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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Nothing new for me. This says it all.



This is the point that I keep carping about - the Res F needs to become capable at warfighting and the Army's leadership needs to get it into their thick heads that until they properly organize, equip and train the Res F they will not be able to form a proper defence capability.

An Army with forty plus thousand soldiers whose whole business plan is to be able to generate two battlegroups at a time is missing the point of what a national defence force is. To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.

🍻

No more nor no less than improperly equipping them. About which I keep carping.

Slainte.

The same thing goes for equipment. Both the guard and the reserves prize gear that can be used at war or in a domestic emergency — everything from aircraft and cargo trucks to things like bulk water tank racks. The Army’s modernization priorities focus on air and land combat equipment and soldier lethality. According to a recent DOD report, the Army Guard’s air and weapons capabilities are generally more modern, in keeping with these priorities. Areas like engineering, logistics, and transportation, which are critical for responding to natural disasters, have more older equipment or shortages of this dual-use gear, the report says. But as Covid continues to surge, and climate change brings more extreme weather, the guard’s domestic missions, and its reliance on gear like this, are unlikely to abate.
 
I tried that once, many years ago (late 1990s). Almost the first question asked when I brought it up in my unit was "when do we sign the pay sheet". Almost the first question when I informally broached the subject with members of a local volunteer SAR group was "what equipment or funding are you going to give us". It didn't go much past that. There might have been one or two of my soldiers who looked into working with the SAR group, but generally it was a no-go.
That's discouraging, especially on the SAR side: there's a vast number of tasks* where "somewhat motivated, somewhat fit warm bodies with suitable clothes" are the missing piece.

*Most of which become or stay "fun" in direct proportion to how many people are available.
 
To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.

🍻

I did my part... I hit CRA last year :)
doing my part GIF
 
I tried that once, many years ago (late 1990s). Almost the first question asked when I brought it up in my unit was "when do we sign the pay sheet". Almost the first question when I informally broached the subject with members of a local volunteer SAR group was "what equipment or funding are you going to give us". It didn't go much past that. There might have been one or two of my soldiers who looked into working with the SAR group, but generally it was a no-go.
Outside of major urban centres, is it the RCMP that decides to initiate a search?
 
An Army with forty plus thousand soldiers whose whole business plan is to be able to generate two battlegroups at a time is missing the point of what a national defence force is. To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.

🍻
I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.

However, the lack of many items leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.
 
I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.

However, the lack of many items leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.

The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.

Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.
 
I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.

However, the lack of many items leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.
Absolutely.
The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.

Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.
Amongst other things SSS refers to the threat of great power competition, names China and Russia specifically, reiterates the need for deterrence and specifies that this requires a capability to participate in full-spectrum, peer-to-peer conflict.

Any half-wit running DND/CAF should be able to figure out the mission from that. It's not the mission that's missing. What's missing is an ability within DND/CAF to translate the mission that's been given into a coherent force structure capable of meeting the threats.

What Canada's problem is that most of its senior leadership grew up in an age when there was an active rejection of a Cold War Army in favour of a new all-singing, all-dancing agile medium force aimed at fixing failed states. They continue to be in denial of the fact that we are back into the Cold War they've never themselves had to face, that the force that they've built over the last twenty years is the wrong one for this age and that fixing failed states is a hit and miss endeavor that folks will shy away from like the plague in the future.

For me the hallmarks came in the first half of the 2010s when DND rejected the necessity to streamline our national headquarters, divested itself of key capabilities such as air defence and anti armour weapons, turned off the IFV project in favour of rebuilding LAVs for a war we had just left behind and cavalierly ignored for the most part the tactical and strategic lessons coming out of the Ukraine and the Middle East.

One only has to look at the options and objectives of Force 2025 that they continue to live in denial. It's long ago ceased to be a budget issue. Its a vision issue.

🍻
 
Would you accept Budget AND Vision issue...

Frankly I think given the way of the world the CF needs to embrace Total Force - and Total JOINT Force

1 Armored (Heavy) Bde - 1/3 Reg. - NATO Europe focused
2 Medium (LAV) bde. - 1/3rd Reg. - 1 PAC/ASIA focused - 1 Africa/ME/Europe
2 Light Bde - 2/3rds Reg. - 1 Arctic/ Airmobile, 1 Amphibious

Because the "willy nilly ness" of Canada's deployment - I would jam pack a ton of enablers into the Bde's - so they are basically Mini Div's that can self deploy (they will need Sea/AirLift to leave the North American continent) - but heavy CSS and CS support into those Bde.

CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for the next stages of conflict and competition.
 
Outside of major urban centres, is it the RCMP that decides to initiate a search?

Does it really matter in the context of what the CO of a reserve unit can do? Anyway, in most instances (and jurisdictions) the police are tasked by the provinces to be the lead agency for ground search and rescue (GSAR).

I related my before the turn of the century reminiscence as an example of how "unpaid volunteers" are not necessarily found in the Militia.

Participating in a GSAR with experienced and enthusiastic volunteer SAR groups may be great experience for soldiers, something that will trigger the "excite" button. That actually was the reason why I made the few (but quickly halted) steps in trying to organize something. And while my previous comment in regards the volunteer SAR group may have seemed less than complimentary, my opinion of them (then and now) is to hold them in the highest regard. Just as my responsibility back then was to lead (and manage) a military organization and accomplish specific aims (mostly relating to IBTS and unit BTS) while staying within budget and not losing the limited equipment that we had, so too did the leadership of that group have similar aims.

My familiarity with existing protocols for local authorities requesting DND/CAF assistance is very dated. But back then, IIRC, any request for such assistance (here, out West) had to go to LFWA (they weren't divisions back then) for approval. Some limited authority may have been delegated down for quick response situations but no way did it trickle down to part-time PRes COs.
 
Would you accept Budget AND Vision issue...

Frankly I think given the way of the world the CF needs to embrace Total Force - and Total JOINT Force

1 Armored (Heavy) Bde - 1/3 Reg. - NATO Europe focused
2 Medium (LAV) bde. - 1/3rd Reg. - 1 PAC/ASIA focused - 1 Africa/ME/Europe
2 Light Bde - 2/3rds Reg. - 1 Arctic/ Airmobile, 1 Amphibious

Because the "willy nilly ness" of Canada's deployment - I would jam pack a ton of enablers into the Bde's - so they are basically Mini Div's that can self deploy (they will need Sea/AirLift to leave the North American continent) - but heavy CSS and CS support into those Bde.

CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for the next stages of conflict and competition.
I'll get back to you on that. Remember my 30/70 // 70/30 proposal from above? I've been putting it down on a napkin org chart which I'll try to put up tomorrow - it needs some final touches and I'm putting in a new floor in my furnace room right now and have two book interviews this afternoon/evening so won't get it done until then.

🍻
 
I'll get back to you on that. Remember my 30/70 // 70/30 proposal from above? I've been putting it down on a napkin org chart which I'll try to put up tomorrow - it needs some final touches and I'm putting in a new floor in my furnace room right now and have two book interviews this afternoon/evening so won't get it done until then.

🍻
Just don't forget to count up the number of ships, planes and warehouses we need as well. Warehouses because it would be nice to have a bit of inventory on hand, somewhere, - just in case.
 
CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for the next stages of conflict and competition.

These next stages will take place in Ottawa, and it's not likely to be pretty ;)
 
I've reading this discussion and I'm enjoying the lively debates.

I am a Logistics specialist. Things for everyone to think about when you come up with orbats and equipment. The Log/Maint/Comms org will ask you to answer these basic questions before they can support.

Tactical level
  • the more mechanized you are the need for fuel is exponentially grows. The question now lies where will the fuel come from. If you want it to come from Integral resources, how big will the fuel tanks be? Big tanks = less mobility and big target. Small tanks - more mobility but need to be refuelled more. Does this veh need to keep up with the fighting force?
  • more mechanized means corresponding need to train more drivers. The drivers must safely and expertly operate the vehicles efficiently without wasted effort. However training drivers takes a long time and this eats into other training time for other necessary skills.
  • more mechanized more more maintenance - more maintainers, more time spent by operator to perform driver maintain. Does the maint veh need to keep up with the fighting force or should the veh cas be left behind for the maint to repair later on? Driver maint takes training and time. This eats up on other training time.
  • more mechanized = more parts. How many, what type of parts and what type of veh is required. Does the spare parts vehs needs to be close at hand to the fighting force?
  • how much should be fighting force carry themselves to sustain themselves? Food? Ammo? Fuel? Parts? Protective gear? Batteries? The more you carry the more self-sufficient you are, but there is a corresponding decrease in mobility. The more you carry the bigger the veh you need and the less space for other essential things
  • is the traditional 3 : 1 ratio still relevant? Fighting carries three days worth of supplies and the CSS org carries one day of maint load for the Bde?
  • the more weapons, the different types the greater the requirement for vehs to carry ammunition. Don't forget that some ammunition types are not compatible so you may need separate vehs.
  • who is going to protect your A1/A2 echs? Can they defend themselves?

Operational level (deployed)
Bde
How should be Svc Bn be configured to support the Bde. More maint, less supply and transport? More maint, more transport but less supply?
Who is going to protect the Svc Bn in their area? Remember the Svc Bn doesn't have much in terms of weapons to protect themselves. it doesn't have a designated D&S organization for protection.

Div (deployed overseas)
How long should the lines of comms be?
Should there be large supply / fuel depots? How many days should it hold? This means specialized equipment and vehs. For example a fuel depot means pipelines, pumping stations and so forth.
Personnel holding units. Replacement person in these units until they can be assigned.
Who will protect this area?

For Res F CSS orgs, the questions comes down how well trained do you want them to be (amount of training days that can be alloted to them) before you can give them tasks and corresponding equipment. Do you want them to operate a mobile warehouse, well they must be trained to be soldiers, operate the warehouse (this is not easy as there are many procedures and safety practices to follow) and give them the necessary IT equipment and support.
How about a Transportation Company? Will you give them HSVWs or stay with the MSVS? Should the Transportation Company be specialized : carry just general cargo; carry ammunition on PLS or tanker trucks. Should the Maint Coy be specialized? Training a tech takes years before they can be trusted to turn a wrench with limited supervision? Does this fit the Army's needs? I remember that these questions were posed to the Res Svc Bn in the late 1980s, early 1990s and they all wanted to be configured like the Reg F Svc Bn. They wanted to be able to support their respective CBGs which was understandable but from a Reg F perspective not doable without extensively more training time and Reg F expertise for supervision and training.

For the Reg F Log pers, they will require significantly more training days. They must receive more training to be a soldier before they become a Loggie. The Environmental commanders must agree to this, but this will mean significantly longer time in the training system and there is a matter of cost.

When I was at CANOSCOM and CJOC the J1, J4 and J6 Staffs had to be linked hand in hand with the J3 to provide timely and effective support The J3 staff knew you can't just order / demand things and things just happen to be repaired, people fed and watered, and foreign Gov't and Allied Nation support to just magically happen. In brief, you need the right people with the right experience at these HQ to staff.

Don't forget about the upcoming political fight to save Regts and or their traditional tasks.

You can go back to planning the ideal fighting force.

Cheers
 
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While muddying waters - and who doesn't enjoy a good wallow in the mud?

Leo-Sryker-CONOP.jpg


Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership

The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.​


1635286003452.jpeg1635286022561.jpeg

I'm sorry, but that MSHORAD beast still looks like a Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle to me. But anyway...



The top picture shows an electronic device for killing drones, cheaply. My question is this, given that these Short Range, Very Short Range and In Your Face devices are by definition short range, how many vehicles are going to be able to shelter under the moving umbrella they supply? It is supposed to be a mobile system for a fluid battlefield after all.

That top wonder weapon doesn't seem to be compatible with mounting on every vehicle like a trophy C-RAM system. It looks like it needs a carrier all to its self. And if it is very short range does that suggest that every patrol needs its own covering vehicle?

Lots of covering vehicles to permit 1 vehicle per troop, or even 1 per patrol, or do squadron sized patrols become the norm?

And do we need to add that ATGM vehicle to the patrol as well? Or do we stick a couple of reloadable ATGM tubes onto the patrol vehicle turrets? How much space is left inside the vehicle for the patrolmen?

So, complicating Happy Guy's questionnaire, what kit do we need for the unknown, upcoming battlefield and how will we use it.

4 vehicles crammed with riflemen with bayonets joining 41 others on the objective is one thing. But do we kit out those 45 vehicles so that they can also be used scattered all over Latvia, or Mali, or Taiwan?

It seems to me that Dispersed Operations means you need to add more specialist vehicles to the mix meaning fewer, larger, easier to detect, patrols. Or do you forego patrols completely and leave the patrolling to the eyes in the skies with only the occasional, targeted, recce patrol?

Or do you limit yourself to what you can carry on your back and trust to the loggies to deliver what you need and pull you out of the fire if it comes to it?
 
While muddying waters - and who doesn't enjoy a good wallow in the mud?

Leo-Sryker-CONOP.jpg


Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership

The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.​


View attachment 66901View attachment 66902

I'm sorry, but that MSHORAD beast still looks like a Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle to me. But anyway...



The top picture shows an electronic device for killing drones, cheaply. My question is this, given that these Short Range, Very Short Range and In Your Face devices are by definition short range, how many vehicles are going to be able to shelter under the moving umbrella they supply? It is supposed to be a mobile system for a fluid battlefield after all.

That top wonder weapon doesn't seem to be compatible with mounting on every vehicle like a trophy C-RAM system. It looks like it needs a carrier all to its self. And if it is very short range does that suggest that every patrol needs its own covering vehicle?

Lots of covering vehicles to permit 1 vehicle per troop, or even 1 per patrol, or do squadron sized patrols become the norm?

And do we need to add that ATGM vehicle to the patrol as well? Or do we stick a couple of reloadable ATGM tubes onto the patrol vehicle turrets? How much space is left inside the vehicle for the patrolmen?

So, complicating Happy Guy's questionnaire, what kit do we need for the unknown, upcoming battlefield and how will we use it.

4 vehicles crammed with riflemen with bayonets joining 41 others on the objective is one thing. But do we kit out those 45 vehicles so that they can also be used scattered all over Latvia, or Mali, or Taiwan?

It seems to me that Dispersed Operations means you need to add more specialist vehicles to the mix meaning fewer, larger, easier to detect, patrols. Or do you forego patrols completely and leave the patrolling to the eyes in the skies with only the occasional, targeted, recce patrol?

Or do you limit yourself to what you can carry on your back and trust to the loggies to deliver what you need and pull you out of the fire if it comes to it?

But what about the Courier Pigeons we need to keep comms going? ;)
 
Tactical level
  • more mechanized more more maintenance - more maintainers, more time spent by operator to perform driver maintain. Does the maint veh need to keep up with the fighting force or should the veh cas be left behind for the maint to repair later on? Driver maint takes training and time. This eats up on other training time.
  • more mechanized = more parts. How many, what type of parts and what type of veh is required. Does the spare parts vehs needs to be close at hand to the fighting force?
  • how much should be fighting force carry themselves to sustain themselves? Food? Ammo? Fuel? Parts? Protective gear? Batteries? The more you carry the more self-sufficient you are, but there is a corresponding decrease in mobility. The more you carry the bigger the veh you need and the less space for other essential things
  • is the traditional 3 : 1 ratio still relevant? Fighting carries three days worth of supplies and the CSS org carries one day of maint load for the Bde?
  • the more weapons, the different types the greater the requirement for vehs to carry ammunition. Don't forget that some ammunition types are not compatible so you may need separate vehs.
  • who is going to protect your A1/A2 echs? Can they defend themselves?
Tactical level maintenance wise:

1. Depends on the force, 1st line maint assets will always be with the F echalon, anything they can't deal with is sent to the ECP. One often overlooked thing RCEME does is route clearance, I am not talking engineers clearing, I mean as the battle moves forward collecting any battle damaged vehicles to be brought back for inspection and repair. This is why we have the lines of maintenance, we just need to practice it more in a field context.​
2. Parts scaling is figured out as we go with new kit, you slowly adjust over time stock levels on an on going basis depending on what you need​
3. Our standard ratio makes sense still F ech CQ carries 24 hours worth of supplies, A ech another 24, and so on and so on. You end up with a fresh 24H worth of parts, technical stores, etc.. constantly moving to the front to maintain your 3 days stock with the fighting element, if we have more vehicles it changes our parts scaling and that's about it, 2nd line + components won't change much, and 1st line tasks are minor enough the increased scaling won't effect space on trucks by much.​
4. Another long forgotten thing, CO service battalion is in charge of rear area security, that is why CSS still needs to know how to fight. The brigade can't always detech the infantry, armored, or Cav to protect or escort us, I haven;t read Log doctrine in awhile but I know we teach how to do internal escort duty within maintance if required and what the minimum is.​
Operational level (deployed)
Bde
How should be Svc Bn be configured to support the Bde. More maint, less supply and transport? More maint, more transport but less supply?
Who is going to protect the Svc Bn in their area? Remember the Svc Bn doesn't have much in terms of weapons to protect themselves. it doesn't have a designated D&S organization for protection.

Maintenance would need to upscale and become an independent command, a Maint Coy won't keep up with the increased demands so we will need a maintenance battalion, which is 6 companies plus a platoon for training. We may not have the assets for self defense right now, but thats because we haven't followed our own rules, C6 on every in and out route, same for Carl G, gun trucks in every platoon for self defense, it's all written down, someone already thought of all of this before, we just do not want to listen.

For Res CSS orgs, the questions comes down how well trained do you want them to be (amount of training days that can be alloted to them) before you can give them tasks and corresponding equipment. Do you want them to operate a mobile warehouse, well they must be trained to be soldiers, operate the warehouse (this is not easy as there are many procedures and safety practices to follow) and give them the necessary IT equipment and support.
How a Transportation Company? Will you give them HSVWs or stay with the MSVS? Should the Transportation company be specialized : carry just general cargo; carry ammunition on PLS or tanker trucks. Should the Maint Coy be specialized? Training a tech takes years before they can be trusted to turn a wrench wit limited supervision? Does this fit the Army's needs? I remember that these questions were posed to the Res Svc Bn in the late 1980s, early 1990s and they all wanted to be configured like the Reg F Svc Bn. They wanted to be able to support their respective CBGs which was understandable but from a Reg F perspective not doable without extensively more training time and Reg F expertise for supervision and training.

Experience and qualifications are two different things, skill fade is also real, it is why every tech has manuals they follow like a bible. One of the big lines used against PRes techs getting the same qualifications is that we would never use it unless going over seas. The point of the reserves is augmentation, can't do that if we are not trained how to do the job. Secondly it happens in the reg force from time to time any way. Example a weapons tech posted to 1 RCHA spends 8 years working on the M777, gets posted to 3VP and only works on small arms for another 6, then is posted back to 1 RCHA. How good of a howitzer tech do you think this soldier is after 6 years of not touching the kit? answer is not a good one any more, but the delta to get that tech back up to speed will be that much smaller because of the prior experience. Same goes for the reserves, train them to do the job, sure they may not use it every day but that's what work up training is for any way to shake off the rust.

As for specializing the PRes techs, the way we are organized you can't too much, Weapons techs in the PRes are essentially Small arms specialists with a bit of C3 but thats useless overseas, Vtechs are essentially soft skin and TAPV specialists. That said we are not the US Army, we do not have the luxery in terms of personal or equipment being abundent enough to specialize our forces, and until the day the CAF breaks 400k we never should specialize any trade or role to an extreme.
 
ACK about the RCEME classifications. I used to work closely with the RCEME Trade Advisors and I am aware of the issues for both Reg F and Res F. For the Res F, I think that the best thing to do is simply concentrate on the Veh and Wpns Tech and this is based on the kit that the Res CBGs have. Forget about Mat Teh or EO Tech. The training and equipment that these trades needs are beyond the what a Res F Svc Bn can realistically handle.

The requirement for a Maint Bn has been a typical of discussion for years as well as need for a Tn and Sup Bn. You can easily prove the requirement but it comes down to personnel positions and cost. Will you grow the Army or cut positions from other classification? Can the MND convince the gov't to grow the CAF and give it sufficient funds for personnel, equipment and infrastructure costs? At the Bde level, the Comd has Inf, Armd, Arty, Cbt Eng, Tac Hel, Med and CSS Advisors. While it may not seem much to add on a Maint Advisor the issue comes down to span of control, passage of information and coordination.

ACK about spares and kitting. But recent experience and past experience in the Balkans have shown that the ech system have shown that sparing and kitting is highly dependant on the theatre AOR and vulnerability of the lines of comms. In brief, depending on the situation, a unit may have to carry significantly more types of spares or major assemblies than it usually does because of the environmental conditions or vulnerability of the lines of comms. Flexibility is the key and reduction of risk.

The Ech system works. The DOS in the F, A1 and A2 Echs can and should vary depending on the circumstances. A CO must be aware that having his unit carry much will hamper his/her ability to fight and this must be tempered with the actual operational conditions. A Light Inf unit operating in a mountainous area but well supported by helicopters can carry limited DOS in contrast to a mech inf bn operatng in an open desert environment will wisely carry more water, fuel and filters.

CO Svc Bn is responsible for rear area security but this is not realistic. I am well aware of what doctrine says, I was part of the board that wrote CSS doctrine.

As you know all Logistics NCMs are purple. When I had a Pl, my Sgt was Air Force and was never trained to fight as a soldier. The issue is the lack of training time allocated to the Logistics Trade and lack of positions. That is why RCLS is purple. A Sup Tech, HR Clerk can be expected to be posted to a ship, air base, Army unit or a Svc Bn. You can train them to perform their logistics function but should you train a Sup Tech who wears a Navy blue uniform to be a soldier? The same goes for an MSE OP. Should an Army MSE OP be trained on airfield ops? Should the Air Force Sup Tech be trained to fight fires on ship and do damage control. There is simply not enough RCLS (Log Branch) personnel to have been permently assigned to an environment. When the CAF stood up the Chinook Squadron, personnel positions were transferred from the Army to the RCAF.

If there is a Maint Bn should the CO be responsible for maint as well as rear area security? The B ech / rear area is huge. it is not tens but it could be hundreds of km big with a significant amount of traffic that flows through it and that needs to be controlled.

In brief a Svc Bn (Reg or Res) doesn't:
  • have sufficient trained pers to defend itself
  • have sufficient trained pers to defend the rear area
  • have the necessary weapons or vehicles to defend it self or the rear area. When I was in 1 and 2 Svc Bn, only Maint Coy had GPMGs mounted on its armoured recovery vehs. The question then becomes should Maint Coy perform rear area security or perform its maint function? Can it realistically do both?

For rear area security you either give the Svc Bn a D&S Coy to protect itself and perhaps perform some rear area security tasks; create a org to provide rear security or assign it to an existing Cbt Arms unit.

The problem is known to the CDS and Environmental Comds. The problem comes down to personnel positions, you need to create more positions by growing the CAF or grow the RCLS at the expense of the other classifications. If you grow the CAF this of course will raise personnel costs (I believe this already constitutes over 50% of the current CAF budget), equipment costs and infrastructure costs.

As this generation of Officers and NCMs have learned, fighting is only one part of operations, support is one of the fundamental blocks that it needs to get right or the success of any operation will be in jeopardy.

CSS will be a forever problem that will not be resolved unless Canada gets involved in another major conflict on the scale of a World War.

Thank God I'm retired now.
 
Agreed, and CSS is an area the CAF needs to focus Bd expand, no offense to those of you I'm combat arms but support trades, the majority of them atleast take longer to train than a infanteer, armoured crewman or a combat engineer. Meaning when shit hits the fan it takes a heck of a lot longer to expand us vs an infantry regiment
 
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