• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
Let's remember this is Force 2025, not Force 2040 ;) jk jk

A GBAD capability I think will be a given, regardless of the deployment. Whoever rules the air, rules the war. While you may not be able to hold ground with aircraft, you can sure bomb the hell out of whoever is holding the ground & limit their ability to do anything. (Move, Communicate, Shoot? Nope.)

Just my own opinion here... but GBAD for low to medium level air threats is essential for any deploying forces, from any country. Everybody should be able to make sure the skies above them are clear of low flying threats.

Armed drones, loitering munitions/drones, helicopters, low flying aircraft, etc etc - can all be engaged pretty quickly, without having to coordinate a bunch of whiz-bang stuff. (Coordination is obviously necessary, but in this context I am talking about the tactical fight. I.e., enemy helicopter transporting enemy troops, seen by friendly forces, and directly shot down by friendly forces.)




Where we should coordinate with our allies is in regards to long-range precision fires, strategic level ISR assets, EW assets, etc. Why spend generous money on a decent EW system if, when we deploy, an advanced EW system is to be provided by someone else?

Why deploy 6 MLRS when the US has already deployed 60 in theatre, and has that base covered?

Why deploy 2 Heron-type UAV's when NATO/US/Allies are deploying armed UAV's with better cameras, higher operating altitudes, and a bunch of fancy EW gear?

Why buy 'the radar part' of Iron Dome when the alliance will already have the latest Iron Dome version, complete with the part that actually shoots down the incoming threat. Along with the latest Patriot systems, sea-cannister based SM-2, ESSM, perhaps SM-6, etc.



Do we need to be able to operate independently of a coalition? Yes.

Even in a coalition environment, are countries guaranteed to show up with what the coalition had agreed was their responsibility? No.

Will that leave us with some potential massive & deadly capability gaps, if Country X shows up without the burgers everybody thought they were responsible for bringing? Yes.

Is my 'random thought' of sorts perfect? No. Reasonable? Perhaps. Doable? Yes.



If we look to NORAD as an example of the kind of alliance planning I'm talking about, it is clearly stated that Canada must provide X-number of aircraft to the NORAD mission, with Y available at any given time in case of an emergency. We provide the capability we agreed to. Whatever other ambitions we have, we know that our NORAD commitment must be provided for first & foremost.

If NATO said 'Canada is required to contribute 1 squadron of utility helicopters, with X number of aircraft available in the case of an emergency'...or... 'Canada is required to contribute 20 MRLS-type vehicles and provide it's own GBAD cover' - it would give the Army a clear objective to plan for, which would guide our purchases, force structure, other capabilities we'd want, etc.




I agree with G2G that it is a matter of professionalism, that the Army be able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the government when the government is looking at options. However, given the size of the country and the size of the armed forces/population, we literally can't afford to be all things, all the time. (A modern ATGM, or GBAD capability, would be easy as hell to acquire if someone showed some leadership and pushed it through. It wouldn't break the bank. And should be acquired regardless.)

Capable of providing a wide range of capabilities? Yes. But we can't excel at everything. We should consult with our allies, find out what would be most useful or valued in a coalition fight, and strive to excel at that thing.



Again, just my 0.02 -- just in the context of what is doable by 2025.

OK - Following G2G's lead: Force 2050. Cheers.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
Let's remember this is Force 2025, not Force 2040 ;) jk jk

A GBAD capability I think will be a given, regardless of the deployment. Whoever rules the air, rules the war. While you may not be able to hold ground with aircraft, you can sure bomb the hell out of whoever is holding the ground & limit their ability to do anything. (Move, Communicate, Shoot? Nope.)

Just my own opinion here... but GBAD for low to medium level air threats is essential for any deploying forces, from any country. Everybody should be able to make sure the skies above them are clear of low flying threats.

Armed drones, loitering munitions/drones, helicopters, low flying aircraft, etc etc - can all be engaged pretty quickly, without having to coordinate a bunch of whiz-bang stuff. (Coordination is obviously necessary, but in this context I am talking about the tactical fight. I.e., enemy helicopter transporting enemy troops, seen by friendly forces, and directly shot down by friendly forces.)




Where we should coordinate with our allies is in regards to long-range precision fires, strategic level ISR assets, EW assets, etc. Why spend generous money on a decent EW system if, when we deploy, an advanced EW system is to be provided by someone else?

Why deploy 6 MLRS when the US has already deployed 60 in theatre, and has that base covered?

Why deploy 2 Heron-type UAV's when NATO/US/Allies are deploying armed UAV's with better cameras, higher operating altitudes, and a bunch of fancy EW gear?

Why buy 'the radar part' of Iron Dome when the alliance will already have the latest Iron Dome version, complete with the part that actually shoots down the incoming threat. Along with the latest Patriot systems, sea-cannister based SM-2, ESSM, perhaps SM-6, etc.



Do we need to be able to operate independently of a coalition? Yes.

Even in a coalition environment, are countries guaranteed to show up with what the coalition had agreed was their responsibility? No.

Will that leave us with some potential massive & deadly capability gaps, if Country X shows up without the burgers everybody thought they were responsible for bringing? Yes.

Is my 'random thought' of sorts perfect? No. Reasonable? Perhaps. Doable? Yes.



If we look to NORAD as an example of the kind of alliance planning I'm talking about, it is clearly stated that Canada must provide X-number of aircraft to the NORAD mission, with Y available at any given time in case of an emergency. We provide the capability we agreed to. Whatever other ambitions we have, we know that our NORAD commitment must be provided for first & foremost.

If NATO said 'Canada is required to contribute 1 squadron of utility helicopters, with X number of aircraft available in the case of an emergency'...or... 'Canada is required to contribute 20 MRLS-type vehicles and provide it's own GBAD cover' - it would give the Army a clear objective to plan for, which would guide our purchases, force structure, other capabilities we'd want, etc.




I agree with G2G that it is a matter of professionalism, that the Army be able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the government when the government is looking at options. However, given the size of the country and the size of the armed forces/population, we literally can't afford to be all things, all the time. (A modern ATGM, or GBAD capability, would be easy as hell to acquire if someone showed some leadership and pushed it through. It wouldn't break the bank. And should be acquired regardless.)

Capable of providing a wide range of capabilities? Yes. But we can't excel at everything. We should consult with our allies, find out what would be most useful or valued in a coalition fight, and strive to excel at that thing.



Again, just my 0.02 -- just in the context of what is doable by 2025.

A bit of digging on the RAF Regiment turned up this on their Field Squadrons (different to the Air Defence bit)

A Reg Force RAFR Sqn expects to patrol an area of 140 km2 (10 x 14 km)
It has a strength of 171 including CSS atts.

It is mounted in Landrovers (unarmoured) and Jackals (armoured) - both with Weapon Mounting Kits for GPMGs, HMGs, GMGs and ATGMs.

It has its own ISTAR assets along with GPMGs, HMGs, Javelins or N-LAWS and 81mm mortars.

It is organized into an HQ Flt (Pl), a Spt Wpns Flt (Pl) and 3 or 4 Rifle Flts (Pls).

It is expected to be deployable and operate independently for an extended period of time but anchored to the base it is protecting.


A Royal Auxilliary Air Force Field Squadron, manned by reservists for home defence duties, dispenses with both the CSS atts and the Spt Wpns flt.

It has a strength of 120 organized into an HQ Flt (Pl) and 4 Rifle Flts (Plt). 2 of the platoons are mobile and mounted in Landrovers, while the other 2 are static, gate guard platoons.

The cost of maintaining and operating the RAuxAF Fd Sqn is apparently 500,000 UKP per Sqn per year.


In a Canadian Reserve context, the combination of the RCA GBAD Tps and the RCIC/RCAC Security elements would result in both a useful service and also a focus of training and recruiting. Perhaps the RCAC could supply TAPV Tps instead of the WMIK Flts. Perhaps some of the Companies could be equipped with the Spt Wpns and ISTAR elements while the rest were closer to the RAuxAF model.

My sense is that with a defined rationale on which to focus recruiting, equipping and training - and doing it locally - then it would be easier to find and maintain troops and justify equipment and training budgets.

It would also result in the units being in good shape to handle local domestic emergencies.

Finally, I see nothing to prevent the soldiers, who will have developed some military skills including handling a variety of weapons, ISTAR and comms gear, driving, conducting patrols and establishing a fixed defence, and even just standing gate guard, from applying as individuals to assist the Regs. Or they could be called up in formed bodies for D&S or LOC duties.

Or, some privileged few, could perhaps be permitted to ride in the back of a LAV at Meaford once a year.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
So what might a company team be defending? How about something like this?

Skyshield_AA.jpg


Either at the local armouries or the municipal airfield.
 

CBH99

Army.ca Veteran
Donor
Reaction score
1,213
Points
1,090
Not sure what you mean there?

But Yes part of NorthCOM's role is Defense of Canada - which shows you how much faith we have you guys these days ;)
Oooofffff… 😅

Well in our defence (no pun intended) - the Arctic is a lot bigger than people realize, and the Russians ain’t comin’. 😈😉

You can’t get very far when your vehicles won’t start, food supplies are frozen, water supplies are frozen, batteries are all dead (even spares) - no comms - fighting vehicles sink or end up as pillboxes, etc.

Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective. Second best? Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above 😈


Also, what motivation do we really have when you guys park a squadron of F-22s, multiple F-35 squadrons, and F-15C’s in Alaska? Literally the ‘crappiest’ jet you guys have up there is one of the best fighters in the entire world 😅

Things are fine up here. Totally fine. Everything is juuusssttttt fine… 😐🤥
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
Oooofffff… 😅

Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective. Second best? Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above 😈

So you want to train the Rangers to be FACs? ;)
 

KevinB

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Reaction score
8,190
Points
1,140
Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective. Second best? Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above 😈
I think the RCAF's CF-18's are getting a tad long in the tooth
Also, what motivation do we really have when you guys park a squadron of F-22s, multiple F-35 squadrons, and F-15C’s in Alaska? Literally the ‘crappiest’ jet you guys have up there is one of the best fighters in the entire world 😅
It's the Catch-22, we stick a lot of stuff to guard the North because you don't - and you don't because we do...
Things are fine up here. Totally fine. Everything is juuusssttttt fine… 😐🤥
I remember a Grade 9 History Textbook that suggested the Canadian Anthem should actually be for the US Mil.
I was embarrassed at the time as a Canadian, now I am just an unamused American.
 

CBH99

Army.ca Veteran
Donor
Reaction score
1,213
Points
1,090
I think the RCAF's CF-18's are getting a tad long in the tooth

It's the Catch-22, we stick a lot of stuff to guard the North because you don't - and you don't because we do...

I remember a Grade 9 History Textbook that suggested the Canadian Anthem should actually be for the US Mil.
I was embarrassed at the time as a Canadian, now I am just an unamused American.
1. A wee bit, yes. But they can still bum the heck out of whoever is dumb enough to set up shop in the Arctic in winter.

2. It is a catch 22. Which sucks that our bilateral agreement isn’t more equal when it comes to defending the North.

We can obviously never hope to compete with the United States overall in terms of military capability. But we should be able to share the responsibility or equally when it comes to defending northern approaches.

At least her F-18s will be there to greet the enemy if they somehow managed to fight their way through multiple squadrons of high-end assets coming out of Alaska? 😐👍🏻


3. Well for what it’s worth, there are tens of millions of unamused Canadians with similar sentiments. Some perhaps with even more intensity.

If a single politician who was running for office demonstrated real leadership, I imagine they would be elected by a very healthy margin.

Like a Jocko Willink type. Instead we are stuck with some fratboy/hippie named Justin… 🤦🏼‍♂️
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
3,517
Points
1,060
So what might a company team be defending? How about something like this?

Skyshield_AA.jpg


Either at the local armouries or the municipal airfield.


Also, in considering this construct, the antecedent of the TAPV was designed by Cadillac Gage for the US Military Police and was employed by the USAF in Vietnam to conduct .... airfield security. Cadillac Gage built a one man, one meter turret for the vehicles, which ended up on the Mowag Piranha to become the AVGP Grizzly. The USNG uses the M1117 as a Security Vehicle.

SCSO_rescue_vehicle.jpg
1024px-278th_MP_Company%27s_new_ASVs.jpg
YW2KQP4HNFEM7CXTIXBTMITDSA.jpg


And the Rheinmetal SkyShield is simply the latest iteration of the Oerlikon SkyGuard previously operated by 4 RCA in conjunction with the ADATS system back in the 90s. And need we remind ourselves that Rheinmetal is a Quebec company.



Rheinmetal also puts their guns on armoured boxes with wheels and calls the system SkyRanger


Skyranger_text_landscape_new.png


The same kit fits on ships

maxresdefault.jpg
USS_New_Orleans_%28LPD-18%29_launches_RIM-116_missile_2013.jpg
 
Last edited:

foresterab

Member
Reaction score
22
Points
180
Afternoon all,

Again trying to follow the discussion from a civilian perspective and it seems like it's either a top down mission goal starting with Reg. Force assignments (which frankly confuses me quickly when you get into the sub-unit specialist roles) or bottom up Res. Force and drive towards the end goal through attrition? alignment.

But for me the background is in emergency management and the standard Incident Command System (ICS) that is used not just across Canada but also the US, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Europe etc. and while they are similar to the Armed Forces they are not the same. Am I setting up incident command based upon function roles (armor, artillery, infantry, aviation branches), location (Division Alberta, Ontario, Maritime) or do I need some blend of both. For example on a major wildfire we would have an Operations Section Chief (Col? General) who might have 1,000 personnel within it...but they are in turn also split by Air Operations Branch Director (and associated helibases), Wildland Urban Interface (Structural fire fighters arranged via the Office of the Fire Commissioner), and Branches for each group of divisions of people (Think Regiment for Branch), who in turn supervises multiple Divisions (Company? command of 1-300 men), who supervises multiple task force leaders (Platoon commander), who supervises multiple subunits of crews.

Logistics (the infrastructure and equipment needed), Plans (the tactics and personal assignments), and Finance (cost tracking) are all smaller units operating under the Incident Commander. Liaison/Safety/Agency Representatives report to IC.

Why mention all this...because it shows how alternative civilian organizations adjust to the mission. So how to apply to Forces 2025 question:
1. Reg. Force/Class B Reserve. Sorry I've combined them but if you're spending most of the time in the role you're full time. This is benchmark for not just command but also planning/logistics/admin and depending on how you assign manpower can be the key. An HQ heavy on brass but focused on planning and logistics support is way different than having a line command with a supervisor for every grunt/seaman/airman. How many officers are needed for each function and truly prune roles back to the needed, not desired, numbers and invest in training junior staff for replacing those present as the Afghanistan/Piracy Patrols/Air Space missions experience is lost through attrition. For reference the United States Forest Service uses a 30% rule of thumb in logistics which includes all cooks/cleaners/warehouse/stevedores/drivers/mechanics etc. which significant smaller numbers in Plans, Finance, and Command roles. Most are in operations.

2. Recruitment and training. Needs to be fast recruitment for entry level and clearly communicated training. You can only do so many "emergency" deployments for training before it's a toll and especially if not clearly aligned with the big picture mission before people get out. While both Reg. and Res. Forces appear to be suffering from this issue it has to be a clear focus. We recruit in January for April jobs...and probably lose 10-15% of good applicants due to delays. If it's 8 months for a reserve unit that's' potentially 25% of a university student employment window lost due to waiting...before waiting for the next training que.

3. Review training to provide both clearer direction but also leverage technology changes. If I can see air tankers conducting refresher training via simulators linked in multiple provinces what are the options for the Armed Forces? Can 3x reserve battalions in 3 different cities use a LAV trainer to conduct digital operations or do we have to always touch iron to be able to train effective. Online/interlinked is good but does not replace the need for larger scale pre-planned exercises and as others have mentioned the years efforts should be focused towards an annual exercise (or two).

4. If the pre-deployment mission standard is a 6 month work up then be realistic on what that means for Res. Forces. It means you're not deploying units or specialists and instead train up to a basic competency level (rifleman/driver/seaman?) and either do two things - A) increase Class B contracts for those specialists needed to maintain unit effectiveness (signals? gun commander?) or B) accept that you have created a "home guard" level training force that can deploy in numbers wearing a uniform and work to strengthen the emergency relief taskings of Flood/Fire/Snow/COVID etc. If a reserve unit is called out as a unit then it could/should be considered equivalent to Point #3.

5. Res.Force Plans/Logistics staff. Almost every province has some form of an Emergency Operations Center usually in the capital. Work to establish a small number of liaison roles here to better apply on either a pre-identified roster or Class B. position to align the armed forces with provincial response. Tons of opportunities for both sides to learn more and the ex-members I've worked with have been able to apply many of their experiences, from whatever uniform they wore, to the task at hand and have been a big positive assets.

6. review resource needs. I still think we over complicate our supply and logistics often for the 5% scenario and instead over build our organization charts, vehicle needs, and training for the unexpected rather than accepting that the unexpected will happen and focus on training for the 90% of common tasks we do often so we're confident enough to adjust to the unexpected. Weather alone changes everything and the first time you fight fire in a July snowstorm you learn to adapt and adjust tactics as a result...but you don't gear up for snow in July just because "it might" happen.

Regardless of what side of the fence you're on everyone is struggling with recruitment, training, budgets and mission creep. So keep throwing the ideas out there because the more ideas tossed around the cleaner the end product should be.

foresterab
 

KevinB

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Reaction score
8,190
Points
1,140
Afternoon all,

Again trying to follow the discussion from a civilian perspective and it seems like it's either a top down mission goal starting with Reg. Force assignments (which frankly confuses me quickly when you get into the sub-unit specialist roles) or bottom up Res. Force and drive towards the end goal through attrition? alignment.

But for me the background is in emergency management and the standard Incident Command System (ICS) that is used not just across Canada but also the US, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Europe etc. and while they are similar to the Armed Forces they are not the same. Am I setting up incident command based upon function roles (armor, artillery, infantry, aviation branches), location (Division Alberta, Ontario, Maritime) or do I need some blend of both. For example on a major wildfire we would have an Operations Section Chief (Col? General) who might have 1,000 personnel within it...but they are in turn also split by Air Operations Branch Director (and associated helibases), Wildland Urban Interface (Structural fire fighters arranged via the Office of the Fire Commissioner), and Branches for each group of divisions of people (Think Regiment for Branch), who in turn supervises multiple Divisions (Company? command of 1-300 men), who supervises multiple task force leaders (Platoon commander), who supervises multiple subunits of crews.

Logistics (the infrastructure and equipment needed), Plans (the tactics and personal assignments), and Finance (cost tracking) are all smaller units operating under the Incident Commander. Liaison/Safety/Agency Representatives report to IC.

One problem you re going to face is the CF isn't organized to make any sense in that manner.
Part of the issue is Who Owns what, Versus Who Employs What, and Who Pays for What.
The above don't always mesh in a manner that make sense any more.
As a result you get the Services (RCAF, RCN, CA) then in the CA the Branches, Schools, and Units/Formations.
Of all which have HQ staff of some sort.


Why mention all this...because it shows how alternative civilian organizations adjust to the mission. So how to apply to Forces 2025 question:
1. Reg. Force/Class B Reserve. Sorry I've combined them but if you're spending most of the time in the role you're full time. This is benchmark for not just command but also planning/logistics/admin and depending on how you assign manpower can be the key. An HQ heavy on brass but focused on planning and logistics support is way different than having a line command with a supervisor for every grunt/seaman/airman. How many officers are needed for each function and truly prune roles back to the needed, not desired, numbers and invest in training junior staff for replacing those present as the Afghanistan/Piracy Patrols/Air Space missions experience is lost through attrition. For reference the United States Forest Service uses a 30% rule of thumb in logistics which includes all cooks/cleaners/warehouse/stevedores/drivers/mechanics etc. which significant smaller numbers in Plans, Finance, and Command roles. Most are in operations.

Ideally there would be no Class B, except summer concentrations/schools.
Reg Force - Class C Res support to Reg Force, or just Class A Res.

30% isn't enough for a Military - but how that support in structured is vastly important - as you can end up with a massive tail that doesn't offer any real support to the teeth.



2. Recruitment and training. Needs to be fast recruitment for entry level and clearly communicated training. You can only do so many "emergency" deployments for training before it's a toll and especially if not clearly aligned with the big picture mission before people get out. While both Reg. and Res. Forces appear to be suffering from this issue it has to be a clear focus. We recruit in January for April jobs...and probably lose 10-15% of good applicants due to delays. If it's 8 months for a reserve unit that's' potentially 25% of a university student employment window lost due to waiting...before waiting for the next training que.
I fail to see how it can take that long -- When I joined the Res in 1987 it took three months, it took 5 Months for me to transfer to the Regs - and it took 4 months to rejoin after 9/11
It should be a very easy process.
Paperwork (background check etc) - Aptitude Test - Physical - then find a slot and get Sworn In.

3. Review training to provide both clearer direction but also leverage technology changes. If I can see air tankers conducting refresher training via simulators linked in multiple provinces what are the options for the Armed Forces? Can 3x reserve battalions in 3 different cities use a LAV trainer to conduct digital operations or do we have to always touch iron to be able to train effective. Online/interlinked is good but does not replace the need for larger scale pre-planned exercises and as others have mentioned the years efforts should be focused towards an annual exercise (or two).
Depending on the Simulator - yes you can network them - the US National Guard uses Sims at Armories that don't have local vehicle storage (of A Vehicles) - and can "play" with others in the network.
My experiences with the CF is fairly dated - but there where not a lot of Sims around - and where very limited even in Reg Force units.

4. If the pre-deployment mission standard is a 6 month work up then be realistic on what that means for Res. Forces. It means you're not deploying units or specialists and instead train up to a basic competency level (rifleman/driver/seaman?) and either do two things - A) increase Class B contracts for those specialists needed to maintain unit effectiveness (signals? gun commander?) or B) accept that you have created a "home guard" level training force that can deploy in numbers wearing a uniform and work to strengthen the emergency relief taskings of Flood/Fire/Snow/COVID etc. If a reserve unit is called out as a unit then it could/should be considered equivalent to Point #3.
Pre-Deployment should be a realistic 2-3 weeks period of Theatre Specific Training for the Reg Force -- if the Reg Force isn't combat ready - why have them?
Res Class C work up - should be 3-4 months attached to the Reg unit they are augmenting.

5. Res.Force Plans/Logistics staff. Almost every province has some form of an Emergency Operations Center usually in the capital. Work to establish a small number of liaison roles here to better apply on either a pre-identified roster or Class B. position to align the armed forces with provincial response. Tons of opportunities for both sides to learn more and the ex-members I've worked with have been able to apply many of their experiences, from whatever uniform they wore, to the task at hand and have been a big positive assets.
Those jobs shouldn't be Res IMHO - again the whole class B "bum" issue is a detriment to the mission of both Reg and Res Forces.

6. review resource needs. I still think we over complicate our supply and logistics often for the 5% scenario and instead over build our organization charts, vehicle needs, and training for the unexpected rather than accepting that the unexpected will happen and focus on training for the 90% of common tasks we do often so we're confident enough to adjust to the unexpected. Weather alone changes everything and the first time you fight fire in a July snowstorm you learn to adapt and adjust tactics as a result...but you don't gear up for snow in July just because "it might" happen.
The Army (and CF as a whole) faces a significantly broader mission set - as a result it needs to be able to:
Fight a High Intensity Conflict agains a Peer/Near Peer threat - from Arctic to Equator to Antarctica.
It also needs to prepare for OOTW, and NEO Tasks along the entire geographic spread as well.
Plus Humanitarian Missions - and Aid to Civil Power and Defence of Canada Missions.

As a result it ends up NEEDING a lot more equipment for the personnel it actually has to be able to conduct any of its assigned missions from the Canadian Government.

Regardless of what side of the fence you're on everyone is struggling with recruitment, training, budgets and mission creep. So keep throwing the ideas out there because the more ideas tossed around the cleaner the end product should be.

foresterab
The CF and CA specifically to this thread has plethora of issues - on top of the ones you mention.
Part of it is internally created - IMHO a lot of it is, but it is IMHO also exceptionally wasteful with a lot of it's personnel and capital acquisitions.

The First thing the Army needs to do is restructure
Scrap the Reserve system into a functional system that can effectively Force Generate units-subunits.
Reorg the Regular Army to make effective use of the equipment it does have - scrap symmetrical Brigades,

Then sit down and look at what those Brigades need from a Manning side - and how to incorporate Reserves into them
Then what it needs for equipment to those three different Brigades.

In doing that - as well as actually following through with other reforms - that will help with morale, and thus retention - as well as make recruiting easier IMHO.
 

CBH99

Army.ca Veteran
Donor
Reaction score
1,213
Points
1,090
I'm pretty sure some recent articles have shown a light on the poor material management practices in our SOF world.

My limited time in that sphere and the Clearance Diver sphere really gave me a deeper appreciation for those day in day out sailors doing the unglamorous work, with poor equipment, poor pay and little recognition.
I'm curious, what would one google to find some of these articles?

Genuinely curious. Usually we don't hear much about the SOF side of things, and on the surface they always appear to have solid personal kit & weapons.

Just wondering where one would start to dig to find these articles?
 

Brad Sallows

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
3,190
Points
1,010
I fail to see how it can take that long

SYEP. Walked in the door sometime in May. Paperwork, part I, off to a contracted doc for part II, sworn in, started course in July. Didn't release at end of summer. No additional admin that I can recall.

[For those wondering: no, there was no psychological screening.]
 
Last edited:

KevinB

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Reaction score
8,190
Points
1,140
I'm curious, what would one google to find some of these articles?

Genuinely curious. Usually we don't hear much about the SOF side of things, and on the surface they always appear to have solid personal kit & weapons.

Just wondering where one would start to dig to find these articles?
I am aware of a few early issues back when DHTC first was starting off.
I would put those down to teething pains - and while I think some Requirements have been a little "odd" I wouldn't say that there are poor material management issues in CANSOFCOM.
 

CBH99

Army.ca Veteran
Donor
Reaction score
1,213
Points
1,090
SYEP. Walked in the door sometime in May. Paperwork, part I, off to a contracted doc for part II, sworn in, started course in July. Didn't release at end of summer. No additional admin that I can recall.
During the Afghan war years, I was a recruiter for 41CBG. We pumped recruits through pretty quickly and easily.

  • Submitted their application online. Basic clearance was pretty quick to get, as it was just a police check & credit check.
  • We brought them in for their CFAT in the morning, lunch, interview in the afternoon. Medicals were usually done right after the interview, or the next day. (If recruits were coming in from out of town, we made sure they got it all done in one bang.)
  • Submitted their file to Ottawa for approval. Usually received the green-light fairly quickly.
  • Applicant was contacted, and either sworn in at the unit, or sworn in at a slightly larger ceremony in the same building our recruiting office was.

Boom. Done.

- Arrangements were made for new member to attend ASU to draw all of their kit, uniform, etc. Off to their unit they went, and they would make arrangements for BMQ, etc.



I honestly don't know how the f**k it takes so long for an application to go through these days.

If an applicant warrants further review (usually due to moving here from another country, hence additional checks need to be made) so be it. Otherwise, get the CFAT out of the way, interview, medical, fitness test, etc - and get them rolling. There is no excuse for us to be less efficient now than we were 10-20+ years ago.


Question - are reserve units still allowed to run their own recruiting? I know there was a trial idea a few years back, where reserve units were given authority to speed up applications. I believe the goal was 'from first walk in, to sworn in, within 30 days.' Is that still a thing?
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
11,363
Points
1,160
Question - are reserve units still allowed to run their own recruiting? I know there was a trial idea a few years back, where reserve units were given authority to speed up applications. I believe the goal was 'from first walk in, to sworn in, within 30 days.' Is that still a thing?

Yes, we can 'attract'. CFRC does most of the leg work after that and our recruits are usually at the bottom of the pile.

They don't get 'recognized' for pushing us toons through, of course, as the MillColl and technical trades are usually a much higher priority, which gets them the Brownie points from on high.

To be fair to CFRC, the medical stages (out of their control) are insanely long and can increase delays by months, usually to the point that people drop out as they can't stand it anymore.

Now, if there's a Rootin' Tootin' Shootin' War on, and you need to fill up the LAVs with teenaged bayonets as a priority then yes, they'll gladly stream the death techs through faster.

Having said all that, there will probably be someone along in a minute who will tell me I'm mistaken, which is highly likely in some respects! ;)
 

Halifax Tar

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
2,264
Points
1,260
I am aware of a few early issues back when DHTC first was starting off.
I would put those down to teething pains - and while I think some Requirements have been a little "odd" I wouldn't say that there are poor material management issues in CANSOFCOM.

Can't post them on this site.
 
Top