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EX MAPLE GUARDIAN (TF 3-09)

Pointer

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Thoughts? From a troop's perspective, methinks it was of little use.  From my perspective, I learned a little - KLE practice, the importance of mission-command/ lower-lvl initiative, dealing with recalcitrant LNs, how tanks achieve little during non-deliberate operations but eat infantry manpower that could be better spent on other tasks, how force protection and Q/IRFing has - apparently - become the primary role of the BG, and observing the absolute inability of many to coordinate and communicate laterally.  Add a dash of seemingly absolute chaos in the PRT and an ad-hoc strategy of rotating a different CIMIC/PSYOPS/JDCC/etc. through the same village every day to ensure nothing ever actually gets accomplished beyond enraging the locals and that about covers it.  Oh - and having an unrealistically small number of interpreters so that the "realism" in communication becomes nothing more than a severe impediment to training. 

CMTC has an unenviable task and I think they did a great job in most areas.  The inf guys in the OMLT and POMLT were great to work with, though I definitely don't envy their task.  About the best training value any of my guys got out of the exercise was training troops without their Turret Op crse to do turret watch, how best to fight apathy, and how to make shift lists.

That's just my 2 cents - anyone have anything different on their end?

Oh, and a question: does anyone know whether there's bonuses paid to CIED for responding to calls?  Sounds absolutely ridiculous but this rumour doesn't seem to be going away.
 
Pointer said:
Oh, and a question: does anyone know whether there's bonuses paid to CIED for responding to calls?  Sounds absolutely ridiculous but this rumour doesn't seem to be going away.

This is nothing new; it's been on the books for years, just updated recently to explicitly include IEDs.  $334 bucks a pop.

See CBI 205.38:
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/pub/cbi-dra/205-eng.asp#sec-38

205.38 - EXCEPTIONAL HAZARD ALLOWANCE (EHA)

205.38(1) (Definitions) The definitions in this paragraph apply in this instruction.

“explosive chemical”
    means an explosive chemical that is described in the Laboratory Waste Disposal Manual as having a factor of four. (produit chimique explosif)
“improvised explosive device”
    means a device fabricated in an improvised manner that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy, kill, disfigure, distract or harass, but does not include:

      1. items of military ordnance except when a military ordnance item, or any of its parts, is incorporated into a device that would otherwise qualify as an improvised explosive device; or
      2. nitro-glycerine or nitro-glycerine-based explosives except when these explosives are found to be in a deteriorated condition. (engin explosif artisanal)

“primed charge”
    means a commercial explosive connected to one or more detonators. (charge amorcée)

205.38(2) (Eligibility) An officer or non-commissioned member is entitled to Exceptional Hazard Allowance in the amount of $334 when the member is ordered to carry out normal disposal procedures on a known or suspected improvised explosive device, explosive chemical or printed charge, unless the member is in receipt of an allowance under 205.385 (Special Operations Allowance) .

205.38(3) (Chief of the Defence Staff may authorize payment) When the circumstances so warrant, the Chief of the Defence Staff may approve payment of Exceptional Hazard Allowance in the amount of $173 to an officer or non-commissioned member who is ordered to carry out normal disposal procedures on any other extremely hazardous commercial explosives or chemicals, unless the member is in receipt of an allowance under 205.385 (Special Operations Allowance) .

(TB, effective 1 April 2008)
 
dapaterson said:
This is nothing new; it's been on the books for years, just updated recently to explicitly include IEDs.  $334 bucks a pop.

See CBI 205.38:
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/pub/cbi-dra/205-eng.asp#sec-38

Good. Lord. 

The absurd is a reality.  I guess the guys finding the IEDs/hitting the IEDs/fighting the people planting/making the IEDs/etc. are at less risk and, ergo, deserving of less pay.

Maybe they should get robots too....
 
Just remember, to a degree CMTC doesn't really care if you as a soldier can do your job, nor are you expected to learn anything on MG.  Army training is successive in nature starting with IBTS, moving to pairs, section, platoon/platoon gp, Coy/ Cbt Tm etc. (and their support trade eqs). By the time you go through CMTC you are expected to be competent at the lower levels and have been confirmed/validated as such.  It is your BG/TF leadership that is under the gun on MG.  Sure they try to make sure everyone gets as much value out of the experience as possible but in the end it is the BG/TF (esp the HQs) as a whole that are being looked at.  If they tried to (re)confirm everyone it would be next to impossible.  There is always a debate about whether MG is/should be a MRX or a validation/confirmation ex.  But make no mistake it is a validation ex for levels 5-7 as applic.  Many people will argue that MG does not have to look at all like Afgh as long as it tests the BTS. I can see some merit in that since you will never truly replicate the theatre and you always get troops saying "that's not what it's like"... so why try.  Admit from the beginning that all you are doing is testing BTS in any context and at least a few more people may understand what you are trying to achieve.  I am obviously oversimplifying but just make sure you keep the context in mind when debating the apparent utility (or lack thereof) from a soldier's perspective.
 
Cleared Hot said:
Just remember, to a degree CMTC doesn't really care if you as a soldier can do your job, nor are you expected to learn anything on MG.  Army training is successive in nature starting with IBTS, moving to pairs, section, platoon/platoon gp, Coy/ Cbt Tm etc. (and their support trade eqs). By the time you go through CMTC you are expected to be competent at the lower levels and have been confirmed/validated as such.  It is your BG/TF leadership that is under the gun on MG.  Sure they try to make sure everyone gets as much value out of the experience as possible but in the end it is the BG/TF (esp the HQs) as a whole that are being looked at.  If they tried to (re)confirm everyone it would be next to impossible.  There is always a debate about whether MG is/should be a MRX or a validation/confirmation ex.  But make no mistake it is a validation ex for levels 5-7 as applic.  Many people will argue that MG does not have to look at all like Afgh as long as it tests the BTS. I can see some merit in that since you will never truly replicate the theatre and you always get troops saying "that's not what it's like"... so why try.  Admit from the beginning that all you are doing is testing BTS in any context and at least a few more people may understand what you are trying to achieve.  I am obviously oversimplifying but just make sure you keep the context in mind when debating the apparent utility (or lack thereof) from a soldier's perspective.

I think there's a false dichotomy there - training intended as validation for higher doesn't have to be useless for the troops.  The lvl 6 range on Ex DESERT RAM provided plenty of training value at all levels even though it was intended for the BG level.  If the training's of little or no value to the troops, you might as well do it in JANUS or whatever system they're using now, thereby saving piles of money and cutting dead field time for troops that just spent a month+ away from their families and will spend another 6-7 in a few months.
 
Pointer said:
I think there's a false dichotomy there - training intended as validation for higher doesn't have to be useless for the troops.  The lvl 6 range on Ex DESERT RAM provided plenty of training value at all levels even though it was intended for the BG level.  If the training's of little or no value to the troops, you might as well do it in JANUS or whatever system they're using now, thereby saving piles of money and cutting dead field time for troops that just spent a month+ away from their families and will spend another 6-7 in a few months.

Agreed. If you want to properly test higher levels of command, you must engage your lower level units in challenging scenarios. Just like real operations, higher must learn how to manage high intensity ops from the section level on up, build up and respond to int pictures, anticipate and respond to complex sustainment issues etc etc. I find it hard to believe that, given our now extensive experience in preparing troops for war in central asia, that we have inf sections/ vehicle crews sitting around twiddling their thumbs on a major exercise like this.

I have seen this happen before where senior leaders are afraid of 'failing' in some way on the exercise, and consequently undertask and over control their units and HQ elements thinking they'll look good as a result. I hope that's not the case here, because that's not how we learn most effectively.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Just like real operations, higher must learn how to manage high intensity ops from the section level on up...
Maybe my disagreement is wordsmithing, but I think we have a serious problem with the inability of higher to let go of managing section-level ops.

As near as I can tell, CEFCOM exists almost exclusively to ensure the Commander isn't caught out if anyone asks a question about ops....right down to the Sect level
 
Pointer said:
Good. Lord. 

The absurd is a reality.  I guess the guys finding the IEDs/hitting the IEDs/fighting the people planting/making the IEDs/etc. are at less risk and, ergo, deserving of less pay.

Maybe they should get robots too....

I suggest you suck back and reload.  Maybe send your respects to this guy: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/86656.0/topicseen.html

How is this absurd?  The person getting paid the bonus is willingly walking towards a device.  Often that device is designed to kill the IEDD op, not the regular soldier.

With regard to robots, the fact that they exist and are used is irrelevant for a reason I won't get into because of OPSEC.

If you are jealous of the people who can draw that bonus, then you re-trade and volunteer.
 
Ack...
Pointer:
I'll even go downrange with you if you dare.
The mantra is "Remote remote remote". Trust me mate the bomb techs I have worked with in the past do not go blindly trotting down just for the EHA.
Why not do a little PD on your own and find out what the EOD teams do, you might even come to understand it.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Agreed. If you want to properly test higher levels of command, you must engage your lower level units in challenging scenarios. Just like real operations, higher must learn how to manage high intensity ops from the section level on up, build up and respond to int pictures, anticipate and respond to complex sustainment issues etc etc. I find it hard to believe that, given our now extensive experience in preparing troops for war in central asia, that we have inf sections/ vehicle crews sitting around twiddling their thumbs on a major exercise like this.
But that mentality is part of the problem.  Afghanistan is not a high-intensity conflict.  Sure it has its high-intensity battles but as you know it is a counter-insurgency.  The way to win a counter-insurgency is not to have every combat troop you have advancing to contact every day.

Ex DR was basically a stands based training event where you rotated from 3.5 range to COE stand to IED stand then whatever.  Sure you are occupied amost of the time, but it is dictated where you will go and when to make sure everyone gets in all the required training.  CMTC is not designed that way, on MG you get emersed into a scenario where you are responsible to come up with your own plan maybe you just patrol for two days and nothing happens but that is the reality of theatre - you do not come under contact every day.  Because you can never know what the PTA will or won't do, CMTC usually has three plans as to get information out.  First, the int is always accessible but if you don't patrol you can't find it so then plan B would be to have it "given" to you.  Once it's given and if you can't or don't connect the dots you will be magically ordered to do something from higher.  What often happens at CMTC is that if there is nothing "scheduled" lower level commanders don't take the initiative to do as much as they could/should and the end result is troops twiddling their thumbs complaining about being bored. If you do get out, an IED or contact is not necessarily what you are looking for, it is information to feed higher so they can put a picture together and figure out what is happening and what to do about it.

Then there is the manning issue.  CMTC comes with a huge bill in terms of civilian contractors and augmentation.  You can't force civilians to sign up and everyone knows how tapped the units are, so you do not always get the numbers you need.  When you have limited resources, you have to prioritize and it's always going to be the lower level training that suffers vice higher.

Again, our organizations are confirmed two levels down (or by an outside agency).  That means that when you left DR the Cbt Tms should have been validated by the Bde Comd but the BG would not have been until MG.  However, the Bde Comd must be able to say "I have trained this BG and am comfortable handing it off to someone else to look at" which is what he does.  It only makes sense that if you don't want to look incompetent that you train them harder that what the "test" will be.

In the end, I do not work at CMTC nor was I at MG0901.  Suffice it to say I have been at more than my fair share and am intimately familiar with the way they are conceived, planned and executed.  The decision makers are all wearing maple leaves, have been to theatre, and are very experienced intelligent people who are fully aware of what corners they are cutting to achieve their aims at other levels.  It's too bad you feel your experience wasn't more positive but hey, every major event like this has a PXR produced to help make the next one better.  It's good to hear there is at least one troop who passed his points constructively higher so when the OPs O writes the PXR he can make constructive suggestions to improve it for the next guys.
 
Just throwing in my 2 cents here, you could easily debate the merits of CMTC however I'm inclined to agree more with Cleared Hot and his perspective, at some point the C of C has to say their troops are GTG and thus become further down the chain WRT a PTA. What I really have a bit of a problem with is calling it an outright validation/confirmation, to me it would only be that if there was someone next in line who could fill in/replace that C of C or BG should they not do so well, to the best of my knowledge that hasn't happened, ever, nor do we roll with an Op Reserve for the Higher Echelon so to me although CMTC is putting them thru their paces its more a check in the box than a validation as per say. My opinion.

Ammo TechAlthough I don't disagree with the EOD Teams getting extra pay for IED Exploitation, to say that they deserve more because they are "willingly" walking toward the device is a bit ridiculous. There are Ops where the troops are all "willingly" walking toward what they know is an imminent TIC, the difference is they don't know the exact loc of the threat nor do they have the huge ForcePro package that usually accompanies the Teams. I'm not taking anything away from the guys that do the job, I wouldn't want it but I'd be willing to bet as much that the EOD guys wouldn't want to be out humping around with the OMLT guys either on a daily basis waiting to get shot at.
 
rampage800 said:
What I really have a bit of a problem with is calling it an outright validation/confirmation, to me it would only be that if there was someone next in line who could fill in/replace that C of C or BG should they not do so well, to the best of my knowledge that hasn't happened, ever, nor do we roll with an Op Reserve for the Higher Echelon so to me although CMTC is putting them thru their paces its more a check in the box than a validation as per say. My opinion.

That is a very valid point and let's not kid ourselves, once an organization is identified for a tour, it is a virtual certainty that it is going, we just aren't big enough to do otherwise.  That being said, the goal shouldn't be to throw the baby out with the bathwater anyway.  Weak links however can, will and have been tossed.  I don't know about the most recent one but on previous MG serials very senior staff officers and members of comd teams have been fired based on performance; it just isn't the type of thing that is advertised too publicly.  In the end, identified weak areas will be retrained/practiced as required on the next ex for these guys Ex BR.  MG isn't the end of the process.
 
Just got back from MG0901 and from my perspective, it ran smoothly. I was in a role where I got to deal with both Kaf N and Kaf Main personnel. That includes the UAV guys, the US folks on the chinooks and blackhawks, the medical personnel, CMTC et al

I also met the chief of land staff and the CAS when they came out to see what is going on.
 
I found the experience to be a waste of time.  I sat out in the field in my vehicle acting as a storage unit for water and rations, and giving someone an extra hour of sleep (as if 20 hours a day of doing nothing isn't enough time to catch up) every night doing a roaming patrol.  I did learn which rations taste good and which are horrible, having them as the only available food for 15 days straight.  Next time, I will rob a library and fill my ruck with books to occupy my time.
 
I can only comment on the MAPLE GUARDIAN for TF 3-08.  As previously mentioned, it is a BG level assessment/validation/whatever.  Its main target is the BG as a whole, not the individual parts.  So, think "holistically".  Does this mean that individuals, sections, platoons and even companies may go "idle" for a bit?  Perhaps.  But that also happens "over there" from time to time.  There are areas to improve and areas to sustain, and I won't get into details. 

One area I find a bit over-emphasised is the WES.  Though it is meant as a validation for the BG as a whole, it seemed at times to focus on individual skills (eg: marskmanship).  Given that lasers don't effectively mimic real-life ballistics, I personally think that it is a waste of time if the target audience is the BG (or TF) as a whole.  If "they" want to exercise the BG in a mass cas, IED strike or whatever, then they could simply inject the "event" using umpires.  In my personal opinion, it would lessen the logistics of the whole event ten-fold and allow the CMTC staff to really focus on BG operations, vice the giant "laser-tag" event that it has become.

As an aside, I do believe that WES is an awesome system; however, BG ops aren't the time or place for them.  Personally I would see it at PL/TP level, or perhaps sub-unit.  Perhaps.
 
If your enfor program is well developed, you can keep everyone busy enough for days of AAR follow up.

On a couple of occasions I led a company of enfor during week long exs that were part of the prep for BGs to deploy on COIN ops. We kept them tired and on their toes with not much more effort than was required on a usual FTX on our part. Anyone seen sitting around 'thumb twiddling' by my guys were brassed up pretty quick and featured in the daily debrief, with pictures (very funny in many cases). And they even thanked us for being so diligent and sneaky! 

Now, this wasn't because I was such an awesome leader of troops (no, really), it was mainly a good program developed by the Trg system that we slotted into and followed, with a bit of improvisation of course.

It's not that difficult with the right planning, packaging and imagination.
 
daftandbarmy said:
If your enfor program is well developed, you can keep everyone busy enough for days of AAR follow up.

On a couple of occasions I led a company of enfor during week long exs that were part of the prep for BGs to deploy on COIN ops. We kept them tired and on their toes with not much more effort than was required on a usual FTX on our part. Anyone seen sitting around 'thumb twiddling' by my guys were brassed up pretty quick and featured in the daily debrief, with pictures (very funny in many cases). And they even thanked us for being so diligent and sneaky! 

Now, this wasn't because I was such an awesome leader of troops (no, really), it was mainly a good program developed by the Trg system that we slotted into and followed, with a bit of improvisation of course.

It's not that difficult with the right planning, packaging and imagination.
I'm fairly certain that the aim of MG (any serial) is NOT to "brass up" dudes who are "twiddling thumbs".  As I stated, there are specific lessons to be brought forth.  It may sound formulaeic, but so are football drills (to use a sports analogy).  When practicing for the Stanley Cup as an example, the teams go through drills, that are set.  Then, when it's time for the "big game", you rely on drills as a baseline from which you adapt.  So, MG is not a pre-season game, it is a warm up.
 
The WES system would be great, but on this particular exercise, CMTC would ignore it as a training aid and resurrect everyone.    Almost an entire platoon was killed in one attack.  All but 6 were resurrected.  What is the training purpose in doing that?  I found the scenarios in BMQ more realistic than anything else so far.  This is my first time going through workup training, and I am really not impressed with it.  I don't what else could be done to improve it, or what I thought to expect, but there is something lacking.  Others I have talked with have even commented that previous workups were more valuable.  Maybe Brave Ram will change my opinion.
 
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