F-22A in air-ground trials

[3rd Herd]

There are some who believe that Douhet, Mitchell, and Harris, but to name a few, were self-serving to a large degree - everybody make way for the big AF marching band! 

The "Air Force" crowd get pretty ornery when some folks point out that Air Power is and always has been a supporting element to operations that establish and maintain an effective and meaningful persistence in the battlespace (read: troops on the ground, or ships in waters). 

2 more ¢

G2G

"Boot on the ground the only way to hold territory is physical presence (no different from Iraq today) aircraft cannot hold ground, they can prepare it for occupation as the Navy can but they cannot hold it."(Absolon) Which is part of an argument based on the Battle of Britian and the refuting of Douchet's principals as the following occurred; the major civil populations in Britian were not demoralized as prophesied, the observation of the ability for aircraft to operate successfully in the defensive role countered his principal of  air power as a "strictly offensive weapon". Even today airpower "only has the capability for point destruction" and "this results in dispersal, not annihilation at the operational level." (Thompson)

As lessons learned in the Viet Nam conflict to the recent Kosovo crisis, show a third world government stymieing the modern developed air forces which led to a defeat at the strategic/political level. It is also well written that 'no fly zones' have had little influence on the "desired effects on the ground" as it "is not likely to halt the persecution of a protected minority group."(Barkley) Further, there are instances of failure to enforce 'no fly zone' regulations for fear the violating aircraft "particularly helicopters, might be carrying wounded, politicians or civilians." (Clarke)

While rightly pursuing the collection of information through the use of unmanned vehicles (UAVs) the mind set of air to air combat still prevails with project names such as "Hunter, Raptor, Talon, Predator, Dark Star" and the increased costs associated with offensive armment.(Szafranski/Libicki) Most of the offensive systems are laser guided which is often thwarted by mother nature in the form of cloud cover as found in the Sixth Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, 'Lessons of Kosovo,' and when mother nature is not available the general confusion of smoke, dust, and deliberately set obscuring fires suffices.




Source:

Absolon, John de Mansfield "When did the Germans lose the 1939 -45 war?" http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/89/a2211689.shtml

Barkey, Brett D. "Bosnia: Question of Intervention, 'Strategic Review' 21, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 55-59.

Szafranski, Richard Col., Libicki. Martin Dr. "...Or Go Down In Flame"? An Airpower Manifesto for the 21st Century" https://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/2025/volume4/chap02/v4c2.htm

Clarke, Michael.  ‘Air Power and Force in Peace Support Operations’, in Group Captain Andrew Lambert and Arthur C. Williamson (eds.), The Dynamics of Air Power (London: HMSO for Royal Air Force Staff College Bracknell, 1996), p.178.

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

Don't have much time right now, BUT Douhet got the big stuff right:

1. Breaking the will of the people, was but one intention of strategic bombing: it is the most oft-cited by critics as it was the only area in which his theories haven't been fully vindicated.
2. Moreover, BoB lacked the intensity to break the will of the people (despite how horrible it was, it was not of the intensity envisaged by Douhet).
3. Linebacker 2 (Viet Nam), the firebombing of Japanese cities during WW2 as well as the First Gulf War all proved Douhet correct, but none moreso than the Cold War (and of those only WW2 and the Cold War could rightly be recognized as the type of "Total War" of which Douhet wrote).

 

[a_majoor]

Getting back to the F-22 as a CAS platform, it has very limited carrying capability and loiter time.

The proposed FB-22 has much greater range (or loiter time at the same range) and can carry up to 30 "Small Diameter Bombs", but it is still more of a tactical system. To carry out air campaigns we either need hordes of F-22s (or FB-22's) and fleets of support aircraft, or heavy bombers: B-52's, B-1B, B-2 or some successor aircraft. Whatever it is, it needs long range/loitering time, heavy bombload and sophisticated systems to take target inputs from all sources. (Alternatively, the pilot could carry a satellite phone and talk to the SOF operators on the ground, but that's no fun  ). In terms of resources, the heavy bomber option makes more sense than the hordes of fighters option (especially when you factor in support costs like running and securing airfields, technical staff etc.).

Even if the USAF can purchase the F-22 in sufficient numbers, they will still need a medium strike craft and a heavy bomber in the arsenal (FB-22 and B-3?) for a well rounded fighting force. As a bonus, the medium strike platform can also serve as a recce and EW platform for tactical operations as well.

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

A little F-22 pr0n (via chic[k]pilot, via Jake Silver): http://chicpilot.blogspot.com/2007/06/eye-candy.html

We now return you to your regularly-scheduled thread ...