TangoTwoBravo
Army.ca Veteran
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I recently read a short book titled The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons. by Alvin Kernan (2005 Yale University). While the book discusses the action of the torpedo bombers at Midway, some of the lessons appeared applicable to me on a broader scope.
While Midway is usually seen as the turning point in the Pacific War and a major US victory with four Japanese Carriers sunk for the loss of one US carrier, four American Torpedo Squadrons were virtually wiped out without themselves inflicting harm on their targets. It can be argued that the torpedo bomber action distracted the Japanese fighters and in doing so facilitated the devastating US dive bombing attack. Nevertheless, this had not been the intention.
Reading the book I was struck by the interplay of equipment, doctrine and training along with the process by which lessons are learned and promulgated. The US torpedo bomber at the time, the Devastator, was obselescent at the time, being the oldest of the main trio of US carrier aviation (the Wildcat was the fighter and the Dauntless was the dive bomber). Perhaps more critical was the problem of the US torpedo. The torpedo had been produced in fairly small numbers and the high cost had meant that few pilots had actually dropped one in training, let alone combat. Those that had been dropped had gone through a number of failures, and the fleet squadrons attempted to develop methods to counter-act them. They adopted a "slow and low" approach, which in turn made them extremely vulnerable. They bravely attempted to execute this attack at Midway, but virtually all the Devastators were shot down with no hits registered. Testing revealed that a higher and faster profile would have actually worked better for the torpedo's guidance systems. Thus the crews had trained hard to execute the wrong technique due in no small part to not having enough real torpedos to practice with in the first place.
There were also issues with fighter cover. The Wildcat had difficulties facing the Japanese Zero and the arrival of the various squadrons of US aircraft was not coordinated very well.
Of note was that the air group of the Yorktown had greater success sequencing the take-off of their squadrons and estimating the location of the Japanese carriers. They had been intended to arrive after the air groups from the Hornet and Enterprise and had took off an hour later, but ended up arriving at the same time. The Hornet's dive bomber group never found the enemy while the Enterprise dive bombers were lucky enought to follow a lone Japanese destroyer and had virtually no fuel to spare.
The Yorktown had been in combat at the battle of the Coral Sea and the air staff had learned lessons there. The Enterprise and Hornet air groups did not seem to benefit from this experience. The time between those battles was very short, but nonetheless the importance of passing combat lessons between different elements is highlighted. It should be noted, of course, that the dive bombers from the Enterprise along with those of the Yorktown delivered the key blows.
To me, the applicability to land force sixty years later is the linkage between equipment, doctrine and training. While it is important to train, the training must be correct. If the wrong technique is being practiced, then all the training in the world may only lead to destruction. Training should be as realistic as possible and using the same weapons in war as in peace. In the era of very expensive munitions, the lessons of the torpedoes should be noted. Finally, the difficulties and importance of passing lessons around a force are highlighted.
(p.s. Title changed)
While Midway is usually seen as the turning point in the Pacific War and a major US victory with four Japanese Carriers sunk for the loss of one US carrier, four American Torpedo Squadrons were virtually wiped out without themselves inflicting harm on their targets. It can be argued that the torpedo bomber action distracted the Japanese fighters and in doing so facilitated the devastating US dive bombing attack. Nevertheless, this had not been the intention.
Reading the book I was struck by the interplay of equipment, doctrine and training along with the process by which lessons are learned and promulgated. The US torpedo bomber at the time, the Devastator, was obselescent at the time, being the oldest of the main trio of US carrier aviation (the Wildcat was the fighter and the Dauntless was the dive bomber). Perhaps more critical was the problem of the US torpedo. The torpedo had been produced in fairly small numbers and the high cost had meant that few pilots had actually dropped one in training, let alone combat. Those that had been dropped had gone through a number of failures, and the fleet squadrons attempted to develop methods to counter-act them. They adopted a "slow and low" approach, which in turn made them extremely vulnerable. They bravely attempted to execute this attack at Midway, but virtually all the Devastators were shot down with no hits registered. Testing revealed that a higher and faster profile would have actually worked better for the torpedo's guidance systems. Thus the crews had trained hard to execute the wrong technique due in no small part to not having enough real torpedos to practice with in the first place.
There were also issues with fighter cover. The Wildcat had difficulties facing the Japanese Zero and the arrival of the various squadrons of US aircraft was not coordinated very well.
Of note was that the air group of the Yorktown had greater success sequencing the take-off of their squadrons and estimating the location of the Japanese carriers. They had been intended to arrive after the air groups from the Hornet and Enterprise and had took off an hour later, but ended up arriving at the same time. The Hornet's dive bomber group never found the enemy while the Enterprise dive bombers were lucky enought to follow a lone Japanese destroyer and had virtually no fuel to spare.
The Yorktown had been in combat at the battle of the Coral Sea and the air staff had learned lessons there. The Enterprise and Hornet air groups did not seem to benefit from this experience. The time between those battles was very short, but nonetheless the importance of passing combat lessons between different elements is highlighted. It should be noted, of course, that the dive bombers from the Enterprise along with those of the Yorktown delivered the key blows.
To me, the applicability to land force sixty years later is the linkage between equipment, doctrine and training. While it is important to train, the training must be correct. If the wrong technique is being practiced, then all the training in the world may only lead to destruction. Training should be as realistic as possible and using the same weapons in war as in peace. In the era of very expensive munitions, the lessons of the torpedoes should be noted. Finally, the difficulties and importance of passing lessons around a force are highlighted.
(p.s. Title changed)
