeated an unmanned...

www.israeldefense.co.il

 

[markppcli]

@Kirkhill 3,750 meters is still greater than 2,500 no? Also the T2B Arrow exceeds that range but I digress. My point is that even in that formation you still have ATGM over watch. I'm not anti Javelin, I'm very pro it, but we need to be sure that the way we employ and issue it makes sense and works. If that means we drop the Carl G for it, fine, but there's a limit to how much space we have and how much people can carry. Tools in the swiss army knife and all that.

Bill hasn't been in service since 2013.

edit: After some quick research, the Javelin has been extended to 4000m in the dismounted role. Still less that an TOW 2B.

 

[FJAG]

Fair points FJAG but if we are content saying that we can rerole LAV to Light to Para and back again ...

I'm not one of those "we". I tend to think that there's a significant difference between armoured and mech and light infantry. I see Armoured infantry more like you do as a very specialized role with specialized equipment (like a CV 90) and tactics - I don't see LAVs as part of that. Our LAVs I see more in the Stryker brigade role. In that respect, yes, I see the LAV battalions as being able to, in fact trained to, fight dismounted and therefore "light capable".

... I have to ask how much easier it is to rerole an infantry battalion from an anti-personnel direct fire role to an anti-tank direct fire role.

I agree that training is involved but is the difference greater than that of conducting hasty and prepared attacks and defences; in open, close or urban terrain; in boreal, jungle, arctic and desert environments?

I agree that fire discipline is going to be a major issue when, instead of the individual soldier having 300 rounds of 5.56 at his disposal for the anti-personnel battle, in the antii-tank battle it will be a case of the Section Leader having half a dozen 84mms or the Platoon Leader having a dozen ATGMs and some Swingfires. It will require different templates for different kill zones and different call of shots.

But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.

I may not be the best guy in this forum to ask that question. I've had the Reg F Combat Team Commanders course and Command and Staff Course, worked as a FOO for several years with mostly mech battalions and ran a Res rifle company (platoon +) for a few years but compared to the more knowledgeable people on this board my experience is indeed limited. That said, IMHO, I think it's very difficult to rerole folks (especially once deployed). One can always rerole and retrain but there is a time factor involved with that and most people underestimate the time needed. The training on the weapon system is perhaps the easiest. The training on the tactics is significantly harder and, for a start, requires that there are trained and experienced officers and NCOs available to conduct the training.

And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band. Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.

I have no problem with the 50 km band being an Arty responsibility. But the 5 km band is no longer strictly a Bn responsibility. That band has moved down to the Coy/Pl level.

It's not a range thing. Maybe it was when we layered M72s and Carl Gs and TOWs. But I doubt very many direct fire weapons operators in a rifle company will ever engage at 5 kms (except in the Middle East). For me it's more a question of how many operators are needed for a crew served weapon, a gunner, a loader? an ammo handler, a communicator/driver? How mobile does the system need to be when in contact? How many systems work as mutually supporting teams - two - three? Are these systems part of a main defence line or part of a deep guard? What role do they provide while the force is mobile - flank protection - rear guard - advance guard - how are they controlled?

During my training we had both close in ATk weapons in the rifle company and ATGM platoons with the battalion. During about 80% of the operational phases, the ATGM platoon did it's job nowhere near a rifle company. Only once you got into the last phase of a defensive operation would they be covering anywhere near the rifle companies.

It's very much the same with air defence. Yes we have manpads which are much easier to operate than the Blowpipe but by the time that you tie in radars and air support coordination and selected air corridors and threat vectors and optimum firing positions you end up with a force that is constantly moving and repositioning itself across the battlefield to provide the best coverage.

Rifle companies rarely occupy a piece of ground that's optimal for heavy ATGMs or GBAD. Even if they have a weapon system that reaches out and touches someone at 5 Kms the bulk of the rifle company's weapon systems operate in a band from several hundreds of metres to maybe a kilometre at best and the coy will be sited to exploit those ranges (yup, I know the 25mm reaches out further than that but where will it be sited in whatever phase you are in).

OTOH, an ATGM platoon (or better yet an ATGM coy) can be sited to fully exploit the longer ranges from positions that are nowhere near the rifle company. Each will have its own command structure to exploit its weapon systems to the best advantage. Dumping all of that on a company commander will almost guarantee that something will not operate at its optimum - especially when you are dealing with more widely dispersed operations and you need to cover the gaps because the rifle companies are, in all probability, no longer mutually supporting. I can't think of anything more difficult than a rifle company commander trying to control half of his company falling back from their long-range ATk or AD firing positions back into the main position to start fighting with a set of medium and then light weapons as the battle closes in on him while in the meantime his position is being pounded by 152mm splinters.

Like you, I believe we aren't postured right. And I think the biggest fiction we tell ourselves is that we are a multi-purpose and agile force - and then go through a three-year managed readiness cycle with a specialized six month predeployment training cycles for a particular mission. That's about as far away as you can get from the definition of multi-purpose and agile. Adding greater complexity to the rifle company will not move us forward. We need to clearly establish what a rifle company is to do (and by that I mean what effects can it deliver with the bulk of the weapons system it has [or ought to have] and not with the additional ones we could foist on it without regard if they realistically can employ them) and then build and provide the additional specialist enablers needed to cover everything else. By all means give the rifle company anti-armour weapons that work well within their zone (like the Carl G) but don't try to spread the company all over the battlefield.

And just let me reinforce what I said before. I distinguish between the job that an armoured infantry company does in a combined arms battalion in an armoured brigade with the job done by a light or LAV rifle company in a mech brigade. An armoured infantry company requires a whole different suite of tools most of which will be bolted onto their IFVs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not every tool needs to be in the back does it? Some could be at the CQ or with the RQ?

Thanks for the info on BILL.

 

[Underway]

How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't. The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.

It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub. I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.

 

[markppcli]

Not every tool needs to be in the back does it? Some could be at the CQ or with the RQ?

Thanks for the info on BILL.

So now the change around requires CQ to drop off the system. So we're regigging on the go. Not exactly this really quick, low effort turn around you were talking about.

And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band. Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.

Payload, and weight. There's a reason a TOW missile is twice the weight of a Javelin.

To echo what @FJAG is saying, the Anti Armour platoon's job is firing happening kilometers away from the line companies. The task isn't simply to carry a missile and stand over there, it's specific tactics and tasks. Covering flanks and gaps, assessing gaps, sited in enough depth that your signature is masked, having appropriate fire control, ect. I have been part of the TOW section of a rifle company enough to know that when it's just a secondary task it's done badly, to the point that the system is as much a detriment as it is an asset.

 

[blacktriangle]

How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't. The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.

I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.

 

[markppcli]

How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't. The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.

It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub. I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.

US Army chooses winner to build its new Stryker gun system

The Army has chosen who will build its Medium Caliber Weapon System for the Stryker combat vehicle.

www.defensenews.com

Funny you should mention that. It appears that the US army has recognized they're under gunned against Russian Motor Rifle Regiments in Europe and will be doing a mass up gun. LAV Company Tactics (interim) states that the one of the LAV's jobs is the destruction of enemy IFV's and APCs. So that takes some stress of our anti armour weapons in comparison to say a Stryker or Light formation. What the actual number looks like we shall see I suppose.

I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.

None to my knowledge. It would require a substantial turret redesign to even fit a 30mm Bushmaster 2 in there. That being said for the jobs it's supposed to do against vehicles 25mm is still adequate, it's when you start talking about HE / Airburst capability that the differences show.

 

[McG]

I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.

At 40 mm, you also can find options for swatting UAV & UAV swarms.

Ammunition - CTA International

40CT AMMUNITION A SMART SOLUTION FOR EVERY SCENARIO APFSDS-T KE-AB GPR AB-T GPR-PD-T GPR-KE-T TP-T TPRR-T The main unique feature of the 40CT ammunition is its Cased Telescoped design, in which the projectile is integrated into the cartridge case. This innovative design enables 40CT ammunition...

www.cta-international.com

 

[Underway]

None to my knowledge. It would require a substantial turret redesign to even fit a 30mm Bushmaster 2 in there. That being said for the jobs it's supposed to do against vehicles 25mm is still adequate, it's when you start talking about HE / Airburst capability that the differences show.

There is only one weapon that I know of that can fit into approx the same space but would still require a turret redesign is the CTAS 40mm.



The CTAS ammo was what @McG just posted. However the ammunition does take up more space then a 25mm and is much much more expensive...