Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[vangemeren]

I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60782/post-565168.html#msg565168

 

[pbi]

I know this thread's last reply is a little old, but how do units that are service arms merge with combat arms. I have indirectly heard that the Algonquin Regiment in North Bay and 26 Service (North Bay) Battalion were combining some of their operations. I asked this question in a low visibility area.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/60782/post-565168.html#msg565168

I don't think it's really a question of "merging" so much as it is a question of a command and control grouping. The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit. This grouping is usually foreseen as temporary, but depending on the causes of the weakness, it could be for years. The "under command" unit does not give up its capbadges, MOC training, nor anything important like that. What it gains is the support of a functioning command and control structure than can provide all the "life support" functions that keep a Res unit healthy and functioning. And, let's face it, 80% of those functions have little or nothing to do with MOC or capbadge.

In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks.

Personally, I have come to believe that this is the way ahead for the Army Res: it is just getting far too difficult to grow unit-level leadership. You need a deep and healthy gene pool, not a little puddle of 50 people, from which to truly be able to select the best, and keep on selecting them over years and decades. Where this not possible because of demographics and local economics, units have been struggling and in some cases gradually shrivelling and dying, as troops without effective leaders simply stop coming down to train, thus further attriting the unit and further reducing the pool from which to draw potential leaders. It can be a death spiral.

Making things worse, we are now demanding so much of our senior Res leaders that fewer and fewer suitable people can actually find the time to do it. After all, a Res officer/NCO has a family, a job, possibly ongoing post graduate or professional education, and perhaps other commitments as well.  While I was COS 38 CBG, I attended a USARNG event in Minnesota with my Comd. His ARNG peers were shocked to realize how many days a year he was giving to commanding his CBG and all the myriad of activities that entails. Our Res unit COs face very similar demands, as guys like dglad can readily tell us.

The old model has gradually been running down for years (it was not much better off when I joined the Militia in 1974: I read exactly the same complaints on these pages today as we had 33 years ago...) and now in some places it is failing altogether. We have to preserve what is good and useful about our Army Res system, but get on with developing something that will survive and regenerate itself, with the best people leading our troops. The "last man standing" approach to promotion is a guarantee for continuing decline.

Cheers

 

[McG]

The way I understand the process of "tactical grouping", the weaker of the two units (ie the one that can't produce enough leadership to run itself and train its troops properly) is placed under command of the stronger unit.

That is how I always saw it done (but I'm going back half a decade now).  At the time, there were often complaints from those in the "under command" unit that they were often given second class treatment in that there was a perception that good courses & tasks went to those in the "commanding" unit.

I don't know it the preferential treatment were real or if it were just perception, but it is a problem either way.

I suspect the problem could be mitigated if the HQ were shared.  If units are close, one location could be selected for HQ pers to commute to.  If units are far apart then the HQ learns to work with MSN messenger, VOIP, mIRC, and other electronic conversation/conferencing tools.

 

[vangemeren]

So what happens to 26 Service battalion? They have their HQ in North Bay, but one of its coys is located in Sault Ste Marie.

...In 38 CBG we launched two of these (one for our Arty units, one for our three Svc Bns) and I was recently informed of at least one more that is now under way in that CBG. These tactical groupings are more likely to happen in a command like 38 CBG where regional and local demographics can make it very, very difficult to recruit, retain and develop officers and NCOs past Lt/Sgt, but there are adequate numbers of young Canadians willing to join and serve a few years as junior ranks.  ...

Do you think think that all the units in North Eastern Ontario (26 Service, 2nd Irish, 49th, and the Algonquins) will be "tactically grouped" together?

 

[pbi]

I have no real idea of what will happen in 33 CBG: it depends on the local conditions, the will of the Bde Comd, the cooperation of the COs and units and the support of the Honoraries. Fortunately in 38 CBG we had all of these things when we set up the Arty Tac Gp and the Svc Bn Tac Gp.  The way we handled the detached company of 16 Svc Bn (located in Saskatoon, with Bn HQ in Regina) was not to change anything much at all. We just treated it like a sub-sub-sub unit (it was barely parading a platoon anyway, so there was no loss of resources, etc). Same for the detached field batteries in Prince Albert and Portage La Prairie: they were treated as sub-sub-units of their parent units (which were really functioning as sub-units within the 38 CBG Arty Tac Gp). 116 Ind Bty in Kenora  was treated as a sub-unit, because it had been an independent unit in its own right before the tactical group happened: it had no parent RHQ. Maybe 33 CBG wil do something similar: I can't speak for them.

Cheers

 

[pbi]

I recently attended the Canadian Infantry Association Conference in Edmonton. Amongst various topics for study/presentation by working groups, was the TDBG concept and where the Infantry might fit into it. I was a member of the TDBG working group-the other members were all Res. Although we had some interesting discussions, I came away with the following impressions:

-The concept is not well understood. While most people seem to understand that the TDBG represents very little (or no...) real change to the strength and organization of Res units, and little diversion from the warfighting focus of training, others believe very strongly that there will be re-groupings, extensive new kit (with a "dom ops" flavour) and training focused on dom ops. I don't think that we are all on the same sheet here, at all;

-I don't know if the Army actually knows what it wants to achieve with creating TDBGs, as opposed to just improving the existing CBG-based system for Res force generation in civil emergencies. Nor is it clear that the staff who drafted the TDBG concept were familiar with the extent to which various LFA's have already written the Res into their domops CONPLANS. In some ways, I think the TDBG concept has already been overtaken by reality;

-I'm not clear on the expectations about TDBGs being a source of force generation for deployed ops. The "party line" seems to be that this isn't the intent, but some discussion pointed out that this might actually be a consideration. Again, I don't see where TDBG would really be any significant improvement over the current CBG-based system, unless we are going to give units fully manned BORs, QMs full of deployment kit, and Med/Dent/Chap folks to do DAGs; and

-I think that the "D" in TDBG is causing problems of interpretation: some folks clearly have confused "dom ops" (the apparent focus of TDBG) with "continental defence ops"  which  doesn't really seem to form part of the TDBG concept, but which some are taking to be the actual mission.

Cheers

 

[Harris]

As I'm scheduled to be one of the Coy Comd for my local TDBG (at least that's what we're still calling it), I've gotten a bit of the brief.  Basically my Unit will see an increase of one full time person.  In our case that will be the Coy 2IC.  This will be a B or B/A (I forget which) from within the Brigade.  Otherwise all of my Units troops involved will be the same troops doing Unit trg.  Currently the following trg is scheduled above and beyond Unit trg:  2X Recce wknds for Commanders, 2X PD Trg wknds for Sect Comd and up and 2X FTX wknds for the entire Org.  I fully expect that to change between now and Sept.

 

[pbi]

The training regime you describe is pretty similar to what was discussed in our WG, and what seems to be in place elsewhere. There was good consensus that as Res units have little enough time to train for their primary military tasks, we must reduce time spent on dom-ops mission specific trg to training those key leaders and LOs who need to know enough to deal effectivelly (and legally) with civil authorities, and then maybe one annual ex for the troops. Nobody wanted to see a return to tht "snakes and ladders" of the 1960's.

Cheers

 

[sgtdixon]

Young Troop Straying out of his lane, but with a pertinent question.

This Year, 41CBG Managed to recruit, in Edmonton, 45 new Members, 15 of which will be joining B Sqn SALH, the BG also ran a Higschool co-op BMQ SQ, that saw close to half the Troops release after SQ as "they only wanted to try the army", coupled with the LER's Releasing 55 No Hook, SQ Qual'd Only troops, that leaves you a fair number of people who are now out or on their way out of the PRes Orginization.

So where do all these troops come from to fill out these new re-orgs and so on.

IMHO, and Very Humble at that, based on what I have seen, Why are we not Concentrating on Training the Soldier rather than Slapping down new letter heads on everything we can, I mean, we can get the troops in the door, polish em through BMQ then SQ... but then it stalls and languishes, DP1's abd BIQ's get binned for lack of instrs (Understandably, all the instrs are heading back to or are in the sandbox right now). The Same is happening at the JNCO and SNCO level with men and women with many years of experience leaving because theres either, No challenge, No Motivation or their Unit is being poorly run and its MLOC after ELOC after IBTS after BTS weekend.

My very Naive .2 bits


Now If youll excuse me, a run and packing for DP1 which i found out is back on, awaits.

Dixon

 

[geo]

Fabled Regiment could suffer mortal blow
John Ivison, National Post
Published: Friday, May 02, 2008
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada survived the mud of the Somme and the pebble beaches of Dieppe but concerns are being raised that one of this country's most storied regiments might not be around to celebrate its 100th anniversary in two years because of a drive to merge it with another Winnipeg reserve infantry unit.

In the First World War, Captain Robert Shankland was awarded the Victoria Cross for service in the unit. In the Second World War, it was one of two Canadian regiments that landed on the beaches of Dieppe, where 76 of its number were killed.

Yet, the Canadian Forces believe the regiment's failure to recruit soldiers has reduced its strength to untenable levels. Under a process known as "tactical grouping," it is proposed that the Camerons effectively merge with another unit of 38 Canadian Brigade Group in Winnipeg. The Camerons already form part of 38 CBG's combat capability but the regiment has operated as a standalone unit to this point.

The St. Andrews Society of Winnipeg, which has close ties to the Camerons, has written to General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, expressing its concerns that the regiment has been barred from recruiting new members and that the commanding officer and regimental sergeant-major have been removed to serve with another reserve group, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles.

A letter from Vernon Ness, president of the St. Andrews Society, quoted a member of the Camerons' advisory board, who complained to the commanding officer of the 38 CBG: "We are banned from recruiting, and if we did, there would not be the budget to pay the salaries of the new members. If we got them, there would be insufficient qualified personnel to train them."

Mr. Ness said the Camerons are being penalized for contributing to the Canadian army's operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. "The support given to the Canadian army by providing soldiers for overseas postings over the last several years, while applauded then, now earns criticism because of the reduced numbers in the regiment. [This] in turn, is partially caused by the Camerons' success in providing those volunteers. It sounds to us like they are being punished for doing their job well," he said.

Mr. Ness said his Society intends to work diligently to prevent the demise of the regiment, whose Colonel-in-Chief is Prince Philip.

Colonel Robert Poirier, commander of the 38 Canadian Brigade Group, said the decline in the number of trained officers has made it difficult to conduct adequate training. The Camerons have serious gaps in senior and junior leadership, while the Royal Winnipeg Rifles lack top-level leadership, he said.

"Since the Camerons of Canada and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles are both infantry units and reside at the same location, Minto Armoury, it was a logical decision to invoke time and energy-saving measures to improve the training and capacity within these units, solidifying the leadership focus and direction," he said.

The commanding officer and regimental sergeant-major of the merged units come from the Winnipeg Rifles but Col. Poirier said that in future, they may be Camerons. He said there has been no downsizing, changes to existing structures or reclassification of the Camerons of Canada.

Bill Blaikie, the NDP MP from Winnipeg, was a Cameron Highlander from 1967 to 1972 and said he would be very sad if the regiment disappeared. "I don't think it's necessary if proper recruiting takes place."

He said he fears the same fate awaits the Camerons as met the Winnipeg Grenadiers, which faced severe cutbacks before being placed on the supplementary order of battle in 1965. This alternative to disbandment is a list of regiments whose existence is deemed no longer relevant.

The Camerons' history goes back to 1910, when the regiment was formed as the 79th Highlanders of Canada by descendants of the original Selkirk Settlers from Scotland. During the First World War, the Camerons served with distinction at Ypres, the Somme and Passchendaele, where Capt. Shankland won his Victoria Cross for repulsing an enemy counter-attack after capturing a strategic position.
 

 

[McG]

Under a process known as "tactical grouping," it is proposed that the Camerons effectively merge with another unit of 38 Canadian Brigade Group in Winnipeg.

We went through this same emotional silliness in the media about the Brockville Rifles last year.  It is not helpful to the needs of the Army.

Where there are two infantry regiments both operating out of the same Minto Armouries, why should we waste resources providing each of them a seperate Bn HQ when combined they do not add up to a Bn?  The existence of a cap badge does not independently justify the need for a full unit structure.

Tactical Groupings make sense.  One battalion with the sub units wearing different capbadges.

 

[McG]

Here is a whole thread supporting tactical groupings: http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/25713.0.html

 

[Ex Ranger Instructor]

I would suggest going even further: amalgamate all the Reserve units (all types) in a particular geographical area to form Reserve Battle Groups.  One HQ, one CO, one shared pool of resources, and the different sub units can retain their distinctive dress if they wish.

 

 

[geo]

Heh... IMHO, they should consider forming a NEW Regiment that does not have the hsitorical/political baggage of the former.
Assign coy names that in themselves will perpetuate the old former Battalions.

Eg: new unit....
The Ping Pong Fusiliers of Winnipeg
A Coy, Camerons
B Coy, Devils
C Coy, Grenadiers

Time to think about reducing the units to NIL Strength and starting anew.....

 

[McG]

I would suggest going even further ... 

Go read the other thread.  That is exactly what was proposed.

 

[geo]

The problem with retaining distinctive dress is that, as an example
Maj Soandso the OC of A Coy Camerons is moved to C Coy Grenadiers.... so in your scenario, he'd have to change all his uniforms
WO Bloggins is a Pl WO in C Coy Grenadiers - is moved to A Coy Camerons.... so WO Bloggins has to start wearing a Kilt... and the works....

It would be 100% impossible to manage such a structure.... IMHO

 

[Infanteer]

Get rid of 'em all and make a new unit.  Nobody recruited after that point would give a shit and the new unit would make it's own history.  Time to quit tieing our hand behind our back because of emotional ties to something doesn't exist (mobilized battalions of the reserve going to war).

 

[vonGarvin]

Get rid of 'em all and make a new unit.  Nobody recruited after that point would give a shit and the new unit would make it's own history.  Time to quit tieing our hand behind our back because of emotional ties to something doesn't exist (mobilized battalions of the reserve going to war).

Agreed.  Though history and tradition are important, throwing good money after bad isn't worth it.  Amalgamate the units if need be, preserve the characteristics and/or traditions that pay proper respect to those units, but in the end, a "unit" with a few soldiers is indeed wasteful.  Both in time and in effort.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The Brits do it all the time, with more famed Regiments:

http://www.army.mod.uk/rac/main_battle_tanks/royal_scots_dragoon_guards.htm

Brief History of The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards
The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards are Scotland's senior Regiment and her only Regiment of cavalry.  The Regiment was formed in 1971, as a result of the amalgamation of two very distinguished Regiments; The Royal Scots Greys and the 3rd Carabiniers.  The 3rd Carabiniers themselves constituted from the 1922 amalgamation of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards). 

I've spent the odd occasion with these guys and there is never any untoward talk or animosity of the amalgamated units. They just carry on with business as usual.

 

[The Bread Guy]

And even famouser....
http://www.army.mod.uk/blackwatch/

now The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS)